The CFR devil in Nuclear Diplomacy Exposed

The Arms Control Association (ACA) about link tells us, “The Arms Control Association, founded in 1971, is a national nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. Through its public education and media programs and its magazine, Arms Control Today, we provide policy-makers, the press and the interested public with authoritative information, analysis and commentary on arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements, and related national security issues. In addition to the regular press briefings the Arms Control Association holds on major arms control developments, the staff provides commentary and analysis on a broad spectrum of issues for journalists and scholars both in the United States and abroad.

The ACA just published a fact sheet titled Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy. The Chronology begins in 1985 and follows the diplomatic negotiations up to today. The fact sheet names a host of people who played parts in the negotiations which have resulted in North Korea becoming a nuclear threat. People named include Jimmy Carter, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, William Perry, Sandy Berger, James Woolsey, Winston Lord, Donald Rumsfeld, George Tenet, Wendy Sherman, Madeleine Albright. Colin Powell, Richard Armitage, John Bolton, James Kelly, Bill Richardson, Stephen Bosworth, P. J. Crowley, Kurt Campbell, Leon Panetta. Missing from the article is a key fact, all are members of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Organizations that played key roles in the negotiation process were the CIA and the State Department. Both organizations are headed and staffed by CFR members. CFR Directors of Central Intelligence include Agency Gen. Walter Bedell Smith (1950-1953), Allen W. Dulles (1953-1961), John Alex McCone (1961-1965), Richard Helms (1966-1973), James R. Schlesinger (1973), William E. Colby (1973-1976), George H.W. Bush (1976-1977), Stansfield Turner (1977-1981), William J. Casey (1981-1987), William H. Webster (1987-1991), Robert M. Gates (1991-1993), R. James Woolsey (1993-1995), Adm. William Studeman (1995), [acting] John M. Deutch (1995-1996), George J. Tenet (1997-2004), Porter Goss (2004-2006), Gen. Michael V. Hayden (2006-2009), Gen. David H. Petraeus (2011-2012). CFR U.S. Secretaries of State Include Elihu Root (1905-1909),Charles Evans Hughes (1921-1925),Frank B. Kellogg (1925-1929),Henry L. Stimson (1929-1933),Edward R. Stettinius Jr. (1944-1945),Dean G. Acheson (1949-1953),John Foster Dulles (1953-1959),Christian A. Herter (1959-1961),Dean Rusk (1961-1969),William P. Rogers (1969-1973),Henry A. Kissinger (1973-1977),Cyrus R. Vance (1977-1980),Edmund S. Muskie (1980-1981),Alexander M. Haig Jr. (1981-1982),George P. Shultz (1982-1989),James A. Baker III (1989-1992),Lawrence S. Eagleburger (1992-1993),Warren M. Christopher (1993-1997),Madeleine K. Albright (1997-2001),Colin L. Powell (2001-2005),Condoleezza Rice (2005-2009),John Forbes Kerry (2013-2016).

By leaving CFR negotiation ties out of the fact sheet is the ACA really providing “policy-makers, the press and the interested public with authoritative information, analysis and commentary on arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements, and related national security issues” or is it misinforming us?

If CFR members have been the negotiators for 32 years, and if CFR members and the Military Industrial Complex which it controls can make more profit from endless war than from peace then did the CFR negotiators plan on letting N. Korea end up as a Nuclear threat?  Shouldn’t ACA include the CFR ties to negotiation in the Fact Sheet?

In 2015 a Bipartisan Group of 60 Senior National Security Leaders endorsed the  Iran Nuclear Deal. Thirty-nine of the group are members of the Council on Foreign Relations. They are identified in the figure below :

fig 1 - 39 CFR sr officialsFigure 1 Thirty-Nine out of Sixty National Security Who Endorsed the Iran Nuke Deal are CFR Members

 

Why is the Council on Foreign Relations so interested in allowing countries to develop Nuclear Capabilities that can stir up tension and conflict in the Middle East and Asia? A Land Destroyer report by Tony Carllucci provides insight. Mr. Carllucci writes, “The West has no intention of striking any lasting deal with Iran, as nuclear capabilities, even the acquirement of nuclear weapons by Iran was never truly an existential threat to Western nations or their regional partners. The West’s issue with Iran is its sovereignty and its ability to project its interests into spheres traditionally monopolized by the US and UK across the Middle East. Unless Iran plans on turning over its sovereignty and regional influence along with its right to develop and use nuclear technology, betrayal of any “nuclear deal” is all but inevitable, as is the war that is to shortly follow.” Is the Council on Foreign Relations orchestrating a psyop that will result in a Nuclear incident to keep people all over the world in a state of fear that will result in generating trillions of endless war bucks? Are you ok with that?

