Why States Should Enact Laws To Challenge & Overturn Supreme Courts Abortion & Gay Marriage Decisions In October of 2015, Kansas v Carr, a case involving a particularly heinous crime cam…
Why States Should Enact Laws To Challenge & Overturn Supreme Courts Abortion & Gay Marriage Decisions
Why States Should Enact Laws To Challenge & Overturn Supreme Courts Abortion & Gay Marriage Decisions
Why States Should Enact Laws To Challenge & Overturn Supreme Courts Abortion & Gay Marriage Decisions
In October of 2015, Kansas v Carr, a case involving a particularly heinous crime came up before the supreme court. The Supreme Court of Kansas vacated the death sentences passed down by a Kansas jury. The reason was the trial violated the Eighth Amendment Rights of the Constitution of the United States. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsberg, Breyer and Alito. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.
Scalia Opinion of Court:
The Supreme Court of Kansas vacated the death sentences of Sidney Gleason and brothers Reginald and Jona – than Carr. Gleason killed one of his co-conspirators and her boyfriend to cover up the robbery of an elderly man. The Carrs’ notorious Wichita crime spree culminated in the brutal rape, robbery, kidnapping, and execution-style shooting of five young men and women. We first consider whether the Constitution required the sentencing courts to instruct the juries that mitigating circumstances “need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” And second, 2 KANSAS v. CARR Opinion of the Court whether the Constitution required severance of the Carrs’ joint sentencing proceedings. It is improper to vacate a death sentence based on pure “speculation” of fundamental unfairness, “rather than reasoned judgment,” Romano , supra , at 13–14.
Only the most extravagant speculation would lead to the conclusion that the supposedly prejudicial evidence rendered the Carr brothers’ joint sentencing proceeding fundamentally unfair. It is beyond reason to think that the jury’s death verdicts were caused by the identification of Reginald as the “corrupter” or of Jonathan as the “corrupted,” the jury’s viewing of Reginald’s handcuffs, or the sister’s re-tracted statement that Reginald fired the final shots. None of that mattered. What these defendants did—acts of almost inconceivable cruelty and depravity—was described in excruciating detail by Holly, who relived with the jury, for two days, the Wichita Massacre. The joint sentencing proceedings did not render the sentencing proceedings fundamentally unfair.
Sotomayor’s dissent :
I respectfully dissent because I do not believe these cases should ever have been reviewed by the Supreme Court. I see no reason to intervene in cases like these— and plenty of reasons not to. Kansas has not violated any federal constitutional right. If anything, the State has overprotected its citizens based on its interpretation of state and federal law. For reasons ably articulated by my predecessors and colleagues and because I worry that cases like these prevent States from serving as necessary laboratories for experimenting with how best to guarantee defendants a fair trial, I would dismiss the writs as improvidently granted…
The cases here demonstrate yet another cost of granting certiorari to correct a state court’s overprotection of federal rights: In explaining that the Federal Constitution does not protect some particular right, it is natural to buttress the conclusion by explaining why that right is not very important. In so doing, the Court risks discouraging States from adopting valuable procedural protections even as a matter of their own state law. [formatting mine]
Sotomayor is wrong. This explanation is essential and affords the needed protection of states rights. In Roe v. Wade (abortion) the states’ rights of protecting the unborn are being discouraged yet there is no adequate explanation of how the life of an unborn child is not protected by the constitution. In Obergefell et al v. Hodges, Director, Ohio (homosexual marriage) there is no explanation of why the Constitution requires the practice of homosexual marriage, which is contrary to the religious beliefs of many of our citizens and legitimizes and encourages the practice of sodomy despite the fact the Center for Disease Control and Prevention has found that the homosexual subculture is less than 2% of the population yet accounts for 72% of the HIV cases.
States should keep passing laws that challenge both Roe v. Wade and Obergefell v. Hodges as violating the Constitution demanding why protecting the right of the Unborn Child and Traditional Marriage are not guaranteed by the Constitution. The decisions do not explain how these rights can be over-ridden by the two decisions.
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2015 1
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
KANSAS v. CARR
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS
No. 14–449. Argued October 7, 2015—Decided January 20, 2016*
A Kansas jury sentenced respondent Sidney Gleason to death for killing a co-conspirator and her boyfriend to cover up the robbery of an elderly man.
A Kansas jury sentenced respondents Reginald and Jonathan Carr, brothers, to death after a joint sentencing proceeding. Respondents were convicted of various charges stemming from a notorious crime spree that culminated in the brutal rape, robbery, kidnaping, and execution-style shooting of five young men and women.
The Kansas Supreme Court vacated the death sentences in each case, holding that the sentencing instructions violated the Eighth Amendment by failing “to affirmatively inform the jury that mitigating circumstances need only be proved to the satisfaction of the individual juror in that juror’s sentencing decision and not beyond a reasonable doubt.” It also held that the Carrs’ Eighth Amendment right “to an individualized capital sentencing determination” was violated by the trial court’s failure to sever their sentencing proceedings.
1. The Eighth Amendment does not require capital-sentencing courts to instruct a jury that mitigating circumstances need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Pp. 8–13.
(a) Because the Kansas Supreme Court left no doubt that its ruling was based on the Federal Constitution, Gleason’s initial argument—that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear his case because the state court’s decision rested on adequate and independent state-law grounds—is rejected. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U. S. 163, 169. Pp. 8–9.
*Together with No. 14–450, Kansas v. Carr, and No. 14–452, Kansas
v. Gleason, also on certiorari to the same court.
2 KANSAS v. CARR
(b) This Court’s capital-sentencing case law does not support requiring a court to instruct a jury that mitigating circumstances need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U. S. 269, 275. Nor was such an instruction constitution- ally necessary in these particular cases to avoid confusion. Ambiguity in capital-sentencing instructions gives rise to constitutional error only if “there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence,” Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370, 380, a bar not cleared here. Even assuming that it would be unconstitutional to require the defense to prove mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the record belies the defendants’ contention that the instructions caused jurors to apply such a standard of proof here. The instructions make clear that both the existence of aggravating circumstances and the conclusion that they outweigh mitigating circumstances must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt but that mitigating circumstances must merely be “found to exist,” which does not suggest proof beyond a reasonable doubt. No juror would have reasonably speculated that “beyond a reasonable doubt” was the correct burden for mitigating circumstances. Pp. 9–13.
2. The Constitution did not require severance of the Carrs’ joint sentencing proceedings. The Eighth Amendment is inapposite when a defendant’s claim is, at bottom, that evidence was improperly admitted at a capital-sentencing proceeding. The question is whether the allegedly improper evidence “so infected the sentencing proceeding with unfairness as to render the jury’s imposition of the death penalty a denial of due process.” Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U. S. 1, 12. In light of all the evidence presented at the guilt and penalty phases relevant to the jury’s sentencing determination, the contention that the admission of mitigating evidence by one Carr brother could have “so infected” the jury’s consideration of the other’s sentence as to amount to a denial of due process is beyond the pale. The Court presumes that the jury followed its instructions to “give separate consideration to each defendant.” Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, distinguished. Joint proceedings are permissible and often preferable when the joined defendants’ criminal conduct arises out of a single chain of events. Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U. S. 402, 418. Limiting instructions, like those given in the Carrs’ proceeding, “often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice,” Zafiro v. United States, 506 U. S. 534, 539, that might arise from codefendants’ “antagonistic” mitigation theories, id., at 538. It is improper to vacate a death sentence based on pure “speculation” of fundamental unfairness, “rather than reasoned judgment.” Romano, supra, at 13–14. Only the most extravagant speculation would lead to the conclusion that any sup Cite as: 577 U. S. ____ (2016) 3
posedly prejudicial evidence rendered the Carr brothers’ joint sentencing proceeding fundamentally unfair when their acts of almost inconceivable cruelty and depravity were described in excruciating detail by the sole survivor, who, for two days, relived the Wichita Massacre with the jury. Pp. 13–17.
No. 14–449, 300 Kan. 340, 329 P. 3d 1195; No. 14–450, 300 Kan. 1, 331 P. 3d 544; and No. 14–452, 299 Kan. 1127, 329 P. 3d 1102, reversed and remanded.
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, G INSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 14–449, 14–450, and 14–452
JONATHAN D. CARR
REGINALD DEXTER CARR, JR.
SIDNEY J. GLEASON
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS
[January 20, 2016]
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Supreme Court of Kansas vacated the death sentences of Sidney Gleason and brothers Reginald and Jonathan Carr. Gleason killed one of his co-conspirators and her boyfriend to cover up the robbery of an elderly man. The Carrs’ notorious Wichita crime spree culminated in the brutal rape, robbery, kidnaping, and execution-style shooting of five young men and women. We first consider whether the Constitution required the sentencing courts to instruct the juries that mitigating circumstances “need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” And second, whether the Constitution required severance of the Carrs’ joint sentencing proceedings.
Less than one month after Sidney Gleason was paroled from his sentence for attempted voluntary manslaughter, he joined a conspiracy to rob an elderly man at knifepoint. Gleason and a companion “cut up” the elderly man to get $10 to $35 and a box of cigarettes. 299 Kan. 1127, 1136, 329 P. 3d 1102, 1115 (2014). Fearing that their female co-conspirators would snitch, Gleason and his cousin, Damien Thompson, set out to kill co-conspirator Mikiala Martinez. Gleason shot and killed Martinez’s boyfriend, and then Gleason and Thompson drove Martinez to a rural location, where Thompson strangled her for five minutes and then shot her in the chest, Gleason standing by and providing the gun for the final shot.
The State ultimately charged Gleason with capital murder for killing Martinez and her boyfriend, first-degree premeditated murder of the boyfriend, aggravating kidnaping of Martinez, attempted first-degree murder and aggravated robbery of the elderly man, and criminal possession of a firearm. He was convicted on all counts except the attempted first-degree murder charge. Id., at 1134– 1135, 1146, 329 P. 3d, at 1114, 1120. The jury also found that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of four aggravating circumstances and unanimously agreed to a sentence of death. Id., at 1146–1147, 329 P. 3d, at 1120–1121.
In December 2000, brothers Reginald and Jonathan
Carr set out on a crime spree culminating in the Wichita Massacre. On the night of December 7, Reginald Carr and an unknown man carjacked Andrew Schreiber, held a gun to his head, and forced him to make cash withdrawals at various ATMs.
On the night of December 11, the brothers followed Linda Ann Walenta, a cellist for the Wichita symphony, home from orchestra practice. One of them approached her vehicle and said he needed help. When she rolled down her window, he pointed a gun at her head. When she shifted into reverse to escape, he shot her three times, ran back to his brother’s car, and fled the scene. One of the gunshots severed Walenta’s spine, and she died one month later as a result of her injuries.
On the night of December 14, the brothers burst into a triplex at 12727 Birchwood, where roommates Jason, Brad, and Aaron lived. Jason’s girlfriend, Holly, and Heather, a friend of Aaron’s, were also in the house. Armed with handguns and a golf club, the brothers forced all five into Jason’s bedroom. They demanded that they strip naked and later ordered them into the bedroom closet. They took Holly and Heather from the bedroom, demanded that they perform oral sex and digitally penetrate each other as the Carrs looked on and barked orders. They forced each of the men to have sex with Holly and then with Heather. They yelled that the men would be shot if they could not have sex with the women, so Holly— fearing for Jason’s life—performed oral sex on him in the closet before he was ordered out by the brothers.
Jonathan then snatched Holly from the closet. He ordered that she digitally penetrate herself. He set his
gun between her knees on the floor. And he raped her.
Then he raped Heather.
Reginald took Brad, Jason, Holly, and Aaron one-by-one to various ATMs to withdraw cash. When the victims returned to the house, their torture continued. Holly urinated in the closet because of fright. Jonathan found an engagement ring hidden in the bedroom that Jason was keeping as a surprise for Holly. Pointing his gun at Jason, he had Jason identify the ring while Holly was sitting nearby in the closet. Then Reginald took Holly from the closet, said he was not going to shoot her yet, and raped her on the dining-room floor strewn with boxes of Christmas decorations. He forced her to turn around, ejaculated into her mouth, and forced her to swallow. In a nearby bathroom, Jonathan again raped Heather and then again raped Holly.
At 2 a.m.—three hours after the mayhem began—the brothers decided it was time to leave the house. They attempted to put all five victims in the trunk of Aaron’s Honda Civic. Finding that they would not all fit, they jammed the three young men into the trunk. They directed Heather to the front of the car and Holly to Jason’s pickup truck, driven by Reginald. Once the vehicles arrived at a snow-covered field, they instructed Jason and Brad, still naked, and Aaron to kneel in the snow. Holly cried, “Oh, my God, they’re going to shoot us.” Holly and Heather were then ordered to kneel in the snow. Holly went to Jason’s side; Heather, to Aaron.
Holly heard the first shot, heard Aaron plead with the brothers not to shoot, heard the second shot, heard the screams, heard the third shot, and the fourth. She felt the blow of the fifth shot to her head, but remained kneeling. They kicked her so she would fall face-first into the snow and ran her over in the pickup truck. But she survived, because a hair clip she had fastened to her hair that night deflected the bullet. She went to Jason, took off her sweater, the only scrap of clothing the brothers had let her wear, and tied it around his head to stop the bleeding from his eye. She rushed to Brad, then Aaron, and then Heather.
Spotting a house with white Christmas lights in the distance, Holly started running toward it for help—naked, skull shattered, and without shoes, through the snow and over barbed-wire fences. Each time a car passed on the nearby road, she feared it was the brothers returning and camouflaged herself by lying down in the snow. She made it to the house, rang the doorbell, knocked. A man opened the door, and she relayed as quickly as she could the events of the night to him, and minutes later to a 911 dispatcher, fearing that she would not live.
Holly lived, and retold this play-by-play of the night’s events to the jury. Investigators also testified that the brothers returned to the Birchwood house after leaving the five friends for dead, where they ransacked the place for valuables and (for good measure) beat Holly’s dog, Nikki, to death with a golf club.
The State charged each of the brothers with more than 50 counts, including murder, rape, sodomy, kidnaping, burglary, and robbery, and the jury returned separate guilty verdicts. It convicted Reginald of one count of kidnaping, aggravated robbery, aggravated battery, and criminal damage to property for the Schreiber carjacking, and one count of first-degree felony murder for the Walenta shooting. Jonathan was acquitted of all counts related to the Schreiber carjacking but convicted of first-degree felony murder for the Walenta shooting. For the Birchwood murders, the jury convicted each brother of 4 counts of capital murder, 1 count of attempted first-degree murder, 5 counts of aggravated kidnaping, 9 counts of aggravated robbery, 20 counts of rape or attempted rape, 3 counts of aggravated criminal sodomy, 1 count each of aggravated burglary and burglary, 1 count of theft, and 1 count of cruelty to animals. The jury also convicted Reginald of three counts of unlawful possession of a firearm. 300 Kan. 1, 15–16, 331 P. 3d 544, 573–574 (2014).
The State sought the death penalty for each of the four Birchwood murders, and the brothers were sentenced together. The State relied on the guilt-phase evidence, including Holly’s two days of testimony, as evidence of four aggravating circumstances: that the defendants knowingly or purposely killed or created a great risk of death to more than one person; that they committed the crimes for the purpose of receiving money or items of monetary value; that they committed the crimes to prevent arrest or pro- secution; and that they committed the crimes in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. Id., at 258–259, 331 P. 3d, at 708. After hearing each brother’s case for mitigation, the jury issued separate verdicts of death for Reginald and Jonathan. It found unanimously that the State proved the existence of the four aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and that those aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, justifying four separate verdicts of death for each brother for the murders of Jason, Brad, Aaron, and Heather. App. in No. 14–449 etc., pp. 461–492.
The Kansas Supreme Court vacated the death penalties in both cases. It held that the instructions used in both Gleason’s and the Carrs’ sentencing violated the Eighth Amendment because they “failed to affirmatively inform the jury that mitigating circumstances need only be proved to the satisfaction of the individual juror in that juror’s sentencing decision and not beyond a reasonable doubt.” 299 Kan., at 1196, 329 P. 3d, at 1147 (Gleason); 300 Kan., at 303, 331 P. 3d, at 733 (Reginald Carr); 300 Kan. 340, 369–370, 329 P. 3d 1195, 1213 (2014) (Jonathan Carr). Without that instruction, according to the court, the jury “was left to speculate as to the correct burden of proof for mitigating circumstances, and reasonable jurors might have believed they could not consider mitigating circumstances not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” 299 Kan., at 1197, 329 P. 3d, at 1148. This, the court concluded, might have caused jurors to exclude relevant mitigating evidence from their consideration. Ibid.
The Kansas Supreme Court also held that the Carrs’ death sentences had to be vacated because of the trial court’s failure to sever their sentencing proceedings, thereby violating the brothers’ Eighth Amendment right “to an individualized capital sentencing determination.”
300 Kan., at 275, 331 P. 3d, at 717; 300 Kan., at 368, 329 P. 3d, at 1212. According to the court, the joint trial “inhibited the jury’s individualized consideration of [Jonathan] because of family characteristics tending to demonstrate future dangerousness that he shared with his brother”; and his brother’s visible handcuffs prejudiced the jury’s consideration of his sentence. 300 Kan., at 275, 331 P. 3d, at 717. As for Reginald, he was prejudiced, according to the Kansas Supreme Court, by Jonathan’s portrayal of him as the corrupting older brother. Id., at 276, 331 P. 3d, at 717. Moreover, Reginald was prejudiced by his brother’s cross-examination of their sister, who testified that she thought Reginald had admitted to her that he was the shooter. Id., at 279, 331 P. 3d, at 719. (She later backtracked and testified, “‘I don’t remember who was, you know, shot by who[m].’” Ibid.) The Kansas Supreme Court opined that the presumption that the jury followed its instructions to consider each defendant separately was “defeated by logic.” Id., at 280, 331 P. 3d, at 719. “[T]he defendants’ joint upbringing in the maelstrom that was their family and their influence on and interactions with one another . . . simply was not amenable to orderly separation and analysis.” Ibid., 331 P. 3d, at 719–720. The Kansas Supreme Court found itself unable to “say that the death verdict was unattributable, at least in part, to this error.” Id., at 282, 331 P. 3d, at 720. We granted certiorari. 575 U. S. ___ (2015).
We first turn to the Kansas Supreme Court’s contention that the Eighth Amendment required these capitalsentencing courts to instruct the jury that mitigating circumstances need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Before considering the merits of that contention, we consider Gleason’s challenge to our jurisdiction. According to Gleason, the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision rests on adequate and independent state-law grounds. This argument is a familiar one. We rejected it in Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U. S. 163, 169 (2006). Like the defendant in that case, Gleason urges that the decision below rests only on a rule of Kansas law announced in State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 40 P. 3d 139 (2001) (per curiam)—a rule later reiterated in State v. Scott, 286 Kan. 54, 183 P. 3d 801 (2008) ( per curiam). As we stated in Marsh, “Kleypas, itself, rested on federal law.” 548 U. S., at 169. So too does the relevant passage of Scott, which rested on Kleypas’s discussion of the constitutional rule that jurors need not agree on mitigating circumstances. See Scott, supra, at 106–107, 183 P. 3d, at 837–838. The Kansas Supreme Court’s opinion in this case acknowledged as much, saying that “statements from Kleypas implicate the broader Eighth Amendment principle prohibiting barriers that preclude a sentencer’s consideration of all relevant mitigating evidence.” 299 Kan., at 1195, 329 P. 3d, at 1147.
The Kansas Supreme Court’s opinion leaves no room for doubt that it was relying on the Federal Constitution. It stated that the instruction it required “protects a capital defendant’s Eighth Amendment right to individualized sentencing,” that the absence of the instruction “implicat[ed] Gleason’s right to individualized sentencing under the Eighth Amendment,” and that vacatur of Gleason’s death sentence was the “[c]onsequen[ce]” of Eighth Amendment error. Id., at 1196–1197, 329 P. 3d, at 1147–1148 (emphasis added).
