How Council on Foreign Relations Republican Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Republican Justice Anthony Kennedy, and Republican Justice David Souter used their positions to help divide and conquer the bewildered herd


The way the CFR works is clearly explained by the famous journalist Walter Lippmann. Lippmann was a member of America’s first intelligence organization the INQUIRY, attended the Paris Peace Conference after World War I, and was a founding father of the Council on Foreign Relations. Central to Lippmann’s strategy of achieving government and international relations policy aims were large scale psycho-political operations aimed at the masses. Lippmann and his fellow Council on Foreign Relations members considered themselves superior to their fellows. Lippmann clearly shows how Council on Foreign Relations members feel about us in his book Public opinion, “The public must be put in its place…so that each of us may live free of the trampling and the roar of a bewildered herd.’” The Council on Foreign Relations believes that controlling the minds of the masses is essential to the proper functioning of a modern democracy. The Council on Foreign Relations control of main stream media along with their control of U.S. intelligence organizations is used to achieve these ends.

bernays lippmann

Natural law is the foundation of the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution and religion. We are being taught to forget both human nature and the God who created it. Four Council on Foreign Relations members have been Supreme Court justices: Sandra Day O’Conner, Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Neil Gorsuch. The Council on Foreign Relations are using the Supreme Court to interpret our rights to Life, Liberty and Happiness in fanciful and destructive ways. This results in insurmountable societal divisions used to divide and conquer the bewildered herd by setting us against each other and creating polarized politics.

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) member Republican Justice Sandra Day O’Conner helped the CFR achieve this result in the Planned Parenthood vs Casey, SCOTUS 5-4 decision, in June of 1992. Sandra Day O’Conner and republican justices Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter provided decisive swing votes to uphold Roe Vs. Wade. Their decision upholding the right to abortion stated: “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”

This statement redefines liberty. It suggests there is no universal or absolute set of moral principles by which liberty is bound and we can do anything at all. How can our Creator have created us equal if we have the liberty to define ourselves as better than our neighbors? If  O’Conner’s, Kennedy’s and Souter’s liberty were the liberty defended by the Declaration, we could never have formed a society at all.

natural law

The Declaration of Independence reminds us our freedom comes from the Laws of Nature and the Laws of God  When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”

Thomas Jefferson reminds us “Rightful liberty is unobstructed action according to our will within limits drawn around us by the equal rights of others. I do not add ‘within the limits of the law’ because law is often but the tyrant’s will, and always so when it violates the rights of the individual.”

Thomas Jefferson made the “Golden Rule” the foundation of American Democracy by changing John Locke’s Natural rights law from Life, Liberty and Property to the inalienable rights of Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness. The change insures decisions driven by civic virtue instead of selfishness. The change resulted from Jefferson’s understanding of the “Golden Rule” and his struggle with slavery. The original draft of the Declaration of Independence contained a scathing denunciation of slavery: : “he has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life & liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating & carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their transportation thither. this piratical warfare, the opprobrium of infidel powers, is the warfare of the CHRISTIAN king of Great Britain. determined to keep open a market where MEN should be bought & sold, he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or to restrain this execrable commerce and that this assemblage of horrors might want no fact of distinguished die, he is now exciting those very people to rise in arms among us, and to purchase that liberty of which he has deprived them, by murdering the people upon whom he also obtruded them; thus paying off former crimes committed against the liberties of one people, with crimes which he urges them to commit against the lives of another.”

Jefferson’s change declares it immoral and illegal to consider one person the property of another. If you would be unhappy being owned by someone else it follows that it is wrong to consider another person your property. If the original draft of the Declaration of Independence had been approved there would have been no slavery after the revolution of 1776. The original draft was not approved, slavery was not abolished, and a civil war was fought leaving a legacy of bitterness in America still felt today.

Jefferson advantages of religion

In John Locke’s Second Treatise of Civil Government John Locke (1690) CHAP. IV. Of Slavery, Locke uses Natural Law to show why laws of man permitting slavery are wrong.

Sec.22. THE natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his rule. The liberty of man, in society, is to be under no other legislative power, but that established, by consent, in the commonwealth; nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall enact, according to the trust put in it. Freedom then is not what Sir Robert Filmer tells us, Observations, A. 55. a liberty for every one to do what he lists, to live as he pleases, and not to be tied by any laws: but freedom of men under government is, to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man: as freedom of nature is, to be under no other restraint but the law of nature.

Sec.23. This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to, and closely joined with a man’s preservation, that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his preservation and life together: for a man, not having the power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or his own consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of another, to take away his life, when he pleases. No body can give more power than he has himself; and he that cannot take away his own life, cannot give another power over it. Indeed, having by his fault forfeited his own life, by some act that deserves death; he, to whom he has forfeited it, may (when he has him in his power) delay to take it, and make use of him to his own service, and he does him no injury by it: for, whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery outweigh the value of his life, it is in his power, by resisting the will of his master, to draw on himself the death he desires.

Sec.24. This is the perfect condition of slavery, which is nothing else, but the state of war continued, between a lawful conqueror and a captive: for, if once compact enter between them, and make an agreement for a limited power on the one side, and obedience on the other, the state of war and slavery ceases, as long as the compact endures: for, as has been said, no man can, by agreement, pass over to another that which he hath not in himself, a power over his own life.

I confess, we find among the Jews, as well as other nations, that men did sell themselves; but, it is plain, this was only to drudgery, not to slavery: for, it is evident, the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary, despotical power: for the master could not have power to kill him, at any time, whom, at a certain time, he was obliged to let go free out of his service; and the master of such a servant was so far from having an arbitrary power over his life, that he could not, at pleasure, so much as maim him, but the loss of an eye, or tooth, set him free, Exod. xxi.”

In his Letter from Birmingham jail Martin Luther King Jr. makes clear the distinction between just and unjust laws One may well ask: “How can you advocate breaking some laws and obeying others?”   The answer lies in the fact that there are two types of laws: just and unjust.  I would be the first to advocate obeying just laws.  One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws.  Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws.  I would agree with St. Augustine that “an unjust law is no law at all.”

Now, what is the difference between the two?  How does one determine whether a law is just or unjust?  A just law is a man made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God.  An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law.  To put it in the terms of St. Thomas Aquinas:  An unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law.   Any law that uplifts human personality is just.  Any law that degrades human personality is unjust.”

Council on Foreign Relations member Sandra Day O’Connor and her fellow justices are wrong. “the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life” are not at the heart of liberty. Natural law and the Golden Rule are at the heart of religion, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. They are the law and moral code that will guarantee our rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Natural law and the Golden Rule are at the heart of liberty.

Sanday Day O'Connor Anthony Kennedy David Souter Clarence Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg

Council on Foreign Relations Member Republican Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Republican Justice Anthony Kennedy, Republican Justice David Souter, Clarence Thomas, Council on Foreign Relations Member Ruth Bader Ginsberg

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The CIA Story — a page the CIA decided to take down

CIA Missing Web Page of CFR members McCloy and Donovan’s creation of the the CIA. Missing reference to McCloy and Donovan Council On Foreign Relations membership. Click this link and use the CFR membership chart to help connect the CFR dots.

This webpage used to be posted on the CIA website. After I started posting the page and asking questions why the CIA history didn’t mention that McCloy and Donovan were CIA

Webpage in The Wayback Machine

Central Intelligence Agency

The Work Of A Nation. The Center of Intelligence

The Creation of the Central Intelligence Group


The Creation of the Central Intelligence Group


Editor’s Note: This article is an expanded version of one that appeared under the same title in the fall 1995 edition of Studies in Intelligence.

January 1996 marked the 50th anniversary of President Truman’s appointment of the first Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the creation of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), CIA’s institutional predecessor. The office diary of the President’s chief military adviser, Flt. Admr. William D. Leahy, records a rather unexpected event on 24 January 1946:

At lunch today in the White House, with only members of the Staff present, RAdm. Sidney Souers and I were presented [by President Truman] with black cloaks, black hats, and wooden daggers, and the President read an amusing directive to us outlining some of our duties in the Central Intelligence Agency [sic], “Cloak and Dagger Group of Snoopers.”(1)

With this whimsical ceremony, President Truman christened Admiral Souers as the first DCI.

The humor and symbolism of this inauguration would have been lost on many veterans of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the big intelligence and covert action agency that Truman had suddenly dismantled at the end of World War II, only four months earlier. CIG inevitably suffered (and still suffers) from comparisons with OSS. The Group began its brief existence with a phony cape and a wooden dagger. It was a bureaucratic anomaly with no independent budget, no statutory mandate, and staffers assigned from the permanent departments of the government. Nevertheless, CIG grew rapidly and soon gained a fair measure of organizational autonomy. The Truman administration invested it with the two basic missions of strategic warning and coordination of clandestine activities abroad, although interdepartmental rivalries prevented the Group from performing either mission to the fullest. Strategic warning and clandestine activities are the two basic missions of today’s CIA.(2)

Historical accounts of Truman’s dissolution of OSS and creation of CIG have concentrated on assigning credit to certain actors and blame to their opponents and rivals.(3) The passage of time and the gradually expanding availability of sources, however, promise to foster more holistic approaches to this subject.

The problem for the Truman administration that fall of 1945 was that no one, including the President, knew just what he wanted, while each department and intelligence service knew fully what sorts of results it wanted to avoid. With this context in mind, it is informative to view the formation of CIG with an eye toward the way administration officials preserved certain essential functions of OSS and brought them together again in a centralized, peacetime foreign intelligence agency. Those decisions created a permanent intelligence structure that, while still incomplete, preserved some of the most useful capabilities of the old OSS while resting on a firmer institutional foundation.

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From War to Peace

Before World War II, the US Government had not seen fit to centralize either strategic warning or clandestine activities, let alone combine both missions in a single organization. The exigencies of global conflict persuaded Washington to build a formidable intelligence apparatus in Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan’s Office of the Coordinator of Information (renamed OSS in 1942), America’s first nondepartmental intelligence arm. As such, it encountered resentment from such established services as the FBI and the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff (better known as the G-2).

General Donovan advocated the creation of a limited but permanent foreign intelligence service after victory, mentioning the idea at several points during the war.(4) President Roosevelt made no promises, however, and, after Roosevelt’s death in April 1945 and the German surrender that May, President Truman felt no compulsion to keep OSS alive. He disliked Donovan (perhaps fearing that Donovan’s proposed intelligence establishment might one day be used against Americans).(5) The President and his top military advisers also knew that America’s wartime intelligence success had been built on cryptologic successes, in which OSS had played only a supporting role. Signals intelligence was the province of the Army and Navy, two jealous rivals that only barely cooperated; not even General Donovan contemplated centralized, civilian control of this field.

Major-General William J. Donovan

Truman could have tried to transform OSS into a central intelligence service conducting clandestine collection, analysis, and operations abroad. He declined the opportunity and dismantled OSS instead. Within three years, however, Truman had overseen the creation of a central intelligence service conducting clandestine collection, analysis, and operations abroad. Several authors have concluded from the juxtaposition of these facts that Truman dissolved OSS out of ignorance, haste, and pique, and that he tacitly admitted his mistake when he endorsed the reassembly of many OSS functions in the new CIA. Even Presidential aide Clark Clifford has complained that Truman “prematurely, abruptly, and unwisely disbanded the OSS.”(6)

A look at the mood in Washington, however, places Truman’s decision in a more favorable light. At the onset of the postwar era, the nation and Congress wanted demobilization–fast. OSS was already marked for huge reductions because so many of its personnel served with guerrilla, commando, and propaganda units considered extraneous in peacetime. Congress regarded OSS as a temporary “war agency,” one of many bureaucratic hybrids raised for the national emergency that would have to be weeded out after victory.(7) Indeed, early in 1945 Congress passed a law requiring the White House to seek a specific Congressional appropriation for any new agency operating for longer than 12 months.(8) This obstacle impeded any Presidential wish to preserve OSS or to create a permanent peacetime intelligence agency along the lines of General Donovan’s plan–a path made even slicker by innuendo, spread by Donovan’s rivals, that the General was urging the creation of an “American Gestapo.”(9)

Truman had barely moved into the Oval Office when he received a scathing report on OSS. (Indeed, this same report might well have been the primary source for the abovementioned innuendo) A few months before he died, President Roosevelt had asked an aide, Col. Richard Park, Jr., to conduct an informal investigation of OSS and General Donovan. Colonel Park completed his report in March, but apparently Roosevelt never read it. The day after Roosevelt’s death, Park attended an Oval Office meeting with President Truman. Although no minutes of their discussion survived, Park probably summarized his findings for the new President; in any event, he sent Truman a copy of his report on OSS at about that time. That document castigated OSS for bumbling and lax security, and complained that Donovan’s proposed intelligence reform had ”all the earmarks of a Gestapo system.” Park recommended abolishing OSS, although he conceded that some of the Office’s personnel and activities were worth preserving in other agencies. OSS’s Research and Analysis Branch in particular could be ”salvaged” and given to the State Department.(10)

Donovan himself hardly helped his own cause. OSS was attached to the Executive Office of the President but technically drew its orders and pay from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Donovan refused to compromise on his proposals with JCS representatives delegated to study postwar intelligence needs. He insisted that a permanent intelligence arm ought to answer directly to the President and not to his advisers.(11) The Joint Chiefs had already rescued Donovan once, when the G-2 had tried to subsume OSS in 1943. This time the White House did not ask the Joint Chiefs’ opinion. The JCS stood aside and let the Office meet its fate.

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Taking the Initiative

The White House evidently concluded that the problem was how to create a new peacetime intelligence organization without Donovan and his Office. Many senior advisers in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations believed that the nation needed some sort of permanent intelligence establishment. The Bureau of the Budget took up this issue shortly before President Roosevelt’s death, presenting itself to Roosevelt as a disinterested observer and creating a small team to study the government’s intelligence requirements and recommend possible reforms. Soon after he took office, Truman endorsed the Budget Bureau’s effort.(12)

Donald C. Stone, Bureau of the Budget

In August, the Budget Bureau began drafting liquidation plans for OSS and other war agencies, but initially the Bureau assumed that liquidation could be stretched over a period of time sufficient to preserve OSS’s most valuable assets while the Office liquidated functions and released personnel no longer needed in peacetime. On 27 or 28 August, however, the President or his principal “reconversion” advisers–Budget Director Harold D. Smith, Special Counsel Samuel Rosenman, and Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion John W. Snyder–suddenly recommended dissolving OSS almost immediately.(13) Bureau staffers had already conceived the idea of giving a part of OSS, the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A), to the State Department as “a going concern.” The imminent dissolution of OSS meant that something had to be done fast about the rest of the Office; someone in the Budget Bureau (probably the Assistant Director for Administrative Management, Donald C. Stone) quickly decided that the War Department could receive the remainder of OSS “for salvage and liquidation.”(14) Stone told frustrated OSS officers on 29 August that important functions of the Office might survive:

Stone stated that he felt that the secret and counterintelligence activities of OSS should probably be continued at a fairly high level for probably another year. He said he would support such a program.(15)

Snyder and Rosenman endorsedthe Budget Bureau’s general plan for intelligence reorganization and passed it to Truman on 4 September 1945.(16) Donovan predictably exploded when he learned of the plan, but the President ignored Donovan’s protests, telling Harold Smith on 13 September to “recommend the dissolution of Donovan’s outfit even if Donovan did not like it.”(17) Within a week, the Budget Bureau had the requisite papers ready for the President’s signature. Executive Order 9621 on 20 September dissolved OSS as of 1 October 1945, sending R&A to State and everything else to the War Department. The Order also directed the Secretary of War to liquidate OSS activities “whenever he deems it compatible with the national interest.”(18) That same day, Truman sent a letter of appreciation (drafted by Donald Stone) to General Donovan.(19) The transfer of OSS’s R&A Branch to the State Department, the President told Donovan, marked “the beginning of the development of a coordinated system of foreign intelligence within the permanent framework of the Government.” The President also implicitly repeated Stone’s earlier assurances to OSS, informing Donovan that the War Department would maintain certain OSS components providing “services of a military nature the need for which will continue for some time.”(20)

OSS was through, but what would survive the wreck? The President probably gave little thought to those necessary “services of a military nature” that would somehow continue under War Department auspices. Truman shared the widespread feeling that the government needed better intelligence, although he provided little positive guidance on the matter and said even less about intelligence collection (as opposed to its collation). He commented to Budget Director Harold Smith in September 1945 that he had in mind “a different kind of intelligence service from what this country has had in the past,” a “broad intelligence service attached to the President’s office.”(21) Later remarks clarified these comments slightly. Speaking to an audience of CIA employees in 1952, Truman reminisced that, when he first took office, there had been:

…no concentration of information for the benefit of the President. Each Department and each organization had its own information service, and that information service was walled off from every other service.(22)

Truman’s memoirs subsequently expanded on this point, explaining what was at stake:

I have often thought that if there had been something like coordination of information in the government it would have been more difficult, if not impossible, for the Japanese to succeed in the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor. In those days [1941] the military did not know everything the State Department knew, and the diplomats did not have access to all the Army and Navy knew.(23)

John J. McCloy, Asst Secretary of War

These comments suggest that Truman viewed strategic warning as the primary mission of his new intelligence establishment, and as a function that had to be handled centrally. His remarks also suggest that he innocently viewed intelligence analysis as largely a matter of collation; the facts would speak for themselves, if only they could only be gathered in one place. That is what he wanted his new intelligence service to do.

The Budget Bureau itself had not proposed anything that looked much clearer than the President’s vague notions. Bureau staffers wanted the State Department to serve as the President’s “principal staff agency” in developing “high-level intelligence,” after taking the lead in establishing the “integrated Government-wide Program.”(24) At the same time, however, Budget Bureau officers wanted the departments to continue to conduct their own intelligence functions, rather than relegating this duty to “any single central agency.” A small interagency group, “under the leadership of the State Department,” could coordinate departmental intelligence operations.(25) This proposed program rested on two assumptions that would soon be tested: that the State Department was ready to take the lead, and that the armed services were willing to follow.