The Arms Control Association article follows. I have modified it to identify CFR members and CFR ties and included figures that provide further information about the CFR. If you agree that the CFR is not working in the best interest of the American people I urge you to send a link to this webpage to your local, state, and federal representatives and demand an investigation of the Council on Foreign Relations members who are running our government and negotiating endless war.

 

 

 

Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy

 

Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, (202) 463-8270 x102

Updated: November 2017

For years, the United States and the international community have tried to negotiate an end to North Korea’s nuclear and missile development and its export of ballistic missile technology. Those efforts have been replete with periods of crisis, stalemate, and tentative progress towards denuclearization, and North Korea has long been a key challenge for the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.

The United States has pursued a variety of policy responses to the proliferation challenges posed by North Korea, including military cooperation with U.S. allies in the region, wide-ranging sanctions, and non-proliferation mechanisms such as export controls. The United States also engaged in two major diplomatic initiatives to have North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons efforts in return for aid.

In 1994, faced with North Korea’s announced intent to withdraw from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which requires non-nuclear weapon states to forswear the development and acquisition of nuclear weapons, the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework. Under this agreement, Pyongyang committed to freezing its illicit plutonium weapons program in exchange for aid.

Following the collapse of this agreement in 2002, North Korea claimed that it had withdrawn from the NPT in January 2003 and once again began operating its nuclear facilities.

The second major diplomatic effort were the Six-Party Talks initiated in August of 2003 which involved China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. In between periods of stalemate and crisis, those talks arrived at critical breakthroughs in 2005, when North Korea pledged to abandon “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” and return to the NPT, and in 2007, when the parties agreed on a series of steps to implement that 2005 agreement.

Those talks, however, broke down in 2009 following disagreements over verification and an internationally condemned North Korea rocket launch. Pyongyang has since stated that it would never return to the talks and is no longer bound by their agreements. The other five parties state that they remain committed to the talks, and have called for Pyongyang to recommit to its 2005 denuclearization pledge.

The following chronology summarizes in greater detail developments in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, and the efforts to end them, since 1985.

Skip to: 19851991199219931994199519961997199819992000200120022003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,2008, 2009, 20102011201220132014201520162017

1985

December 12, 1985: North Korea accedes to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) but does not complete a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Under Article III of the NPT, North Korea has 18 months to conclude such an arrangement. In coming years, North Korea links adherence to this provision of the treaty to the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea.

fig 2 - highway of deathFigure 2 Council on Foreign Relations member George H.W. Bush’s Highway of Death

1991

September 27, 1991: President [Council on Foreign Relations member]  George Bush announces the unilateral withdrawal of all naval and land-based tactical nuclear weapons deployed abroad. Approximately 100 U.S. nuclear weapons had been based in South Korea. Eight days later, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev reciprocates.

November 8, 1991: In response to [Council on Foreign Relations member]  President Bush’s unilateral move, President Roh Tae Woo of South Korea announces the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, under which South Korea promises not to produce, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons. In addition, the declaration unilaterally prohibits South Korea from possessing nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities. These promises, if enacted, would satisfy all of North Korea’s conditions for allowing IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities.

1992

January 20, 1992: The two Koreas sign the South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Under the declaration, both countries agree not to “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons” or to “possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.” They also agree to mutual inspections for verification.

January 30, 1992: More than six years after signing the NPT, North Korea concludes a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

March 6, 1992: The United States imposes sanctions on North Korea’s Lyongaksan Machineries and Equipment Export Corporation and Changgwang Sinyong Corporation for missile proliferation activities.*

April 9, 1992: North Korea ratifies the safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

May 4, 1992: North Korea submits its nuclear material declarations to the IAEA, declaring seven sites and some 90 grams of plutonium that could be subject to IAEA inspection. Pyongyang claims that the nuclear material was the result of reprocessing 89 defective fuel rods in 1989. The IAEA conducted inspections to verify the completeness of this declaration from mid-1992 to early 1993.