For this reason, the criticism leveled by the dissent is misdirected. It generally would have been “none of our business” had the Kansas Supreme Court vacated Gleason’s and the Carrs’ death sentences on state-law grounds. Marsh, 548 U. S., at 184 (SCALIA, J., concurring). But it decidedly did not. And when the Kansas Supreme Court time and again invalidates death sentences because it says the Federal Constitution requires it, “review by this Court, far from undermining state autonomy, is the only possible way to vindicate it.” Ibid. “When we correct a state court’s federal errors, we return power to the State, and to its people.” Ibid. The state courts may experiment all they want with their own constitutions, and often do in the wake of this Court’s decisions. See Sutton, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez And Its Aftermath, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1963, 1971–1977 (2008). But what a state court cannot do is experiment with our Federal Constitution and expect to elude this Court’s review so long as victory goes to the criminal defendant. “Turning a blind eye” in such cases “would change the uniform ‘law of the land’ into a crazy quilt.” Marsh, supra, at 185. And it would enable state courts to blame the unpopular death-sentence reprieve of the most horrible criminals upon the Federal Constitution when it is in fact their own doing.
We turn, then, to the merits of the Kansas Supreme Court’s conclusion that the Eighth Amendment requires capital-sentencing courts in Kansas “to affirmatively inform the jury that mitigating circumstances need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” 299 Kan., at 1197, 329 P. 3d, at 1148.
Approaching the question in the abstract, and without reference to our capital-sentencing case law, we doubt whether it is even possible to apply a standard of proof to the mitigating-factor determination (the so-called “selection phase” of a capital-sentencing proceeding). It is possible to do so for the aggravating-factor determination (the so-called “eligibility phase”), because that is a purely factual determination. The facts justifying death set forth in the Kansas statute either did or did not exist—and one can require the finding that they did exist to be made beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether mitigation exists, however, is largely a judgment call (or perhaps a value call); what one juror might consider mitigating another might not. And of course the ultimate question whether mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances is mostly a question of mercy—the quality of which, as we know, is not strained. It would mean nothing, we think, to tell the jury that the defendants must deserve mercy beyond a reasonable doubt; or must morelikely-than-not deserve it. It would be possible, of course, to instruct the jury that the facts establishing mitigating circumstances need only be proved by a preponderance, leaving the judgment whether those facts are indeed mitigating, and whether they outweigh the aggravators, to the jury’s discretion without a standard of proof. If we were to hold that the Constitution requires the mitigatingfactor determination to be divided into its factual component and its judgmental component, and the former to be accorded a burden-of-proof instruction, we doubt whether that would produce anything but jury confusion. In the last analysis, jurors will accord mercy if they deem it appropriate, and withhold mercy if they do not, which is what our case law is designed to achieve.
In any event, our case law does not require capital sentencing courts “to affirmatively inform the jury that mitigating circumstances need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ibid. In Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U. S. 269 (1998), we upheld a death sentence even though the trial court “failed to provide the jury with express guidance on the concept of mitigation.” Id., at 275. Likewise in Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U. S. 225 (2000), we reaffirmed that the Court has “never held that the State must structure in a particular way the manner in which juries consider mitigating evidence” and rejected the contention that it was constitutionally deficient to instruct jurors to “‘consider a mitigating circumstance if you find there is evidence to support it,’” without additional guidance. Id., at 232–233.
Equally unavailing is the contention that even if an instruction that mitigating evidence need not be “proven beyond a reasonable doubt” is not always required, it was constitutionally necessary in these cases to avoid confusion. Ambiguity in capital-sentencing instructions gives rise to constitutional error only if “there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.” Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370, 380 (1990) (emphasis added). The alleged confusion stemming from the jury instructions used at the defendants’ sentencings does not clear that bar. A meager “possibility” of confusion is not enough. Ibid. As an initial matter, the defendants’ argument rests on the assumption that it would be unconstitutional to require the defense to prove mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Assuming without deciding that that is the case, the record belies the defendants’ contention that the instructions caused jurors to apply that standard of proof. The defendants focus upon the following instruction: “The State has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there are one or more aggravating circumstances and that they are not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances found to exist.” App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 14–452, p. 133 (Instr. 8). The juxtaposition of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, so goes the argument, caused the jury to speculate that mitigating circumstances must also be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 299 Kan., at 1197, 329 P. 3d, at 1148. It seems to us quite the opposite. The instruction makes clear that both the existence of aggravating circumstances and the conclusion that they outweigh mitigating circumstances must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; mitigating circumstances themselves, on the other hand, must merely be “found to exist.” That same description, mitigating circumstances “found to exist,” is contained in three other instructions, App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 14–452, at 133 (Instrs. 7, 9, and 10) (emphasis added)—unsurprisingly, since it recites the Kansas statute, see Kan. Stat. Ann. §21–4624(e) (1995). “Found to exist” certainly does not suggest proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The instructions as a whole distinguish clearly between aggravating and mitigating circumstances: “The State has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there are one or more aggravating circumstances . . . ,” and the jury must decide unanimously that the State met that burden. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 14–452, at 133 (Instrs. 8 and 10) (emphasis added). “Mitigating circumstances,” on the other hand, “do not need to be found by all members of the jury” to “be considered by an individual juror in arriving at his or her sentencing decision.” Id., at 131 (Instr. 7). Not once do the instructions say that defense counsel bears the
burden of proving the facts constituting a mitigating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt—nor would that make much sense, since one of the mitigating circumstances is (curiously) “mercy,” which simply is not a fac- tual determination.
We reject the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision that jurors were “left to speculate as to the correct burden of proof for mitigating circumstances.” 299 Kan., at 1197, 329 P. 3d, at 1148. For the reasons we have described, no juror would reasonably have speculated that mitigating circumstances must be proved by any particular standard, let alone beyond a reasonable doubt. The reality is that jurors do not “pars[e] instructions for subtle shades of meaning in the same way that lawyers might.” Boyde, supra, at 381. The instructions repeatedly told the jurors to consider any mitigating factor, meaning any aspect of the defendants’ background or the circumstances of their offense. Jurors would not have misunderstood these instructions to prevent their consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.
We turn next to the contention that a joint capitalsentencing proceeding in the Carrs’ cases violated the defendants’ Eighth Amendment right to an “individualized sentencing determination.” 300 Kan., at 276, 331 P. 3d, at 717.
The Kansas Supreme Court agreed with the defendants that, because of the joint sentencing proceeding, one defendant’s mitigating evidence put a thumb on death’s scale for the other, in violation of the other’s Eighth Amendment rights. Ibid. It accepted Reginald’s contention that he was prejudiced by his brother’s portrayal of him as the corrupting older brother. And it agreed that Reginald was prejudiced by his brother’s cross-examination of their sister, who equivocated about whether Reginald admitted to her that he was the shooter. (Reginald has all but abandoned that implausible theory of prejudice before this Court and contends only that the State “likely would not have introduced any such testimony” had he been sentenced alone. Brief for Respondent in No. 14–450, p. 34, n. 3.) Jonathan asserted that he was prejudiced by evidence associating him with his dangerous older brother, which caused the jury to perceive him as an incurable sociopath. Both speculate that the evidence assertedly prejudicial to them would have been inadmissible in severed proceedings under Kansas law. The Kansas Supreme Court also launched a broader attack on the joint proceedings, contending that the joinder rendered it impossible for the jury to consider the Carrs’ relative moral culpability and to determine individually whether they were entitled to “mercy.” 300 Kan., at 278, 331 P. 3d, at 718–719. Whatever the merits of defendants’ procedural objections, we will not shoehorn them into the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments.” As the United States as amicus curiae intimates, the Eighth Amendment is inapposite when each defendant’s claim is, at bottom, that the jury considered evidence that would not have been admitted in a severed proceeding, and that the joint trial clouded the jury’s consideration of mitigating evidence like “mercy.” Brief for United States 24, n. 8. As we held in Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U. S. 1 (1994), it is not the role of the Eighth Amendment to establish a special “federal code of evidence” governing “the admissibility of evidence at capital sentencing proceedings.” Id., at 11–12. Rather, it is the Due Process
Clause that wards off the introduction of “unduly prejudicial” evidence that would “rende[r] the trial fundamentally unfair.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 825 (1991); see also Brown v. Sanders, 546 U. S. 212, 220–221 (2006). The test prescribed by Romano for a constitutional violation attributable to evidence improperly admitted at a capital-sentencing proceeding is whether the evidence “so infected the sentencing proceeding with unfairness as to render the jury’s imposition of the death penalty a denial of due process.” 512 U. S., at 12. The mere admission of evidence that might not otherwise have been admitted in a severed proceeding does not demand the automatic vacatur of a death sentence.
In light of all the evidence presented at the guilt and penalty phases relevant to the jury’s sentencing determination, the contention that the admission of mitigating evidence by one brother could have “so infected” the jury’s consideration of the other’s sentence as to amount to a
denial of due process is beyond the pale. To begin with, the court instructed the jury that it “must give separate consideration to each defendant,” that each was “entitled to have his sentence decided on the evidence and law which is applicable to him,” and that any evidence in the penalty phase “limited to only one defendant should not be considered by you as to the other defendant.” App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 14–450, at 501 (Instr. 3). The court gave defendant-specific instructions for aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Id., at 502–508 (Instrs. 5, 6, 7, and 8). And the court instructed the jury to consider the “individual” or “particular defendant” by using four separate verdict forms for each defendant, one for each murdered occupant of the Birchwood house. Id., at 509 (Instr. 10); App. in No. 14–449 etc., at 461–492. We presume the jury followed these instructions and considered each defendant separately when deciding to impose a sentence of death for each of the brutal murders. Romano, supra, at 13.
The contrary conclusion of the Kansas Supreme Court— that the presumption that jurors followed these instructions was “defeated by logic,” 300 Kan., at 280, 331 P. 3d, at 719—is untenable. The Carrs implausibly liken the prejudice resulting from the joint sentencing proceeding to the prejudice infecting the joint trial in Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968), where the prosecution admitted hearsay evidence of a codefendant’s confession implicating the defendant. That particular violation of the defendant’s confrontation rights, incriminating evidence of the most persuasive sort, ineradicable, as a practical matter, from the jury’s mind, justified what we have described as a narrow departure from the presumption that jurors follow their instructions, Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 207 (1987). We have declined to extend that exception, id., at 211, and have continued to apply the presumption to instructions regarding mitigating evidence in capital-sentencing proceedings, see, e.g., Weeks, 528 U. S., at 234. There is no reason to think the jury could not follow its instruction to consider the defendants separately in this case.
Joint proceedings are not only permissible but are often preferable when the joined defendants’ criminal conduct arises out of a single chain of events. Joint trial may enable a jury “to arrive more reliably at its conclusions regarding the guilt or innocence of a particular defendant and to assign fairly the respective responsibilities of each defendant in the sentencing.” Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U. S. 402, 418 (1987). That the codefendants might have “antagonistic” theories of mitigation, Zafiro v. United States, 506 U. S. 534, 538 (1993), does not suffice to overcome Kansas’s “interest in promoting the reliability and consistency of its judicial process,” Buchanan, supra, at 418. Limiting instructions, like those used in the Carrs’ sentencing proceeding, “often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice.” Zafiro, supra, at 539 (citing Richardson, supra, at 211). To forbid joinder in capital-sentencing proceedings would, perversely, increase the odds of “wanto[n] and freakis[h]” imposition of death sentences. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 206–207 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). Better that two defendants who have together committed the same crimes be placed side-by-side to have their fates determined by a single jury.
It is improper to vacate a death sentence based on pure “speculation” of fundamental unfairness, “rather than reasoned judgment,” Romano, supra, at 13–14. Only the most extravagant speculation would lead to the conclusion that the supposedly prejudicial evidence rendered the Carr brothers’ joint sentencing proceeding fundamentally unfair. It is beyond reason to think that the jury’s death verdicts were caused by the identification of Reginald as the “corrupter” or of Jonathan as the “corrupted,” the jury’s viewing of Reginald’s handcuffs, or the sister’s retracted statement that Reginald fired the final shots. None of that mattered. What these defendants did—acts of almost inconceivable cruelty and depravity—was described in excruciating detail by Holly, who relived with the jury, for two days, the Wichita Massacre. The joint sentencing proceedings did not render the sentencing proceedings fundamentally unfair.
When we granted the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari for the Carrs’ cases, we declined to review whether the Confrontation Clause, U. S. Const., Amdt. 6, requires that defendants be allowed to cross-examine witnesses whose statements are recorded in police reports referred to by the State in penalty-phase proceedings. The Kansas Supreme Court did not make the admission of those statements a basis for its vacating of the death sentences, but merely “caution[ed]” that in the resentencing proceedings these out-of-court testimonial statements should be omitted, 300 Kan., at 288, 331 P. 3d, at 724. We are confi- dent that cross-examination regarding these police reports would not have had the slightest effect upon the sen- tences. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 684 (1986).
* * *
The judgments of the Supreme Court of Kansas are reversed, and these cases are remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 14–449, 14-450, and 14–452
JONATHAN D. CARR
REGINALD DEXTER CARR, JR.
SIDNEY J. GLEASON
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS
[January 20, 2016]
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I do not believe these cases should ever have been reviewed by the Supreme Court. I see no reason to intervene in cases like these— and plenty of reasons not to. Kansas has not violated any federal constitutional right. If anything, the State has overprotected its citizens based on its interpretation of state and federal law. For reasons ably articulated by my predecessors and colleagues and because I worry that cases like these prevent States from serving as necessary laboratories for experimenting with how best to guarantee defendants a fair trial, I would dismiss the writs as improvidently granted.
In 2014, the Kansas Supreme Court vacated three death sentences—the sentences of Sidney Gleason and the Carr brothers, Reginald and Jonathan—because of constitutional errors in the penalty phases of their trials. All three men were tried under jury instructions that did not include language previously mandated by the Kansas Supreme Court. The instructions did not state that, under Kansas’ statutory scheme, mitigating circumstances need only be proven to an individual juror’s satisfaction and not beyond a reasonable doubt. 299 Kan. 1127, 1192–1197, 329 P. 3d 1102, 1145–1148 (2014) (Sidney Gleason); 300 Kan. 1, 302–303, 331 P. 3d 544, 732– 733 (2014) (Reginald Carr); 300 Kan. 340, 368–369, 329 P. 3d 1195, 1213 (2014) (Jonathan Carr). The court found that the instructions therefore both undermined Kansas’ state law and created a “reasonable likelihood that the jury . . . applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents consideration” of mitigating evidence as required by the Federal Constitution. 299 Kan., at 1191–1197, 329 P. 3d, at 1144–1148 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494
U. S. 370, 380 (1990)).
The Kansas Supreme Court also vacated the Carr brothers’ death sentences because they were jointly tried at the penalty phase. The court concluded that each brother’s particular case for mitigation compromised the other brother’s case and therefore that trying them jointly violated the Eighth Amendment right to individualized sentencing. The error was not harmless, the Kansas Supreme Court found, because an “especially damning subset” of the evidence presented might not have been admitted in separate penalty proceedings. 300 Kan., at 275–282, 331 P. 3d, at 717–720; 300 Kan., at 369–370, 329
P. 3d, at 1212.
The Kansas attorney general requested certiorari, alleging that it would best serve the State’s interest for a federal court to intervene and correct the Kansas Supreme Court. This Court complied, even though there was no suggestion that the Kansas Supreme Court had violated any federal constitutional right. The majority now reverses the Kansas Supreme Court on both points.
Even where a state court has wrongly decided an “important question of federal law,” Sup. Ct. Rule 10, we often decline to grant certiorari, instead reserving such grants for instances where the benefits of hearing a case outweigh the costs of so doing. My colleagues and predecessors have effectively set forth many of the costs of granting certiorari in cases where state courts grant relief to criminal defendants: We risk issuing opinions that, while not strictly advisory, may have little effect if a lower court is able to reinstate its holding as a matter of state law. Florida v. Powell, 559 U. S. 50, 66 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). We expend resources on cases where the only concern is that a State has “‘overprotected’” its citizens. Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1068 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting). We intervene in an intrastate dispute between the State’s executive and its judiciary rather than entrusting the State’s structure of government to sort it out. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 766–767 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). And we lose valuable data about the best methods of protecting constitutional rights—a particular concern in cases like these, where the federal constitutional question turns on the “reasonable likelihood” of jury confusion, an empirical question best answered with evidence from many state courts. Cf. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1, 30–31 (1995) (GINSBURG, J., dissenting).
The cases here demonstrate yet another cost of granting certiorari to correct a state court’s overprotection of federal rights: In explaining that the Federal Constitution does not protect some particular right, it is natural to buttress the conclusion by explaining why that right is not very important. In so doing, the Court risks discouraging States from adopting valuable procedural protections even as a matter of their own state law.
State experimentation with how best to guarantee a fair trial to criminal defendants is an essential aspect of our federalism scheme. See, e.g., Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bill of Rights, 9 U. Balt. L. Rev. 379, 393 (1980). The Federal Constitution guarantees only a minimum slate of protections; States can and do provide individual rights above that constitutional floor. See, e.g., Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: the Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Constitutional Rights, 61 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 535, 548–550 (1986). That role is particularly important in the criminal arena because state courts preside over many millions more criminal cases than their federal counterparts and so are more likely to identify protections important to a fair trial. Compare Court Statistics Project, Examining the Work of State Courts: An Analysis of 2010 State Court Caseloads 19–21 (2012), with Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics 2011–2012, pp. 19–20 (Jan. 2015) (Tables 11 and 12).
The majority’s opinion in these cases illustrates how an unnecessary grant of certiorari can lead to unexpected costs by disrupting this sort of state experimentation. Take the first question presented in these cases. The majority’s actual holding is that the Eighth Amendment does not require an instruction specifying that mitigating factors need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Ante, at 11–12. The Eighth Amendment has nothing to say about whether such an instruction is wise as a question of state law or policy. But the majority nonetheless uses this Court’s considerable influence to call into question the logic of specifying any burden of proof as to mitigating circumstances. The majority claims that while assessing an aggravating factor is “a purely factual determination,” assessing mitigation involves “a judgment call (or perhaps a value call)” and is thus not amenable to burdens of proof. Ante, at 10. Short of dividing the mitigating factor “into its factual component and its judgmental component,” and issuing burden-of-proof instructions only as to the former, the majority wonders “whether it is even possible to apply a standard of proof to the mitigatingfactor determination.” Ibid.
By this observation, and with no experience with the needs of juries, the majority denigrates the many States that do specify a burden of proof for the existence of mitigating factors as a matter of state law, presumably under the belief that it is, in fact, “possible” to do so.* Brief for Respondent in No. 14–452, pp. 28–29, and n. 6. Some States even recommend an instruction specifying that mitigating factors need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Idaho Jury Instr., Crim., ICJI 1718, Jury Deliberations (2010); Okla. Jury Instr., Crim, OUJI–CR 4– 78 (2015).
The majority’s discussion of severance likewise short circuits state experimentation. The majority is not con-
*I leave aside the merits of the majority’s questionable distinction, though I cannot see how the jury’s conclusion that the Carr brothers committed their crime “in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner”—one of the aggravating circumstances found by the Carr brothers’ jury—involved any less of a judgment or value call than the mitigating circumstances alleged. See 300 Kan. 1, 282–283, 331 P. 3d 544, 721 (2014).
tent to hold that the Eighth Amendment does not, strictly speaking, require severance of capital penalty proceedings. Instead, it goes on to explain why joint capital sentencing proceedings are not only permissible under the Federal Constitution but are, in fact, preferable as a policy matter: “Better that two defendants who have together committed the same crimes be placed side-by-side to have their fates determined by a single jury.” Ante, at 17. The majority even intimates that severed proceedings may be worse for defendants: “To forbid joinder in capitalsentencing proceedings would, perversely, increase the odds of ‘wanto[n] and freakis[h]’ imposition of death sentences.” Ibid. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206–207 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
So much for Ohio’s, Georgia’s, and Mississippi’s sentencing regimes, all of which routinely allow severance at both phases of capital proceedings. See Ga. Code Ann. §17–8–4 (2013) (upon request, defendants must be tried separately in capital cases); Miss. Code Ann. §99–15–47 (2015) (same); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2945.20 (Lexis 2014) (capital defendants shall be tried separately unless good cause is shown for a joint trial). There is no evidence that any of those three States adopted a severance regime based on a misunderstanding of the Eighth Amendment. But without any empirical foundation or any basis in experience, the majority asserts that such regimes may increase the odds of arbitrariness.