In the meantime, Donovan fumed about the President’s decision yet again to Budget Bureau staffers who met with him on 22 September to arrange the details of the OSS’s dissolution. An oversight in the drafting of EO 9621 had left the originally proposed termination date of 1 October unchanged in the final signed version, and now Donovan had less than two weeks to dismantle his sprawling agency. One official of the Budget Bureau subsequently suggested to Donald Stone that the War Department might ease the transition by keeping its portion of OSS functioning “for the time being,” perhaps even with Donovan in charge. Stone preferred someone other than Donovan for this job and promised to discuss the idea with Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy on 24 September.(26)

Two days later, McCloy stepped into the breach. He glimpsed an opportunity to save OSS components as the nucleus of a peacetime intelligence service. A friend of Donovan’s, McCloy had long promoted an improved national intelligence capability.(27) He interpreted the President’s directive as broadly as possible by ordering OSS’s Deputy Director for Intelligence, Brig. Gen. John Magruder, to preserve his Secret Intelligence (SI) and Counterespionage (X-2) Branches “as a going operation” in a new office that McCloy dubbed the “Strategic Services Unit” (SSU):

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This assignment of the OSS activities…is a method of carrying out the desire of the President, as indicated by representatives of the Bureau of the Budget, that these facilities of OSS be examined over the next three months with a view to determining their appropriate disposition. Obviously, this will demand close liaison with the Bureau of the Budget, the State Department, and other agencies of the War Department, to insure that the facilities and assets of OSS are preserved for any possible future use….The situation is one in which the facilities of an organization, normally shrinking in size as a result of the end of fighting, must be preserved so far as potentially of future usefulness to the country.(28)

The following day, the new Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, confirmed this directive and implicitly endorsed McCloy’s interpretation, formally ordering Magruder to “preserve as a unit such of these functions and facilities as are valuable for permanent peacetime purposes” [emphasis added].(29) With this order, Patterson postponed indefinitely any assimilation of OSS’s records and personnel into the War Department’s G-2.

Brig. Gen. John Magruder, OSS Dep. Director

General Magruder soon had to explain this unorthodox arrangement to sharp-eyed Congressmen and staff. Rep. Clarence Cannon, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, asked the general on 2 October about the OSS contingents sent to the State and War Departments and the plans for disposing of OSS’s unspent funds (roughly $4.5 million). Magruder explained that he did not quite know what State would do with R&A; when Cannon asked about the War Department’s contingent, the general read aloud from the Secretary of War’s order to preserve OSS’s more valuable functions “as a unit.”(30) Two weeks later, staffers from the House Military Affairs Committee asked why the War Department suddenly needed both SSU and the G-2:

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General Magruder explained that he had no orders to liquidate OSS (other than, of course, those functions without any peacetime significance) and that only the Assistant Secretary of War [McCloy] could explain why OSS had been absorbed into the War Department on the basis indicated. He said he felt, however,…that the objective was to retain SSU intact until the Secretary of State had surveyed the intelligence field and made recommendations to the President.

Committee staff implicitly conceded that the arrangement made sense, but hinted that both SSU and the remnant of R&A in the State Department ought to be “considerably reduced in size.”(31)

Reducing SSU is just what was occupying the unit’s new Executive Officer, Col. William W. Quinn:

The orders that General Magruder received from the Secretary of War were very simple. He was charged with preserving the intelligence assets created and held by OSS during its existence and the disbandment of paramilitary units, which included the 101 Detachment in Burma and Southeast Asia and other forms of intelligence units, like the Jedburgh teams, and morale operations, et cetera. My initial business was primarily liquidation. The main problem was the discharge of literally thousands of people. Consequently, the intelligence collection effort more or less came to a standstill….(32)

Magruder did his best to sustain morale in the Unit, keeping his deputies informed about high-level debates over “the holy cause of central intelligence,” as he jocularly dubbed it. He suggested optimistically that SSU would survive its current exile:

In the meantime I can assure you there is a great deal of serious thinking in high places regarding the solution that will be made for OSS [SSU]. I hope it will prove fruitful. There is a very serious movement under way to reconstruct some of the more fortunate aspects of our work.(33)

Despite Magruder’s and Quinn’s efforts, the House of Representatives on 17 October lopped $2 million from the OSS terminal budget that SSU shared with the Interim Research and Intelligence Service (IRIS), its erstwhile sister branch now set in the Department of State. The cut directly threatened both SSU and IRIS. The Truman administration eventually convinced Congress to drop the House’s recision and even increase funding for both pieces of OSS, but not until after several anxious weeks in SSU and the War Department.(34)

Institutional enemies closer to hand also seemed to threaten SSU’s independence that fall. Just before Thanksgiving, McCloy warned Secretary Patterson that only “close supervision” could prevent the War Department bureaucracy from taking “the course of least resistance by merely putting [SSU] into what I think is a very unimaginative section of G-2 and thus los[ing] a very valuable and necessary military asset.”(35) General Magruder told his lieutenants that SSU was quietly winning friends in high places, but repeatedly reminded staffers of the need for discretion, noting that “some people” did not like SSU “and the less said about [the Unit] the better.”(36)

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Controversy and Compromise

McCloy (with Stone’s help) had precipitated an inspired bureaucratic initiative that would eventually expand the Truman administration’s options in creating a new intelligence establishment. Amid all the subsequent interagency debates over the new intelligence establishment that autumn, SSU preserved OSS’s foreign intelligence assets for eventual transfer to whichever agency received this responsibility. The Truman administration waged a heated internal argument over which powers to be given to the new central intelligence service. The Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, who quickly agreed that they should oversee the proposed office, stood together against rival plans proposed by the Bureau of the Budget and the FBI. The Army and Navy, however, would not accept the State Department’s insistence that the new office’s director be selected by and accountable to the Secretary of State. The armed services instead preferred a plan outlined by the JCS back in September, which proposed lifting the new intelligence agency outside the Cabinet departments by placing it under a proposed National Intelligence Authority.(37)

President Truman and Sidney Souers

This was the plan that would soon settle the question of where to place SSU. The JCS had been working on this plan for months, having been spurred to action by Donovan’s 1944 campaigning for a permanent peacetime intelligence agency. In September, JCS Chairman William Leahy had transmitted the plan (JCS 1181/5) to the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War, who sent it on to the State Department, where it languished for several weeks. The plan proposed, among other things, that a new “Central Intelligence Agency” should, among its duties, perform:

…such services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished by a common agency, including the direct procurement of intelligence.(38)

This artful ambiguity–“services of common concern”–meant espionage and liaison with foreign intelligence services, the core of clandestine foreign intelligence. Everyone involved with the draft knew this, but no one in the administration or the military wanted to say such things out loud; hence, the obfuscation.(39) In any case, here was another function that the drafters of the JCS plan felt had to be performed, or at least coordinated, ”centrally.”

In December 1945, an impatient President Truman asked to see both the State Department and the JCS proposals and decided that the latter looked simpler and more workable. This decision dashed the Budget Bureau’s original hope that the State Department would lead the government’s foreign intelligence program. Early in the new year, Truman created the CIG, implementing what was in essence a modification of the JCS 1181/5 proposal. He persuaded Capt. (soon to be Rear Admiral) Sidney Souers, the Assistant Chief of Naval Intelligence and a friend of Navy Secretary Forrestal (and Presidential aide Clark Clifford) who had advised the White House on the intelligence debate, to serve for a few months as the first DCI.(40)The CIG formally came into being with the President’s directive of 22 January 1946. Cribbing text from JCS 1181/5, the President authorized CIG to:

…perform, for the benefit of said intelligence agencies, such services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.(41)

Here was the loaded phrase “services of common concern” again, only this time the telltale clause “including the direct procurement of intelligence” had discreetly disappeared. (With minor editing, the phrase would appear yet again in the CIA’s enabling legislation, the National Security Act of 1947.)

Two days later, on 24 January, Truman invited Admiral Souers to the White House to award him his black cape and wooden dagger. Thanks in part to McCloy’s order to preserve OSS’s SI and X-2 Branches, the “cloak and dagger” capability–the “services of common concern” mentioned in the President’s directive–was waiting in the War Department for transfer to the new CIG. General Magruder quietly applauded Souers’s appointment as DCI, explaining to his deputies that SSU might soon be moving:

With respect to SSU, we and the War Department are thinking along the same lines: that at such time as the Director [of Central Intelligence] is ready to start operating, this Unit, its activities, personnel, and facilities will become available to the Director, but as you know, the intent of the President’s [22 January] directive was to avoid setting up an independent agency. Therefore, the Central Intelligence Group, purposely called the Group, will utilize the facilities of several Departments. This Unit will become something in the way of a contribution furnished by the War Department.(42)

Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy had saved the foreign intelligence core of OSS in the SSU; all that was required was for the National Intelligence Authority to approve a method for transferring it. This the NIA did at its third meeting, on 2 April 1946.(43) The actual transfer of SSU personnel began almost as soon as CIG had acquired a new DCI, Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, in June 1946. Vandenberg a month later was able to report matter of factly to the National Intelligence Authority that the tiny CIG had begun to take over “all clandestine foreign intelligence activities,” meaning the much larger SSU. At that same meeting, Admiral Leahy also reminded participants (in a different context) that “it was always understood that CIG eventually would broaden its scope.(44)

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From Small Beginnings

An eminent historian once remarked that the crowning achievement of historical research is to attain an understanding of how things do not happen. To put it simply, history rarely offers up tidy events and clear motivations. President Truman did not follow a neat plan in founding the CIG. He implicitly imposed two broad requirements on his advisers and departments in the fall of 1945: to create a structure that could collate the best intelligence held by the various departments, and to make that structure operate, at least initially, on funds derived from the established agencies. Indeed, the friction and waste in the process that resulted from this vague guidance prompted complaints that the President had acted rashly in dissolving OSS and ignoring the advice of intelligence professionals like Donovan.

In the fall of 1945, the President vaguely wanted a new kind of centralized intelligence service, but his Cabinet departments and existing services knew fairly specifically what kinds of central intelligence they did not want. Between these two realities lay the gray area in which the CIG was founded and grew in 1946. Truman always took credit for assigning CIG the task of providing timely strategic warning and guarding against another Pearl Harbor. CIG acquired its second mission–the conduct of clandestine activities abroad–in large part through the foresight of Donald Stone and John J. McCloy. These two appointees ensured that trained OSS personnel stayed together as a unit ready to join the new peacetime intelligence service. Within months of its creation, CIG had become the nation’s primary agency for strategic warning and the management of clandestine activities abroad, and within two years the Group would bequeath both missions to its successor, the CIA.

The relationship–and tension–between the two missions (strategic warning and clandestine activities) formed the central dynamic in the unfolding early history of CIA. Many officials thought the two should be handled ”centrally”, although not necessarily by a single agency. That they ultimately were combined under one organization (CIG and then CIA) was due largely to the efforts of McCloy and Magruder. Nevertheless, it is clear from the history of the SSU that high-level Truman administration officials acted with the tacit assent of the White House in preserving OSS’s most valuable components to become the nucleus of the nation’s foreign intelligence capability. The President’s actions do not deserve the charge of incompetence that has been leveled against them, but it does seem justified to conclude that Truman’s military advisers deserve most of the credit for the creation of a CIG that could collect as well as collate foreign intelligence.

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(1) Diary of William D. Leahy, 24 January 1946, Library of Congress. Admiral Leahy was simultaneously designated the President’s representative to the new, four-member National Intelligence Authority (CIG’s oversight body). The other members were the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy.

(2) A recent unclassified statement to CIA employees entitled ”Vision, Mission, and Values of the Central Intelligence Agency” identified the following as CIA’s basic missions:”

We support the President, the National Security Council, and all who make and execute US national security policy by:

  • Providing accurate, evidence-based comprehensive and timely foreign intelligence related to national security; and
  • Conducting counterintelligence activities, special activities, and other functions related to foreign intelligence and national security as directed by the President.”

(3) Several authors describe the founding and institutional arrangements of CIG. Three CIA officers had wide access to the relevant records in writing their accounts; see Arthur B. Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1950 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990); Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (Washington, DC: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1981); and Ludwell Lee Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence: October 1950-February 1953 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), pp. 15-35. See also Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA (New York: Basic Books, 1983). B. Nelson MacPherson offers thoughtful commentary in “CIA Origins as Viewed from Within,” Intelligence and National Security, 10 April 1995, pp. 353-359.

(4) Donovan’s “Memorandum for the President,” 18 November 1944, is reprinted in Troy, Donovan and the CIA, pp. 445-447.

(5) Richard Dunlop, Donovan: America’s Master Spy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1982), pp. 467-468. See also Troy, Donovan and the CIA, p. 267.

(6) Clark Clifford, it bears noting, played little if any role in the dissolution of OSS; see Counsel to the President: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 1991, p. 165). William R. Corson calls the affair a “sorry display of presidential bad manners and shortsightedness”; The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire (New York: Dial Press, 1977), p. 247.

(7) The Bureau of the Budget had warned Donovan in September 1944 that OSS would be treated as a war agency to be liquidated after the end of hostilities. See Troy, Donovan and the CIA, pp. 219-220.

(8) The legislation was titled the “Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1945,” Public Law 358, 78th Congress, Second Session.

(9) For an indication of the mixed Congressional attitudes toward OSS, see Smith, The Shadow Warriors, pp. 404-405.

(10) The Park report resides in the Rose A. Conway Files at the Harry S. Truman Library, ”OSS/Donovan” folder; see especially pp. 1-3 and Appendix III. Thomas F. Troy has pointed to strong similarities between the Park report and Walter Trohan’s ”Gestapo” stories in the Chicago Tribune; see Donovan and the CIA, pp. 267, 282.

(11) Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith, pp. 19-21. For more on Donovan’s refusal to compromise, see Troy, Donovan and the CIA, pp. 270-271.

(12) George F. Schwarzwalder, Division of Administrative Management, Bureau of the Budget, project completion report, “Intelligence and Internal Security Program of the Government” [Project 217], 28 November 1947, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 51 (Bureau of the Budget), Series 39.35, “Progress Reports,” Box 181, p. 5.

(13) George Schwarzwalder recorded several years later that the Budget Bureau learned on 24 August that OSS would be dissolved; see his 1947 progress report on Project 217, cited above, p. 9.

(14) Donald C. Stone, Assistant Director for Administrative Management, Bureau of the Budget, to Harold Smith, Director, “Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and the Transfer of its Activities to the State and War Departments,” 27 August 1945, reproduced in C. Thomas Thorne, Jr. and David S. Patterson, editors Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States series (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 22-23. Hereinafter cited as FRUS.

(15) G.E. Ramsey, Jr., Bureau of the Budget, to Deputy Comptroller McCandless, “Conference on OSS with Don Stone and OSS representatives, Aug. 29,” 29 August 1945, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 51 (Bureau of the Budget), Series 39.19, “OSS Organization and Functions,” Box 67.

(16) Smith, Rosenman, and Snyder to Truman, “Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and the Transfer of its Activities to the State and War Departments,” 4 September 1945, Official File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

(17) The quoted phrase comes from Harold Smith’s office diary for 13 September 1945, in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York.

(18) Executive Order 9621, 20 September 1945, FRUS pp. 44-46

(19) Stone’s authorship is noted in Corson, Armies of Ignorance, p. 246.

(20) Harry S. Truman to William J. Donovan, 20 September 1945; Document 4 in Michael Warner, The CIA under Harry Truman (Washington, DC: CIA, 1994)p. 15. See also Troy, Donovan and the CIA, pp. 302-303.

(21) Harold Smith’s office diary entries for 13 and 20 September 1945, Roosevelt Library.

(22) Truman’s speech is reprinted as Document 81 in Warner, The CIA under Harry Truman, p. 471.

(23) Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Volume II, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956), p. 56.

(24) Quoted phrases are in Snyder, Rosenman, and Smith to Truman, 4 September 1945.

(25) Harold D. Smith to Harry S. Truman, “Transfer of Functions of the Office of Strategic Services,” 18 September 1945, Official File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Harry S. Truman Library.

(26) G.E. Ramsey, Jr., Bureau of the Budget, to the Assistant Director for Estimates, Bureau of the Budget, “Disposition of OSS,” 24 September 1945, FRUS, pp. 51-52.

(27) For McCloy’s advocacy of a centralized intelligence capability, see Kai Bird, The Chairman: John J. McCloy, the Making of the American Establishment (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), pp. 129-130.

(28) John J. McCloy to John Magruder, OSS, “Transfer of OSS Personnel and Activities to the War Department and Creation of Strategic Services Unit,” 26 September 1945, FRUS, pp 235-236.

(29) Robert P. Patterson to John Magruder, 27 September 1945, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 319 (Army Intelligence), Decimal File 1941-48, 334 OSS, box 649, “Strategic Services Unit” folder.

(30) US House of Representatives, House Appropriations Committee, “First Supplemental Surplus Appropriation Recision Bill, 1946,” 79th Cong., First Sess., 1945, pp. 615-625.

(31) John R. Schoemer, Jr., Acting General Counsel, Strategic Services Unit, memorandum for the record, “Conference with representatives of House Military Affairs Committee,” 19 October 1945, CIA History Staff HS/CSG-1400, item 14, unclassified.

(32) William W. Quinn, Buffalo Bill Remembers: Truth and Courage (Fowlerville, MI: Wilderness Adventure Books, 1991), p. 240.

(33) SSU Staff Meeting Minutes, 23 October 1945, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 226 (OSS), Entry 190, WASH-DIR-OP-266 (microfilm M1642), Roll 112, folder 1268. General Magruder made his “holy cause” quip at the 29 November meeting.

(34) SSU Staff Meeting Minutes for 19 October, 30 October, and 20 December 1945. Harry S. Truman to Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House of Representatives, 7 November 1945, reprinted in US House of Representatives, “House Miscellaneous Documents II,” 79th Cong., 1st Sess., serial set volume 10970, document 372, with attached letter from Harold D. Smith, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, to President Truman, dated 6 November 1945. First Supplemental Surplus Appropriation Recession Act, 1946, Public Law 79-301, Title 1, 60 Stat. 6, 7, (1946).

(35) McCloy to Patterson, “Central Intelligence Agency,” 13 November 1945, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 107 (War Department), Entry 180, Files of the Assistant Secretary of War, box 5, “Intelligence” folder.

(36) SSU Staff Meeting Minutes for 1 November, 6 November, and 29 November 1945.

(37) Troy, Donovan and the CIA, pp. 297-300, 315, 322.

(38) JCS 1181/5 is attached to William D. Leahy, memorandum for the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, “Establishment of a central intelligence service upon liquidation of OSS,” 19 September 1945; Document 2 in Warner, The CIA under Harry Truman, p. 5.

(39) The term “services of common concern” apparently originated with OSS’s General Magruder and was adopted by a JCS study group; Troy, Donovan and the CIA, p. 233.

(40) Truman, Memoirs, pp. 55-58. See also William Henhoeffer and James Hanrahan, “Notes on the Early DCIs,” Studies in Intelligence (spring 1989), p. 29; also Clifford, Counsel to the President, p. 166.

(41) President Truman to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, 22 January 1946; FRUS, pp. 179-179

(42) SSU Staff Meeting Minutes, 29 January 1946; Magruder praised Souers’s appointment at the 24 January meeting.

(43) National Intelligence Authority, minutes of the NIA’s third meeting, 2 April 1946, CIA History Staff HS/HC-245, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 263 (CIA), History Staff Source Collection.

(44) National Intelligence Authority, minutes of the NIA’s fourth meeting, 17 July 1946; Document 13 in Warner, The CIA under Harry Truman, pp. 56-59.

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Why The fight to preserve the Constitution is worthwhile and one no American who believes in God should back away from.

“The general voice from north to south… calls for a bill of rights. It seems pretty generally understood that this should go to juries, habeas corpus, standing armies, printing, religion and monopolies. I conceive there may be difficulty in finding general modifications of these suited to the habits of all the States. But if such cannot be found, then it is better to establish trials by jury, the right of habeas corpus, freedom of the press, and freedom of religion, in all cases, and to abolish standing armies in time of peace, and monopolies in all cases, than not to do it in any. The few cases wherein these things may do evil cannot be weighed against the multitude wherein the want of them will do evil.” –Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 1788. ME 7:96

In very broad strokes our founding fathers including, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, John Adams, and George Washington believed that Christians should be free to live by their consciences, even if this means breaking the laws of the country in which they live. As you might expect, this attitude brought them into conflict with princes, kings, and lords. And which laws did they refuse to follow? They refused not join armies or even pay taxes that would fund wars. This angered the nobility. It was this type of thinking that would result in the American Revolution.

Thomas Jefferson made the “Golden Rule” the foundation of American Democracy by changing John Locke’s Natural rights law from Life, Liberty and Property to the inalienable rights of Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness. The change ensures that decisions are driven by civic virtue instead of selfishness. The change resulted from Jefferson’s understanding of the “Golden Rule” and his struggle with slavery. The original draft of the Declaration of Independence contained a scathing denunciation of slavery.[1] Jefferson’s change declares it immoral and illegal to consider one person the property of another. If you would be unhappy being owned by someone else it follows that it is wrong to consider another person your property. If the original draft of the Declaration of Independence had been approved there would have been no slavery after the revolution of 1776. The original draft was not approved, slavery was not abolished, and a civil war was fought leaving a legacy of bitterness in America still felt today.

Men like Jefferson, Adams, Madison and Franklin understood there is one God that created all of us. Therefore we are all equal and all members of one race – the human race. They made the Golden Rule the moral compass of US government by including Right To Life Liberty and Happiness in the Declaration of Independence and Constitution. They made a constitution based on God’s Law and Natural law and assuring separation of Church on State. The constitution gives all Americans freedom of religion and freedom of speech. They taught us that doing something to our neighbor that we wouldn’t want them to do to us was wrong.

America is the greatest nation on earth. The Declaration of Independence and US constitution are among the greatest pieces of literature ever written. It is assumed that our rights are God-given, not government given. This is an important assumption in a world run by a ruling elite that considers themselves nobility and are out to destroy religion.

The constitution offers a balanced view of the government’s role and the individual’s responsibility to practice self-control. It is one our finest achievements, and what keeps us unique and a leader in the free world. The fight to preserve the Constitution is worthwhile and one no American should back away from.

Instead of tearing down our founding fathers’ statues we should be teaching our children what great men they were and why. We all should be proud of them and giving us a USA that is unique in protecting our freedom of religion, free speech rights, separating church and state, and treating all people as equals. Our constitution should be adopted by all other nations.

Time for everyone to recall the words of America’s first president, George Washington, in his farewell address.

“Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morali-ty are indispensable supports. … And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.”

1776 – Broadway Musical Comedy about the US Declaration of Independence (1972)

The Birth Of Christ And The Birth Of America Are Linked

Hillsdale College Introduction to the Constitution

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Propaganda and Elite Power

Guest post by
Piers Robinson
  a Professor of Politics, Society and Political Journalism at the Department of Journalism Studies, University of Sheffield. Originally Published by ElitePowerInvestigations which has disappeared from the World Wide Web

Propaganda Architect & Prominent Member of the US Establishment, Edward Bernays

by Piers Robinson
This op-ed was first published on EPIC

Propaganda and manipulative forms of Organised Persuasive Communication (OPC) are central to the exercise of political and economic power and yet, over time, our awareness of these activities has been significantly blunted.
This has not always been the case and, historically, early theorists of propaganda such as Harold Lasswell[1] and Walter Lippman[2] openly advocated the intelligent manipulation of public opinion and, indeed, saw this as essential to democracy. However, as Edward Bernays revealingly noted, ‘propaganda got to be a bad word because of the Germans … using it [during WW1].[3] So what I did was to … find some other words. So we found the words Counsel on Public Relations.’ Since then, a plethora of terms have come to be used to denote activities which, although not always, involve systematic and coordinated strategies to manipulate opinions and behaviours. In addition to public relations, terms such as strategic communication, perception management, political communication, political marketing, advertising, public diplomacy have all helped to obfuscate the manipulative and frequently deceptive communication strategies that powerful actors employ. As Carey wryly notes, ‘the success of business propaganda in persuading us … that we are free from propaganda is one of the most significant achievements of the twentieth century’.[4] For some, such as the late British historian Professor Phil Taylor, these deceptions and self deceptions were profoundly unproductive: he observed that ‘an entire euphemism industry has developed to deflect attention away from the realities of’ propaganda, and that ‘despite the euphemism game, democracies have grown ever more sophisticated at conducting propaganda, however labeled, which only they deny to be propaganda in the first place.’[5]
The consequences of our failure to fully recognise these realities are deleterious for democracy, accountability and, arguably, good decision making. For example, the recent Chilcot Inquiry has, whilst offering a damning indictment of the Blair government and how it took Britain to war in Iraq,  also provided surprisingly revealing information regarding the origins of the Iraq War and the centrality of propaganda to the West’s ‘war on terror’. Indeed, perhaps the most damning information emerging from the 7 year long Chilcot Inquiry relates to the origins of UK involvement in this ill-fated enterprise. As the early parts of the report makes clear, the genesis of British involvement in the Iraq War lay in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 when elements within the US administration sought to take advantage of the event in order to pursue a long standing objective of toppling Saddam Hussein. The report quotes a British embassy report dated 15 September 2001 which states that ‘The “regime-change hawks” in Washington were arguing that a coalition put together for one purpose (against international terrorism) could be used to clear up other problems in the region.’ (Section 3.1, p.324). The report then cites Blair’s considerations with respect to the emerging ‘war on terror’ strategy:
“… in order to give ourselves space [it is important] that we say: “Phase 1 is the military action focused on Afghanistan because it’s there that the perpetrators of 11 September hide.
            “Phase 2 is the medium and longer term campaign against terrorism in all its forms. Of course we will discuss that … This kicks it away for the moment but leaves all options open. We just don’t need it debated freely in public until we know what exactly we want to do; and how we can do it.”
Mr Blair concluded that a “dedicated tightly knit propaganda unit” was required, and suggested that he and President Bush should “talk soon”. In this context, Chilcot also makes clear Blair’s preferred tactic with respect to how to promote the war, and presumably a central output of his suggested ‘tightly knit propaganda unit’, was to effectively exaggerate and mislead with respect to the alleged WMD threat posed by Iraq: ‘The tactics chosen by Mr Blair were to emphasise the threat which Iraq might pose, rather than a more balanced consideration of both Iraq’s capabilities and intent … That remained Mr Blair’s approach in the months that followed”. In a nutshell, this appears to be support from an official source for the thesis that the ‘war on terror’ has been exploited in order to pursue wars to ‘clear up other problems’ and that, as a part of this, Western publics have been manipulated and deceived via propaganda, ‘clever’ strategies and threat exaggeration. Needless to say these findings decidedly open up the need for a full investigation by mainstream academics with regard to the strategic backdrop to the ‘war on terror’ and the Iraq war and its connection with neoconservative aspirations regarding power and influence in the Middle east and the question of resources and oil.
The events surrounding the ‘war on terror’ and the Iraq invasion, of course, are not unique and need to be understood as indicative of a broader systematic problem in democracies whereby power is exercised via manipulation of information and in ways which are frequently corrosive to good governance, justice and democracy. Further examples abound: for example, public awareness of the plight of the Palestinian peoples in the West Bank and Gaza strip, after a few years of optimism following the 1993 Oslo Accords, would appear to have been clouded by robust propaganda aimed at presenting the conflict as one of Israel’s defence against ideological extremists and terrorists, rather than the occupation and progressive take over of land that is allocated, by international law and the United Nations, to the Palestinians. The possibility of anything approaching a reasonable or just settlement for the Palestinians is rapidly slipping away as the living situation in the Gaza strip worsens and more land is taken from Palestinians in the West Bank.[6] Away from the realm of conflict and war, the role of propaganda and persuasion with respect to the tobacco industry, which worked tirelessly for decades to help obscure the health risks of smoking, and also more recently the fossil fuel industry which has sought to sow seeds of doubt regarding human impact on global warming, highlight the role of propaganda (they call it ‘PR’) in the service of big business.[7] In short, propaganda and the ‘intelligent manipulation of the mind’ play a central role in defining issues of our time, are central to the exercise of power, and have profound implications for how we understand governance and the state of our democracy.
Engagement with manipulative propaganda is essential if we are to tackle the major issues of our time. War, climate change, diminishing resources and acute poverty are matters of profound importance now confronting humanity and, if we are to have any hope of grappling with these issues, then people need to be able to learn how to become better informed and to defend themselves against strategies of manipulation and deception. Part of this process involves becoming more aware of the fact that manipulative communication, propaganda, is a key part of the way in which powerful actors wield power in the world. Starting to recognize and to see through these strategies is an essential first step. But much more is needed. Mainstream academia has been surprisingly reluctant toward full on engagement with theorizing and researching manipulative communication and many researchers tend to fall back on the euphemisms of the powerful such as ‘strategic communication’ and ‘perception management’ or ‘PR’. Academics need to start to study more closely the doctrines, practices and institutions that lie behind these activities as well as produce more empirical evidence and case study material in order to help reveal major examples of manipulation and deception. Also, journalists and their professional autonomy are an essential part of any democratic system and should be a vital part of challenging and counteracting the kinds of manipulations described above. The institution of journalism needs as much strengthening as possible in order to improve levels of journalistic professional autonomy. Finally, given the scale of the problem, and the need for the public, academics and journalists to all be involved in holding power to account, it is perhaps time to give a rebirth to the Institute for Propaganda Analysis which might serve to coordinate the activities and multiple engagements needed across the academy, the public and media professionals.  
These are challenging times and there is urgent work to be done. But the stakes are very high and, in an era of multiple global crises, our future depends upon it. 
Piers Robinson
 is Professor of Politics, Society and Political Journalism at the Department of Journalism Studies, University of Sheffield. Follow him on Twitter.

Further Reading   
Emma Briant (2015) Propaganda and Counterterrorism: Strategies for Global Change, Manchester University Press.
David Miller and Willliam Dinan (2008). A Century of Spin. London: Pluto Press.
Christopher Simpson. (1994). Science of Coercion: communication research and psychological warfare 1945-1960. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Philip M. Taylor (2002) War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

[1] Lasswell, H., Casey, R. and Smith, B. L. (1935). Propaganda and Promotional Activities. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[2] Lippman, W. (1922). Public Opinion. New York: Harcourt, Brace.

[3] Miller, D. and Dinan, W. (2008). A Century of Spin. London: Pluto Press.

[4] Carey, A. (1997). Taking the Risk out of Democracy. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. pp: 20-21.

[5] Taylor, P.M. (2002), ‘Perception Management and the ‘War’ Against Terrorism’, Journal of Information Warfare, 1(3): 16-29: 20.

[6] Philo, Greg and Mike Berry (2011) More Bad News from Israel (Pluto Books) and The Occupation of the American Mind, (2016) The Media Education Foundation.

[7] Oreskes, Naomi and Eric M. Conway Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming, (Bloomsbury).

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How America’s Founding Fathers Made God’s Law and Natural Law the Foundation of American Government

Founding Fathers Jefferson, Adams, Franklin Washington Put the Golden Rule in the Declaration of Independence by changing John Lock’s rights of Life, Liberty, Property to Life, Liberty, Pursuit of Happiness

Men like Jesus, Moses, Mohammed, and Buddha walked the earth teaching billions of people about God and God’s laws. They made the golden-rule the moral compass of their religions. They taught us that doing something to our neighbor that we wouldn’t want them to do to us was wrong. Men like Jefferson, Adams, Washington, and Franklin made the Golden Rule the moral compass of US government by including Right to Life Liberty and Happiness in the Declaration of Independence and Constitution.

We are here to live and grow intellectually and morally, to take advantage of the present and to plan for future needs. The Golden Rule is God’s algorithm for intelligently designed morality. No creature in the universe can simplify the Golden rule making human beings among the most intelligent creatures in the universe.

The only settled law are Natural Law and the Laws of God. Anyone who suggests that laws of man can overrule Natural law, or the law of God does not understand the US constitution and unqualified to judge anything or hold public office. They are using Power to bend people to do the unnatural and that is evil and unsound and lacks moral character. It is stupid not intelligent at all.

The only government in the world today that guarantees separation of church and state in its constitution is the Government U.S.A. The 1st amendment guarantees us all freedom of speech and religion.

American founding fathers Jefferson, Adams, Madison, and Franklin achieved this by making the golden rule the foundation of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. These men did for government and man-made laws what the great religious leaders did for religion.

Instead of celebrating this great achievement our government leaders and Mainstream Media are encouraging people to tear down their statutes and brand them enemies of the people. The greatest achievement America’s founding fathers is not being taught to our children.

These are the Type of Leaders We Need To Run Our Government

Politicians must act in accord with the moral code of their religion and the first amendment give them the freedom to do just that! If they do not and their actions will result in encouraging others to do evil shouldn’t their Church and their fellow church members call them to task?

That is the intent of the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution, which reads: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof….” Isn’t that the “wall of separation of church and state”?

Separation of Church and state guarantees there will be no State religion not that politicians or people in government shouldn’t act in accordance with their religion’s moral compass – the golden rule.

The text of the 1786 Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom gives great insight into our nation’s First Amendment right. It reads: “… no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced.… in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinion in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.”

“I have never been able to conceive how any rational being could propose happiness to himself from the exercise of power over others.” Thomas Jefferson

Mastery and success require staying on the path and not giving up. We are taught in countless ways to enjoy the prize, the climactic moment, but a true life of mastery and success is spent on the journey.

America is the greatest nation on earth. The Declaration of Independence and US constitution are among the greatest pieces of literature ever written. It is assumed that our rights are God-given, not government given. This is an important assumption in a world run by a ruling elite out to destroy religion. The constitution offers a balanced view of the government’s role and the individual’s responsibility to practice self-control. It is one our finest achievements, and what keeps us unique and a leader in the free world. The fight to preserve the Constitution is worthwhile and one no American should back away from.

Time for everyone to recall the words of America’s first president, George Washington, in his farewell address.

“Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. … And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason, and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.”

Among us are a group of inhuman beings that don’t believe they are equal to their neighbor and can take advantage of them to gain power and riches for themselves. They are out to destroy religion, the traditional family and belief in God and Country. Their golden rule is the law of the jungle – survival of the fittest. They believe their wealth and power makes them the fittest. They are inhuman beasts. When an inhuman beast attacks your God, your family, and your church you do what any human being does put it down. Time to put the CFR deep state ruling elite inner circle 5k inhuman beasts down.

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The Roundtable and the League of Nations

The Council on Foreign Relations and its British Counterpart the Royal Institute of International Affairs were formally established in Paris after the Paris Peace Conference in 1921. The Council on Foreign Relations and Royal Institute of International Affairs can trace their roots back to a secret organization called the Roundtable. It founded and funded by Cecil Rhodes and Lord Nathan Rothschild. Rhodes became fabulously wealthy by exploiting the people of South Africa. Rhodes is the father of Apartheid.

Many of the American members were American intelligence officers that belonged to the first American Intelligence Agency — THE INQUIRY. Many of the British members were British Intelligence Agents. THE INQUIRY and its members, who included such notable Americans as Col. Edward Mandel House, Walter Lippmann, Isaiah Bowman, and James Shotwell, wrote most of Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points. T he INQUIRY members attended the Paris Peace conference and traded off most of the Fourteen Points and worked with British roundtable members to establish the League of Nations and Israel.