The majority claims that we “‘return power to the State, and to its people,’” when we explain that the Federal Constitution does not require a particular result. Ante, at 9 (emphasis deleted). But that is only so when the Court is able to pass solely on the federal constitutional ground and not the wisdom of a state holding on an equivalent question. Though the Court pretends that it sends back cases like this one with a clean slate, it rarely fully erases its thoughts on the virtues of the procedural protection at issue. By placing a thumb on the scale against a State adopting—even as a matter of state law—proce- dural protections the Constitution does not require, the Court risks turning the Federal Constitution into a
ceiling, rather than a floor, for the protection of individual liberties.
I see no reason why these three cases out of the Kansas Supreme Court warranted our intervention given the costs that I have just described and those described by my predecessors and colleagues, see supra, at 3. No federal right has been compromised. And nobody disputes that the State of Kansas could, as a matter of state law, reach the same outcome.
Perhaps most importantly, both of the questions on which the Court granted certiorari turn on specific features of Kansas’ sentencing scheme. As a result, the Kansas Supreme Court’s opinion is unlikely to have much salience for other States. If the Kansas Supreme Court was wrong, its wrong opinion will not subvert federal law on a broader scale.
First, the Kansas court’s decision on the jury instruction question aimed to “both preserv[e] the [state] statute’s favorable distinction and protec[t] a capital defendant’s Eighth Amendment right to individualized sentencing by ensuring jurors are not precluded from considering all relevant mitigating evidence.” 299 Kan., at 1196, 329 P. 3d, at 1147 (emphasis added). The Kansas Supreme Court’s decision was thus informed by a combination of federal and state considerations. A decision that expressly relies on a State’s unique statutory scheme—as did the Kansas Supreme Court’s here—has limited potential for influencing other States.
It is not absurd to conclude that a juror unfamiliar with the mechanics of the law might be confused by Kansas’ jury instructions, which almost always mention aggravating and mitigating instructions in the same breath. Id., at 1196–1197, 329 P. 3d, at 1147–1148. The Kansas Supreme Court’s opinion rested largely on the specific language and ordering of that State’s instructions. Other States’ jury instructions may be less likely to have the same effect.
Moreover, the decision below was made against the unique backdrop of trial courts’ failure to implement the Kansas Supreme Court’s earlier demands for a change to jury instructions in capital cases. In a 2001 case, the Kansas Supreme Court considered the jury instructions insufficiently confusing to reverse the judgment, but sufficiently confusing to demand higher clarity going forward: “[A]ny instruction dealing with the consideration of mitigating circumstances should state (1) they need to be proved only to the satisfaction of the individual juror in the juror’s sentencing decision and not beyond a reason- able doubt and (2) mitigating circumstances do not need to be found by all members of the jury in order to be considered in an individual juror’s sentencing decision.” State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 1078, 40 P. 3d 139, 268. The Kansas pattern instructions were then revised to include consideration (2), but—“inexplicably,” as the court noted in Gleason—not consideration (1). 299 Kan., at 1193, 329 P. 3d, at 1145. The Kansas Supreme Court reiterated the two requirements for any jury instruction in 2008, see State v. Scott, 286 Kan. 54, 106–108, 183 P. 3d 801, 837, and the pattern instructions were finally changed in 2011, see 299 Kan., at 1193, 329 P. 3d, at 1145. But Gleason and the Carr brothers were tried in the 10-year delay between the Kansas Supreme Court’s initial admonition and when the jury instructions were finally edited. The Kansas Supreme Court’s opinion in Gleason may have rested in part on a “broader Eighth Amendment principle,” but it also rested on some lower courts’ failure to give instructions reflecting the Kansas Supreme Court’s “repeated recognition of the required content.” 299 Kan., at 1195, 329 P. 3d, 1146, 1147. Given this context, the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision is particularly unlikely to undermine other States or the Federal Constitution. The same goes for the severance question. The Kansas Supreme Court’s decision depended on the “especially damning subset” of the aggravating evidence presented that may not have been admitted in a severed proceeding under Kansas’ capital punishment scheme and evidentiary rules, such as evidence that one brother was a bad influence on the other. Ibid. But the difference between a joint penalty phase and a severed penalty phase may be of limited significance in States where the same evidence may be admitted in joint and severed proceedings. Cf. Brown v. Sanders, 546 U. S. 212, 217 (2006); L. Palmer,
The Death Penalty in the United States: A Complete Guide to Federal and State Laws 137 (2d ed. 2014). It thus seems to me unlikely that the Kansas Supreme Court’s opinion would have proven instructive in other States, even though it was couched in the language of the Federal Constitution.
There may, of course, be rare cases where certiorari is warranted in which a state prosecutor alleges that a State’s highest court has overprotected a criminal defendant. These circumstances may include: Where a state court’s decision in favor of a criminal defendant implicates another constitutional right, see, e.g., Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 547 (1976); where a state court indicates a hostility to applying federal precedents, Florida v. Meyers, 466 U. S. 380, 383 (1984) ( per curiam) (Stevens, J., dissenting); or where a state court’s grant of relief is particularly likely to destabilize or significantly interfere with federal policy. None of those circumstances, and no comparable interest, is present in these cases.
The Carr brothers committed acts of “almost inconceivable cruelty and depravity,” and the majority is understandably anxious to ensure they receive their just deserts. (So anxious, in fact, that it reaches out to address a question on which we did not grant certiorari at all. Ante, at 17). But I do not believe that interest justifies not only “correcting” the Kansas Supreme Court’s error but also calling into question the procedures of other States.
The standard adage teaches that hard cases make bad law. See Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 364 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). I fear that these cases suggest a corollary: Shocking cases make too much law. Because I believe the Court should not have granted certiorari here, I respectfully dissent.
 The facts for this portion of the opinion come from the Kansas Supreme Court, 299 Kan. 1127, 1134–1147, 329 P. 3d 1102, 1113–1121 (2014), and the parties’ briefs.
 The facts for this portion of the opinion come from the Kansas Supreme Court, 300 Kan. 1, 18–38, 331 P. 3d 544, 575–586 (2014), and witness testimony. See 21–A Tr. 59–75 (Oct. 7, 2002), 22–B Tr. 39–124 (Oct. 8, 2002), 23–A Tr. 4–118 (Oct. 9, 2002), 23–B Tr. 5–133 (Oct. 9, 2002), and 24–A Tr. 4–93 (Oct. 10, 2002).
 The relevant penalty-phase instructions from the Carrs’ sentencing proceedings are materially indistinguishable. See App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 14–450, pp. 501–510.
 Jonathan also alleges that he was prejudiced by the jury’s witnessing his brother’s handcuffs, which his brother requested remain visible before the penalty phase commenced. That allegation is mystifying. That his brother’s handcuffs were visible (while his own restraints were not) more likely caused the jury to see Jonathan as the less dangerous of the two.
Financialization is a new term used to discuss the emergence of a new form of capitalism in which financial markets dominate over the traditional industrial economy. Traditionally capitalism was th…
Brussels attacks 3/22/16 An injured woman sits on a chair at Brussels airport in the aftermath of a suicide attack In December 2004, Council on Foreign Relations member Robert L. Hutchings, Chair…
Brussels attacks 3/22/16 An injured woman sits on a chair at Brussels airport in the aftermath of a suicide attack
In December 2004, Council on Foreign Relations member Robert L. Hutchings, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council of the CIA, presented the US president, members of Congress, cabinet members and key officials involved in policymaking a 123-page report titled “Mapping the Global Future” ( http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Global%20Trends_Mapping%20the%20Global%20Future%202020%20Project.pdf ). In the preface Hutchings gives special recognition to Council on Foreign Relations member Matthew Burrows, Director of the NIC’s Analysis and Production Staff. The project took about a year and involved more than 1000 people.
The report foresees pervasive insecurity. Since that time the CFR has been working hard to produce that insecurity by convincing the American public that we should allow hundreds of thousands of middle east refugees into the USA. CFR cohorts in other nations have done the same. Six CFR former Secretaries of State James A. Baker III (served 1989-1992), Dr. Madeleine K. Albright (1997-2001), General Colin L. Powell USA (Ret.) (2001-2005), George Shultz (1982-1989), Dr. Condoleezza Rice (2005-2009), Dr. Henry A. Kissinger (1973-1977) said:
MADELEINE ALBRIGHT I think it enriches our country to have refugees here.
COLIN POWELL And America has always had a history of welcoming, not only immigrants, but refugees
HENRY KISSINGER I cannot imagine the United States living in the world in which we are without committing itself in some organized fashion to assist refugees on a global basis
KISSINGER It would be totally incompatible with our values and our image of who we are.
JAMES BAKER The principles and values are very important because that’s what made this country great. We have always been open to refugees we have always been open to immigrants
BAKER We are after all a country of immigrants
ALBRIGHT without an organization like the IRC, I think an awful lot of people would fall through the cracks and would get no care at all.
POWELL For all these years, it has reached out, touched people, from the most desperate places in the world, brought them to this country.
POWELL And having brought them here …then making sure they have a place to go. And they had the beginning of a new home, a new life.
GEORGE SHULTZ And refugees are people, really, fleeing from something or involved in something tragic in their country. And so if you want to have a decent world, you have to worry about them.
POWELL No organization that I have ever worked with has done as much dealing with this population as the IRC has.
ALBRIGHT It was an organization that worked so hard to do exactly the kind of things I think the US Government needed partners for – a non-governmental organization that was there to do the kind of work that distinguished America in so many ways,
CONDOLEEZA RICE –to see the human toll, the human cost, of conflict mitigated
RICE…to speak for and to be advocates for people who would otherwise be voiceless sometimes even stateless, as sometimes even refugees are.
ALBRIGHT What I think is so interesting about the IRC these days is that it’s not just a matter of placing people somewhere, but almost being what I would call a full-service organization. In many ways it helps to educate people. It provides health care so that disease doesn’t spread. And it really looks at the whole person so the refugee is not just an object that is kind of moved around like some game piece; but a human being that needs total care.
KISSINGER It’s the American tradition. So, I feel very strongly that the United States has a responsibility. And I’m an enormous admirer of the IRC for its efforts in that field.
Not addressed by the speakers is that there is no way to screen hundreds of thousands of refugees for a small handful of terrorists that will surely be placed amongst them by ISIS. These terrorists will conduct attacks like those in Paris and Brussels and turn the West against the Muslims and their religion. The vast majority of innocent refugees will be the targets of hate caused by the few bad apples amongst them.The terrorist attacks will be used as an excuse for the New World Order crew to turn countries into police states and change constitutions to take away our freedoms and right to privacy. Bilderberger Hollande, a strong proponent and importer of middle east refugees, is using the Paris terrorist attacks to call for a constitutional change.
The CIA’s crystal ball predicts:
“We foresee a more pervasive sense of insecurity—which may be as much based on psychological perceptions as physical threats—by 2020. Even as most of the world gets richer, globalization will profoundly shake up the status quo—generating enormous economic, cultural, and consequently political convulsions. With the gradual integration of China, India, and other emerging countries into the global economy, hundreds of millions of working-age adults will become available foremployment in what is evolving into a more integrated world labor market.
Military and Masked Police on the Streets of Brussels after Terror Attack 3/22/16
This enormous work force—a growing portion of which will be well educated—will be an attractive, competitive source of low-cost labor at the same time that technological innovation is expanding the range of globally mobile occupations.
The transition will not be painless and will hit the middle classes of the developed world in particular, bringing more rapid job turnover and requiring professional retooling. Outsourcing on a large scale would strengthen the antiglobalization movement. Where these pressures lead will depend on how political leaders respond, how flexible labor markets become, and whether overall economic growth is sufficiently robust to absorb a growing number of displaced workers.”
The report foresees International Terrorism :
“The key factors that spawned international terrorism show no signs of abating over the next 15 years. Facilitated by global communications, the revival of Muslim identity will create a framework for the spread of radical Islamic ideology inside and outside the Middle East, including Southeast Asia, Central Asia and Western Europe, where religious identity has traditionally not been as strong. This revival has been accompanied by a deepening solidarity among Muslims caught up in national or regional separatist struggles, such as Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq, Kashmir, Mindanao, and southern Thailand, and has emerged in response to government repression, corruption, and ineffectiveness. Informal networks of charitable foundations, madrassas, hawalas1, and other mechanisms will continue to proliferate and be exploited by radical elements; alienation among unemployed youths will swell the ranks of those vulnerable to terrorist recruitment.
Staff walks away after Brussels Terror Attack 3/22/2016
We expect that by 2020 al-Qa’ida will be superceded by similarly inspired Islamic extremist groups, and there is a substantial risk that broad Islamic movements akin to al-Qa’ida will merge with local separatist movements. Information technology, allowing for instant connectivity, communication, and learning, will enable the terrorist threat to become increasingly decentralized, evolving into an eclectic array of groups, cells, and individuals that do not need a stationary headquarters to plan and carry out operations. Training materials, targeting guidance, weapons know-how, and fund-raising will become virtual (i.e., online).”
The report lays out four possible scenarios for the future :
“Davos World provides an illustration of how robust economic growth, led by China and India, over the next 15 years could reshape the globalization process—giving it a more non-Western face and transforming the political playing field as well.
Pax Americana takes a look at how US predominance may survive the radical changes to the global political landscape and serve to fashion a new and inclusive global order.
A New Caliphate provides an example of how a global movement fueled by radicalreligious identity politics could constitute a challenge to Western norms and values as the foundation of the global system.
Cycle of Fear provides an example of how concerns about proliferation might increase to the point that large-scale intrusive security measures are taken to prevent outbreaks of deadly attacks, possibly introducing an Orwellian world.”
On December 12, 2005 Elisabetth Bumiller published an Article in the NY Times titled 21st-Century Warnings of a Threat Rooted in the 7th. The article is about the word “Caliphate”. The article is a limited hangout mentioning six members of the Council on Foreign Relations but links only one of them to the CFR. “Just as we had the opportunity to learn what the Nazis were going to do, from Hitler’s world in ‘Mein Kampf,’ ” [Council on Foreign Relations member ] General Abizaid said, “we need to learn what these people intend to do from their own words.” Two Council on Foreign Relations members, George Shuster and William Langer edited the English version of “Mein Kampf” in 1939. Instead of warning the American people The Council on Foreign Relations brought Hitler and the National Socialists to power to cause World War II. ( http://www.bilderberg.org/roundtable/emhitler.html ).
The Council on Foreign Relations is now bringing Islamic Radicals to power to escalate the War on Terror and bring about World War III. The unrest in the Middle East is part of the Council on Foreign Relations plan. Sceanario three, A New Caliphate, is unfolding. The Tunisian and Egyption revolutions in the middle east are a giant step forward in the plan.
Meanwhile the Council on Foreign Relations War on Terror is advancing scenario four, the Cycle of Fear, as western nations like the USA and Britain infringe on the liberties of their citizens, strip away their privacy, dignity and freedom and turn them into police states.
The article follows modified to identify the Council on Foreign Relations members.
ELISABETH BUMILLER/White House Letter: 21st-Century Warnings of a Threat Rooted in the 7th New York Times; Dec 12, 2005;
Defense Secretary [Trilateral Commission member] Donald H. Rumsfeld said it in a speech last Monday in Washington and again on Thursday on PBS. Eric S. Edelman, the under secretary of defense for policy, said it the week before in a round table at the Council on Foreign Relations. Stephen J. Hadley, the national security adviser, said it in October in speeches in New York and Los Angeles. [Council on Foreign Relations member] Gen. John P. Abizaid, the top American commander in the Middle East, said it in September in hearings on Capitol Hill.
Vice President[Council on Foreign Relations member ] Dick Cheney was one of the first members of the Bush administration to say it, at a campaign stop in Lake Elmo, Minn., in September 2004.
The word getting the workout from the nation’s top guns these days is “caliphate” – the term for the seventh-century Islamic empire that spanned the Middle East, spread to Southwest Asia, North Africa and Spain, then ended with the Mongol sack of Baghdad in 1258. The term can also refer to other caliphates, including the one declared by the Ottoman Turks that ended in 1924.
Specialists on Islam say the word is a mysterious and ominous one for many Americans, and that the administration knows it. “They recognize that there’s a lot of resonance when they use the term ‘caliphate,’ ” said [Council on Foreign Relations member ] Kenneth M. Pollack, a former Central Intelligence Agency analyst and now a scholar at the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution. [Council on Foreign Relations member ] Zbigniew Brzezinski, [Council on Foreign Relations member ] President Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser, said that the word had an “almost instinctive fearful impact.”
So now, [Council on Foreign Relations member ] Mr. Cheney and others warn, Al Qaeda’s ultimate goal is the re-establishment of the caliphate, with calamitous consequences for the United States. As Mr. Cheney put it in Lake Elmo, referring to Osama bin Laden and his followers: “They talk about wanting to re-establish what you could refer to as the seventh-century caliphate” to be “governed by Sharia law, the most rigid interpretation of the Koran.” Or as Mr. Rumsfeld put it on Monday: “Iraq would serve as the base of a new Islamic caliphate to extend throughout the Middle East, and which would threaten legitimate governments in Europe, Africa and Asia.”
Lawyers CFR member’s Johnson and Preston Pave The Way to Kill Bin Laden
[Council on Foreign Relations member ] General Abizaid was dire, too. “They will try to re-establish a caliphate throughout the entire Muslim world,” he told the House Armed Services Committee in September, adding that the caliphate’s goals would include the destruction of Israel. “Just as we had the opportunity to learn what the Nazis were going to do, from Hitler’s world in ‘Mein Kampf,’ ” [Council on Foreign Relations member ] General Abizaid said, “we need to learn what these people intend to do from their own words.”
A number of scholars and former government officials take strong issue with the administration’s warning about a new caliphate, and compare it to the fear of communism spread during the Cold War. They say that although Al Qaeda’s statements do indeed describe a caliphate as a goal, the administration is exaggerating the magnitude of the threat as it seeks to gain support for its policies in Iraq.
In the view of John L. Esposito, an Islamic studies professor at Georgetown University, there is a difference between the ability of small bands of terrorists to commit attacks across the world and achieving global conquest. “It is certainly correct to say that these people have a global design, but the administration ought to frame it realistically,” said Mr. Esposito, the founding director of the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown. “Otherwise they can actually be playing into the hands of the Osama bin Ladens of the world because they raise this to a threat that is exponentially beyond anything that Osama bin Laden can deliver.”
Georgetown University a CFR’s Rat’s Nest
[Council on Foreign Relations member ] Shibley Telhami, the Anwar Sadat professor for peace and development at the University of Maryland, said Al Qaeda was not leading a movement that threatened to mobilize the vast majority of Muslims. A recent poll Mr.Telhami conducted with Zogby International of 3,900 people in six countries – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Lebanon – found that only 6 percent sympathized with Al Qaeda’s goal of seeking an Islamic state.
The notion that Al Qaeda could create a new caliphate, he said, is simply wrong. “There’s no chance in the world that they’ll succeed,” he said. “It’s a silly threat.” (On the other hand, more than 30 percent in [Council on Foreign Relations member ] Mr. Telhami’s poll said they sympathized with Al Qaeda, because the group stood up to America.)
The term “caliphate” has been used internally by policy hawks in the Pentagon since the planning stages for the war in Iraq, but the administration’s public use of the word has increased this summer and fall, around the time that American forces obtained a letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri, the No. 2 leader in Al Qaeda, to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. The 6,000-word letter, dated early in July, called for the establishment of a militant Islamic caliphate across Iraq before Al Qaeda’s moving on to Syria, Lebanon and Egypt and then a battle against Israel.
In recent weeks, the administration’s use of “caliphate” has only intensified, as Mr. Bush has begun a campaign of speeches to try to regain support for the war. He himself has never publicly used the term, although he has repeatedly described the caliphate, as he did in a speech last week when he said that the terrorists want to try to establish “a totalitarian Islamic empire that reaches from Indonesia to Spain.”