Wilson was so disturbed by the INQUIRY’s betrayal he suffered a stroke and physical collapse and refused to speak to his influential advisor INQUIRY member Edward House ever again. The American people refused to join the League of Nations, because they did not want to belong to an organization that could force America to go to war and whose intent was to be an international police force. The European Jews refused to leave their homes in Europe and wouldn’t move to Israel.

The Inquiry Members Who Wrote Wilson’s 14 Points and Attended the Paris Peace Conference

The Round Table

According to The Anglo-American Establishment by Carroll Quigley, Lippmann along with Col. House, in addition to Morgan, Rockefeller and Carnegie, were members of the Round Table, a secret organization created by Lord Nathaniel Rothschild at the bidding of diamond magnate Cecil Rhodes, and which was devoted to “the extension of British rule throughout the world.”[4]

The Round Table’s projects for the US included a central bank, creation of a Central Intelligence Agency, and the League of Nations. In the “Col. E.M. House Report,” addressed to British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, Col. House details progress in preparing “for the peaceful return of the American colonies to the dominion of the Crown.” “Crown” refers not to the Queen, but to the bakers of the City of London.

Having succeeded in rallying the Americans into sacrificing their lives to “liberate” Europe, the war was finally brought to an end in 1918. At the subsequent Paris conference in January 1919, which culminated in the Treaty of Versailles, House’s vision was pursued as the creation of the League of Nations, the precursor to the United Nations. According to Col. House: “We have wrapped this plan in the peace treaty so that the world must accept from us the League or a continuance of the war. The League is in substance the Empire with America admitted on the same basis as our other colonies.”[5]

In the American delegation to the Peace Conference had been Walter Lippman, and brothers Allen and John Foster Dulles. It was Lippman who recommended Allen Dulles, a key agent of the British and American plot to finance Hitler, and future head of the CIA, as a top recruit for Col. House’s plan to use the United States relief program in Europe after the war as cover for intelligence activities.

The American delegation was headed by Paul Warburg, the inspiration behind “Daddy Warbucks” in the Annie cartoons. The Warburgs were a Sabbatean family.[6] Paul ‘s brother Max, of the Warburg banking consortium in Germany and the Netherlands, headed the German delegation. The Family had reached their financial influence during the years of the nineteenth century, with the growth of Kuhn, Loeb Company, a well-known private banking firm with whom they stood in a personal union and family relationship. It was Paul Warburg who said, “We shall have World Government, whether or not we like it. The only question is whether World Government will be achieved by conquest or consent.”[7]

Jacob Schiff, another Sabbatean and the chief Rothschild agent in America, bought into Kuhn and Loeb. Shortly after he became a partner, he married Loeb’s daughter, Teresa. Kuhn, Loeb, and Company financed Edward Harriman’s monopoly over the railroads. In addition, Schiff also opened the doors of the House of Rothschild to bankers like J.P. Morgan. Likewise, following the American Civil War, Schiff had begun to finance the great operations of the Robber Barons, such as the Standard Oil Company for John D. Rockefeller, the railroad empire for Edward R. Harriman, and the steel empire for Andrew Carnegie.[8]

Thus, at the turn of the nineteenth century, Schiff exercised firm control over the entire banking fraternity on Wall Street, which by then, with Schiff’s help, included Lehman brothers, Goldman-Sachs, and other internationalist banks that were headed by men chosen by the Rothschilds.[9]

However, the US Senate ultimately rejected the creation of a League of Nations. Deciding that America would not join any scheme for world government without a change in public opinion, Col. House and Round Table members formed the Royal Institute for International Affairs (RIIA), for the purpose of coordinating British and American efforts. They also formed an American branch, known as the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), founded by Col. House with the financial assistance of John D. Rockefeller Jr., son of Standard Oil’s founder. The early CFR included members like J.P. Morgan, Paul Warburg and Jacob Schiff.

[5] Henry Makow, “The U.S. is a “Crown” Financial Colony.” []

[6] Barry Chamish, “Deutsch Devils,” (December 31, 2003).

[7] Statement made before the United States Senate on Feb. 7, 1950 by James Paul Warburg

[8] Myron Fagan, “Council on Foreign Relations.”
[9] Myron Fagan, Illuminati and CFR Lecture (1960); Dean Henderson, “The Federal Reserve Cartel: The Eight Families,” Global Research, (June 01, 2011

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Crisis of Command a CFR Foreign Affairs Limited Hangout

The authors of Crisis of Command are:

RISA BROOKS is Allis Chalmers Associate Professor of Political Science at Marquette University, a Nonresident Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and an Adjunct Scholar at West Point’s Modern War Institute.

JIM GOLBY is a Senior Fellow at the Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin, an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and a co-host of the podcast Thank You for Your Service. He is a retired U.S. Army officer.

HEIDI URBEN is an Adjunct Associate Professor in Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, a Nonresident Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and an Adjunct Scholar at West Point’s Modern War Institute. She is a retired U.S. Army officer.

The wrote:

Resetting this broken relationship is a tall order. It demands that Congress doggedly pursue its oversight role and hold the military accountable, regardless of who occupies the White House. It requires that defense secretaries hire skilled civilian staffs composed of political appointees and civil servants. But most important, it requires an attentive public that is willing to hold both civilian leaders and the military to account.

For congress to pursue its oversight role and an attentive public willing to hold civilian leaders and the military account they need to know that the Council on Foreign Relations are the 1% ruling elite deep state inner circle 5k that have run every Presidential administration for the last 100 years; that the Council on Foreign Relations chose and control both the civilian and military leaders; that the Council on Foreign Relations controls Main Stream Media and has made it an arm of its intelligence organizations who use it to direct well planned psycho-political operations at American citizens to shape public opinion to further the Council on Foreign Relations goal of forming a one world government controlled by them and their 1% ruling elite cohorts from other nations. These authors have connected none of these things to the story.

I am going to modify this story to identify the Council on Foreign Relations members that are in the story. The authors failed to do this even though they are publishing the story in the Council on Foreign Relations magazine Foreign Affairs.

Crisis of Command

America’s Broken Civil-Military Relationship Imperils National Security

By Risa Brooks, Jim Golby, and Heidi Urben

May/June 2021

<CFR member> Joe Biden and <CFR member> Lloyd Austin at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, April 2008
Gerry Broome / Reuters

When U.S. President Donald Trump left office on January 20, many of those concerned about the state of civil-military relations in the United States breathed a deep sigh of relief. They shouldn’t have. Yes, Trump used the military as a political prop, referred to some of its leaders as “my generals,” and faced a Pentagon that slow-rolled his attempts to withdraw troops from battlefields around the world. But problems in the relationship between military officers and elected officials did not begin with Trump, and they did not end when Joe Biden took office.

Civilian control over the military is deeply embedded in the U.S. Constitution; the armed forces answer to the president and legislature. Starting in 1947, Congress built robust institutions designed to maintain this relationship. But over the past three decades, civilian control has quietly but steadily degraded. Senior military officers may still follow orders and avoid overt insubordination, but their influence has grown, while oversight and accountability mechanisms have faltered. Today, presidents worry about military opposition to their policies and must reckon with an institution that selectively implements executive guidance. Too often, unelected military leaders limit or engineer civilians’ options so that generals can run wars as they see fit.

Civilian control is therefore about more than whether military leaders openly defy orders or want to overthrow the government. It’s about the extent to which political leaders can realize the goals the American people elected them to accomplish. Here, civilian control is not binary; it is measured in degrees. Because the military filters information that civilians need and implements the orders that civilians give, it can wield great influence over civilian decision-making. Even if elected officials still get the final say, they may have little practical control if generals dictate all the options or slow their implementation—as they often do now.

Resetting this broken relationship is a tall order. It demands that Congress doggedly pursue its oversight role and hold the military accountable, regardless of who occupies the White House. It requires that defense secretaries hire skilled civilian staffs composed of political appointees and civil servants. But most important, it requires an attentive public that is willing to hold both civilian leaders and the military to account.


Evidence of the decline in civilian control over the military isn’t hard to find. Over the last few decades, senior military leaders have regularly thwarted or delayed presidential decisions on military policy. In 1993, <CFR member> Colin Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, helped block <CFR member> President Bill Clinton from ending the policy that banned gays from the military, resulting in the now defunct “don’t ask, don’t tell” compromise. Both President Barack Obama and Trump complained that officers boxed them in—limiting military options and leaking information—and forced them to grudgingly accept troop surges they did not support. Obama’s generals signaled that they would accept nothing less than an aggressive counterinsurgency in Afghanistan—despite White House opposition. Obama later fired <CFR member> Stanley McChrystal, then commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, after members of the general’s staff disparaged White House officials in remarks to a reporter. Trump, for his part, saw senior military leaders push back against his orders to withdraw troops from Afghanistan and Syria. Although these moves were signature campaign promises, Trump eventually backed off when military leaders told him they couldn’t be done and that the policies would harm national security.

<23 Council on Foreign Relations members have been U.S. Secretary of Defense

  1. James V. Forrestal 1947-1949
  2. Robert A. Lovett 1951-1953
  3. Neil H. McElroy 1957-1959
  4. Thomas S. Gates Jr. 1959-1961
  5. Robert S. McNamara 1961-1968
  6. Melvin R. Laird 1969-1973
  7. Elliot L. Richardson 1973
  8. James R. Schlesinger 1973-1975
  9. Donald Rumsfeld 1975-1977
  10. Harold Brown 1977-1981
  11. Caspar W. Weinberger 1981-1987
  12. Frank C. Carlucci 1987-1989
  13. Richard B. “Dick” Cheney 1989-1993
  14. Les Aspin 1993-1994
  15. William J. Perry 1994-1997
  16. William S. Cohen 1997-2001
  17. Donald Rumsfeld 2001-2006
  18. Robert M. Gates 2006-2011
  19. Chuck Hagel 2013-2015
  20. Ass Carter2015-2017
  21. Mark Esper 2019-2020
  22. Christopher Miller2020-2021
  23. Lloyd Austin (2021-present) >

Of course, senior military leaders do not always get everything they want, but they often get more than they should. Their power also extends beyond headline-grabbing decisions about overseas deployments or troop reductions. The military’s influence manifests hundreds of times a day through bureaucratic maneuvers inside the Pentagon, in policy discussions in the White House, and during testimony on Capitol Hill. These mundane interactions, perhaps more than anything else, steer decision-making away from civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and toward uniformed personnel. Inside the Pentagon, for instance, <Council on Foreign Relations>military leaders often preempt the advice and analysis of civilian staff by sending their proposals straight to the <CFR> secretary of defense, bypassing the byzantine clearance process that non-uniformed staffers must navigate.

There are signs of the erosion of civilian control outside the Pentagon, as well. Congress too rarely demands that the military bow to civilian authority, instead weighing in selectively and for partisan reasons. During the Obama <CFR packed> administration, for example, some commentators and at least one member of Congress suggested that Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should resign in protest over the president’s management of the campaign to defeat the Islamic State, also known as ISIS. The goal was to use Dempsey’s role as the president’s chief military adviser as leverage in a partisan battle over Obama’s foreign policy. Under Trump <whose administration was also run by CFR members> , many Democrats cheered on the retired and active-duty generals who pushed back against the president’s decisions. These “adults in the room” included James Mattis (the secretary of defense), John Kelly (the secretary of homeland security and then White House chief of staff), and <CFR member> H. R. McMaster (Trump’s national security adviser). At the extreme, some of Trump’s opponents even urged senior military leaders to contemplate removing Trump from office. In August 2020, two well-known retired army officers, <CFR member> John Nagl and Paul Yingling, penned an open letter to Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, telling him to do just that if the president refused to leave office after losing the 2020 election. Although these efforts may have comforted those concerned about Trump’s erratic policies, they undermined civilian control by suggesting that it was the military’s job to keep the executive in check. When politicians endorse military insubordination that serves their interests, they do long-term damage to the principle of civilian primacy.

Civilian control over the military is deeply embedded in the U.S. Constitution.

Oversight itself has also become politicized. Politicians increasingly turn to those with military experience to run the Pentagon. Trump decided to appoint a former general, Mattis, as secretary of defense, and <CFR member> Biden did the same, putting <CFR member> Lloyd Austin in the post. In both cases, Congress had to waive a requirement that officers be retired for at least seven years before serving in the department’s top job. The rule, which had been broken only once before, is designed to prioritize leaders with distance from the mindset and social networks associated with military service. Ideally, defense secretaries should be comfortable operating as civilians—not soldiers. Mattis’s and <CFR member> Austin’s nominations, and subsequent confirmations, therefore represent a break with over seven decades of law and tradition, beginning with the 1947 reforms, stipulating that the secretary of defense cannot be a recently retired general.

There is no obvious reason to think that those with military experience are better suited to controlling the military on behalf of Congress or the president—and plenty of reasons to suspect the opposite. In the military, soldiers are taught to follow orders, not scrutinize their implications, as a cabinet official should. Military personnel, moreover, are ideally taught to stay out of partisan debates, whereas the secretary’s job demands well-honed political skill and experience. Yet as Mattis’s and <CFR member> Austin’s appointments show, military service is becoming a litmus test for Pentagon policy jobs traditionally held by civilians, and this is true even at lower levels.

Meanwhile, the public is failing to insist that elected leaders hold the military to account. Many Americans would rather put troops on a pedestal and admire the military from afar. Repeating the mantra “Support our troops” has become a substitute for the patriotic duty of questioning the institution those troops serve. Large numbers of citizens are now reluctant to even offer their opinions in response to survey questions about the military, let alone to criticize military leaders. In a 2013 YouGov survey, for instance, 25 to 30 percent of the nonveterans asked consistently chose “I don’t know” or “no opinion” in response to questions about the military.

At best, these trends immunize the military from scrutiny; at worst, they give it a pass to behave with impunity. An October 2017 White House press conference epitomized this exceptionalism: during a discussion of Trump’s condolence call to the widow of a slain soldier, Kelly, who had served in the military for more than four decades and whose own son was killed fighting in Afghanistan, refused to call on journalists who didn’t know someone who had had a family member killed in combat. Sarah Huckabee Sanders, the White House press secretary, later admonished journalists for daring to question Kelly. Debating “a four-star Marine general,” she said, was “highly inappropriate.”


Part of the decline in civil-military relations can be blamed on institutional changes. As the United States became a global power, elected leaders developed a bureaucratic structure to manage the military on a day-to-day basis. When it became clear at the start of the Cold War that the U.S. defense establishment had become too large for the president and the legislature to control on their own, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947. The law established what would eventually become the Department of Defense and placed at its head a civilian secretary of defense, who would bring experience managing bureaucratic and domestic politics. That person would have the exclusive job of ensuring that the military’s activities aligned with the nation’s goals as determined by its elected political leaders. And Congress granted the secretary a civilian staff composed of individuals who could draw on their experiences in government, business, and academia. <In 1947 Council on Foreign Relations members George Kennan, Walter Lippmann, Paul Nitze, Dean Achenson, and Walter Krock took part in a psycho-political operation forcing the Marshall Plan on the American public. The PSYOP included a “anonymous” letter credited to a Mr. X, which appeared in the Council on Foreign Relations magazine FOREIGN AFFAIRS. The letter opened the door for the CFR controlled Truman administration to take a hard line against the threat of Soviet expansion. George Kennan was the author of the letter. The Marshall Plan should have been called the Council on Foreign Relations Plan. The so-called Marshall Plan and the ensuing North Atlantic Treaty Organization defined the role of the United States in world politics for the rest of the century.>

But in 1986, Congress unintentionally undid much of this work. That year, it overhauled the 1947 law by passing the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, which shifted power and resources away from civilian leaders and to their military counterparts. Since that law passed, large, well-resourced military staffs have displaced civilians in the Pentagon and across the rest of the government. Today, for example, ambassadors and other civilian officials frequently depend on the military’s regional combatant commands for resources, including planes and logistical support, necessary to do their jobs. Regional combatant commanders also have responsibilities that cross national boundaries, giving them de facto diplomatic authority and frequent contact not only with their military counterparts overseas but also with foreign government leaders. The military officials who govern security assistance and cooperation programs have also grown in number and influence, further sidelining their civilian counterparts in the State Department. <The Secretary of State is a CFR job

24 Council on Foreign Relations members U.S. Secretary of State

  1. Elihu Root 1905-1909
  2. Charles Evans Hughes 1921-1925
  3. Frank B. Kellogg 1925-1929
  4. Henry L. Stimson 1929-1933
  5. Edward R. Stettinius Jr. 1944-1945
  6. Dean G. Acheson 1949-1953
  7. John Foster Dulles 1953-1959
  8. Christian A. Herter 1959-1961
  9. Dean Rusk 1961-1969
  10. William P. Rogers 1969-1973
  11. Henry A. Kissinger 1973-1977
  12. Cyrus R. Vance 1977-1980
  13. Edmund S. Muskie 1980-1981
  14. Alexander M. Haig Jr. 1981-1982
  15. George P. Shultz 1982-1989
  16. James A. Baker III 1989-1992
  17. Lawrence S. Eagleburger 1992-1993
  18. Warren M. Christopher 1993-1997
  19. Madeleine K. Albright 1997-2001
  20. Colin L. Powell 2001-2005
  21. Condoleezza Rice 2005-2009
  22. John Forbes Kerry 2013-2017
  23. Bilderberg member Mike Pompeo  2018-2021
  24. Anthony Blinken 2021- >

It is a truism in national security discourse that diplomats are underfunded relative to the military. Even former defense secretaries, including Mattis and <CFR member> Robert Gates, have warned Congress of the risks of underfunding the <CFR run> State Department. But no one ever does much about it. Without a serious attempt at rebalancing, the military’s personnel and resource advantages will only further undermine civilian control, giving the military extra speed and capacity that it can leverage during bureaucratic fights to make and implement policy.