Six days earlier, Mr. Edelman, the under secretary of defense, made it clear. “Iraq’s future will either embolden terrorists and expand their reach and ability to re-establish a caliphate, or it will deal them a crippling blow,” he said. “For us, failure in Iraq is just not an option.”
The events of the last few weeks in Tunisia and Egypt have emboldened the terrorists and expanded their reach and ability to re-establish a caliphate. Was this what the CFR had in store for the World when they backed Bin Laden during the Soviet/Afghan War ?
In the NYT columnist Jacob Heilbrunn’s The Next Act of the Neocons Are Neocons Getting Ready to Ally With Hillary Clinton? We are warned, “the neocon odyssey is about to continue. In 1972, [CFR member] Robert L. Bartley, the editorial page editor of The Wall Street Journal and a man who championed the early neocon stalwarts, shrewdly diagnosed the movement as representing “something of a swing group between the two major parties.” Despite the partisan battles of the early 2000s, it is remarkable how very little has changed.” Heilbrunn connects Hillary Clinton to many powerful neocons. What Heilbrunn leaves out is that almost all that are mentioned are members of the Council on Foreign Relations as is Hillary’s spouse Bill Clinton.
The article follows with the Council on Foreign Relations members identified using the Council on Foreign Relations membership list. Hyperlinks have been added to provide the reader with more in depth information about the characters involved. The reader is encouraged to bookmark the list and use it when they read main stream media articles or watch the the news. The Council on Foreign relations has run Main Stream Media and our Government for 100 years. They have surrounded every President from
Wilson on with unelected Council of Foreign Relations members in powerful administrative positions. These CFR members shape the President’s thinking and actions to further Council on Foreign Relations’ goals of perpetual war and perpetual war bucks making them rich and powerful. It is likely that quite a few CFR members mentioned in this article will be tapped to be part of Hillary Clinton’s administration if she is elected president in 2016. It is time for all Americans to know what is going on and take their country back.
Are Neocons Getting Ready to Ally With Hillary Clinton?
By JACOB HEILBRUNN JULY 5, 2014
Devils in the details of forever war Council on Foreign Relations spouse Hillary Clinton, Council on Foreign Relations spouse Robert Kagan, Council on Foreign Relations member Kagan’s spouse Victoria Neuland
WASHINGTON — AFTER nearly a decade in the political wilderness, the neoconservative movement is back, using the turmoil in Iraq and Ukraine to claim that it is President Obama, not the movement’s interventionist foreign policy that dominated early George W. Bush [son of CFR member George H.W. Bush]-era Washington, that bears responsibility for the current round of global crises.
Even as they castigate Mr. Obama, the neocons may be preparing a more brazen feat: aligning themselves with Hillary Rodham Clinton [spouse of CFR member Bill Clinton] and her nascent presidential campaign, in a bid to return to the driver’s seat of American foreign policy.
To be sure, the careers and reputations of the older generation of neocons — [CFR member] Paul D. Wolfowitz, [CFR member] L. Paul Bremer III, [CFR member] Douglas J. Feith, Richard N. Perle — are permanently buried in the sands of Iraq. And not all of them are eager to switch parties: In April, William Kristol, [son of neocon CFR member Irving Kristol] the editor of The Weekly Standard, said that as president [CFR spouse] Mrs. Clinton would “be a dutiful chaperone of further American decline.”
But others appear to envisage a different direction — one that might allow them to restore the neocon brand, at a time when their erstwhile home in the Republican Party is turning away from its traditional interventionist foreign policy.
It’s not as outlandish as it may sound. Consider the historian [CFR member] Robert Kagan, the author of a recent, roundly praised article in The New Republic that amounted to a neo-neocon manifesto. He has not only avoided the vitriolic tone that has afflicted some of his intellectual brethren but also co-founded an influential bipartisan advisory group during Mrs. Clinton’s time at the [CFR run] State Department.
[CFR member] Mr. Kagan has also been careful to avoid landing at standard-issue neocon think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute [AEI is part of the CFR policy planning network],; instead, he’s a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution [Brookings is part of the CFR policy planning network], that citadel of liberalism headed by [CFR member] Strobe Talbott, who was deputy secretary of state under [CFR member] President Bill Clinton and is considered a strong candidate to become secretary of state in a new Democratic administration. ([CFR member] Mr. Talbott called the [CFR member] Kagan article “magisterial,” in what amounts to a public baptism into the liberal establishment [establishment is a CFR run Main Stream Media euphemism for the Council on Foreign Relations].)
Perhaps most significantly, [CFR member] Mr. Kagan and others have insisted on maintaining the link between modern neoconservatism and its roots in muscular Cold War liberalism. Among other things, he has frequently praised Harry S. Truman’s secretary of state, [CFR member] Dean Acheson, drawing a line from him straight to the neocons’ favorite president: “It was not [CFR member] Eisenhower or Kennedy or [CFR member] Nixon but Reagan whose policies most resembled those of [CFR member] Acheson and Truman.”
Other neocons have followed [CFR member] Mr. Kagan’s careful centrism and respect for [CFR spouse] Mrs. Clinton. Max Boot, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, noted in The New Republic this year that “it is clear that in administration councils she was a principled voice for a strong stand on controversial issues, whether supporting the Afghan surge or the intervention in Libya.”
And the thing is, these neocons have a point. [CFR spouse] Mrs. Clinton voted for the Iraq war; supported sending arms to Syrian rebels; likened Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin, to Adolf Hitler; wholeheartedly backs Israel; and stresses the importance of promoting democracy.
It’s easy to imagine Mrs. Clinton’s making room for the neocons in her administration. No one could charge her with being weak on national security with the likes of [CFR member] Robert Kagan on board.
Of course, the neocons’ latest change in tack is not just about intellectual affinity. Their longtime home, the Republican Party, where presidents and candidates from Reagan to [CFR member] Senator John McCain of Arizona supported large militaries and aggressive foreign policies, may well nominate for president Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky, who has been beating an ever louder drum against American involvement abroad.
In response, Mark Salter, a former chief of staff to [CFR member] Senator McCain and a neocon fellow traveler, said that in the event of a Paul nomination, “Republican voters seriously concerned with national security would have no responsible recourse” but to support [CFR member] Mrs. Clinton for the presidency.
Still, Democratic liberal hawks, let alone the left, would have to swallow hard to accept any neocon conversion. [CFR spouse] Mrs. Clinton herself is already under fire for her foreign-policy views — the journalist Glenn Greenwald, among others, has condemned her as “like a neocon, practically.” And humanitarian interventionists like Samantha Power, the ambassador to the [CFR created] United Nations, who opposed the second Iraq war, recoil at the militaristic unilateralism of the neocons and their inveterate hostility to international institutions like the World Court.
But others in Mrs. Clinton’s orbit, like [CFR member] Michael A. McFaul, the former ambassador to Russia and now a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, a neocon haven at Stanford, are much more in line with thinkers like [CFR member] Mr. Kagan and [CFR member] Mr. Boot, especially when it comes to issues like promoting democracy and opposing Iran.
Far from ending, then, the neocon odyssey is about to continue. In 1972, [CFR member] Robert L. Bartley, the editorial page editor of The Wall Street Journal and a man who championed the early neocon stalwarts, shrewdly diagnosed the movement as representing “something of a swing group between the two major parties.” Despite the partisan battles of the early 2000s, it is remarkable how very little has changed.
In 2011 during Arab Spring nationwide protests against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government began. Assad’s government forces responded with a violent crackdown and a civil war broke out. In the United States seven think tanks and twenty-one media commentators participated in the media debate surrounding Syria. Seventeen of the twenty-one commentators were CFR members or CFR term members.
|CFR Industry ties of commentators profiled|
|Commentator||Identified as||Industry ties|
|former National Security Advisor||Raytheon, RiceHadleyGates, APCO Worldwide|
|former Vice Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff||Raytheon, TASC, Accenture, Enlightenment Capital|
|CNN national security analyst and member of CIA and DHS advisory committees||MacAndrews & Forbes, Monument Capital Group, Decision Sciences|
|former Commander in Chief of US Central Command||BAE Systems, DC Capital Partners|
CFR member 2001
|former Chief of Staff to DoD and CIA||Beacon Global Strategies|
CFR member 2001
|former Under Secretary of State||Cohen Group, Entegris|
|William S. Cohen
|former Secretary of Defense||Cohen Group|
|former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO||Wesley K. Clark & Associates, MFG.com|
CFR member 2001
|former National Security Council staff||Booz Allen Hamilton|
|former chief US weapons inspector||Omnis|
|Adam Ereli||former State Department deputy spokesperson and ambassador to Bahrain||Mercury LLC|
|former Under Secretary of Defense||Boston Consulting Group|
|former CIA Director||Chertoff Group, Alion Science and Technology, Next Century Corporation|
|former deputy assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East||consultant to the Defense Department with TS-SCI clearance|
CFR member 2001
|Senior Fellow at Center for American Progress||Albright Stonebridge Group|
|former Vice Chief of Staff of the US Army||General Dynamics, SCP Partners|
|Patrick Murphy||Iraq veteran and former US Representative from Pennsylvania||Fox Rothschild LLP|
|former Secretary of State||Albright Stonebridge Group|
|James “Spider” Mark
|former Commander of the US Army Intelligence Center||Stony Lonesome Group, Willowdale Services http://www.invism.com/about-us/team.htm|
|Chuck Nash||Fox News military analyst and retired US Navy Captain||Applied Visual Sciences, Emerging Technologies International Inc.|
|former Director of National Intelligence||McLarty Associates, Aamina, Oxford Analytica, Intelligence and National Security Alliance|
|Robert Scales||Fox News military analyst and former Commandant of the US Army War College||Colgen (see correction)|
Authors Gin Armstrong, Whitney Yax, Kevin Connor wrote a report titled, Conflicts of interest in the Syria debate. The report,
“documents the industry ties of [Council on Foreign Relations member] Hadley, 21 other media commentators, and seven think tanks that participated in the media debate around Syria. Like Hadley, these individuals and organizations have strong ties to defense contractors and other defense- and foreign policy-focused firms with a vested interest in the Syria debate, but they were presented to their audiences with a veneer of expertise and independence, as former military officials, retired diplomats, and independent think tanks.
The report offers a new look at an issue raised by David Barstow’s 2008 Pulitzer Prize-winning New York Times series on the role military analysts played in promoting the Bush Administration’s narrative on Iraq. In addition to exposing coordination with the Pentagon, Barstow found that many cable news analysts had industry ties that were not disclosed on air.”
The table of commentators above is from the Amrstrong, Yax and Connor report. It has been updated to identify the CFR members.
The think-tanks in the article include Brookings Institution, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, American Enterprise Institute, Atlantic Council, Center for American Progress and the Institute for the Study of War. In their paper, America’s Post-Cold War Grand Strategy-Makers and the Policy Planning Network, Naná de Graaff and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn explain how the main think tank is the Council on Foreign Relations and the other think tanks are part of the Council’s Policy Planning Networks in the Clinton-Bush-Obama administrations.
Hardly one person in 1000 ever heard of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).
The Council on Foreign Relations was formally established in Paris in 1919 along with its British Counterpart the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The Council on Foreign Relations and Royal Institute of International Affairs can trace their roots back to a secret organization founded and funded by Cecil Rhodes, who became fabulously wealthy by exploiting the people of South Africa. Rhodes is the father of Apartheid.
The Council on Foreign Relations was founded by a group of American and British imperialists and racists intent on ruling the world. Many of the American members were American intelligence officers that belonged to the first American Intelligence Agency — THE INQUIRY. Many of the British members were British Intelligence Agents. THE INQUIRY and its members, who included such notable Americans as Col. Edward Mandel House, Walter Lippmann, Isaiah Bowman, and James Shotwell, wrote most of Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points.
The CFR/RIIA method of operation is simple — they control public opinion. They keep the identity of their group secret. They learn the likes and dislikes of influential people. They surround and manipulate them into acting in the best interest of the CFR/RIIA.
The Council on Foreign Relations, and the Royal Institute of International Affairs are adept at using the media to create massive psycho-political operations used to manipulate public opinion. The psycho-political operations are often designed to create tensions between different groups of people. The object is to keep the world in a state of perpetual tension and warfare to maximize profits from CFR/RIIA munition, medicine, media, energy, and food businesses.
The CFR has only 4000 members yet they control over three-quarters of the nations wealth. The CFR runs the State Department and the CIA. The CFR has placed 100 CFR members in every Presidential Administration since Woodrow Wilson. They work together to misinform and disinform the President to act in the best interest of the CFR not the best interest of the American People. At least five Presidents (Eisenhower, Ford, Carter, Bush, and Clinton) have been members of the CFR. The CFR has packed every Supreme court with CFR insiders. Three CFR members (Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsberg, and Sandra Day O’Connor) sit on the supreme court. The CFR’s British Counterpart is the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The members of these groups profit by creating tension and hate. Their targets include British and American citizens.
The 100 CFR members that surround the president are “the Secret Team.” The “Secret Team” help carry out psycho-political operations scripted by CFR members in the state department and the Intelligence Organizations. The psycho-political operations are coordinated by a group of Council on Foreign Relations members called the Special Group. The Special Group evolved from the Psychological Strategy Board.
President Truman issued an executive order establishing the Psychological Strategy Board. The Board was run by CFR members Gordon Gray and Henry Kissinger. The PSB has close ties to the State Department and Intelligence Organizations. The purpose of the PSB was to co-ordinate psycho-political operations. Many of those operations were focused at Americans. The people became wary of the Psychological Strategy Board. Eisenhower issued an executive order changing its name to the Operations Coordination Board. The OCB was a bigger more powerful PSB. Gray and Kissinger ran the OCB too. President Kennedy abolished the OCB. It became an ad hoc committee called the “Special Group,” which exists today. The PSB/OCB/Special Group always has CFR members running and sitting on it. Since the Special Group was not formed by Executive Order it cannot be abolished.
On September 12, 1939, the Council on Foreign Relations began to take control of the Department of State. On that day Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Editor of Foreign Affairs, and Walter H. Mallory, Executive Director of the Council on Foreign Relations, paid a visit to the State Department. The Council proposed forming groups of experts to proceed with research in the general areas of Security, Armament, Economic, Political, and Territorial problems. The State Department accepted the proposal. The project (1939-1945) was called Council on Foreign Relations War and Peace Studies. Hamilton Fish Armstrong was Executive director.
In February 1941 the CFR officially became part of the State Department. The Department of State established the Division of Special Research. It was organized just like the Council on Foreign Relations War and Peace Studies project. It was divided into Economic, Political, Territorial, and Security Sections. The Research Secretaries serving with the Council groups were hired by the State Department to work in the new division. These men also were permitted to continue serving as Research Secretaries to their respective Council groups. Leo Pasvolsky was appointed Director of Research.
In 1942 the relationship between the Department of State and the Council on Foreign Relations strengthened again. The Department organized an Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policies. The Chairman was Secretary Cordell Hull, the vice chairman, Under Secretary Sumner Wells, Dr. Leo Pasvolsky ( director of the Division of Special Research) was appointed Executive Officer. Several experts were brought in from outside the Department. The outside experts were Council on Foreign Relations War and Peace Studies members; Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Isaiah Bowman, Benjamin V. Cohen, Norman H. Davis, and James T. Shotwell.
In total there were 362 meetings of the War and Peace Studies groups. The meetings were held at Council on Foreign Relations headquarters — the Harold Pratt house, Fifty-Eight East Sixty-Eighth Street, New York City. The Council’s wartime work was confidential.17
In 1944 members of the Council on Foreign Relations The War and Peace Studies Political Group were invited to be active members at the Dumbarton Oaks conference on world economic arrangements. In 1945 these men and members of Britain’s Royal Institute of International Affairs were active at the San Francisco conference which ensured the establishment of the United Nations.
In 1947 Council on Foreign Relations members George Kennan, Walter Lippmann, Paul Nitze, Dean Achenson, and Walter Krock took part in a psycho-political operation forcing the Marshall Plan on the American public. The PSYOP included a “anonymous” letter credited to a Mr. X, which appeared in the Council on Foreign Relations magazine FOREIGN AFFAIRS. The letter opened the door for the CFR controlled Truman administration to take a hard line against the threat of Soviet expansion. George Kennan was the author of the letter. The Marshall Plan should have been called the Council on Foreign Relations Plan. The so-called Marshall Plan and the ensuing North Atlantic Treaty Organization defined the role of the United States in world politics for the rest of the century.
In 1950 another PSYOP resulted in NSC-68, a key cold war document. The NSC (National Security Council) didn’t write it — the Department of State Policy Planning Staff did. The cast of characters included CFR members George Kennan, Paul Nitze, and Dean Achenson. NSC-68 was given to Truman on April 7, 1950. NSC-68 was a practical extension of the Truman doctrine. It had the US assume the role of world policeman and use 20 per cent of its gross national product ($50 billion in 1953) for arms. NSC-68 provided the justification — the WORLD WIDE COMMUNIST THREAT!
NSC-68 realized a major Council on Foreign Relations aim — building the largest military establishment in Peace Time History. Within a year of drafting NSC-68, the security-related budget leaped to $22 billion, armed forces manpower was up to a million — CFR medicine, munition, food, and media businesses were humming again. The following year the NSC-68 budget rose to $44 billion. In fiscal 1953 it jumped to $50 billion. Today (1997) we are still running $300 billion dollar defense budgets despite Russia giving up because it went bankrupt.
America would never turn back from the road of huge military spending. Spending that included the purchase of radioactive fallout on American citizens in the 50’s, and buying thermonuclear waste from the Russians as we approach the year 2000. Spending resulting in a national debt of $16.3 Trillion Dollars that continues to grow, and interest payments of over $270 billion a year. Is the Council on Foreign Relations trying to make the United States economically vulnerable to influence from outside sources? Isn’t that treason?
THE INQUIRY, the PSB/OCB/Special group, the War and Peace Studies, the “X” Affair, and NSC-68 have had tremendous historical impact. Yet these events and the role played by the Council on Foreign Relations in sponsoring and carrying out the events are missing from our History books. You represent the people. Can you explain to me why the Council on Foreign Relations role in History has been left out of the History books? Why don’t we learn about them in High School History courses? Why don’t History majors in college learn about the Council on Foreign Relations?
Read America’s Post-Cold War Grand Strategy-Makers and the Policy Planning Network and Conflicts of Interest in the Syrian Debate. Have you connected the dots yet? The Council on Foreign Relations has kept the world in a state of perpetual war for 100 years. When the cold war ended they produce the war on terror. Millions of people have died and millions families destroyed so that a small group of several thousand could become rich and powerful. Martin Luther King Jr said “There comes a time when silence is betrayal.” That time is now, it is time for everyone who knows what is going on to speak out about it and put a stop to the Council on Foreign Relations blood bath.
The Conservative Tribune Website published an article titled, Leaked Benghazi Docs Directly Implicate Barack H. Obama… Spread This Everywhere. It involves Hillary Clinton e-mails with Council on Foreign Relations members who played a direct role in the “blame the video” cover operation following the 2012 Benghazi terrorist attack. Missing from the article are the CFR connections. I fixed that. I have modified the article so that the reader can identify the Council on Foreign Relations connections.
The article implicates Victoria Neuland in the cover-up. V ictoria Nuland’s husband is Council on Foreign Relations member Robert Kagan, a Neocon, historian and foreign-policy commentator at the Brookings Institution. The Brookings Institute is part of the Council on Foreign Relations Policy Planning Network.
During Council on Foreign Relations member Bill Clinton’s administration, Nuland was chief of staff to Deputy Secretary of State Council on Foreign Relations member Strobe Talbott before moving on to serve as deputy director for former Soviet Union affairs. Talbot is president of The Brookings Institute.