The Pentagon City metro stop in Washington, D.C., October 2013
Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

At the same time, there has also been a hollowing out of the processes of civilian control within the Department of Defense itself. In recent years, the Pentagon has faced immense difficulties recruiting, retaining, and managing the civilian professional staff responsible for overseeing the uniformed military. These challenges are the result of underinvestment in the civilian workplace. There is little systematic training to prepare civilian officials for their responsibilities, and they are often thrown into the deep end of the Pentagon and left to sink or swim. In contrast, service members benefit from thorough professional military education programs and other developmental opportunities throughout their careers.

By 2018, this situation had deteriorated to a point where the bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission, a congressionally appointed panel, concluded that a lack of civilian voices in national security decision-making was “undermining the concept of civilian control.” To be sure, these problems became more acute during the Trump administration, when the Pentagon was littered with acting officials and unfilled positions. But the civilian bench was shallow long before Trump took over.


Partisan polarization has also undermined civilian control. After 9/11, the public’s esteem for the military spiked, and politicians noticed. Elected leaders became increasingly willing to disregard civil-military norms, avoid serious oversight and accountability, and encourage military insubordination to score political points against their political opponents.

Today, politicians on both sides of the aisle capitalize on the military’s prestige to shield themselves from criticism and attack their rivals—often a cost-free strategy, given the military’s popularity. During campaigns, candidates often claim that troops prefer them over their opponent; in 2020, a Trump ad featured the tagline “Support our troops,” and Biden cited a Military Times poll to suggest that it was he who enjoyed their support. Candidates regularly seek the endorsement of retired generals and even use them as partisan attack dogs. At the 2016 Republican National Convention, the Trump adviser Michael Flynn, who had then been out of the military for just two years, criticized Trump’s opponent, Hillary Clinton, and encouraged the crowd to chant “Lock her up!” As president, Trump repeatedly delivered partisan speeches in front of uniformed audiences, once telling officers at MacDill Air Force Base, “We had a wonderful election, didn’t we? And I saw those numbers—and you like me, and I like you.” In over-the-top campaign videos, some post-9/11 veterans running for office use their experience as a means of dividing those who served from those who did not. In 2020, the Republican Texas congressman and former Navy SEAL Dan Crenshaw released an Avengers-themed ad entitled “Texas Reloaded” that featured attack helicopters, fighter jets, and Crenshaw himself parachuting out of a plane.

More frequently ignored, however, are the less egregious moments of politicization, such as presidents donning bomber jackets and flight suits in public speeches to military audiences or venturing to West Point to make major foreign policy addresses rather than to a civilian university. All these actions reinforce the belief that military service is superior to other kinds of public service.

Politicians on both sides of the aisle stand to benefit from better civilian oversight.

Even though politicians try to gain electoral advantage through such behavior, what they are ultimately doing is damaging their own authority. By lionizing the armed forces, politicians teach the public to expect elected officials to make concessions to military leaders or defer to them on important decisions. This same dynamic motivates civilian leaders to encourage officers to serve as “the adults in the room,” resist or oppose their partisan opponents’ policies, or resign in protest against a lawful order from an elected president. Although there may be short-term advantages to such behavior (assuming, of course, that the military leaders are correct), it subverts the broader principle that civilians get to pursue the policies they were elected to carry out.

The military has also played a role in the degradation of civilian control. For one thing, its nonpartisan ethic is in decay. Whereas the majority of senior military officers did not identify with a political party as late as 1976, nearly three-quarters do so today, according to surveys of senior officers attending various war colleges conducted between 2017 and 2020. Many service members are comfortable airing their partisan political commentary on social media to wide audiences, an outspokenness that would have made past generations of soldiers blush. Retired generals involved in politics—especially through campaign endorsements—reinforce to those in uniform that the military is riven by partisan divides. Senior military leaders have largely failed to address this behavior, either looking the other way or attributing it to a few bad apples. Their silence, however, normalizes partisanship in the military, with those in uniform concluding that it is acceptable to openly pick political sides. Recent surveys of senior active-duty officers found that roughly one-third had observed their colleagues make or share disparaging comments about elected officials on social media.

Service members also make civilian control that much harder when they act as if they are superior to their civilian counterparts. Research consistently shows that many in the military believe that their decision to serve in uniform makes them morally superior to those Americans who did not make that choice. According to a 2020 survey by the research institution NORC, this sense of superiority extends even to their views of those Americans whose jobs also entail significant risks—including doctors fighting the pandemic and diplomats serving in combat zones or in hardship assignments. At the extreme, military personnel question the legitimacy of the civilians who oversee them, especially if they suspect that those leaders don’t share their partisan views.

Another factor undermining civilian authority is the military’s attachment to the notion that it should have exclusive control over what it views as its own affairs. This concept, endorsed by the political scientist Samuel Huntington, contends that the military has a right to push back when civilians attempt to interfere in military matters. According to this view, autonomy is a right, not a privilege. But military and political affairs are not as distinct as many officers have been led to believe, and the experience of other countries suggests that alternative models are just as plausible: throughout Europe, for example, military leaders are accustomed to much more intrusive oversight than their U.S. counterparts.

HOLLYWOOD TREATMENT < Muckety – Hollywood Lends Some Glamour to the Council On Foreign Relations>

Trends in American culture underpin many of these problems. Americans increasingly fetishize the armed forces and believe that the only true patriots are those in uniform. According to Gallup polling, the public consistently has more confidence in the military than in any other national institution. That admiration, coupled with declining trust and confidence in civilian organizations, means that large segments of the population think that those in uniform should run the military, and maybe even the country itself.

This adoration has grown in part out of efforts to bring the military out of its post-Vietnam malaise. In 1980, Edward Meyer, the army chief of staff, declared his force a “hollow army,” and that same year, an operation intended to rescue U.S. hostages in Iran ended in disaster, showing the public just how depleted its armed forces had become. While Congress attempted to rectify the situation by ramping up military spending, the military cannily worked to rehabilitate its image through popular culture. In the 1980s, the Pentagon cooperated with big-budget movies such as Top Gun, a practice it has continued to the present with such superhero films as Captain Marvel. By conditioning its cooperation and provision of equipment on approval of the script, the military learned that it could influence storylines and enhance its brand.

Another contributing problem is the military’s tendency to recruit heavily from particular subsections of American society. With few calls for shared sacrifice or national mobilization during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the majority of the public had little to do besides thank the troops for their service. The military, meanwhile went to great lengths to honor soldiers with patriotic displays centered on the nobility of military service, notably during college and professional sporting events. These trends all reinforced the notion that military service members were truly exceptional—better, different, and more selfless than the civilians who cheered them on.


Together, these pressures have weakened the institutional processes, nonpartisan practices, and societal values that have historically served to keep the principle of civilian control of the military strong in its mundane and often unglamorous daily practice. But the damage can be repaired. Institutional reforms have the greatest chance of success. Politicians on both sides of the aisle stand to benefit from better civilian oversight.

Congress could start by rebalancing power in the Department of Defense away from the Joint Staff and the combatant commands (the 11 military commands with specific geographic or functional responsibilities) and toward civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Legislators can do this by resisting calls to further cut the Pentagon’s civilian workforce and by eliminating duplicate efforts among the Joint Staff and the combatant commands, which together account for an estimated 40,000 positions. A parallel program to train, retrain, and prepare a civilian workforce would help deepen the Pentagon’s civilian bench.

Congress should also rethink efforts to give the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the mission of “global integration” of U.S. military capabilities—an initiative that took root when Joseph Dunford filled the role, from 2015 to 2019. The idea was that the Joint Chiefs could adjudicate the military’s competing geographic requirements, curb the power of the combatant commands, and prioritize resources. But that role is best played by civilians in the defense secretary’s office, not by a sprawling military staff.

The uniformed military must also address its role in undermining civilian control. A hallmark of any profession is its ability to enforce standards of conduct, and yet the military has at times struggled to ensure that its members refrain from partisan activity. To address this, active-duty officers should publicly disavow retired senior officers who damage the military’s nonpartisan ethic through campaign endorsements and other political pronouncements. Retired officers should also use peer pressure to curb partisan campaign endorsements among their colleagues. If that fails, Congress should consider instituting a four-year cooling-off period that would prohibit generals and admirals from making partisan endorsements immediately after retiring—similar to what it did with lobbying efforts.

Politicians must stop propagating the myth that serving in the military is a prerequisite for overseeing it. < CFR invited the presidential candidates challenging President Trump in the 2020 election to articulate their positions on twelve critical foreign policy issues. Candidates’ answers are posted exactly as they are received. The politicians never connect the CFR to US foreign policy and their control of the military industrial complex.>

Finally, military leaders must do a better job of educating service members about the importance of nonpartisanship, including on social media. This will require clear regulations and consistent enforcement. The same leaders should also rethink their view of military professionalism, abandoning the notion that they have an exclusive domain and embracing an approach that accepts the need for civilian oversight.

Other areas in need of reform, including among civilian elected leaders, are less likely to see change. Politicians today face few repercussions for politicizing the military, and they have considerable incentives to continue to do so. Still, elected leaders could start to deal with the problem by ending the practice of soliciting endorsements from retired generals. They could also stop using the uniformed military as a backdrop for partisan political speeches and stop running campaign advertisements that insinuate that they enjoy more military support than their opponents. Veterans and active reservists or members of the National Guard should also stop weaponizing their service for electoral gain. That would mean an end to cashing in on public support for the military through campaign ads that suggest their military service makes them superior citizens.

Politicians should also stop propagating the myth that serving in the military is a prerequisite for overseeing it. This belief not only diminishes the important role civilians play but also symbolically raises the military above its civilian superiors in the minds of service members and the public. Instituting a ten-year waiting period—or at least adhering to the existing seven-year requirement—before a retired officer can serve as secretary of defense is a necessary step. So is valuing and investing in the contributions of civilian expertise at all echelons in the Pentagon.

Finally, those who continue to mythologize the military in popular culture should rebalance their portrayals. A little more M*A*S*H—the darkly comedic 1970s television series about a U.S. Army medical unit during the Korean War—and a little less righteous soldiering might humanize military personnel and chip away at the public’s distorted view of the armed services. Bringing the military back down to earth and a bit closer to the society it serves would help politicians in their effort to scrutinize military affairs and encourage Americans to see accountability as a healthy practice in a democratic society.

If Americans do not recognize the rot lurking beneath their idyllic vision of civilian control, the United States’ civil-military crisis will only get worse. More than most citizens realize, the country’s democratic traditions and national security both depend on this delicate relationship. Without robust civilian oversight of the military, the United States will not remain a democracy or a global power for long.

  • RISA BROOKS is Allis Chalmers Associate Professor of Political Science at Marquette University, a Nonresident Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and an Adjunct Scholar at West Point’s Modern War Institute.

    JIM GOLBY is a Senior Fellow at the Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin, an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and a co-host of the podcast Thank You for Your Service. He is a retired U.S. Army officer.
  • HEIDI URBEN is an Adjunct Associate Professor in Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, a Nonresident Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and an Adjunct Scholar at West Point’s Modern War Institute. She is a retired U.S. Army officer.

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About King George of Great Britain, Thomas Jefferson, Slavery, and the Declaration of Independence

America is the country where liberty took hold. The history of the British peerage, a system of nobility found in the United Kingdom, stretches over the last thousand years. In that system one class is superior to another. There is no true liberty in a system where the ruling elite believe they are better than their neighbors.

Jefferson had the person responsible for slavery pegged – twas King George of Great Britain – why isn’t anyone asking the Royal Family to pay the reparations? Because they are still part of the ruling elite and not held accountable to the laws of God or the laws of man?

Jefferson’s original draft of the Declaration of Independence states : “he has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life & liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating & carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their transportation thither. this piratical warfare, the opprobrium of infidel powers, is the warfare of the CHRISTIAN king of Great Britain. determined to keep open a market where MEN should be bought & sold, he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or to restrain this execrable commerce and that this assemblage of horrors might want no fact of distinguished die, he is now exciting those very people to rise in arms among us, and to purchase that liberty of which he has deprived them, by murdering the people upon whom he also obtruded them; thus paying off former crimes committed against the liberties of one people, with crimes which he urges them to commit against the lives of another.” 

Thomas Jefferson made the “Golden Rule” the foundation of American Democracy by changing John Locke’s Natural rights law from Life, Liberty and Property to the inalienable rights of Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness. The change insures that decisions are driven by civic virtue instead of selfishness. The change resulted from Jefferson’s understanding of the “Golden Rule” and his struggle with slavery. The original draft of the Declaration of Independence contained a scathing denunciation of slavery.[1] Jefferson’s change declares it immoral and illegal to consider one person the property of another. If you would be unhappy being owned by someone else it follows that it is wrong to consider another person your property. If the original draft of the Declaration of Independence had been approved there would have been no slavery after the revolution of 1776. The original draft was not approved, slavery was not abolished, and a civil war was fought leaving a legacy of bitterness in America still felt today.

1776 – Broadway Musical Comedy about the US Declaration of Independence(1972)

The Declaration of Independence

President Donald Trump’s 1776 Commission – Final Report

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A Superpower, Like It or Not By Former Council on Foreign Relations member Robert Kagan still on the CFR payroll at Brookings institute CFR dots connected by @ThomasJefferson1976

A Superpower, Like It or Not

Why Americans Must Accept Their Global Role

By Former Council on Foreign Relations member Robert Kagan still on the CFR payroll at Brookings institute CFR dots connected by @ThomasJefferson1976

March/April 2021

David Plunkert

All great powers have a deeply ingrained self-perception shaped by historical experience, geography, culture, beliefs, and myths. Many Chinese today yearn to recover the greatness of a time when they ruled unchallenged at the pinnacle of their civilization, before “the century of humiliation.” Russians are nostalgic for Soviet days, when they were the other superpower and ruled from Poland to Vladivostok. Council on foreign Relations member  Henry Kissinger once observed that Iranian leaders had to choose whether they wanted to be “a nation or a cause,” but great powers and aspiring great powers often see themselves as both. Their self-perception shapes their definition of the national interest, of what constitutes genuine security and the actions and resources necessary to achieve it. Often, it is these self-perceptions that drive nations, empires, and city-states forward. And sometimes to their ruin. Much of the drama of the past century resulted from great powers whose aspirations exceeded their capacity. 

Americans have the opposite problem. Their capacity for global power exceeds their perception of their proper place and role in the world. Even as they have met the challenges of Nazism (CFR & Mein Kampf and Japanese imperialism(CFR’s McCloy & Internment ) , Soviet communism, and radical Islamist terrorism, they have never regarded this global activism as normal. Even in the era of the Internet (Google’s regime change agents CFR members Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen), long-range missiles, and an interdependent global economy(How the CFR engineered the financial crisis   )(, many Americans retain the psychology of a people living apart on a vast continent, untouched by the world’s turmoil. Americans have never been isolationists. In times of emergency, they can be persuaded to support extraordinary exertions in far-off places. But they regard these as exceptional responses to exceptional circumstances. They do not see themselves as the primary defender of a certain kind of world order; they have never embraced that “indispensable” role. 

As a result, Americans have often played it poorly. Their continental view of the world has produced a century of wild oscillations—indifference followed by panic, mobilization and intervention followed by retreat and retrenchment. That Americans refer to the relatively low-cost military involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq as “forever wars” is just the latest example of their intolerance for the messy and unending business of preserving a general peace and acting to forestall threats. In both cases, Americans had one foot out the door the moment they entered, which hampered their ability to gain control of difficult situations. (The CFR forever war state department, defense department, intelligence agency administrators CFR packed Joe Biden Cabinet Council on Foreign Relations members in presidential administrations back to Wilson (100 years) CFR and Bilderbergers in the Trump Administration
CFR Policy Planning Network in the Clinton-Bush-Obama administrations policy planning network )

This on-again, off-again approach has confused and misled allies and adversaries, often to the point of spurring conflicts that could have been avoided by a clear and steady application of American power and influence in the service of a peaceful, stable, and liberal world order. The twentieth century was littered with the carcasses of foreign leaders and governments that misjudged the United States, from Germany (twice) and Japan to the Soviet Union to Serbia to Iraq. If the twenty-first century is not to follow the same pattern—most dangerously, in the competition with China—then Americans will need to stop looking for the exits and accept the role that fate and their own power have thrust upon them. Perhaps after four years of President Donald Trump, Americans are ready for some straight talk. ( Here is some straight talk from CFR founding father Walter Lippman’s stooge Edward Bernays)


History is A Weapon – by Edward Bernays

THE conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country.

We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of. This is a logical result of the way in which our democratic society is organized. Vast numbers of human beings must cooperate in this manner if they are to live together as a smoothly functioning society.

Our invisible governors are, in many cases, unaware of the identity of their fellow members in the inner cabinet.

They govern us by their qualities of natural leadership, their ability to supply needed ideas and by their key position in the social structure. Whatever attitude one chooses to take toward this condition, it remains a fact that in almost every act of our daily lives, whether in the sphere of politics or business, in our social conduct or our ethical thinking, we are dominated by the relatively small number of persons—a trifling fraction of our hundred and twenty million—who understand the mental processes and social patterns of the masses. It is they who pull the wires which control the public mind, who harness old social forces and contrive new ways to bind and guide the world.