Victoria Neuland and CFR husband Robert Kagin
Nuland served as the principal deputy foreign policy adviser to Vice President Council on foreign Relations member Dick Cheney and then as U.S. ambassador to Council on Foreign Relations run NATO. CFR Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (NATO), SHAPE and Commander of U.S. European Command include:
- Dwight D. Eisenhower, Army (1951-1952)
- Matthew Ridgway, Army (1952-1953)
- Alfred Gruenther, Army (1953-1956)
- Lauris Norstad, Air Force (1956-1963)
- Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Army (1963-1969)
- Andrew J. Goodpaster, Army (1969-1974)
- Alexander M. Haig Jr., Army (1974-1979)
- Bernard W. Rogers, Army (1979-1987)
- John R. Galvin, Army (1987-1992)
- John M. Shalikashvili, Army (1992-1993)
- George A. Joulwan, Army (1993-1997)
- Wesley K. Clark, Army (1997-2000)
- Joseph W. Ralston, Air Force (2000-2003)
- James L. Jones Jr., Marines (2003-2007)
- Bantz J. Craddock, Army (2007-2009)
- James G. Stavridis, Navy (2009-2013)
It also implicates Ben Rhodes. Rhodes is not a CFR member. Rhodes is a CFR propaganda expert and possibly a covert intelligence operative. He is closely connected with the CFR and used to help them with intelligence cover-ups and limited hangouts that hide the CFR role in a story. Rhodes worked for five years as Special Assistant to CFR member Lee Hamilton. At the time former Indiana congressman was Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. In 2004 Rhodes help draft recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. CFR member Hamilton was Vice Chairman of the Commission. In 2006 Rhodes drafted the report of the Iraq Study Group. Seven of the ten Iraq Study Group members belonged to the Council on Foreign Relations. The Iraq Study group members were :
Ben Rhodes and Council on Foreign Relations Member John Kerry
Leaked Benghazi Docs Directly Implicate Barack H. Obama… Spread This Everywhere
The week that will supposedly define President Obama’s legacy just got a splash of cold water thrown on it. New documents have surfaced showing that President Obama and his officials were directly involved in the “blame the video” narrative following the terrorist attack in Benghazi in 2012
The documents, released by a Freedom of Information Act Request, show that top Obama officials were directly involved in determining how to mislead the American people about the reason behind the terrorist attack that took the lives of 4 Americans.
As we all know, not much happens involving the White House that doesn’t have the approval of the president. At some level, President Obama was involved in the construction of this narrative, even if his name isn’t on ‘from’ line of an email, and now we have the documents that show that.
Judicial Watch’s coverage of the cover up reveals some fascinating information:
“A September 11, 2012, email sent at 6:21 p.m. by State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland [wife of Council on Foreign Relations Member Robert Kegan] to Meehan [Bernadette Meehan, a spokesperson for the [Council on Foreign Relations run] National Security Council], Under Secretary for Management Patrick F. Kennedy, and Clinton’s personal aide Jacob Sullivan shows that the State Department deferred to the White House on the official response to the Benghazi attack. Referencing pending press statements by Barack Obama and Clinton, Nuland wrote: ‘We are holding for Rhodes [then-White House deputy strategic communications adviser] clearance. BMM [Meehan], pls advise asap.’
“Meehan responded three minutes later, at 6:24 p.m.: ‘Ben is good with these and is on with Jake now too.’”
Sponsored by Revcontent
This clearly indicates that the White House was calling all of the shots on what information went to the public, including the false narrative about Muslim unrest over a Youtube video.
Additionally, an email sent by Rashad Hussain, the Obama administration’s special envoy to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), on September 12th stresses the need to blame the attack on a film.
It states, “I am sure you are considering putting a statement on the film and the related violence. In addition to the condemnation of the disgusting depictions, it will be important to emphasize the need to respond in a way that is consistent with Islamic principles, i.e. not engaging in violence and taking innocent life …”
Yes, by all means, let’s make sure to not offend the people who just butchered American citizens.
Another email, sent on September 14th by Ben Rhodes [Rhodes worked for Council on Foreign Relations member Lee Hamilton and in 2006 drafted the Iran Study Group Report. Seven of the 10 study group members were Council on foreign Relations members] to prep former Ambassador [Council on Foreign Relations member] Susan Rice stated, ” ‘Goal’: To underscore that these protests are rooted in an Internet video, and not a broader failure or policy.” (H/TJudicial Watch)
That doesn’t sound fishy at all…
This is absolutely disgusting. It’s time for Republican leadership in Congress to take measures to impeach Obama, or hold him accountable in some way.
Share this everywhere. Everyone needs to see this.
After leaving The Washington Post in 1977, Carl Bernstein spent six months looking at the relationship of the CIA and the press during the Cold War years. What Carl’s six month research missed was the relationship between the Council on Foreign Relations, the CIA, the press, and the senators who served on the Church committee. Was this simply oversight on PUlitzer prize winning journalist Bernstein’s part? Or is Bernstein’s omission part of a phony cover story to misinform the public, volunteering some of the truth while withholding key and damaging facts in the case?
Bernstein’s 25,000-word cover story, published in Rolling Stone on October 20, 1977, is reprinted below. It has been modified to include the missing CFR connections.
Isn’t it time to convene a grand jury to investigate the wrong doing of CFR members in public and private positions of power that have taken over the Government of the U.S.A.?
THE CIA AND THE MEDIA [AND THE CFR]
How Americas Most Powerful [CFR run] News Media Worked Hand in Glove with the[CFR run] Central Intelligence Agency and Why the [CFR run] Church Committee Covered It Up
BY CARL BERNSTEIN
In 1953, Joseph Alsop, then one of America’s leading syndicated columnists, went to the Philippines to cover an election. He did not go because he was asked to do so by his syndicate. He did not go because he was asked to do so by the newspapers that printed his column. He went at the request of the CIA.
Alsop is one of more than 400 American journalists who in the past twenty‑five years have secretly carried out assignments for the Central Intelligence Agency, according to documents on file at CIA headquarters. Some of these journalists’ relationships with the Agency were tacit; some were explicit. There was cooperation, accommodation and overlap. Journalists provided a full range of clandestine services—from simple intelligence gathering to serving as go‑betweens with spies in Communist countries. Reporters shared their notebooks with the CIA. Editors shared their staffs. Some of the journalists were Pulitzer Prize winners, distinguished reporters who considered themselves ambassadors without‑portfolio for their country. Most were less exalted: foreign correspondents who found that their association with the Agency helped their work; stringers and freelancers who were as interested in the derring‑do of the spy business as in filing articles; and, the smallest category, full‑time CIA employees masquerading as journalists abroad. In many instances, CIA documents show, journalists were engaged to perform tasks for the CIA with the consent of the managements of America’s leading news organizations.
WORKING PRESS — CIA STYLE
To understand the role of most journalist‑operatives, it is necessary to dismiss some myths about undercover work for American intelligence services. Few American agents are “spies” in the popularly accepted sense of the term. “Spying” — the acquisition of secrets from a foreign government—is almost always done by foreign nationals who have been recruited by the CIA and are under CIA control in their own countries. Thus the primary role of an American working undercover abroad is often to aid in the recruitment and “handling” of foreign nationals who are channels of secret information reaching American intelligence.
Many journalists were used by the CIA to assist in this process and they had the reputation of being among the best in the business. The peculiar nature of the job of the foreign correspondent is ideal for such work: he is accorded unusual access by his host country, permitted to travel in areas often off‑limits to other Americans, spends much of his time cultivating sources in governments, academic institutions, the military establishment and the scientific communities. He has the opportunity to form long‑term personal relationships with sources and—perhaps more than any other category of American operative—is in a position to make correct judgments about the susceptibility and availability of foreign nationals for recruitment as spies.
“After a foreigner is recruited, a case officer often has to stay in the background,” explained a CIA official. “So you use a journalist to carry messages to and from both parties”
Journalists in the field generally took their assignments in the same manner as any other undercover operative. If, for instance, a journalist was based in Austria, he ordinarily would be under the general direction of the Vienna station chief and report to a case officer. Some, particularly roving correspondents or U.S.‑based reporters who made frequent trips abroad, reported directly to CIA officials in Langley, Virginia.
The tasks they performed sometimes consisted of little more than serving as “eyes and ears” for the CIA; reporting on what they had seen or overheard in an Eastern European factory, at a diplomatic reception in Bonn, on the perimeter of a military base in Portugal. On other occasions, their assignments were more complex: planting subtly concocted pieces of misinformation; hosting parties or receptions designed to bring together American agents and foreign spies; serving up “black” propaganda to leading foreign journalists at lunch or dinner; providing their hotel rooms or bureau offices as “drops” for highly sensitive information moving to and from foreign agents; conveying instructions and dollars to CIA controlled members of foreign governments.
Often the CIA’s relationship with a journalist might begin informally with a lunch, a drink, a casual exchange of information. An Agency official might then offer a favor—for example, a trip to a country difficult to reach; in return, he would seek nothing more than the opportunity to debrief the reporter afterward. A few more lunches, a few more favors, and only then might there be a mention of a formal arrangement — “That came later,” said a CIA official, “after you had the journalist on a string.”
Another official described a typical example of the way accredited journalists (either paid or unpaid by the CIA) might be used by the Agency: “In return for our giving them information, we’d ask them to do things that fit their roles as journalists but that they wouldn’t have thought of unless we put it in their minds. For instance, a reporter in Vienna would say to our man, ‘I met an interesting second secretary at the Czech Embassy.’ We’d say, ‘Can you get to know him? And after you get to know him, can you assess him? And then, can you put him in touch with us—would you mind us using your apartment?”‘
Formal recruitment of reporters was generally handled at high levels—after the journalist had undergone a thorough background check. The actual approach might even be made by a deputy director or division chief. On some occasions, no discussion would he entered into until the journalist had signed a pledge of secrecy.
“The secrecy agreement was the sort of ritual that got you into the tabernacle,” said a former assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence. “After that you had to play by the rules.” David Attlee Phillips, former Western Hemisphere chief of clandestine services and a former journalist himself, estimated in an interview that at least 200 journalists signed secrecy agreements or employment contracts with the Agency in the past twenty‑five years. Phillips, who owned a small English‑language newspaper in Santiago, Chile, when he was recruited by the CIA in 1950, described the approach: “Somebody from the Agency says, ‘I want you to help me. 1 know you are a true‑blue American, but I want you to sign a piece of paper before I tell you what it’s about.’ I didn’t hesitate to sign, and a lot of newsmen didn’t hesitate over the next twenty years.”
“One of the things we always had going for us in terms of enticing reporters,” observed a CIA official who coordinated some of the arrangements with journalists, “was that we could make them look better with their home offices. A foreign correspondent with ties to the Company [the CIA] stood a much better chance than his competitors of getting the good stories.”
Within the CIA, journalist‑operatives were accorded elite status, a consequence of the common experience journalists shared with high‑level CIA officials. Many had gone to the same schools as their CIA handlers, moved in the same circles, shared fashionably liberal, anti‑Communist political values, and were part of the same “old boy” network that constituted something of an establishment elite in the media, politics and academia of postwar America. The most valued of these lent themselves for reasons of national service, not money.
The Agency’s use of journalists in undercover operations has been most extensive in Western Europe (“That was the big focus, where the threat was,” said one CIA official), Latin America and the Far East. In the 1950s and 1960s journalists were used as intermediaries—spotting, paying, passing instructions—to members of the Christian Democratic party in Italy and the Social Democrats in Germany, both of which covertly received millions of dollars from the CIA. During those years “we had journalists all over Berlin and Vienna just to keep track of who the hell was coming in from the East and what they were up to,” explained a CIA official.
In the Sixties, reporters were used extensively in the CIA offensive against Salvador Allende in Chile; they provided funds to Allende’s opponents and wrote anti‑Allende propaganda for CIA proprietary publications that were distributed in Chile. (CIA officials insist that they make no attempt to influence the content of American newspapers, but some fallout is inevitable: during the Chilean offensive, CIA‑generated black propaganda transmitted on the wire service out of Santiago often turned up in American publications.)
According to CIA officials, the Agency has been particularly sparing in its use of journalist agents in Eastern Europe on grounds that exposure might result in diplomatic sanctions against the United States or in permanent prohibitions against American correspondents serving in some countries. The same officials claim that their use of journalists in the Soviet Union has been even more limited, but they remain extremely guarded in discussing the subject. They are insistent, however, in maintaining that the Moscow correspondents of major news organizations have not been “tasked” or controlled by the Agency.
The Soviets, according to CIA officials, have consistently raised false charges of CIA affiliation against individual American reporters as part of a continuing diplomatic game that often follows the ups and downs of Soviet‑American relations. The latest such charge by the Russians—against Christopher Wren of the New York Times and Alfred Friendly Jr., formerly of Newsweek, has no basis in fact, they insist.
CIA officials acknowledge, however, that such charges will persist as long as the CIA continues to use journalistic cover and maintain covert affiliations with individuals in the profession. But even an absolute prohibition against Agency use of journalists would not free reporters from suspicion, according to many Agency officials. “Look at the Peace Corps,” said one source. “We have had no affiliation there and they [foreign governments] still throw them out”
The history of the CIA’s involvement with the American press continues to be shrouded by an official policy of obfuscation and deception for the following principal reasons:
■ The use of journalists has been among the most productive means of intelligence‑gathering employed by the CIA. Although the Agency has cut back sharply on the use of reporters since 1973 primarily as a result of pressure from the media), some journalist‑operatives are still posted abroad.
■ Further investigation into the matter, CIA officials say, would inevitably reveal a series of embarrassing relationships in the 1950s and 1960s with some of the most powerful organizations and individuals in American journalism.
Among the executives who lent their cooperation to the Agency were [CFR member] Williarn Paley of the Columbia Broadcasting System, [CFR member] Henry Luce of Tirne Inc., [CFR member] Arthur Hays Sulzberger of the New York Times, [CFR member] [CFR member] Barry Bingham Sr. of the LouisviIle Courier‑Journal, and James Copley of the Copley News Service. Other organizations which cooperated with the CIA include the American Broadcasting Company, the National Broadcasting Company, the Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters, Hearst Newspapers, Scripps‑Howard, Newsweek magazine, the Mutual Broadcasting System, the Miami Herald and the old Saturday Evening Post and New York Herald‑Tribune.
By far the most valuable of these associations, according to CIA officials, have been with the New York Times, CBS and Time Inc.
The CIA’s use of the American news media has been much more extensive than Agency officials have acknowledged publicly or in closed sessions with members of Congress. The general outlines of what happened are indisputable; the specifics are harder to come by. CIA sources hint that a particular journalist was trafficking all over Eastern Europe for the Agency; the journalist says no, he just had lunch with the station chief. CIA sources say flatly that a well‑known ABC correspondent worked for the Agency through 1973; they refuse to identify him. A high‑level CIA official with a prodigious memory says that the New York Times provided cover for about ten CIA operatives between 1950 and 1966; he does not know who they were, or who in the newspaper’s management made the arrangements.
The Agency’s special relationships with the so‑called “majors” in publishing and broadcasting enabled the CIA to post some of its most valuable operatives abroad without exposure for more than two decades. In most instances, Agency files show, officials at the highest levels of the CIA usually director or deputy director) dealt personally with a single designated individual in the top management of the cooperating news organization. The aid furnished often took two forms: providing jobs and credentials “journalistic cover” in Agency parlance) for CIA operatives about to be posted in foreign capitals; and lending the Agency the undercover services of reporters already on staff, including some of the best‑known correspondents in the business.
In the field, journalists were used to help recruit and handle foreigners as agents; to acquire and evaluate information, and to plant false information with officials of foreign governments. Many signed secrecy agreements, pledging never to divulge anything about their dealings with the Agency; some signed employment contracts., some were assigned case officers and treated with. unusual deference. Others had less structured relationships with the Agency, even though they performed similar tasks: they were briefed by CIA personnel before trips abroad, debriefed afterward, and used as intermediaries with foreign agents. Appropriately, the CIA uses the term “reporting” to describe much of what cooperating journalists did for the Agency. “We would ask them, ‘Will you do us a favor?’”.said a senior CIA official. “‘We understand you’re going to be in Yugoslavia. Have they paved all the streets? Where did you see planes? Were there any signs of military presence? How many Soviets did you see? If you happen to meet a Soviet, get his name and spell it right …. Can you set up a meeting for is? Or relay a message?’” Many CIA officials regarded these helpful journalists as operatives; the journalists tended to see themselves as trusted friends of the Agency who performed occasional favors—usually without pay—in the national interest.
“I’m proud they asked me and proud to have done it,” said Joseph Alsop who, like his late brother, columnist Stewart Alsop, undertook clandestine tasks for the Agency. “The notion that a newspaperman doesn’t have a duty to his country is perfect balls.”
From the Agency’s perspective, there is nothing untoward in such relationships, and any ethical questions are a matter for the journalistic profession to resolve, not the intelligence community. As Stuart Loory, former Los Angeles Times correspondent, has written in the Columbia Journalism Review: ‘If even one American overseas carrying a press card is a paid informer for the CIA, then all Americans with those credentials are suspect …. If the crisis of confidence faced by the news business—along with the government—is to be overcome, journalists must be willing to focus on themselves the same spotlight they so relentlessly train on others!’ But as Loory also noted: “When it was reported… that newsmen themselves were on the payroll of the CIA, the story caused a brief stir, and then was dropped.”
During the 1976 investigation of the CIA by the Senate Intelligence Committee, chaired by Senator Frank Church, the dimensions of the Agency’s involvement with the press became apparent to several members of the panel, as well as to two or three investigators on the staff. But top officials of the CIA, including former directors [CFR member] William Colby and [CFR member] George [H.W.] Bush, persuaded the committee to restrict its inquiry into the matter and to deliberately misrepresent the actual scope of the activities in its final report. The multivolurne report contains nine pages in which the use of journalists is discussed in deliberately vague and sometimes misleading terms. It makes no mention of the actual number of journalists who undertook covert tasks for the CIA. Nor does it adequately describe the role played by newspaper and broadcast executives in cooperating with the Agency.
THE AGENCY’S DEALINGS WITH THE PRESS BEGAN during the earliest stages of the Cold War. [CFR member] Allen Dulles, who became director of the CIA in 1953, sought to establish a recruiting‑and‑cover capability within America’s most prestigious journalistic institutions. By operating under the guise of accredited news correspondents, [CFR member] Dulles believed, CIA operatives abroad would be accorded a degree of access and freedom of movement unobtainable under almost any other type of cover.
American publishers, like so many other corporate and institutional leaders at the time, were willing to commit the resources of their companies to the struggle against “global Communism.” Accordingly, the traditional line separating the American press corps and government was often indistinguishable: rarely was a news agency used to provide cover for CIA operatives abroad without the knowledge and consent of either its principal owner, publisher or senior editor. Thus, contrary to the notion that the CIA insidiously infiltrated the journalistic community, there is ample evidence that America’s leading publishers and news executives allowed themselves and their organizations to become handmaidens to the intelligence services. “Let’s not pick on some poor reporters, for God’s sake,” [CFR member] William Colby exclaimed at one point to the Church committee’s investigators. “Let’s go to the managements. They were witting.” In all, about twenty‑five news organizations including those listed at the beginning of this article) provided cover for the Agency.
In addition to cover capability, [CFR member] Dulles initiated a “debriefing” procedure under which American correspondents returning from abroad routinely emptied their notebooks and offered their impressions to Agency personnel. Such arrangements, continued by [CFR member] Dulles’ successors, to the present day, were made with literally dozens of news organizations. In the 1950s, it was not uncommon for returning reporters to be met at the ship by CIA officers. “There would be these guys from the CIA flashing ID cards and looking like they belonged at the Yale Club,” said Hugh Morrow, a former Saturday Evening Post correspondent who is now press secretary to former vice‑president [CFR member] Nelson Rockefeller. “It got to be so routine that you felt a little miffed if you weren’t asked.”
CIA officials almost always refuse to divulge the names of journalists who have cooperated with the Agency. They say it would be unfair to judge these individuals in a context different from the one that spawned the relationships in the first place. “There was a time when it wasn’t considered a crime to serve your government,” said one high‑level CIA official who makes no secret of his bitterness. “This all has to be considered in the context of the morality of the times, rather than against latter‑day standards—and hypocritical standards at that.”