It is not usually realized how necessary these invisible governors are to the orderly functioning of our group life. In theory, every citizen may vote for whom he pleases. Our Constitution does not envisage political parties as part of the mechanism of government, and its framers seem not to have pictured to themselves the existence in our national politics of anything like the modern political machine. But the American voters soon found that without organization and direction their individual votes, cast, perhaps, for dozens or hundreds of candidates, would produce nothing but confusion. Invisible government, in the shape of rudimentary political parties, arose almost overnight. Ever since then we have agreed, for the sake of simplicity and practicality, that party machines should narrow down the field of choice to two candidates, or at most three or four… )

Americans’ preference for a limited international role is a product of their history and experience and of the myths they tell themselves. Other great powers aspire to recapture past glories. Americans have always yearned to recapture what they imagine as the innocence and limited ambition of their nation’s youth. For the first decades of the new republic’s existence, Americans struggled merely to survive as a weak republic in a world of superpower monarchies. They spent the nineteenth century in selfishness and self-absorption, conquering the continent and struggling over slavery. By the early twentieth century, the United States had become the richest and potentially most powerful country in the world, but one without commitments or responsibilities. It rose under the canopy of a benevolent world order it had no part in upholding. “Safe from attack, safe even from menace,” the British historian James Bryce wrote of the United States in 1888, “she hears from afar the warring cries of European races and faiths, as the gods of Epicurus listened to the murmurs of the unhappy earth spread out beneath their golden dwellings.” For the moment, Bryce wrote, “she sails upon a summer sea.” 

But then the world shifted, and Americans suddenly found themselves at the center of it. The old order upheld by the United Kingdom and made possible by a tenuous peace in Europe collapsed with the arrival of new powers. The rise of Germany destroyed the precarious equilibrium in Europe, and the Europeans proved unable to restore it. The concurrent rise of Japan and the United States put an end to more than a century of British naval hegemony. A global geopolitics replaced what had been a European-dominated order, and in this very different configuration of power, the United States was thrust into a new position. Only it could be both a Pacific and an Atlantic power. Only it, with weak neighbors to the north and south and vast oceans to the east and west, could send the bulk of its forces to fight in distant theaters for prolonged periods while its homeland remained unthreatened. Only it could afford to finance not only its own war efforts but also those of its allies, mustering the industrial capacity to produce ships, planes, tanks, and other materiel to arm itself while also serving as the arsenal for everyone else. Only it could do all of this without bankrupting itself but instead growing richer and more dominant with each major war. The United States, the British statesman Arthur Balfour observed, had become the “pivot” on which the rest of the world turned or, in President Theodore Roosevelt’s words, “the balance of power of the whole world.”

The world had never known such a power—there was not the language to describe it or a theory to explain it. It was sui generis. The emergence of this unusual great power led to confusion and misjudgment. Nations that had spent centuries calculating the power relationships in their own regions were slow to appreciate the impact of this distant deus ex machina, which, after long periods of indifference and aloofness, could suddenly swoop in and transform the balance of power. Americans, too, had a hard time adjusting. The wealth and relative invulnerability that made them uniquely capable of fighting major wars and enforcing peace in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East simultaneously also made them question the necessity, desirability, and even morality of doing so. With the United States fundamentally secure and self-sufficient, why did it need to get involved in conflicts thousands of miles from its shores? And what right did it have? 

The case for a policy aimed at creating and preserving a liberal world order was first made by [Kagan forgot to say A group of men called the Inquiry who wrote Wilson’s 14 points and traded them off at the Paris peace conference for the League of Nations and Israel. Afterword they met and formed the Royal Institute of International Relations and the council on Foreign Relations]  Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson during World War I. With the United Kingdom and the other European powers no longer able to preserve order, they argued, and as the war demonstrated, it had fallen to the United States to create and defend a new liberal world order. This was the purpose of the “World League for the Peace of Righteousness,” proposed by Roosevelt at the beginning of the war, and of the League of Nations, which Wilson eventually championed after it: to create a new peaceful order with American power at its center. Wilson believed it was the only feasible alternative to a resumption of the conflict and chaos that had devastated Europe. If Americans instead turned back to their “narrow, selfish, provincial purposes,” he warned, the peace would collapse, Europe would again divide into “hostile camps,” the world would again descend into “utter blackness,” and the United States would again be dragged into war. The United States had an interest in a peaceful and predominantly liberal Europe, a peaceful Asia, and open and safe oceans on which Americans and their goods could travel safely. But such a world could not be built except around American power. Thus the United States had an interest in world order. [Actually, it was the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International affairs that had an interest in creating a world order run by them]

Members of the Inquiry and Founding Fathers of the Council on Foreign Relations

Americans’ capacity for global power exceeds their perception of their proper place and role in the world.

Such arguments met powerful opposition. The Republican senator Henry Cabot Lodge and other critics condemned Wilson’s league as both unnecessary and a betrayal of the founders’ vision. For the United States to concern itself with world order was to violate the basic principles that made it an exceptional, peace-loving nation in a world at war. Two decades later, as Americans debated whether to enter another world war, another Republican senator, Robert Taft, ridiculed the idea that the United States, which was perfectly safe from attack, should “range over the world, like a knight-errant, protecting democracy and ideals of good faith, and tilting, like Don Quixote, against the windmills of Fascism.” President Franklin Roosevelt argued that even if the United States was not directly threatened by Nazi Germany or imperial Japan, a world in which those powerful dictatorships dominated their regions would be a “shabby and dangerous place to live in.” It was only a matter of time before the dictatorships would gather themselves for a final assault on the remaining citadel of democracy, Roosevelt believed, but even before that moment came, the United States might become “a lone island” of democracy in a world of dictators, and democracy itself might simply perish. But the opponents of American intervention in World War II worried as much about the consequences of winning as about the costs of intervening. They did not want their country to subordinate itself to the interests of European empires, but neither did they want it to replace those empires as the dominant world power. Citing Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, they warned that in becoming the “dictatress of the world,” the United States would lose its soul. 

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor cut short the debate but left it unsettled. Roosevelt fought the war with his eye on the postwar order he hoped to create, but most Americans saw the war as an act of self-defense, perfectly consistent with a continental perspective. When it was over, they expected to come home.

Council on Foreign Relations president John J. McCloy

When the United States did end up dominating the world after World War II, therefore, Americans suffered from a kind of cognitive dissonance. During the Cold War, they took on unheard-of global responsibilities, deploying troops in distant theaters by the hundreds of thousands and fighting two wars, in Korea and in Vietnam, that were 15 times as costly in terms of combat deaths as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would be. They promoted an international free-trade regime that sometimes enriched others more than themselves. They intervened economically, politically, diplomatically, and militarily in every corner of the world. And whether or not they were conscious of it, they did create a liberal world order, a relatively peaceful international environment that in turn made possible an explosion of global prosperity and a historically unprecedented spread of democratic government.

That was the conscious aim of Roosevelt during World War II and of his successors in the Truman administration. They believed that a world order based on liberal political and economic principles was the only antidote to the anarchy of the 1930s. For such an order to exist, the United States could not “sit in the parlor with a shotgun, waiting,” argued Council on Foreign Relations member Dean Acheson, President Harry Truman’s secretary of state. It had to be out in the world actively shaping it, deterring some powers and bolstering others. It had to create “situations of strength” at critical nodes, spreading stability, prosperity, and democracy, especially in the world’s core industrial regions of Europe and Asia. The United States had to be “the locomotive at the head of mankind,” Acheson said, pulling the world along with it. 


Yet even as they[the CFR] created this order, few Americans ever understood world order [and destruction of US sovereignty, the US constitution, the traditional family, freedom of religion and freedom of speech and CFR and their cohorts from other nations ruling all the lower class livestock] as the goal. For most, it was the threat of communism that justified these extraordinary exertions, that justified the establishment of NATO and the defense of Japan, Korea, and, ultimately, Vietnam. Resisting communism became synonymous with the national interest, for communism was perceived as a threat to the American way of life. When Americans balked at supporting Greece and Turkey in 1947, the Republican senator Arthur Vandenberg told Truman administration officials to “scare hell out of the American people,” and CFR member Acheson saw the expediency of making things, as he admitted in his memoirs, “clearer than truth.” With communism as the sole enemy, everything mattered. Every act was as an act of defense.

When the Cold War ended, therefore, the disjunction between Americans’ actual role and Americans’ self-perception became untenable. Without the global threat of communism, Americans wondered what the purpose of their foreign policy should be. What was the point of having a globe-girdling security system, a hegemonic navy, far-flung alliances with dozens of nations, and an international free-trade regime? [So the CFR created a new war — the war on terror]

The rebellion began immediately. When the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, President Council on Foreign Relations member George H. W. Bush initially made the case for driving him out on world-order grounds. “A world in which brutality and lawlessness are allowed to go unchecked isn’t the kind of world we’re going to want to live in,” Bush said in a televised address from the Oval Office, quoting the general who was commanding the U.S. marines fighting Saddam’s forces. But when realists and conservatives criticized Bush’s vision of a “new world order” as overly ambitious and idealistic, the administration fell back on the kind of narrow, continental rationale Americans could supposedly better understand—“jobs, jobs, jobs,” was how Council on Foreign Relations member Secretary of State James Baker explained what the Gulf War was about. When Council on Foreign Relations member President Bill Clinton intervened twice in the Balkans and then expanded NATO, it was in defense of world order, both to stamp out ethnic cleansing in Europe and to prove the United States’ continuing commitment to what Bush had called “a Europe whole and free.” CFR member Clinton, too, was attacked by realists—for engaging in “international social work.”

Highway of Death

Then came President George W. Bush, who’s father was CFR member H.W. Bush. The second war with Iraq was also aimed primarily at preserving world order—to rid the Middle East and the Persian Gulf of a serial aggressor who fancied himself the new Saladin. But the 9/11 attacks had caused world-order objectives to again become confused with continental defense, even for the war’s advocates. When the intelligence on Saddam’s weapons programs proved mistaken, many Americans felt that they had been lied to about the direct threat Iraq posed to the United States. President Barack Obama rode to power in part on the angry disillusionment that still shapes American attitudes today. Ironically, in accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, Obama observed that American willingness to “underwrite global security” had brought stability to the postwar world and that this was in the United States’ “enlightened self-interest.” Yet it quickly became clear that Americans were more interested in nation building at home. In the end, Obama’s realism, like Taft’s, consisted of accepting “the world as it is,” not as advocates of world order might wish it to be.

Protesting the Iraq war in Washington, D.C., September 2007  

Jim Young / Reuters

In 1990, the former U.S. ambassador to the UN Council on Foreign Relations member  Jeane Kirkpatrick argued that the United States should return to being a “normal” nation with normal interests, give up the “dubious benefits of superpower status,” end the “unnatural focus” on foreign policy, and pursue its national interests as “conventionally conceived.” That meant protecting its citizens, its territory, its wealth, and its access to “necessary” goods. It did not mean preserving the balance of power in Europe or Asia, promoting democracy, or taking responsibility for problems in the world that did not touch Americans directly. This is the continental perspective that still reigns today. It does not deny that the United States has interests, but it proposes that they are merely the interests that all nations have. 

The problem is that the United States has not been a normal nation for over a century, nor has it had normal interests. Its unique power gives it a unique role. Bangladeshis and Bolivians also have an interest in global stability, after all, and they might suffer if another Germany came to dominate Europe or if another Japan came to dominate Asia. But no one would suggest that it was in their national interest to prevent that from happening, because they lack the capacity to do so, just as the United States lacked the capacity in 1798, when it was most threatened by the prospect of a European hegemon. World order became the United States’ concern when the old world order collapsed in the early twentieth century and the country became the only power capable of establishing a new one in which its interests could be protected. 

That is still the case today, and yet, even more than in CFR member Kirkpatrick’s time, continentalism remains the dominant perspective. It informs the language Americans use to talk about foreign policy and the theoretical paradigms by which they understand such concepts as national interest and security. It also remains suffused with moralism. Calls for “restraint” still recite the founders’ wisdom and declaim its betrayal as acts of hubris, messianism, and imperialism. Many internationalists still believe that what they regard as the unwarranted exercise of American power is the greatest obstacle to a better and more just world. The mixed results of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are not merely errors of judgment and execution but black marks on the American soul. 

CFR Member George Kennan

Americans still yearn to escape to a more innocent and simpler past. To a degree they probably don’t recognize, they yearn to have less power. Realists have long understood that as long as the United States is so powerful, it will be hard to avoid what the political scientists Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson once called “the imperial temptation.” That is one reason why realists have always insisted that American power is in decline or simply not up to the task. The columnist Council on Foreign Relations member Walter Lippmann and the diplomat Council on Foreign Relations member  George Kennan [ Kennan & Lippmann engaged in a CFR produced and directed Hegelian dialectic that resulted in the Marshall plan. The Marshall plan made forever war even more profitable. Not only would the American tax payer pay the military industrial complex for fighting the war they would pay for rebuilding the country after the war was over. War would make CFR ruling elite richer than ever. Marshall, George C. General of the Army and U.S. Army Chief of Staff during World War II (1 Sep 1939 – 18 Nov 1945) and later U.S. Secretary of State (1947-49) and Secretary of Defense (1950-51). The European Recovery Program known as the Marshall Plan was designed by the Council on Foreign Relations. The American public was manipulated into accepting the plan. Two key players in the Marshall Plan Psycho-political operation were Council on Foreign Relations members Walter Lippmann and George Kennan. Marshall received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1953.] made that argument in the late 1940s, as did Council on Foreign Relations member Kissinger in the late 1960s and the historian Paul Kennedy in the 1980s, and many realists still make it today. Realists treat every unsuccessful war, from Vietnam to Iraq, as if it were the equivalent of the Sicilian expedition, the final act of folly that led to Athens’s defeat in the war against Sparta in the fifth century BC. An entire generation of Americans has grown up believing that the lack of clear-cut victories in Afghanistan and Iraq proves that their country can no longer accomplish anything with power. The rise of China [was arranged by Council on Foreign Relations Bill Clinton and his fellow CFR members], the United States’ declining share of the global economy, the advance of new military technologies, and a general diffusion of power around the world—all have signaled the twilight, once again, of the American order [and the building of a Council on Foreign Relations New World Order run by the CFR ruling elite and their ruling elite cohorts from other nations]

Americans still yearn to escape to a more innocent and simpler past.

Yet if the United States were as weak as so many people claim, it wouldn’t have to practice restraint. It is precisely because the country is still capable of pursuing a world-order strategy that critics need to explain why it should not. The fact is that the basic configuration of international power has not changed as much as many imagine. The earth is still round; the United States still sits on its vast, isolated continent, surrounded by oceans and weaker powers; the other great powers still live in regions crowded with other great powers; and when one power in those regions grows too strong for the others to balance against, the would-be victims still look to the distant United States for help.

Although Russia possesses a huge nuclear arsenal, it is even more an “Upper Volta with rockets” today than when that wisecrack was coined, in the early Cold War. The Soviets at least controlled half of Europe. China has taken the place of Japan, stronger in terms of wealth and population but with unproven military capabilities and a much less favorable strategic position. When imperial Japan expanded in the 1930s, it faced no formidable regional competitors, and the Western powers were preoccupied with the German threat. Today, Asia is crowded with other great powers, including three whose militaries are among the top ten in the world—India, Japan, and South Korea—all of which are either allies or partners of the United States. Should Beijing, believing in Washington’s weakness, use its own growing power to try to alter the East Asian strategic situation, it might have to cope not only with the United States but also with a global coalition of advanced industrial nations, much as the Soviets discovered.

The Trump years were a stress test for the American world order, and the order, remarkably, passed. Confronted by the nightmare of a rogue superpower tearing up trade and other agreements, U.S. allies appeased and cajoled, bringing offerings to the angry volcano and waiting hopefully for better times. Adversaries also trod carefully. When Trump ordered the killing of the Iranian commander Qasem Soleimani, it was reasonable to expect Iran to retaliate, and it may still, but not with Trump as president. The Chinese suffered through a long tariff war that hurt them more than it hurt the United States, but they tried to avoid a complete breakdown of the economic relationship on which they depend. Obama worried that providing offensive weapons to Ukraine could lead to war with Russia, but when the Trump administration went ahead with the weapons deliveries, Moscow acquiesced with barely a murmur. Many of Trump’s [ CFR run administration] policies were erratic and ill conceived, but they did show how much excess, unused power the United States has, if a president chooses to deploy it. In the Obama years, officials measured 50 times before deciding not to cut, ever fearful that other powers would escalate a confrontation. In the Trump years, it was other countries that worried about where a confrontation with the United States might lead.


The United States is “lazily playing with a fraction of her immeasurable strength”—so the British historian Arnold Toynbee commented somewhat ruefully in the early 1930s. At the time, U.S. defense spending was between two and three percent of GDP. Today, it is a little over three percent. In the 1950s, during the Eisenhower administration—often seen as a time of admirable restraint in U.S. foreign policy—the United States had almost one million troops deployed overseas, out of a total American population of 170 million. Today, in an era when the United States is said to be dangerously overextended, there are roughly 200,000 U.S. troops deployed overseas, out of a population of 330 million. Setting aside whether this constitutes “lazily playing with a fraction” of American strength, it is important to recognize that the United States is now in peace mode. Were Americans to shift to a war footing, or even a Cold War–type footing, in response to some Chinese action—for instance, an attack on Taiwan—the United States would look like a very different animal.

At the height of the late Cold War, under President Ronald Reagan [Reagan had 287 CFR and Trilateral Commission members in his Administration. Trilateral/CFR member, Caspar W. Weinberger (Reagan’s Finance Director when he was Governor of California, former Vice President of Bechtel Corp., and former Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare under Nixon and Ford), became Secretary of Defense. Weinberger said: “The Trilateral Commission is performing a very valuable service in strengthening the ties between the United States and our natural allies.”], the United States spent six percent of GDP on defense, and its arms industry produced weapons in such quantity and of such quality that the Soviets simply could not keep up. The Chinese could find themselves in a similar predicament. They might “run wild for the first six months or a year,” as Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the commander of the Japanese fleet during World War II, predicted about his own forces. But in the long run, as he also warned, against a provoked America and its allies, they might well meet the same fate as other U.S. rivals.

The question is not whether the United States is still capable of prevailing in a global confrontation, either hot or cold, with China or any other revisionist power. It is. The real question is whether the worst kinds of hostilities can be avoided, whether China and other powers can be encouraged to pursue their aims peacefully, to confine the global competition to the economic and political realms and thus spare themselves and the world from the horrors of the next great war or even the still frightening confrontations of another cold war.