Many journalists who covered World War II were close to people in the Office of Strategic Services, the wartime predecessor of the CIA; more important, they were all on the same side. When the war ended and many OSS officials went into the CIA, it was only natural that these relationships would continue. Meanwhile, the first postwar generation of journalists entered the profession; they shared the same political and professional values as their mentors. “You had a gang of people who worked together during World War II and never got over it,” said one Agency official. “They were genuinely motivated and highly susceptible to intrigue and being on the inside. Then in the Fifties and Sixties there was a national consensus about a national threat. The Vietnam War tore everything to pieces—shredded the consensus and threw it in the air.” Another Agency official observed: “Many journalists didn’t give a second thought to associating with the Agency. But there was a point when the ethical issues which most people had submerged finally surfaced. Today, a lot of these guys vehemently deny that they had any relationship with the Agency.”
From the outset, the use of journalists was among the CIA’s most sensitive undertakings, with full knowledge restricted to the Director of Central Intelligence and a few of his chosen deputies. [CFR member] Dulles and his successors were fearful of what would happen if a journalist‑operative’s cover was blown, or if details of the Agency’s dealings with the press otherwise became public. As a result, contacts with the heads of news organizations were normally initiated by [CFR member] Dulles and succeeding Directors of Central Intelligence; by the deputy directors and division chiefs in charge of covert operations—[CFR member] Frank Wisner, [CFR member] Cord Meyer Jr., [CFR member] Richard Bissell, Desmond FitzGerald, Tracy Barnes, Thomas Karamessines and , [CFR member] Richard Helms himself a former UPI correspondent); and, occasionally, by others in the CIA hierarchy known to have an unusually close social relationship with a particular publisher or broadcast executive.1
James Angleton, who was recently removed as the Agency’s head of counterintelligence operations, ran a completely independent group of journalist‑operatives who performed sensitive and frequently dangerous assignments; little is known about this group for the simple reason that Angleton deliberately kept only the vaguest of files.
The CIA even ran a formal training program in the 1950s to teach its agents to be journalists. Intelligence officers were “taught to make noises like reporters,” explained a high CIA official, and were then placed in major news organizations with help from management. “These were the guys who went through the ranks and were told ‘You’re going to he [sic] a journalist,’” the CIA official said. Relatively few of the 400‑some relationships described in Agency files followed that pattern, however; most involved persons who were already bona fide journalists when they began undertaking tasks for the Agency.
The Agency’s relationships with journalists, as described in CIA files, include the following general categories:
■ Legitimate, accredited staff members of news organizations—usually reporters. Some were paid; some worked for the Agency on a purely voluntary basis. This group includes many of the best‑known journalists who carried out tasks for the CIA. The files show that the salaries paid to reporters by newspaper and broadcast networks were sometimes supplemented by nominal payments from the CIA, either in the form of retainers, travel expenses or outlays for specific services performed. Almost all the payments were made in cash. The accredited category also includes photographers, administrative personnel of foreign news bureaus and members of broadcast technical crews.)
Two of the Agency’s most valuable personal relationships in the 1960s, according to CIA officials, were with reporters who covered Latin America—Jerry O’Leary of the Washington Star and Hal Hendrix of the Miami News, a Pulitzer Prize winner who became a high official of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation. Hendrix was extremely helpful to the Agency in providing information about individuals in Miami’s Cuban exile community. O’Leary was considered a valued asset in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Agency files contain lengthy reports of both men’s activities on behalf of the CIA.
O’Leary maintains that his dealings were limited to the normal give‑and‑take that goes on between reporters abroad and their sources. CIA officials dispute the contention: “There’s no question Jerry reported for us,” said one. “Jerry did assessing and spotting [of prospective agents] but he was better as a reporter for us.” Referring to O’Leary’s denials, the official added: “I don’t know what in the world he’s worried about unless he’s wearing that mantle of integrity the Senate put on you journalists.”
O’Leary attributes the difference of opinion to semantics. “I might call them up and say something like, ‘Papa Doc has the clap, did you know that?’ and they’d put it in the file. I don’t consider that reporting for them…. it’s useful to be friendly to them and, generally, I felt friendly to them. But I think they were more helpful to me than I was to them.” O’Leary took particular exception to being described in the same context as Hendrix. “Hal was really doing work for them,” said O’Leary. “I’m still with the Star. He ended up at ITT.” Hendrix could not be reached for comment. According to Agency officials, neither Hendrix nor O’Leary was paid by the CIA.
■ Stringers2 and freelancers. Most were payrolled by the Agency under standard contractual terms. Their journalistic credentials were often supplied by cooperating news organizations. some filed news stories; others reported only for the CIA. On some occasions, news organizations were not informed by the CIA that their stringers were also working for the Agency.
■ Employees of so‑called CIA “proprietaries.” During the past twenty‑five years, the Agency has secretly bankrolled numerous foreign press services, periodicals and newspapers—both English and foreign language—which provided excellent cover for CIA operatives. One such publication was the Rome Daily American, forty percent of which was owned by the CIA until the 1970s. The Daily American went out of business this year,
■ Editors, publishers and broadcast network executives. The CIAs relationship with most news executives differed fundamentally from those with working reporters and stringers, who were much more subject to direction from the Agency. A few executives— [CFR member] Arthur Hays Sulzberger of the New York Times among them—signed secrecy agreements. But such formal understandings were rare: relationships between Agency officials and media executives were usually social—”The P and Q Street axis in Georgetown,” said one source. “You don’t tell [CFR member] Wilharn Paley to sign a piece of paper saying he won’t fink.”
■ Columnists and commentators. There are perhaps a dozen well known columnists and broadcast commentators whose relationships with the CIA go far beyond those normally maintained between reporters and their sources. They are referred to at the Agency as “known assets” and can be counted on to perform a variety of undercover tasks; they are considered receptive to the Agency’s point of view on various subjects. Three of the most widely read columnists who maintained such ties with the Agency are [CFR member] C.L. Sulzberger of the New York Times, Joseph Alsop, and the late Stewart Alsop, whose column appeared in the New York Herald‑Tribune, the Saturday Evening Post and Newsweek. CIA files contain reports of specific tasks all three undertook. [CFR member] Sulzberger is still regarded as an active asset by the Agency. According to a senior CIA official, “Young Cy Sulzberger had some uses…. He signed a secrecy agreement because we gave him classified information…. There was sharing, give and take. We’d say, ‘Wed like to know this; if we tell you this will it help you get access to so‑and‑so?’ Because of his access in Europe he had an Open Sesame. We’d ask him to just report: ‘What did so‑and‑so say, what did he look like, is he healthy?’ He was very eager, he loved to cooperate.” On one occasion, according to several CIA officials, Sulzberger was given a briefing paper by the Agency which ran almost verbatim under the columnist’s byline in the Times. “[CFR member] Cy came out and said, ‘I’m thinking of doing a piece, can you give me some background?’” a CIA officer said. “We gave it to [CFR member] Cy as a background piece and [CFR member] Cy gave it to the printers and put his name on it.” [CFR member] Sulzberger denies that any incident occurred. “A lot of baloney,” he said.
[CFR member] Sulzberger claims that he was never formally “tasked” by the Agency and that he “would never get caught near the spook business. My relations were totally informal—I had a goodmany friends,” he said. “I’m sure they consider me an asset. They can ask me questions. They find out you’re going to Slobovia and they say, ‘Can we talk to you when you get back?’ … Or they’ll want to know if the head of the Ruritanian government is suffering from psoriasis. But I never took an assignment from one of those guys…. I’ve known [CFR member] Wisner well, and [CFR member] Helms and even [CFR member] McCone [former [CFR member] CIA director John McCone] I used to play golf with. But they’d have had to be awfully subtle to have used me.
[CFR member] Sulzberger says he was asked to sign the secrecy agreement in the 1950s. “A guy came around and said, ‘You are a responsible newsman and we need you to sign this if we are going to show you anything classified.’ I said I didn’t want to get entangled and told them, ‘Go to my uncle [[CFR member] Arthur Hays Sulzberger, then publisher of the New York Times] and if he says to sign it I will.’” His [CFR member] uncle subsequently signed such an agreement, [CFR member] Sulzberger said, and he thinks he did too, though he is unsure. “I don’t know, twenty‑some years is a long time.” He described the whole question as “a bubble in a bathtub.”
Stewart Alsop’s relationship with the Agency was much more extensive than [CFR member] Sulzberger’s. One official who served at the highest levels in the CIA said flatly: “Stew Alsop was a CIA agent.” An equally senior official refused to define Alsop’s relationship with the Agency except to say it was a formal one. Other sources said that Alsop was particularly helpful to the Agency in discussions with, officials of foreign governments—asking questions to which the CIA was seeking answers, planting misinformation advantageous to American policy, assessing opportunities for CIA recruitment of well‑placed foreigners.
“Absolute nonsense,” said Joseph Alsop of the notion that his brother was a CIA agent. “I was closer to the Agency than Stew was, though Stew was very close. I dare say he did perform some tasks—he just did the correct thing as an American…. The Founding Fathers [of the CIA] were close personal friends of ours. [CFR member] Dick Bissell [former CIA deputy director] was my oldest friend, from childhood. It was a social thing, my dear fellow. I never received a dollar, I never signed a secrecy agreement. I didn’t have to…. I’ve done things for them when I thought they were the right thing to do. I call it doing my duty as a citizen.
Alsop is willing to discuss on the record only two of the tasks he undertook: a visit to Laos in 1952 at the behest of [CFR member] Frank Wisner, who felt other American reporters were using anti‑American sources about uprisings there; and a visit to the Phillipines in 1953 when the CIA thought his presence there might affect the outcome of an election. “Des FitzGerald urged me to go,” Alsop recalled. “It would be less likely that the election could be stolen [by the opponents of Ramon Magsaysay] if the eyes of the world were on them. I stayed with the ambassador and wrote about what happened.”
Alsop maintains that he was never manipulated by the Agency. “You can’t get entangled so they have leverage on you,” he said. “But what I wrote was true. My view was to get the facts. If someone in the Agency was wrong, I stopped talking to them—they’d given me phony goods.” On one occasion, Alsop said, [CFR member] Richard Helms authorized the head of the Agency’s analytical branch to provide Alsop with information on Soviet military presence along the Chinese border. “The analytical side of the Agency had been dead wrong about the war in Vietnam—they thought it couldn’t be won,” said Alsop. “And they were wrong on the Soviet buildup. I stopped talking to them.” Today, he says, “People in our business would be outraged at the kinds of suggestions that were made to me. They shouldn’t be. The CIA did not open itself at all to people it did not trust. Stew and I were trusted, and I’m proud of it.”
MURKY DETAILS OF CIA RELATIONSHIPS WITH INDIVIDUALS and news organizations began trickling out in 1973 when it was first disclosed that the CIA had, on occasion, employed journalists. Those reports, combined with new information, serve as casebook studies of the Agency’s use of journalists for intelligence purposes. They include:
■ The New York Times. The Agency’s relationship with the Times was by far its most valuable among newspapers, according to CIA officials. From 1950 to 1966, about ten CIA employees were provided Times cover under arrangements approved by the newspaper’s late publisher, Arthur Hays Sulzberger. The cover arrangements were part of a general Times policy—set by Sulzberger—to provide assistance to the CIA whenever possible.
[CFR member] Sulzberger was especially close to [CFR member] Allen Dulles. “At that level of contact it was the mighty talking to the mighty,” said a high‑level CIA official who was present at some of the discussions. “There was an agreement in principle that, yes indeed, we would help each other. The question of cover came up on several occasions. It was agreed that the actual arrangements would be handled by subordinates…. The mighty didn’t want to know the specifics; they wanted plausible deniability.
A senior CIA official who reviewed a portion of the Agency’s files on journalists for two hours onSeptember 15th, 1977, said he found documentation of five instances in which the Times had provided cover for CIA employees between 1954 and 1962. In each instance he said, the arrangements were handled by executives of the Times; the documents all contained standard Agency language “showing that this had been checked out at higher levels of the New York Times,” said the official. The documents did not mention Sulzberger’s name, however—only those of subordinates whom the official refused to identify.
The CIA employees who received Times credentials posed as stringers for the paper abroad and worked as members of clerical staffs in the Times’ foreign bureaus. Most were American; two or three were foreigners.
CIA officials cite two reasons why the Agency’s working relationship with the Times was closer and more extensive than with any other paper: the fact that the Times maintained the largest foreign news operation in American daily journalism; and the close personal ties between the men who ran both institutions.
[CFR member] Sulzberger informed a number of reporters and editors of his general policy of cooperation with the Agency. “We were in touch with them—they’d talk to us and some cooperated,” said a CIA official. The cooperation usually involved passing on information and “spotting” prospective agents among foreigners.
[CFR member] Arthur Hays Sulzberger signed a secrecy agreement with the CIA in the 1950s, according to CIA officials—a fact confirmed by his nephew, [CFR member] C.L. Sulzberger. However, there are varying interpretations of the purpose of the agreement: [CFR member] C.L. Sulzberger says it represented nothing more than a pledge not to disclose classified information made available to the publisher. That contention is supported by some Agency officials. Others in the Agency maintain that the agreement represented a pledge never to reveal any of the Times’ dealings with the CIA, especially those involving cover. And there are those who note that, because all cover arrangements are classified, a secrecy agreement would automatically apply to them.
Attempts to find out which individuals in the Times organization made the actual arrangements for providing credentials to CIA personnel have been unsuccessful. In a letter to reporter Stuart Loory in 1974, Turner Cadedge, managing editor of the Times from 1951 to 1964, wrote that approaches by the CIA had been rebuffed by the newspaper. “I knew nothing about any involvement with the CIA… of any of our foreign correspondents on the New York Times. I heard many times of overtures to our men by the CIA, seeking to use their privileges, contacts, immunities and, shall we say, superior intelligence in the sordid business of spying and informing. If any one of them succumbed to the blandishments or cash offers, I was not aware of it. Repeatedly, the CIA and other hush‑hush agencies sought to make arrangements for ‘cooperation’ even with Times management, especially during or soon after World War II, but we always resisted. Our motive was to protect our credibility.”
According to Wayne Phillips, a former Times reporter, the CIA invoked [CFR member] Arthur Hays Sulzberger’s name when it tried to recruit him as an undercover operative in 1952 while he was studying at Columbia University’s Russian Institute. Phillips said an Agency official told him that the CIA had “a working arrangement” with the publisher in which other reporters abroad had been placed on the Agency’s payroll. Phillips, who remained at the Times until 1961, later obtained CIA documents under the Freedom of Information Act which show that the Agency intended to develop him as a clandestine “asset” for use abroad.
On January 31st, 1976, the Times carried a brief story describing the ClAs attempt to recruit Phillips. It quoted [CFR member] Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, the present publisher, as follows: “I never heard of the Times being approached, either in my capacity as publisher or as the son of the late Mr. Sulzberger.” The Times story, written by John M. Crewdson, also reported that Arthur Hays Sulzberger told an unnamed former correspondent that he might he approached by the CIA after arriving at a new post abroad. Sulzberger told him that he was not “under any obligation to agree,” the story said and that the publisher himself would be “happier” if he refused to cooperate. “But he left it sort of up to me,” the Times quoted its former reporter as saying. “The message was if I really wanted to do that, okay, but he didn’t think it appropriate for a Times correspondent”
[CFR member] C.L. Sulzberger, in a telephone interview, said he had no knowledge of any CIA personnel using Times cover or of reporters for the paper working actively for the Agency. He was the paper’s chief of foreign service from 1944 to 1954 and expressed doubt that his uncle would have approved such arrangements. More typical of the late publisher, said [CFR member] Sulzberger, was a promise made to [CFR member] Allen Dulles’ brother, [CFR member] John Foster, then secretary of state, that no Times staff member would be permitted to accept an invitation to visit the People’s Republic of China without [CFR member] John Foster Dulles’ consent. Such an invitation was extended to the publisher’s nephew in the 1950s; Arthur Sulzberger forbade him to accept it. “It was seventeen years before another Times correspondent was invited,” [CFR member] C.L. Sulzberger recalled.
■ The Columbia Broadcasting System. CBS was unquestionably the CIAs most valuable broadcasting asset. CBS President [CFR member] William Paley and [CFR member] Allen Dulles enjoyed an easy working and social relationship. Over the years, the network provided cover for CIA employees, including at least one well‑known foreign correspondent and several stringers; it supplied outtakes of newsfilm to the CIA3; established a formal channel of communication between the Washington bureau chief and the Agency; gave the Agency access to the CBS newsfilm library; and allowed reports by CBS correspondents to the Washington and New York newsrooms to be routinely monitored by the CIA. Once a year during the 1950s and early 1960s, CBS correspondents joined the CIA hierarchy for private dinners and briefings.
The details of the CBS‑CIA arrangements were worked out by subordinates of both [CFR member] Dulles and [CFR member] Paley. “The head of the company doesn’t want to know the fine points, nor does the director,” said a CIA official. “Both designate aides to work that out. It keeps them above the battle.” [CFR member] Dr. Frank Stanton, for 25 years president of the network, was aware of the general arrangements Paley made with Dulles—including those for cover, according to CIA officials. [CFR member] Stanton, in an interview last year, said he could not recall any cover arrangements.) But [CFR member] Paley’s designated contact for the Agency was [CFR member] Sig Mickelson, president of CBS News between 1954 and 1961. On one occasion, [CFR member] Mickelson has said, he complained to [CFR member] Stanton about having to use a pay telephone to call the CIA, and [CFR member] Stanton suggested he install a private line, bypassing the CBS switchboard, for the purpose. According to [CFR member] Mickelson, he did so. [CFR member] Mickelson is now president of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, both of which were associated with the CIA for many years.
In 1976, CBS News president Richard Salant ordered an in‑house investigation of the network’s dealings with the CIA. Some of its findings were first disclosed by Robert Scheer in the Los Angeles Times.) But Salant’s report makes no mention of some of his own dealings with the Agency, which continued into the 1970s.
Many details about the CBS‑CIA relationship were found in [CFR member] Mickelson’s files by two investigators for Salant. Among the documents they found was a September 13th, 1957, memo to [CFR member] Mickelson fromTed Koop, CBS News bureau chief in Washington from 1948 to 1961. It describes a phone call to Koop from Colonel Stanley Grogan of the CIA: “Grogan phoned to say that Reeves [J. B. Love Reeves, another CIA official] is going to New York to be in charge of the CIA contact office there and will call to see you and some of your confreres. Grogan says normal activities will continue to channel through the Washington office of CBS News.” The report to Salant also states: “Further investigation of [CFR member] Mickelson’s files reveals some details of the relationship between the CIA and CBS News…. Two key administrators of this relationship were Mickelson and Koop…. The main activity appeared to be the delivery of CBS newsfilm to the CIA…. In addition there is evidence that, during 1964 to 1971, film material, including some outtakes, were supplied by the CBS Newsfilm Library to the CIA through and at the direction of Mr. Koop4…. Notes in Mr. [CFR member] Mickelson’s files indicate that the CIA used CBS films for training… All of the above [CFR member] Mickelson activities were handled on a confidential basis without mentioning the words Central Intelligence Agency. The films were sent to individuals at post‑office box numbers and were paid for by individual, nor government, checks. …” [CFR member] Mickelson also regularly sent the CIA an internal CBS newsletter, according to the report.
Salant’s investigation led him to conclude that Frank Kearns, a CBS‑TV reporter from 1958 to 1971, “was a CIA guy who got on the payroll somehow through a CIA contact with somebody at CBS.” Kearns and Austin Goodrich, a CBS stringer, were undercover CIA employees, hired under arrangements approved by Paley.
Last year a spokesman for [CFR member] Paley denied a report by former CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr that [CFR member] Mickelson and he had discussed Goodrich’s CIA status during a meeting with two Agency representatives in 1954. The spokesman claimed [CFR member] Paley had no knowledge that Goodrich had worked for the CIA. “When I moved into the job I was told by [CFR member] Paley that there was an ongoing relationship with the CIA,” [CFR member] Mickelson said in a recent interview. “He introduced me to two agents who he said would keep in touch. We all discussed the Goodrich situation and film arrangements. I assumed this was a normal relationship at the time. This was at the height of the Cold War and I assumed the communications media were cooperating—though the Goodrich matter was compromising.
At the headquarters of CBS News in New York, [CFR member] Paley’s cooperation with the CIA is taken for granted by many news executives and reporters, despite tile denials. Paley, 76, was not interviewed by Salant’s investigators. “It wouldn’t do any good,” said one CBS executive. “It is the single subject about which his memory has failed.”
Salant discussed his own contacts with the CIA, and the fact he continued many of his predecessor’s practices, in an interview with this reporter last year. The contacts, he said, began in February 1961, “when I got a phone call from a CIA man who said he had a working relationship with [CFR member] Sig Mickelson. The man said, ‘Your bosses know all about it.'” According to Salant, the CIA representative asked that CBS continue to supply the Agency with unedited newstapes and make its correspondents available for debriefingby Agency officials. Said Salant: “I said no on talking to the reporters, and let them see broadcast tapes, but no outtakes. This went on for a number of years—into the early Seventies.”
In 1964 and 1965, Salant served on a super-secret CIA task force which explored methods of beaming American propaganda broadcasts to the People’s Republic of China. The other members of the four‑man study team were [CFR member] Zbigniew Brzezinski, then a professor at Columbia University; William Griffith, then professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology., and John Haves, then vice‑president of the Washington Post Company for radio‑TV5. The principal government officials associated with the project were [CFR member] Cord Meyer of the CIA; [CFR member] McGeorge Bundy, then special assistant to the president for national security; [CFR member] Leonard Marks, then director of the USIA; and [CFR member] Bill Moyers, then special assistant to President Lyndon Johnson and now a CBS correspondent.
Salant’s involvement in the project began with a call from [CFR member] Leonard Marks, “who told me the White House wanted to form a committee of four people to make a study of U.S. overseas broadcasts behind the Iron Curtain.” When Salant arrived in Washington for the first meeting he was told that the project was CIA sponsored. “Its purpose,” he said, “was to determine how best to set up shortwave broadcasts into Red China.” Accompanied by a CIA officer named Paul Henzie, the committee of four subsequently traveled around the world inspecting facilities run by Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty both CIA‑run operations at the time), the Voice of America and Armed Forces Radio. After more than a year of study, they submitted a report to [CFR member] Moyers recommending that the government establish a broadcast service, run by the Voice of America, to be beamed at the People’s Republic of China. Salant has served two tours as head of CBS News, from 1961‑64 and 1966‑present. At the time of the China project he was a CBS corporate executive.)
■ Time and Newsweek magazines. According to CIA and Senate sources, Agency files contain written agreements with former foreign correspondents and stringers for both the weekly news magazines. The same sources refused to say whether the CIA has ended all its associations with individuals who work for the two publications. [CFR member] Allen Dulles often interceded with his good friend, the late [CFR member] Henry Luce, founder of Time and Life magazines, who readily allowed certain members of his staff to work for the Agency and agreed to provide jobs and credentials for other CIA operatives who lacked journalistic experience.
For many years, [CFR member] Luce’s personal emissary to the CIA was [CFR member] C.D. Jackson, a Time Inc., vice‑president who was publisher of Life magazine from 1960 until his death in 1964.While a Time executive, [CFR member] Jackson coauthored a CIA‑sponsored study recommending the reorganization of the American intelligence services in the early 1950s. [CFR member] Jackson, whose Time‑Life service was interrupted by a one‑year White House tour as an assistant to [CFR member] President Dwight Eisenhower, approved specific arrangements for providing CIA employees with Time‑Life cover. Some of these arrangements were made with the knowledge of [CFR member] Luce’s wife, [CFR member] Clare Boothe. Other arrangements for Time cover, according to CIA officials including those who dealt with Luce), were made with the knowledge of [CFR member] Hedley Donovan, now editor‑in‑chief of Time Inc. [CFR member] Donovan, who took over editorial direction of all Time Inc. publications in 1959, denied in a telephone interview that he knew of any such arrangements. “I was never approached and I’d be amazed if [CFR member] Luce approved such arrangements,” [CFR member] Donovan said. “[CFR member] Luce had a very scrupulous regard for the difference between journalism and government.”
In the 1950s and early 1960s, Time magazine’s foreign correspondents attended CIA “briefing” dinners similar to those the CIA held for CBS. And[CFR member] Luce, according to CIA officials, made it a regular practice to brief [CFR member] Dulles or other high Agency officials when he returned from his frequent trips abroad. Luce and the men who ran his magazines in the 1950s and 1960s encouraged their foreign correspondents to provide help to the CIA, particularly information that might be useful to the Agency for intelligence purposes or recruiting foreigners.
At Newsweek, Agency sources reported, the CIA engaged the services of’ several foreign correspondents and stringers under arrangements approved by senior editors at the magazine. Newsweek’s stringer in Rome in the mid‑Fifties made little secret of the fact that he worked for the CIA. [CFR member] Malcolm Muir, Newsweek’s editor from its founding in 1937 until its sale to the Washington Post Company in 1961, said in a recent interview that his dealings with the CIA were limited to private briefings he gave [CFR member] Allen Dulles after trips abroad and arrangements he approved for regular debriefing of Newsweek correspondents by the Agency. He said that he had never provided cover for CIA operatives, but that others high in the Newsweek organization might have done so without his knowledge.
“I would have thought there might have been stringers who were agents, but I didn’t know who they were,” said [CFR member] Muir. “I do think in those days the CIA kept pretty close touch with all responsible reporters. Whenever I heard something that I thought might be of interest to [CFR member] Allen Dulles, I’d call him up…. At one point he appointed one of his CIA men to keep in regular contact with our reporters, a chap that I knew but whose name I can’t remember. I had a number of friends in [CFR member] Alien Dulles’ organization.” [CFR member] Muir said that Harry Kern, Newsweek’s foreign editor from 1945 until 1956, and [CFR member] Ernest K. Lindley, the magazine’s Washington bureau chief during the same period “regularly checked in with various fellows in the CIA.”
“To the best of my knowledge.” said Kern, “nobody at Newsweek worked for the CIA… The informal relationship was there. Why have anybody sign anything? What we knew we told them [the CIA] and the State Department…. When I went to Washington, I would talk to [CFR member] Foster or [CFR member] Allen Dulles about what was going on. … We thought it was admirable at the time. We were all on the same side.” CIA officials say that Kern’s dealings with the Agency were extensive. In 1956, he left Newsweek to run Foreign Reports, a Washington‑based newsletter whose subscribers Kern refuses to identify.
[CFR member] Ernest Lindley, who remained at Newsweek until 1961, said in a recent interview that he regularly consulted with [CFR member] Dulles and other high CIA officials before going abroad and briefed them upon his return. “Allen was very helpful to me and I tried to reciprocate when I could,” he said. “I’d give him my impressions of people I’d met overseas. Once or twice he asked me to brief a large group of intelligence people; when I came back from the Asian‑African conference in 1955, for example; they mainly wanted to know about various people.”
As Washington bureau chief, [CFR member] Lindley said he learned from [CFR member] Malcolm Muir that the magazine’s stringer in southeastern Europe was a CIA contract employee—given credentials under arrangements worked out with the management. “I remember it came up—whether it was a good idea to keep this person from the Agency; eventually it was decided to discontinue the association,” [CFR member] Lindley said.
When Newsweek was purchased by the Washington Post Company, publisher [CFR member] Philip L. Graham [brother of former senator Bob Graham] was informed by Agency officials that the CIA occasionally used the magazine for cover purposes, according to CIA sources. “It was widely known that [CFR member] Phil Graham was somebody you could get help from,” said a former deputy director of the Agency. “[CFR member] Frank Wisner dealt with him.” [CFR member] Wisner, deputy director of the CIA from 1950 until shortly before his suicide in 1965, was the Agency’s premier orchestrator of “black” operations, including many in which journalists were involved. [CFR member] Wisner liked to boast of his “mighty Wurlitzer,” a wondrous propaganda instrument he built, and played, with help from the press.) [CFR member] Phil Graham was probably [CFR member] Wisner’s closest friend. But [CFR member] Graham, who committed suicide in 1963, apparently knew little of the specifics of any cover arrangements with Newsweek, CIA sources said.
In 1965‑66, an accredited Newsweek stringer in the Far East was in fact a CIA contract employee earning an annual salary of $10,000 from the Agency, according to Robert T. Wood, then a CIA officer in the Hong Kong station. Some, Newsweek correspondents and stringers continued to maintain covert ties with the Agency into the 1970s, CIA sources said.
Information about Agency dealings with the Washington Post newspaper is extremely sketchy. According to CIA officials, some Post stringers have been CIA employees, but these officials say they do not know if anyone in the Post management was aware of the arrangements.
All editors‑in‑chief and managing editors of the Post since 1950 say they knew of no formal Agency relationship with either stringers or members of the Post staff. “If anything was done it was done by[CFR member] Phil without our knowledge,” said one. Agency officials, meanwhile, make no claim that Post staff members have had covert affiliations with the Agency while working for the paper.6
[CFR member] Katharine Graham, P[CFR member] hilip Graham’s widow and the current publisher of the Post, says she has never been informed of any CIA relationships with either Post or Newsweek personnel. In November of 1973, [CFR member] Mrs. Graham called [CFR member] William Colby and asked if any Post stringers or staff members were associated with the CIA. [CFR member] Colby assured her that no staff members were employed by the Agency but refused to discuss the question of stringers.
■ The Louisville Courier‑Journal. From December 1964 until March 1965, a CIA undercover operative named Robert H. Campbell worked on the Courier‑Journal. According to high‑level CIA sources, Campbell was hired by the paper under arrangements the Agency made with Norman E. Isaacs, then executive editor of the Courier‑Journal. [CFR member] Barry Bingham Sr., then publisher of the paper, also had knowledge of the arrangements, the sources said. Both Isaacs and Bingham have denied knowing that Campbell was an intelligence agent when he was hired.
The complex saga of Campbell’s hiring was first revealed in a Courier‑Journal story written by James R Herzog on March 27th, 1976, during the Senate committee’s investigation, Herzog’s account began: “When 28‑year‑old Robert H. Campbell was hired as a Courier‑Journal reporter in December 1964, he couldn’t type and knew little about news writing.” The account then quoted the paper’s former managing editor as saying that Isaacs told him that Campbell was hired as a result of a CIA request: “Norman said, when he was in Washington [in 1964], he had been called to lunch with some friend of his who was with the CIA [and that] he wanted to send this young fellow down to get him a little knowledge of newspapering.” All aspects of Campbell’s hiring were highly unusual. No effort had been made to check his credentials, and his employment records contained the following two notations: “Isaacs has files of correspondence and investigation of this man”; and, “Hired for temporary work—no reference checks completed or needed.”
The level of Campbell’s journalistic abilities apparently remained consistent during his stint at the paper, “The stuff that Campbell turned in was almost unreadable,” said a former assistant city editor. One of Campbell’s major reportorial projects was a feature about wooden Indians. It was never published. During his tenure at the paper, Campbell frequented a bar a few steps from the office where, on occasion, he reportedly confided to fellow drinkers that he was a CIA employee.
According to CIA sources, Campbell’s tour at the Courier‑Journal was arranged to provide him with a record of journalistic experience that would enhance the plausibility of future reportorial cover and teach him something about the newspaper business. The Courier‑Journal’s investigation also turned up the fact that before coming to Louisville he had worked briefly for the Hornell, New York, Evening Tribune, published by Freedom News, Inc. CIA sources said the Agency had made arrangements with that paper’s management to employ Campbell.7
At the Courier‑Journal, Campbell was hired under arrangements made with Isaacs and approved by [CFR member] Bingham, said CIA and Senate sources. “We paid the Courier‑Journal so they could pay his salary,” said an Agency official who was involved in the transaction. Responding by letter to these assertions, Isaacs, who left Louisville to become president and publisher of the Wilmington Delaware) News & Journal, said: “All I can do is repeat the simple truth—that never, under any circumstances, or at any time, have I ever knowingly hired a government agent. I’ve also tried to dredge my memory, but Campbell’s hiring meant so little to me that nothing emerges…. None of this is to say that I couldn’t have been ‘had.’” [CFR member] Barry Bingham Sr., said last year in a telephone interview that he had no specific memory of Campbell’s hiring and denied that he knew of any arrangements between the newspaper’s management and the CIA. However, CIA officials said that the Courier‑Journal, through contacts with [CFR member] Bingham, provided other unspecified assistance to the Agency in the 1950s and 1960s. The Courier‑Journal’s detailed, front‑page account of Campbell’s hiring was initiated by Barry Bingham Jr., who succeeded his father as editor and publisher of the paper in 1971. The article is the only major piece of self‑investigation by a newspaper that has appeared on this subject.8
■ The American Broadcasting Company and the National Broadcasting Company. According to CIA officials, ABC continued to provide cover for some CIA operatives through the 1960s. One was Sam Jaffe who CIA officials said performed clandestine tasks for the Agency. Jaffe has acknowledged only providing the CIA with information. In addition, another well‑known network correspondent performed covert tasks for the Agency, said CIA sources. At the time of the Senate bearings, Agency officials serving at the highest levels refused to say whether the CIA was still maintaining active relationships with members of the ABC‑News organization. All cover arrangements were made with the knowledge off ABC executives, the sources said.
These same sources professed to know few specifies about the Agency’s relationships with NBC, except that several foreign correspondents of the network undertook some assignments for the Agency in the 1950s and 1960s. “It was a thing people did then,” said Richard Wald, president of NBC News since 1973. “I wouldn’t be surprised if people here—including some of the correspondents in those days—had connections with the Agency.”
■ The Copley Press, and its subsidiary, the Copley News Service. This relationship, first disclosed publicly by reporters Joe Trento and Dave Roman in Penthouse magazine, is said by CIA officials to have been among the Agency’s most productive in terms of getting “outside” cover for its employees. Copley owns nine newspapers in California and Illinois—among them the San Diego Union and Evening Tribune. The Trento‑Roman account, which was financed by a grant from the Fund for Investigative Journalism, asserted that at least twenty‑three Copley News Service employees performed work for the CIA. “The Agency’s involvement with the Copley organization is so extensive that it’s almost impossible to sort out,” said a CIA official who was asked about the relationship late in 1976. Other Agency officials said then that James S. Copley, the chain’s owner until his death in 1973, personally made most of the cover arrangements with the CIA.
According to Trento and Roman, Copley personally volunteered his news service to then‑president [CFR member] Eisenhower to act as “the eyes and ears” against “the Communist threat in Latin and Central America” for “our intelligence services.” James Copley was also the guiding hand behind the Inter‑American Press Association, a CIA‑funded organization with heavy membership among right‑wing Latin American newspaper editors.
■ Other major news organizations. According to Agency officials, CIA files document additional cover arrangements with the following news‑gathering organizations, among others: the New York Herald‑Tribune, the Saturday‑Evening Post, Scripps‑Howard Newspapers, Hearst Newspapers Seymour K. Freidin, Hearst’s current London bureau chief and a former Herald‑Tribune editor and correspondent, has been identified as a CIA operative by Agency sources), Associated Press,9 United Press International, the Mutual Broadcasting System, Reuters and the Miami Herald. Cover arrangements with the Herald, according to CIA officials, were unusual in that they were made “on the ground by the CIA station in Miami, not from CIA headquarters.
“And that’s just a small part of the list,” in the words of one official who served in the CIA hierarchy. Like many sources, this official said that the only way to end the uncertainties about aid furnished the Agency by journalists is to disclose the contents of the CIA files—a course opposed by almost all of the thirty‑five present and former CIA officials interviewed over the course of a year.
COLBY CUTS HIS LOSSES
THE CIA’S USE OF JOURNALISTS CONTINUED VIRTUALLY unabated until 1973 when, in response to public disclosure that the Agency had secretly employed American reporters, [CFR member] William Colby began scaling down the program. In his public statements, [CFR member] Colby conveyed the impression that the use of journalists had been minimal and of limited importance to the Agency.
He then initiated a series of moves intended to convince the press, Congress and the public that the CIA had gotten out of the news business. But according to Agency officials, [CFR member] Colby had in fact thrown a protective net around his valuable intelligence in the journalistic community. He ordered his deputies to maintain Agency ties with its best journalist contacts while severing formal relationships with many regarded as inactive, relatively unproductive or only marginally important. In reviewing Agency files to comply with [CFR member] Colby’s directive, officials found that many journalists had not performed useful functions for the CIA in years. Such relationships, perhaps as many as a hundred, were terminated between 1973 and 1976.
Meanwhile, important CIA operatives who had been placed on the staffs of some major newspaper and broadcast outlets were told to resign and become stringers or freelancers, thus enabling [CFR member] Colby to assure concerned editors that members of their staffs were not CIA employees. [CFR member] Colby also feared that some valuable stringer‑operatives might find their covers blown if scrutiny of the Agency’s ties with journalists continued. Some of these individuals were reassigned to jobs on so‑called proprietary publications—foreign periodicals and broadcast outlets secretly funded and staffed by the CIA. Other journalists who had signed formal contracts with the CIA—making them employees of the Agency—were released from their contracts, and asked to continue working under less formal arrangements.
In November 1973, after many such shifts had been made, [CFR member] Colby told reporters and editors from the New York Times and the Washington Star that the Agency had “some three dozen” American newsmen “on the CIA payroll,” including five who worked for “general‑circulation news organizations.” Yet even while the Senate Intelligence Committee was holding its hearings in 1976, according to high‑level CIA sources, the CIA continued to maintain ties with seventy‑five to ninety journalists of every description—executives, reporters, stringers, photographers, columnists, bureau clerks and members of broadcast technical crews. More than half of these had been moved off CIA contracts and payrolls but they were still bound by other secret agreements with the Agency. According to an unpublished report by the House Select Committee on Intelligence, chaired by Representative Otis Pike, at least fifteen news organizations were still providing cover for CIA operatives as of 1976.
[CFR member] Colby, who built a reputation as one of the most skilled undercover tacticians in the CIA’s history, had himself run journalists in clandestine operations before becoming director in 1973. But even he was said by his closest associates to have been disturbed at how extensively and, in his view, indiscriminately, the Agency continued to use journalists at the time he took over. “Too prominent,” the director frequently said of some of the individuals and news organizations then working with the CIA. Others in the Agency refer to their best‑known journalistic assets as “brand names.”)
“[CFR member] Colby’s concern was that he might lose the resource altogether unless we became a little more careful about who we used and how we got them,” explained one of the former director’s deputies. The thrust of [CFR member] Colby’s subsequent actions was to move the Agency’s affiliations away from the so‑called “majors” and to concentrate them instead in smaller newspaper chains, broadcasting groups and such specialized publications as trade journals and newsletters.
After [CFR member] Colby left the Agency on January 28th, 1976, and was succeeded by [CFR member] George [H.W.] Bush, the CIA announced a new policy: “Effective immediately, the CIA will not enter into any paid or contractual relationship with any full‑time or part‑time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station” At the time of the announcement, the Agency acknowledged that the policy would result in termination of less than half of the relationships with the 50 U.S. journalists it said were still affiliated with the Agency. The text of the announcement noted that the CIA would continue to “welcome” the voluntary, unpaid cooperation of journalists. Thus, many relationships were permitted to remain intact.
The Agency’s unwillingness to end its use of journalists and its continued relationships with some news executives is largely the product of two basic facts of the intelligence game: journalistic cover is ideal because of the inquisitive nature of a reporter’s job; and many other sources of institutional cover have been denied the CIA in recent years by businesses, foundations and educational institutions that once cooperated with the Agency.
“It’s tough to run a secret agency in this country,” explained one high‑level CIA official. “We have a curious ambivalence about intelligence. In order to serve overseas we need cover. But we have been fighting a rear‑guard action to try and provide cover. The Peace Corps is off‑limits, so is USIA, the foundations and voluntary organizations have been off‑limits since ‘67, and there is a self‑imposed prohibition on Fulbrights [Fulbright Scholars]. If you take the American community and line up who could work for the CIA and who couldn’t there is a very narrow potential. Even the Foreign Service doesn’t want us. So where the hell do you go? Business is nice, but the press is a natural. One journalist is worth twenty agents. He has access, the ability to ask questions without arousing suspicion.”