The Trump years were a stress test for the American world order, and the order passed. [nonsense they were a stress test for the CFR ruling elite’s international world order. Trump’s National Security Strategy – America First Obama’s National Security Policy says US to join “International Order” A big difference Obama’s policy = CFR globalization Trump’s doesn’t. The CFR run Clinton-Bush-Obama administrations all worked toward global governance]

The United States cannot avoid such crises by continuing to adhere to a nineteenth-century view of its national interest. Doing that would produce what it produced in the past: periods of indifference and retrenchment followed by panic, fear, and sudden mobilization. Already, Americans are torn between these two impulses. On the one hand, China now occupies that place in the American mind that Germany and the Soviet Union once held: an ideological opponent that has the ability to strike at American society directly and that has power and ambitions that threaten the United States’ position in a key region and perhaps everywhere else, too. On the other hand, many Americans believe that the United States is in decline and that China will inevitably come to dominate Asia. Indeed, the self-perceptions of the Americans and the Chinese are perfectly symmetrical. The Chinese think that the United States’ role in their region for the past 75 years has been unnatural and is therefore transient, and so do the Americans. The Chinese believe that the United States is in decline, and so do many Americans. The danger is that as Beijing ramps up efforts to fulfill what it has taken to calling “the Chinese dream,” Americans will start to panic. It is in times like this that miscalculations are made.

Perhaps the Chinese, careful students of history that they are, will not make the mistake that others have made in misjudging the United States. Whether Americans have learned the lessons of their own history, however, remains to be seen. A century-long pattern of oscillation will be difficult to change. It will be especially so when foreign policy experts of all stripes regard support for a liberal world order as impossible and immoral. Among other problems, their prescriptions suffer from an unwarranted optimism about the likely alternatives to a U.S.-led order. Realists, liberal internationalists, conservative nationalists, and progressives all seem to imagine that without Washington playing the role it has played these past 75 years, the world will be just fine, and U.S. interests will be just as well protected. But neither recent history nor present circumstances justify such idealism. The alternative to the American world order is not a Swedish world order. It will not be a world of law and international institutions or the triumph of Enlightenment ideals or the end of history. It will be a world of power vacuums, chaos, conflict, and miscalculation—a shabby place indeed.

The messy truth is that in the real world, the only hope for preserving liberalism at home and abroad is the maintenance of a world order conducive to liberalism, and the only power capable of upholding such an order is the United States. This is not an expression of hubris but a reality rooted in international circumstances. And it is certainly a mixed blessing. In trying to preserve this order, the United States has wielded and will wield power, sometimes unwisely and ineffectively, with unpredictable costs and morally ambiguous consequences. That is what wielding power means. Americans have naturally sought to escape this burden. They have sought to divest themselves of responsibility, hiding sometimes behind dreamy internationalism, sometimes behind a determined resignation to accept the world “as it is,” and always with the view that absent a clear and present danger, they can hang back in their imaginary fortress.

The time has come to tell Americans that there is no escape from global responsibility, that they have to think beyond the protection of the homeland. They need to understand that the purpose of NATO and other alliances is to defend not against direct threats to U.S. interests but against a breakdown of the order that best serves those interests. [US Has Killed More Than 20 Million People in 37 Victim Nations Since World War II The CFR has run every admin since WWI – like taking the blame for the ruling elite that profits from murder USA?]

They need to be told honestly that the task of maintaining a world order is unending and fraught with costs but preferable to the alternative. A failure to be square with the American people[is CFR propagandist Kagan being fair with his reader by leaving all the CFR connections out of this article?] has led the country to its current predicament, with a confused and angry public convinced that its [Concil on Foreign Relations] leaders are betraying American interests for their own nefarious, “globalist” purposes [which they most certainly are Trump’s National Security Strategy – America First Obama’s National Security Policy says US to join “International Order” A big difference Obama’s policy = CFR globalization Trump’s doesn’t. This is not a Democratic or Republican issue – do the majority of Democrats really want to see US sovereignty and our constitution destroyed? Yet Kagan and the CFR maintain control by turning it into a left vs right issue and keeping the American people divided and conquered]. The antidote to this is not scaring the hell out of them about China and other threats but trying to explain, again, why the world order they created still matters. This is a job for Joe Biden and his new Council on Foreign Relations run administration.[The antidote is to cage the 5k CFR members who have controlled the US government for the last 100 years with the goal of destroying US sovereignty and the constitution and making the USA a part of an international order ruled by them. Here are some credible witnesses to CFR control of the USA

Council on Foreign Relations member Jimmy Carter admits the US is an Oligarchy

Council on Foreign Relations member Bill Clinton’s wife and Council on Foreign Relations member Chelsea’s mom Hillary tells us the CFR runs USA ]

here are just a few CFR deep state research sources

Membership Trilateral Commission

This is the CFR’s 2019 Annual Report charts on pages 19 & 36 break down its membership in terms of areas of influence. The group works as circles within circles. The most inner circle develops the best plan to shape public opinion to further CFR goals of globalization which means destruction of national sovereignty. The Webstat charts on pages 14 shows how many people are listening to them – they reach an audience of 16.8M — this audience grew from by 96% last year and that includes 35000 students. They are taking control of the internet as part of their public opinion mind shaping media empire. On page 38 they breakdown their corporate membership by industry. They have 136 members. The corporate members finance their media through advertising. The CEO’s influence advertising to promote goals like abortion rights and gay marriage. Employees and share holders have very little or no say in how the corporation influences public opinion. In return CFR globalization provides the corporations with overseas cheap labor which can increase profits. The cost is loss of American jobs and lowing the middle class standard of living. This isn’t captialism this is crony capitalism at its worst.

The Power Behind Big News & the founding fathers of propaganda

The CFR and the Media

The American Empire and its Media & the key role played by the CFR

Here is a great series on Bernays

History is A Weapon – by Edward Bernays

Propaganda and The Power Elite

From Propaganda to Fake News: Deception, Manipulation and Truth in the Contemporary Media Environment

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The answer to whether United States Secretary of State is a “Council on Foreign Relations job” has to be YES!

Council on Foreign Relations member Anne-Marie Slaughter, is a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, and served as director of policy planning for the State Department from 2009 to 2011. The article that follows appeared in today’s Washington Post. The Washington Post is owned by the Graham family. Many Graham family members are members of the Council on Foreign Relations. Slaughter’s article points out that the position of the Secretary of State of the United States is held by women. Missing from her article is that the women and men holding the position are connected to the Council on Foreign Relations.

On September 12, 1939, the Council on Foreign Relations began to take control of the Department of State. On that day Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Editor of Foreign Affairs, and Walter H. Mallory, Executive Director of the Council on Foreign Relations, paid a visit to the State Department. The Council proposed forming groups of experts to proceed with research in the general areas of Security, Armament, Economic, Political, and Territorial problems. The State Department accepted the proposal. The project (1939-1945) was called Council on Foreign Relations War and Peace Studies. Hamilton Fish Armstrong was Executive director.

In February 1941 the CFR officially became part of the State Department. The Department of State established the Division of Special Research. It was organized just like the Council on Foreign Relations War and Peace Studies project. It was divided into Economic, Political, Territorial, and Security Sections. The Research Secretaries serving with the Council groups were hired by the State Department to work in the new division. These men also were permitted to continue serving as Research Secretaries to their respective Council groups. Leo Pasvolsky was appointed Director of Research.

In 1942 the relationship between the Department of State and the Council on Foreign Relations strengthened again. The Department organized an Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policies. The Chairman was Secretary Cordell Hull, the vice chairman, Under Secretary Sumner Wells, Dr. Leo Pasvolsky ( director of the Division of Special Research) was appointed Executive Officer. Several experts were brought in from outside the Department. The outside experts were Council on Foreign Relations War and Peace Studies members; Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Isaiah Bowman, Benjamin V. Cohen, Norman H. Davis, and James T. Shotwell.

In total there were 362 meetings of the War and Peace Studies groups. The meetings were held at Council on Foreign Relations headquarters — the Harold Pratt house, Fifty-Eight East Sixty-Eighth Street, New York City. The Council’s wartime work was confidential.17

In 1944 members of the Council on Foreign Relations The War and Peace Studies Political Group were invited to be active members at the Dumbarton Oaks conference on world economic arrangements. In 1945 these men and members of Britain’s Royal Institute of International Affairs were active at the San Francisco conference which ensured the establishment of the United Nations.

In 1947 Council on Foreign Relations members George Kennan, Walter Lippmann, Paul Nitze, Dean Achenson, and Walter Krock took part in a psycho-political operation forcing the Marshall Plan on the American public. The PSYOP included a “anonymous” letter credited to a Mr. X, which appeared in the Council on Foreign Relations magazine FOREIGN AFFAIRS. The letter opened the door for the CFR controlled Truman administration to take a hard line against the threat of Soviet expansion. George Kennan was the author of the letter. The Marshall Plan should have been called the Council on Foreign Relations Plan. The so-called Marshall Plan and the ensuing North Atlantic Treaty Organization defined the role of the United States in world politics for the rest of the century. ( )

In his article The Future Is Calling: War on Terror, Ed Griffin gives us insight into the nature of the CFR Secretary of State :

“In 1996, CBS reporter Lesley Stahl interviewed  the American ambassador to the UN, Madeline Albright (a member of the CFR  ). In the course of the interview, Stahl asked this question: “We have heard that a half-million children have died [as a result of this policy]. Is the price worth it?” Albright replied: “We think the price is worth it.” That interview was widely circulated in the Middle East. It was not merely an unfortunate choice of words. It was a forthright statement of collectivist morality: The sacrifice of a half-million children is acceptable because of the greater good of supposedly de-stabilizing Hussein’s regime, the greater good of world peace, the greater good of the New World Order. Remember, in the collectivist mind, anything can be justified by theorizing a greater good for a greater number, and a half-million children is a small number compared to the population of the world. In any event, these policies are well designed to aggravate whole populations into becoming enemies of America, and some of them will be willing to sacrifice their lives in revenge.” Watch the interview ( ).

Slaughter’s article follows, it has been edited to identify members of the Council on Foreign Relations. Isn’t it time for Professors of Journalism and honest journalists to stand up and point out that articles like Slaughter’s are not journalism, but propaganda and disinformation used to sway public opinion to further Council on Foreign Relations goals and keep the Council on Foreign Relations in the shadows so they can continue to control the United States and keep the world in a state of endless unwinnable wars from which their Military Industrial Complex profits from death and destruction?

By Anne-Marie Slaughter,  Dec 08, 2012 02:07 AM EST The Washington Post Published: December 7 Anne-Marie Slaughter, a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, served as director of policy planning for the State Department from 2009 to 2011.  

  Feeling typecast, Madam Secretary?

[CFR member] Madeleine Albright broke the State Department’s glass ceiling to become the first female secretary in 1997.  [CFR member] Condoleeza Rice was the first female national security adviser before she headed to State. And Hillary Rodham Clinton [CFR member William Clinton’s wife] has prioneered “soft power,” using diplomatic tools beyond guns and money. My 14-year-old son and I were watching the Democratic National Convention this past summer when [CFR member] John Kerry came on. My son asked who he was; I responded that he had run for president in 2004, that he was an important senator and that if President Obama were reelected, [CFR member] Kerry might become secretary of state.

“You mean a man can be secretary of state?” my son said, sounding genuinely surprised.  

It makes sense that he assumed that men didn’t have a shot at the job. Three of the past four secretaries of state have been women, and that trend could continue if Obama nominates and the Senate confirms U.N. Ambassador [CFR member]  Susan Rice to replace [CFR wife]  Hillary Rodham Clinton. In fact, I’ve been asked recently whether we are turning secretary of state into a woman’s job.

Women of my generation remember well how big a step it was for [CFR member]  Madeleine Albright to break the secretary of state glass ceiling in 1997. Just a decade later, by 2008, Carol Jenkins, then president of the Women’s Media Center, was noting that “secretary of state has become the women’s spot — a safe expected place for women to be.”

I’m not so sure about that. A recent news report quoted a “longtime foreign-policy expert who has worked for Democratic administrations” as saying that [CFR member]  Rice’s voice “is always right on the edge of a screech,” reminding us that sexist caricatures of strong women as witches — or a word that rhymes with that — still abound.

As someone who worked in [CFR wife]  Clinton’s State Department — and has written frequently about the importance of having more women in high foreign policy positions and the difference that can make to the substance as well as the style of U.S. foreign policy — I think the question of whether women are particularly well-suited to nurturing relationships, marshaling cooperation and conducting tough negotiations around the world is worth asking.

In some ways the answer is yes. Back in the 1980s, [CFR member] Joseph Nye coined the term “soft power,” meaning the power of attraction rather than the power of coercion. (And by attraction, I mean the lure of a nation’s culture and values, not its diplomats’ looks.) But soft power really took off when he argued in 2005 that it was the means to success in world politics. He argued that the United States succeeds when we can persuade the rest of the world to want what we want, rather than imposing our will. Given that women are far less likely to be able to use coercive power than men are, we have been skilled for centuries at getting others to want what we want.

Moreover, I think many women take more readily to the “smart power” approach to foreign policy that [CFR wife] Clinton has pioneered. In a nutshell, this approach entails using a wide spectrum of tools in addition to the hard power of military and economic might to address global problems.

International relations traditionally divides national security (guns and bombs) and international political economy (money) [ ]. These are the arenas of “high politics” — the diplomatic and financial crises that produce high-stakes poker games. [CFR wife] Clinton and her [CFR member]  female predecessors proved repeatedly that they could manage high politics with ease. [CFR wife] Clinton’s handling of the Chen Guangcheng crisis with China, the Libya intervention and the recent Gaza cease-fire proves that she can deal with such situations with aplomb and a spine of steel. And remember Albright during the wars in the Balkans, asking [CFR member]  Colin Powell what the point was of having such a great military if we were not willing to use it? As has often been noted, [CFR wife]  Clinton is equally enthusiastic about a range of broader issues: food security, water management, global health, climate, energy security, technology, and empowering women and girls. These have traditionally been relegated to the catch-all basket of “global issues,” decidedly lower on the foreign policy hierarchy than guns, bombs and money. Indeed, for a long time they were not considered part of foreign policy but instead the province of development.

As[CFR wife]  Clinton said at her Senate confirmation hearing, she came into office determined to elevate development to an equal pillar of our foreign policy, alongside diplomacy and defense. And a critical part of her legacy will be that, when she and her deputies talked to foreign governments, they raised health, water, food, women’s rights and other issues to the level of high politics. Focusing on these concerns before they reach a crisis point is smart long-term policy, the proverbial ounce of prevention worth a pound of cure.

But what does all of this have to do with gender? It is an open secret in Washington that national security meetings in government or think tanks are overwhelmingly male; development meetings are at least 50 percent female. For whatever reasons, men focus more on state-to-state issues, while women pay a great deal of attention to broader social matters. It is thus not unreasonable to think that a female secretary of state would be more adept at handling the full portfolio.

Call it multitasking foreign policy: the ability to look at what is happening across the Middle East, for example, and to recognize that addressing unemployment, resource scarcity and the oppression of women is just as important for the safeguarding of U.S. interests as monitoring geopolitical rivalries between Shiite and Sunni states.

Moreover, as long as the White House remains the foreign policy boys’ club that it has been during the first Obama administration, it is all the more important to have a woman (and many women beneath her) at the State Department.

The men in the president’s inner foreign policy circle [ ] are certainly talented and qualified; many are friends of mine. But consider Foreign Policy magazine’s recent list of the 50 most important Democrats in foreign policy. The top 20 include four men from the White House: national security adviser [CFR member]  Tom Donilon, his deputies Denis McDonough and Ben Rhodes, and Vice President Biden’s chief foreign policy adviser, [CFR member]  Tony Blinken. The rest of the list includes two more male White House insiders, deputy national security adviser [CFR member]  Mike Froman and National Security Council Chief of Staff Brian McKeon. The only woman from the White House was National Security Council senior director Samantha Power, who came in at No. 44.

However, the answer to whether secretary of state is a “woman’s job” has to be no. To begin with, plenty of men, even if not a majority, care deeply about the many issues that[CFRwife]   Clinton has prioritized. If a male secretary of state built on her development legacy (and that of  Condoleezza Rice before her), he could make an important move toward taking “softer” issues out of the gender ghetto once and for all. To take one example, when men focus on women’s empowerment, as USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah and his deputy, Donald Steinberg, have done, these issues gain more legitimacy as part of a mainstream foreign policy agenda. And why not shuffle the deck and put the first female Democrat at the president’s right hand as national security adviser, a position that has hard power and high politics built into its very name?

The last thing we need is to typecast Cabinet members the way law partners used to be. When I interviewed at Wall Street firms in the 1980s, they always trotted out two female partners, one of whom was always in trusts and estates — the theory was that they were good at holding widows’ hands — and the other often in family law. And for a long time in medicine, women were relegated to pediatrics and gynecology. Let’s simply recognize that anyone following[CFR wife] Clinton will have very big pumps to fill, but that a man could fill them just as well, as many great male secretaries of state have proved.

Of course, there could be another reason we’ve had a string of female secretaries of state. Shifting cultural expectations and 21st-century politics mean it is important to have a woman in one of the “big three” Cabinet positions: state, defense or Treasury. Perhaps the State Department keeps going to a woman because of a reluctance to appoint a woman as secretary of defense or Treasury. If this is the reason for putting women in this role, it’s a bad one.

Interestingly, the French are ahead of us on both counts: [Bilderberg member] Christine Lagarde was the French finance minister before she became the first female director of the International Monetary Fund, and Michele Alliot-Marie recently finished a term as France’s first foreign minister. Neither Britain nor Germany have had a woman in these positions, but they have both had women in the government’s top job.