ROLE OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
DESPITE THE EVIDENCE OF WIDESPREAD CIA USE OF journalists, the Senate Intelligence Committee and its staff decided against questioning any of the reporters, editors, publishers or broadcast executives whose relationships with the Agency are detailed in CIA files.
According to sources in the Senate and the Agency, the use of journalists was one of two areas of inquiry which the CIA went to extraordinary lengths to curtail. The other was the Agency’s continuing and extensive use of academics for recruitment and information gathering purposes.
In both instances, the sources said, former directors Colby and Bush and CIA special counsel Mitchell Rogovin were able to convince key members of the committee that full inquiry or even limited public disclosure of the dimensions of the activities would do irreparable damage to the nation’s intelligence‑gathering apparatus, as well as to the reputations of hundreds of individuals. [CFR member] Colby was reported to have been especially persuasive in arguing that disclosure would bring on a latter‑day “witch hunt” in which the victims would be reporters, publishers and editors.
Walter Elder, deputy to former CIA director[CFR member] McCone and the principal Agency liaison to the Church committee [CFR member Frank Church, Idaho, Chairman), argued that the committee lacked jurisdiction because there had been no misuse of journalists by the CIA; the relationships had been voluntary. Elder cited as an example the case of the Louisville Courier‑Journal. “Church and other people on the committee were on the chandelier about the Courier‑Journal,” one Agency official said, “until we pointed out that we had gone to the editor to arrange cover, and that the editor had said, ‘Fine.’”
Some members of the Church committee [five of whom were CFR members see below} and staff feared that Agency officials had gained control of the inquiry and that they were being hoodwinked. “The Agency was extremely clever about it and the committee played right into its hands,” said one congressional source familiar with all aspects of the inquiry. “Church and some of the other members were much more interested in making headlines than in doing serious, tough investigating. The Agency pretended to be giving up a lot whenever it was asked about the flashy stuff—assassinations and secret weapons and James Bond operations. Then, when it came to things that they didn’t want to give away, that were much more important to the Agency, Colby in particular called in his chits. And the committee bought it.”
The Senate committee’s investigation into the use of journalists was supervised by William B. Bader, a former CIA intelligence officer who returned briefly to the Agency this year as deputy to CIA director [CFR member] Stansfield Turner and is now a high‑level intelligence official at the Defense Department. Bader was assisted by [CFR member] David Aaron, who now serves as the deputy to [CFR member] Zbigniew Brzezinski, [CFR member] President Carter’s national security adviser.
According to colleagues on the staff of the Senate inquiry, both Bader and [CFR member] Aaron were disturbed by the information contained in CIA files about journalists; they urged that further investigation he undertaken by the Senate’s new permanent CIA oversight committee. That committee, however, has spent its first year of existence writing a new charter for the CIA, and members say there has been little interest in delving further into the CIA’s use of the press.
Bader’s investigation was conducted under unusually difficult conditions. His first request for specific information on the use of journalists was turned down by the CIA on grounds that there had been no abuse of authority and that current intelligence operations might he compromised. Senators Walter Huddleston, Howard Baker, [CFR member] Gary Hart, [CFR member] Walter Mondale and [CFR member] Charles Mathias—who had expressed interest in the subject of the press and the CIA—shared Bader’s distress at the CIA’s reaction. In a series of phone calls and meetings with [CFR member] CIA director George [H.W.] Bush and other Agency officials, the senators insisted that the committee staff be provided information about the scope of CIA‑press activities. Finally, [CFR member] Bush agreed to order a search of the files and have those records pulled which deals with operations where journalists had been used. But the raw files could not he made available to Bader or the committee, [CFR member] Bush insisted. Instead, the director decided, his deputies would condense the material into one‑paragraph summaries describing in the most general terms the activities of each individual journalist. Most important, [CFR member] Bush decreed, the names of journalists and of the news organizations with which they were affiliated would be omitted from the summaries. However, there might be some indication of the region where the journalist had served and a general description of the type of news organization for which he worked.
Assembling the summaries was difficult, according to CIA officials who supervised the job. There were no “journalist files” per se and information had to be collected from divergent sources that reflect the highly compartmentalized character of the CIA. Case officers who had handled journalists supplied some names. Files were pulled on various undercover operations in which it seemed logical that journalists had been used. Significantly, all work by reporters for the Agency under the category of covert operations, not foreign intelligence.) Old station records were culled. “We really had to scramble,” said one official.
After several weeks, Bader began receiving the summaries, which numbered over 400 by the time the Agency said it had completed searching its files.
The Agency played an intriguing numbers game with the committee. Those who prepared the material say it was physically impossible to produce all of the Agency’s files on the use of journalists. “We gave them a broad, representative picture,” said one agency official. “We never pretended it was a total description of the range of activities over 25 years, or of the number of journalists who have done things for us.” A relatively small number of the summaries described the activities of foreign journalists—including those working as stringers for American publications. Those officials most knowledgeable about the subject say that a figure of 400 American journalists is on the low side of the actual number who maintained covert relationships and undertook clandestine tasks.
Bader and others to whom he described the contents of the summaries immediately reached some general conclusions: the sheer number of covert relationships with journalists was far greater than the CIA had ever hinted; and the Agency’s use of reporters and news executives was an intelligence asset of the first magnitude. Reporters had been involved in almost every conceivable kind of operation. Of the 400‑plus individuals whose activities were summarized, between 200 and 250 were “working journalists” in the usual sense of the term—reporters, editors, correspondents, photographers; the rest were employed at least nominally) by book publishers, trade publications and newsletters.
Still, the summaries were just that: compressed, vague, sketchy, incomplete. They could be subject to ambiguous interpretation. And they contained no suggestion that the CIA had abused its authority by manipulating the editorial content of American newspapers or broadcast reports.
Bader’s unease with what he had found led him to seek advice from several experienced hands in the fields of foreign relations and intelligence[both areas in which most experienced hands were CFR members]. They suggested that he press for more information and give those members of the committee in whom he had the most confidence a general idea of what the summaries revealed. Bader again went to Senators Huddleston, Baker, [CFR member] Hart, [CFR member] Mondale and [CFR member] Mathias. Meanwhile, he told the CIA that he wanted to see more—the full files on perhaps a hundred or so of the individuals whose activities had been summarized. The request was turned down outright. The Agency would provide no more information on the subject. Period.
The CIA’s intransigence led to an extraordinary dinner meeting at Agency headquarters in late March 1976. Those present included Senators [CFR member] Frank Church who had now been briefed by Bader), and [CFR member] John Tower, the vice‑chairman of the committee; Bader; William Miller, director of the committee staff; [CFR member] CIA director Bush; Agency counsel Rogovin; and Seymour Bolten, a high‑level CIA operative who for years had been a station chief in Germany and Willy Brandt’s case officer. Bolten had been deputized by [CFR member] Bush to deal with the committee’s requests for information on journalists and academics. At the dinner, the Agency held to its refusal to provide any full files. Nor would it give the committee the names of any individual journalists described in the 400 summaries or of the news organizations with whom they were affiliated. The discussion, according to participants, grew heated. The committee’s representatives said they could not honor their mandate—to determine if the CIA had abused its authority—without further information. The CIA maintained it could not protect its legitimate intelligence operations or its employees if further disclosures were made to the committee. Many of the journalists were contract employees of the Agency, [CFR member] Bush said at one point, and the CIA was no less obligated to them than to any other agents.
Finally, a highly unusual agreement was hammered out: Bader and Miller would be permitted to examine “sanitized” versions of the full files of twenty‑five journalists selected from the summaries; but the names of the journalists and the news organizations which employed them would be blanked out, as would the identities of other CIA employees mentioned in the files. [CFR member] Church and [CFR member] Tower would be permitted to examine the unsanitized versions of five of the twenty‑five files—to attest that the CIA was not hiding anything except the names. The whole deal was contingent on an agreement that neither Bader, Miner, [CFR member] Tower nor [CFR member] Church would reveal the contents of the files to other members of the committee or staff.
Bader began reviewing the 400‑some summaries again. His object was to select twenty‑five that, on the basis of the sketchy information they contained, seemed to represent a cross section. Dates of CIA activity, general descriptions of news organizations, types of journalists and undercover operations all figured in his calculations.
From the twenty‑five files he got back, according to Senate sources and CIA officials, an unavoidable conclusion emerged: that to a degree never widely suspected, the CIA in the 1950s, ‘60s and even early ‘70s had concentrated its relationships with journalists in the most prominent sectors of the American press corps, including four or five of the largest newspapers in the country, the broadcast networks and the two major newsweekly magazines. Despite the omission of names and affiliations from the twenty‑five detailed files each was between three and eleven inches thick), the information was usually sufficient to tentatively identify either the newsman, his affiliation or both—particularly because so many of them were prominent in the profession.
“There is quite an incredible spread of relationships,” Bader reported to the senators. “You don’t need to manipulate Time magazine, for example, because there are Agency people at the management level.”
Ironically, one major news organization that set limits on its dealings with the CIA, according to Agency officials, was the one with perhaps the greatest editorial affinity for the Agency’s long‑range goals and policies: U.S. News and World Report. The late [CFR member] David Lawrence, the columnist and founding editor of U.S. News, was a close friend of [CFR member] Allen Dulles. But he repeatedly refused requests by the CIA director to use the magazine for cover purposes, the sources said. At one point, according to a high CIA official, [CFR member] Lawrence issued orders to his sub‑editors in which he threatened to fire any U.S. News employee who was found to have entered into a formal relationship with the Agency. Former editorial executives at the magazine confirmed that such orders had been issued. CIA sources declined to say, however, if the magazine remained off‑limits to the Agency after [CFR member] Lawrence’s death in 1973 or if [CFR member] Lawrence’s orders had been followed.)
Meanwhile, Bader attempted to get more information from the CIA, particularly about the Agency’s current relationships with journalists. He encountered a stone wall. “[CFR member] Bush has done nothing to date,” Bader told associates. “None of the important operations are affected in even a marginal way.” The CIA also refused the staffs requests for more information on the use of academics. [CFR member] Bush began to urge members of the committee to curtail its inquiries in both areas and conceal its findings in the final report. “He [CFR member Bush] kept saying, ‘Don’t fuck these guys in the press and on the campuses,’ pleading that they were the only areas of public life with any credibility left,” reported a Senate source. [CFR member] Colby, Elder and Rogovin also implored individual members of the committee to keep secret what the staff had found. “There were a lot of representations that if this stuff got out some of the biggest names in journalism would get smeared,” said another source. Exposure of the CIA’s relationships with journalists and academics, the Agency feared, would close down two of the few avenues of agent recruitment still open. “The danger of exposure is not the other side,” explained one CIA expert in covert operations. “This is not stuff the other side doesn’t know about. The concern of the Agency is that another area of cover will be denied.”
A senator who was the object of the Agency’s lobbying later said: “From the CIA point of view this was the highest, most sensitive covert program of all…. It was a much larger part of the operational system than has been indicated.” He added, “I had a great compulsion to press the point but it was late …. If we had demanded, they would have gone the legal route to fight it.”
Indeed, time was running out for the committee. In the view of many staff members, it had squandered its resources in the search for CIA assassination plots and poison pen letters. It had undertaken the inquiry into journalists almost as an afterthought. The dimensions of the program and the CIA’s sensitivity to providing information on it had caught the staff and the committee by surprise. The CIA oversight committee that would succeed the Church panel would have the inclination and the time to inquire into the subject methodically; if, as seemed likely, the CIA refused to cooperate further, the mandate of the successor committee would put it in a more advantageous position to wage a protracted fight …. Or so the reasoning went as [CFR member] Church and the few other senators even vaguely familiar with Bader’s findings reached a decision not to pursue the matter further. No journalists would be interviewed about their dealings with the Agency—either by the staff or by the senators, in secret or in open session. The specter, first raised by CIA officials, of a witch hunt in the press corps haunted some members of the staff and the committee. “We weren’t about to bring up guys to the committee and then have everybody say they’ve been traitors to the ideals of their profession,” said a senator.
Bader, according to associates, was satisfied with the decision and believed that the successor committee would pick up the inquiry where he had left it. He was opposed to making public the names of individual journalists. He had been concerned all along that he had entered a “gray area” in which there were no moral absolutes. Had the CIA “manipulated” the press in the classic sense of the term? Probably not, he concluded; the major news organizations and their executives had willingly lent their resources to the Agency; foreign correspondents had regarded work for the CIA as a national service and a way of getting better stories and climbing to the top of their profession. Had the CIA abused its authority? It had dealt with the press almost exactly as it had dealt with other institutions from which it sought cover — the diplomatic service, academia, corporations. There was nothing in the CIA’s charter which declared any of these institutions off‑limits to America’s intelligence service. And, in the case of the press, the Agency had exercised more care in its dealings than with many other institutions; it had gone to considerable lengths to restrict its role to information‑gathering and cover.10
Bader was also said to be concerned that his knowledge was so heavily based on information furnished by the CIA; he hadn’t gotten the other side of the story from those journalists who had associated with the Agency. He could be seeing only “the lantern show,” he told associates. Still, Bader was reasonably sure that he had seen pretty much the full panoply of what was in the files. If the CIA had wanted to deceive him it would have never given away so much, he reasoned. “It was smart of the Agency to cooperate to the extent of showing the material to Bader,” observed a committee source. “That way, if one fine day a file popped up, the Agency would be covered. They could say they had already informed the Congress.”
The dependence on CIA files posed another problem. The CIA’s perception of a relationship with a journalist might be quite different than that of the journalist: a CIA official might think he had exercised control over a journalist; the journalist might think he had simply had a few drinks with a spook. It was possible that CIA case officers had written self‑serving memos for the files about their dealings with journalists, that the CIA was just as subject to common bureaucratic “cover‑your‑ass” paperwork as any other agency of government.
A CIA official who attempted to persuade members of the Senate committee that the Agency’s use of journalists had been innocuous maintained that the files were indeed filled with “puffing” by case officers. “You can’t establish what is puff and what isn’t,” he claimed. Many reporters, he added, “were recruited for finite [specific] undertakings and would be appalled to find that they were listed [in Agency files] as CIA operatives.” This same official estimated that the files contained descriptions of about half a dozen reporters and correspondents who would be considered “famous”—that is, their names would be recognized by most Americans. “The files show that the CIA goes to the press for and just as often that the press comes to the CIA,” he observed. “…There is a tacit agreement in many of these cases that there is going to be a quid pro quo”—i.e., that the reporter is going to get good stories from the Agency and that the CIA will pick up some valuable services from the reporter.
Whatever the interpretation, the findings of the Senate committees inquiry into the use of journalists were deliberately buried—from the full membership of the committee, from the Senate and from the public. “There was a difference of opinion on how to treat the subject,” explained one source. “Some [senators] thought these were abuses which should be exorcized and there were those who said, ‘We don’t know if this is bad or not.’”
Bader’s findings on the subject were never discussed with the full committee, even in executive session. That might have led to leaks—especially in view of the explosive nature of the facts. Since the beginning of the Church committee’s investigation, leaks had been the panel’s biggest collective fear, a real threat to its mission. At the slightest sign of a leak the CIA might cut off the flow of sensitive information as it did, several times in other areas), claiming that the committee could not be trusted with secrets. “It was as if we were on trial—not the CIA,” said a member of the committee staff. To describe in the committee’s final report the true dimensions of the Agency’s use of journalists would cause a furor in the press and on the Senate floor. And it would result in heavy pressure on the CIA to end its use of journalists altogether. “We just weren’t ready to take that step,” said a senator. A similar decision was made to conceal the results of the staff’s inquiry into the use of academics. Bader, who supervised both areas of inquiry, concurred in the decisions and drafted those sections of the committee’s final report. Pages 191 to 201 were entitled “Covert Relationships with the United States Media.” “It hardly reflects what we found,” stated [CFR member] Senator Gary Hart. “There was a prolonged and elaborate negotiation [with the CIA] over what would be said.”
Obscuring the facts was relatively simple. No mention was made of the 400 summaries or what they showed. Instead the report noted blandly that some fifty recent contacts with journalists had been studied by the committee staff—thus conveying the impression that the Agency’s dealings with the press had been limited to those instances. The Agency files, the report noted, contained little evidence that the editorial content of American news reports had been affected by the CIA’s dealings with journalists. [CFR member] Colby’s misleading public statements about the use of journalists were repeated without serious contradiction or elaboration. The role of cooperating news executives was given short shrift. The fact that the Agency had concentrated its relationships in the most prominent sectors of the press went unmentioned. That the CIA continued to regard the press as up for grabs was not even suggested.
Former ‘Washington Post’ reporter CARL BERNSTEIN is now working on a book about the witch hunts of the Cold War.
1 [CFR member] John McCone, director of the Agency from 1961 to 1965, said in a recent interview that he knew about “great deal of debriefing and exchanging help” but nothing about any arrangements for cover the CIA might have made with media organizations. “I wouldn’t necessarily have known about it,” he said. “Helms would have handled anything like that. It would be unusual for him to come to me and say, ‘We’re going to use journalists for cover.’ He had a job to do. There was no policy during my period that would say, ‘Don’t go near that water,’ nor was there one saying, ‘Go to it!'” During the Church committee bearings, [CFR member] McCone testified that his subordinates failed to tell him about domestic surveillance activities or that they were working on plans to assassinate Fidel Castro. [CFR member] Richard Helms was deputy director of the Agency at the time; he became director in 1966.
2 A stringer is a reporter who works for one or several news organizations on a retainer or on a piecework basis.
3 From the CIA point of view, access to newsfilm outtakes and photo libraries is a matter of extreme importance. The Agency’s photo archive is probably the greatest on earth; its graphic sources include satellites, photoreconnaissance, planes, miniature cameras … and the American press. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Agency obtained carte‑blanche borrowing privileges in the photo libraries of literally dozens of American newspapers, magazines and television, outlets. For obvious reasons, the CIA also assigned high priority to the recruitment of photojournalists, particularly foreign‑based members of network camera crews.
4 On April 3rd, 1961, Koop left the Washington bureau to become head of CBS, Inc.’s Government Relations Department — a position he held until his retirement on March 31st, 1972. Koop, who worked as a deputy in the Censorship Office in World War II, continued to deal with the CIA in his new position, according to CBS sources.
5 Hayes, who left the Washington Post Company in 1965 to become U.S. Ambassador to Switzerland, is now chairman of the board of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty — both of which severed their ties with the CIA in 1971. Hayes said he cleared his participation in the China project with the late Frederick S. Beebe, then chairman of the board of the Washington Post Company. Katharine Graham, the Post’s publisher, was unaware of the nature of the assignment, he said. Participants in the project signed secrecy agreements.
6 [CFR member] Philip Geyelin, editor of the Post editorial page, worked for the Agency before joining the Post.
7 Louis Buisch, presidentof the publishing company of the Hornell, New York, Evening Tribune, told the Courier‑Journal in 1976 that he remembered little about the hiring of Robert Campbell. “He wasn’t there very long, and he didn’t make much of an impression,” said Buisch, who has since retired from active management of the newspaper.
8 Probably the most thoughtful article on the subject of the press and the CIA was written by Stuart H. Loory and appeared in the September‑October 1974 issue of Columbia Journalism Review.
9 Wes Gallagher, general manager of the Associated Press from 1962 to 1976, takes vigorous exception to the notion that the Associated Press might have aided the Agency. “We’ve always stayed clear on the CIA; I would have fired anybody who worked for them. We don’t even let our people debrief.” At the time of the first disclosures that reporters had worked for the CIA, Gallagher went to [CFR member] Colby. “We tried to find out names. All he would say was that no full‑time staff member of the Associated Press was employed by the Agency. We talked to [CFR member] Bush. He said the same thing.” If any Agency personnel were placed in Associated Press bureaus, said Gallagher, it was done without consulting the management of the wire service. But Agency officials insist that they were able to make cover arrangements through someone in the upper management levels of Associated Press, whom they refuse to identify.
10 Many journalists and some CIA officials dispute the Agency’s claim that it has been scrupulous in respecting the editorial integrity of American publications and broadcast outlets.