At least a couple of very talented women are in line for both defense and Treasury; I hope they find their way to the top in the next four years. But all told, I’ve got a radical proposal. Let’s go gender-blind. If that results in three men in these positions, fine. If it results in three women in these positions, so be it. None is inherently a “man’s” or a “woman’s” role. They are all tough jobs, and we need the best people we can find. [ }

Anne-Marie Slaughter, a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, served as director of policy planning for the State Department from 2009 to 2011.  

You owe it to yourself to learn the truth about the Council on Foreign Relations they control your life :

just a few CFR deep state research sources

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“Rationalization” – CFR Philosophy of Greed

Jeffersonian democracy is based upon a philosophy driven by civic virtue. The Council on Foreign Relations is manipulating the American people into “rationalizing” a global economy driven by a dollar philosophy based upon greed. In TRAGEDY AND HOPE, Quigley writes about a Council on Foreign Relations philosophical doctrine called “rationalization.

Ethics and morals are the essence of humanity. Without ethics and morals one becomes inhuman. “Rationalization” removes ethics and morals from the intelligence equation. “Rationalization” is a false philosophy, driven by selfishness and used to rationalize immoral decisions. “Rationalization” disregards the adverse effects ones actions can have on others as long the desired result is obtained. “Rationalization” is an application of the philosophy that “the ends justify the means.”

Council on Foreign Relations controlled munition, medicine, media, energy and food industries profit, at the expense of unhappiness and suffering of countless human beings. Their profit is maximized during periods of unrest which they create through large scale psycho-political operations designed to cause tension between different target groups that keep the world in a state of perpetual warfare. The war machine generated profits are exhibited as “rationalization” and evidence of the effectiveness of the immoral methods used to generate them. Left out of the profit picture is the cost in human suffering required to produce those profits.

Carroll Quigley’s “TRAGEDY AND HOPE” is a diplomatic, military, economic, and cultural history of the world from about 1900 to 1950. Quigley was professor of western civilization and history at the Foreign Service School of Georgetown University. His credentials as a historian were excellent, and he was well-connected with the Washington elite. Quigley was a consultant for the Brookings Institution, the Defense Department, the State Department, and the Navy. The Georgetown University Foreign Service.School maintains close ties with the the Center for Strategic and International Studies, established in 1962. CSIS included a number of people on its staff who had high-level CIA connections. Quigley moved in these circles until his death in 1977. One of Quigley’s students was CFR member William Jefferson Clinton. Was Quigley a CIA or State Department operative doubling as a University Professor? [1]

According to Quigley:

“I know of the operations of this network [the Institutes of International Affairs, Institutes of Pacific Relations, and the Council on Foreign Relations] because I have studied it for twenty years and was permitted for two years, in the early 1960s, to examine its papers and secret records. I have no aversion to it or to most of its aims and have, for much of my life, been close to it and to many of its instruments. I have objected, both in the past and recently, to a few of its policies, but in general my chief difference of opinion is that it wishes to remain unknown, and I believe its role in history is significant enough to be known.” Why would the Council on Foreign Relations chose an outsider as their historian?

Rationalization appeared at the end of the 19th Century, the same time the Rhodes-Milner secret society was formed. Quigley writes, rationalization, “was first used … to solve problems of mass production, and led, step by step, to assembly-line techniques in which regulated quantities of materials (parts), power, labor, and supervision were delivered … to produce a continuous outflow of some final product…Naturally, such a process serves to dehumanize the productive process and, since it also seeks to reduce every element in the process to a repetitive action, it leads eventually to an automation in which every supervision is electronic and mechanical.” [2]

According to Quigley, rationalization “is a method of dealing with problems and processes in an established sequence of steps, thus: (1) isolate the problem; (2) separate it into its most obvious stages or areas; (3) enumerate the factors which determine the outcome desired in each stage or area; (4) vary the factors in a conscious, systematic, and (if possible) quantitative way to maximize the outcome desired in the stage or area concerned; and (5) reassemble the stages or areas and check to see if the whole problem or process has been acceptably improved in the direction desired.” [3]

This is a definition of the scientific method. Science is systemized knowledge derived from observation, study, and experimentation. Rational thinking requires applying knowledge in a way that will do the most good for all. “Rationalization” misapplies scientific thinking to increase product produced at the cost of “dehumanization” — a most irrational, unethical, and unscientific choice. A choice antithetical to an economic system based on Judeo/Christian ethics. Rationalization isn’t a philosophy — it is a pseudo-philosophy used to rationalize irrational thought. To “dehumanize” human beings and turn them into automatons is irrational — no human being in their right mind would want this to happen to them.

A taxonomy classifies objects according to their natural relationships. From 1949 to 1953 a group of educators worked together to develop a Taxonomy of educational objectives. Their taxonomy of the cognitive domain deals with recall or recognition of knowledge and the development of intellectual abilities and skills. It contains six major classes:

Knowledge – Recalling specifics, universals, methods, processes, patterns, structures or settings.

Comprehension – Understanding what is communicated and using the material without relating it to other material or seeing its fullest implications.

Application – Using abstractions in particular and concrete situations.

Analysis – Breaking down a problem into its parts — determining what has to be done.

Synthesis – Designing different solutions to solve the problem by putting together the parts to form a whole — determining how to do it.

Evaluation – Choosing the best solution or design for solving the problem . [4]

Aristotle wrote “any occupation or art or study deserves to be called mechanical if it renders the body or soul or intellect of free persons unfit for the exercise of the practice of excellence.” Unfortunately a small group can achieve this state. The group consciously makes decisions that benefit their own self interest at the expense of others. Such a mechanical state is reached if this group is able to achieve control. No matter how well meaning, or dedicated members of the occupation, or practitioners of the art, or students involved in the study — they will never be able to achieve quality in their work, if the group controlling that occupation, or art, or study will not allow them to.

“Rationalization” are analysis and synthesis part of the scientific method. Absent from the philosophy of “Rationalization” is evaluation — the stage that requires making the best choice and puts constraints on the outcome. Such constraints are embodied in sets of ethical and moral guidelines agreed to by the members of a society. Such constraints are embodied in ethics and moral codes. Such constraints are embodied in the Golden Rule, the Ten Commandments, the Teachings of Buddha, and the Laws of Mohammed. Such constraints allow individuals to act in their own best interest and at the same time in the best interest of others.

A recent survey of the psychological literature database showed 1400 articles on intelligence, 256 articles on ethics and only four articles on intelligence and ethics. Is evaluative intelligence missing from intelligence definitions and measures by design?

Quigley continues, “From the basically engineering problem of production, rationalization gradually spread into the more dominant problem of business. From maximizing production, it shifted to maximizing profits. This gave rise to “efficiency experts” such as Frederick Winslow Taylor (whose The Principles of Scientific Management appeared in 1911) and, eventually, to management consultants, like Arthur D. Little, Inc.. As in so many other innovations, the introduction of rationalization into war was begun by the British and then taken over on an enormous scale, by the Americans. Its origin is usually attributed to the efforts of Professor P. M.S. Blackett (Nobel Prize 1948) to apply radar to antiaircraft guns. From there Blackett took the technique into antisubmarine defense whence it spread, under the name ‘Operational Research’ into many aspects of the War effort..First news of the success of Operations Research in Britain was brought to the United States by President Conant in 1940 and formally introduced by Vannevar Bush, as chairman of the New Weapons Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 1942. By the end of the war, the technique had spread extensively through the American war effort, and with the arrival of peace, became an established civilian profession. The best known example of this is the Rand Corporation, a private research and development firm, under contract to the United States Air Force…Similar groups arose in Britain. One of the most complex applications of the technique has been Operation Bootstrap, by which the Puerto Rican Industrial Development Corporation, advised by Arthur D. Little, Inc. has sought to transform the Puerto Rican economy.” [5] One must wonder,since Arthur D. Little Inc. was an proponent of “rationalization” whether or not Arthur D. Little considered what “dehumanizing” effects Operation Bootstrap would have on the lives of the average Puerto Ricans.

Conspicuously absent from Quigley’s history of “rationalization” is an Operations Research project, lead by W. Edward Deming that took place in the 1950’s. According to Deming the aim of the study was, “transformation of the style of American management.” What the study resulted in was the loss of thousands of jobs for the American Automobile Worker and the American Steel Worker.

Deming writes, “Transformation of American style of management is not the job or reconstruction or revision. It requires a whole new structure, from foundation upwards. Mutation might be the word, except mutation implies unordered spontaneity. Transformation must take place with directed effort. The aim of this book is to supply the direction. Need for governmental transformation of governmental relations with industry will be obvious…Improvement of quality transfers waste of man-hours and of machine-time into the manufacture of good product and better service. The result is a chain reaction, lower costs, better competitive position, happier people on the job, jobs and more jobs…Management in some companies in Japan observed in 1948 and 1949 that improvement of quality begets naturally and inevitably improvement of productivity. This observation came from the work of a number of Japanese engineers who studied literature on quality control suppled by engineers from Bell Laboratories then working on General MacArthur’s staff. The literature included Walter A. Shewhart’s book Economic Control of Quality of Manufactured Product (Van Nostrand, 1931: repr. ed., American Society for Quality Control). The results were exciting, showing that productivity does indeed improve as variation is reduced, just as prophesied by the methods and logic in Shewhart’s book. As a result of a foreign experts visit in the summer of 1950, the following chain reaction became engraved in Japan as a way of life. This chain reaction was on the blackboard of every meeting with top management in Japan from July 1950 onward: Improve Quality } -> Cost decrease because of less rework, fewer mistakes, fewer delays, snags; better use of machine-time and materials } -> Productivity improves } -> Capture the market with better quality and lower price } -> Stay in Business } -> Provide jobs and more jobs…With no lenders nor stockholders to press for dividends, this effort became an undivided bond between management and production workers. An unfriendly takeover or a leveraged buyout does not take place in Japan.” [6]

Deming’s callous, characterless nature are evidenced in his atom bomb allusions. Deming’s chain reaction was due less to the effectiveness of Operations Research techniques then simply having a cheaper more docile labor pool to exploit. Many of the “jobs and more jobs,” the Japanese worker realized came at the expense of jobs lost by Americans. Americans were paid higher wages then the Japanese ; had to deal with the unfriendly takeovers and leveraged buyouts; hadn’t had an atom bomb dropped on them; and had unionized to prevent management from taking advantage of them.

Council on Foreign Relations members maximized their profits by capitalizing on the higher quality, less expensive cars produced by the Japanese worker, transporting and selling those cars to Americans. At the same time the Council on Foreign Relations created tension; tension between the American worker and the Japanese worker; and, tension between the American automobile worker and other Americans who bought the less expensive higher quality Japanese product. Tension that divided and conquered the Automobile workers unions — unions that the Council on Foreign Relations managers wanted to control.

A similar scenario is being played out today, by exporting American jobs to cheaper labor in foreign lands under NAFTA..The cheaper labor is exploited and American labor finds itself jobless. In the meantime Council on Foreign Relations members on the Board of Directors and their fraternity brothers in Foreign Nations reap tremendous profits underselling the products produced by American workers.

Quigley continues, “A great impetus has been given to rationalization of society in the postwar world by…new developments. Among these have been applications of game theory, information theory, symbolic logic, cybernetics, and electronic computing. The newest of these was probably game theory, worked out by a Hungarian refugee mathematician, John von Neumann, at the Institute for Advanced Study. This applied mathematical techniques to situations in which persons sought conflicting goals in a nexus of relationships governed by rules. Closely related to this were new mathematical methods for dealing with decision-making. The basic work in the new field was the book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (Princeton 1944)…These, and related techniques, are now transforming methods of operation and behavior in all aspects of life and bringing on a large-scale rationalization of human life which is becoming on of the most significant characteristics of Western Civilization in the twentieth century.” [7]

The Institute of Advanced Study at Princeton was a reasonable copy of Britain’s Royal Institute of International Affairs chief Oxford headquarters, All Souls College, organized by Council on Foreign Relations member Abraham Flexner of the Carnegie Foundation and Rockefeller’s General Education Board, from plans drawn by Tom Jones, one of Britain’s Royal Institute of International Affairs most active intriguers and foundations administrators. [8]

Among Von Neuman’s colleagues at The Institute for Advanced Study, were Einstein, Oppenheimer, and Council on Foreign Relations member George F. Kennan. Quigley tells us “the mobilization of rationalization under the Office of Scientific Research and Development and the National Defense Research Committee by those two Massachusetts Yankees, Bush and Conant, is one of the miracles of the war.” Quigley’s got it backwards, given the amount of American tax-payer dollars Bush and Conant were in control of ($460 million), the miracle would have been not mobilizing “rationalization”. In the 1940’s $460 million dollars could get a lot of scientists mobilized to “rationalizing” the suffering death and destruction of countless millions of human beings especially if they were the ones paid to produce the war machines rather than the ones paid to use the wars machines. To get the American people to go along with such “rationalization” required finding an enemy to loath and fear, and be willing to go to war over. Part of the money spent on “scientific research” by Bush and Conant, went to researchers who used the money to develop psycho-political PSYOPS at home and abroad that brought such a monster to power.

In 1975 Council on Foreign Relations magazine FOREIGN AFFAIRS published an article describing how the CFR’s globalony works, “There was a creaming off and co-option of the natural elite of the working class [in America]. Some members were drawn off… to higher education… Their followers were pacified… by vicarious participation in the structure of power and… by receipt of slightly increased shares of a very rapidly growing pie. There is no evidence that any existing wealth was redistributed. ” The article suggests the Third World could be co-opted in the same way. Since the Cold War ended the CFR and branch organizations in other nations have been co-opting and dividing eastern Europe.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1973) explains the Corporate evolutionary process will be replacement of governments with control by large multinational Corporations and “the end of nationality and national governments as we know them.” Isn’t this an Oligarchy – where the ruling power belongs to a few people – the corporate managers?

Are we living in a capitalistic society or a system designed to generate profound psychological insecurities by the depersonalization of business? Is the stock market a device used to give the perception of public ownership? Where the nominal owners are too widely dispersed to exercise any degree of effective control over small controlling groups of Council on Foreign Relations members who own large blocks of stock and sit on the Corporations Board of Directors? Is American capitalism simply State ownership, where State control is in the hands of the CFR rather than the Communist Party elite (aka Russian Institute of Pacific Relations members)?

Shouldn’t the corporate evolutionary process evolve into a system where employees are the only stockholders, with capital raised from bond sales alone? An employee’s shares would reflect the value they add to the product the company produces. Salaries would be stock dividends from profits. The more profitable the corporation the more all employees would be paid. In such a system workers would do things freely and intelligently, not only for the wage earned, and under the instruction of their management.

Such a system would give the great majority of workers a direct personal interest in their company and insight into the social aims of their pursuits. Under the current arrangement a workers result is not the ends of their own actions, but only of their employers. Would an employee owned corporation “rationalize” a product that could endanger their family members, co-workers, friends and neighbors as easily as a small group of greedy self-serving Board of Directors and Corporate Executives?

Is the Council on Foreign Relations trying to destroy the American Peoples belief in God to manipulate them into accepting “Rationalization.” The Council on Foreign Relations controls the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial systems.What better way to destroy the faith of a nation then by legislating and legalizing immorality. Encouraging witnesses to lie under oath encourages people to take the Lords name in vain; condones bearing false witness against ones neighbors; and allows the guilty to go free while encouraging people to steal and murder. Legalizing divorce legalizes and encourages adultery and promiscuity. Legalizing abortion legalizes and encourages murder. What better way to attack a people’s faith then to confuse them about the ethics and morals that guide that faith?

You can stop the Council on Foreign Relations, by making them visible. Tell other Americans who the Council on Foreign Relations are, and what they are doing.

How would Council on Foreign Relations prize winning University Professors, Historians, Authors, Statesmen, Politicians, and Journalists explain to a Grand Jury, why links to the Council on Foreign Relations are missing from major news stories, and from the history books?


[1] From NameBase NewsLine, No. 1, April-June 1993:Clinton, Quigley, and Conspiracy: What’s going on here?

[2] Quigley, Carroll, The World Since 1939: A History, Collier Books, New York, Collier Macmillan Ltd., London, Originally published as Part II TRAGEDY AND HOPE, pg 176-177

[3] Ibid

[4] Bloom, Benjamin S, Taxonomy of Educational Objectives – The Classification of Educational Goals, Book 1 Cognitive Domain, (1956, 1984), Longman, New York 95 Church Street, White Plains, New York 10601

[5] Quigley, Carroll, The World Since 1939: A History, Collier Books, New York, Collier Macmillan Ltd., London, Originally published as Part II Tragedy and Hope, pg 178

[6] Deming W. Edwards, Out of Crisis, MIT Center for Advanced Engineering Study, Cambridge Mass., 1986, pg 1-5

[7] Quigley, Carroll, The World Since 1939: A History, Collier Books, New York, Collier Macmillan Ltd., London, Originally published as Part II Tragedy and Hope, pg 182-3

[8] Hadley Cantril, The Human Dimension: Experiences in Policy Research, Rutgers The State University, 1967 pg 32-34, 30-31; he War and Peace Studies of The Council On Foreign Relations 1939-1945, The Harold Pratt House 58th E. 68th Street, NY, 1946, pg. 24; Quigley, Carroll, Tragedy and Hope, Macmillan, New York 1966, p. 953


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Title-50 War and National Defense § 783 states – “It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to combine,
conspire, or agree with any other person to perform any act which would substantially contribute to the
establishment within the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship, the direction and control of which is to be
vested in, or exercised by or under the domination of control of, any foreign government.”

The Council on Foreign Relations are in violation of Title-50 War and National Defense § 783. The Council
on Foreign Relations has unlawfully and knowingly combined, conspired, and agreed to substantially
contribute to the establishment of one world order under the totalitarian dictatorship, the direction and the
control of members of Council on Foreign Relations, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and
members of their branch organizations in various nations throughout the world. That is totalitarianism on a
global scale.


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