June 23, 1992: The United States imposes “missile sanctions” on the North Korean entities sanctioned in March.*

September 1992: IAEA inspectors discover discrepancies in North Korea’s “initial report” on its nuclear program and ask for clarification on several issues, including the amount of reprocessed plutonium in North Korea.

1993

February 9, 1993: The IAEA demands special inspections of two sites that are believed to store nuclear waste. The request is based on strong evidence that North Korea has been cheating on its commitments under the NPT. North Korea refuses the IAEA’s request.

March 12, 1993: Amid demands for special inspections, North Korea announces its intention to withdraw from the NPT in three months, citing Article X provisions that allow withdrawal for supreme national security considerations.

April 1, 1993: The IAEA declares that North Korea is not adhering to its safeguards agreement and that it cannot guarantee that North Korean nuclear material is not being diverted for nonpeaceful uses.

June 11, 1993: Following talks with the United States in New York, North Korea suspends its decision to pull out of the NPT just before the withdrawal would have become legally effective. North Korea also agrees to the full and impartial application of IAEA safeguards.

For its part, the United States grants assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons. Washington also promises not to interfere with North Korea’s internal affairs.

July 19, 1993: After a second round of talks with the United States, North Korea announces in a joint statement that it is “prepared to begin consultations with the IAEA on outstanding safeguards and other issues” and that it is ready to negotiate IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. The joint statement also indicates that Pyongyang might consider a deal with the United States to replace its graphite nuclear reactors with light-water reactors (LWRs), which are proliferation resistant.

Late 1993: The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency estimate that North Korea had separated about 12 kilograms of plutonium. This amount is enough for at least one or two nuclear weapons.

fig 3 - ben garrison CIAFigure 3  Council on Foreign Relations run CIA Unleashed

1994

January 1994: The director of the CIA estimates that North Korea may have produced one or two nuclear weapons.

February 15, 1994: North Korea finalizes an agreement with the IAEA to allow inspections of all seven of its declared nuclear facilities, averting sanctions by the United Nations Security Council.

March 1, 1994: IAEA inspectors arrive in North Korea for the first inspections since 1993.

March 21, 1994: Responding to North Korea’s refusal to allow the inspection team to inspect a plutonium reprocessing plant at Yongbyon, the IAEA Board of Governors approves a resolution calling on North Korea to “immediately allow the IAEA to complete all requested inspection activities and to comply fully with its safeguards agreements.”

May 19, 1994: The IAEA confirms that North Korea has begun removing spent fuel from its 5-megawatt nuclear research reactor even though international monitors were not present. The United States and the IAEA had insisted that inspectors be present for any such action because spent fuel can potentially be reprocessed for use in nuclear weapons.

June 13, 1994: North Korea announces its withdrawal from the IAEA. This is distinct from pulling out of the NPT—North Korea is still required to undergo IAEA inspections as part of its NPT obligations. The IAEA contends that North Korea’s safeguards agreement remains in force. However, North Korea no longer participates in IAEA functions as a member state.

June 15, 1994: Former U.S. President [Council on Foreign Relations member] Jimmy Carter negotiates a deal with North Korea in which Pyongyang confirms its willingness to “freeze” its nuclear weapons program and resume high-level talks with the United States. Bilateral talks are expected to begin, provided that North Korea allows the IAEA safeguards to remain in place, does not refuel its 5-megawatt nuclear reactor, and does not reprocess any spent nuclear fuel.

July 9, 1994: North Korean President Kim Il Sung dies and is succeeded by his son, Kim Jong Il.

August 12, 1994: An “agreed statement” is signed that establishes a three-stage process for the elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. In return, the United States promises to move toward normalized economic and diplomatic relations and assures North Korea that it will provide assistance with the construction of proliferation-resistant LWRs to replace North Korea’s graphite-moderated reactors.

October 21, 1994: The United States and North Korea conclude four months of negotiations by adopting the “Agreed Framework” in Geneva. To resolve U.S. concerns about Pyongyang’s plutonium-producing reactors and the Yongbyon reprocessing facility, the agreement calls for North Korea to freeze and eventually eliminate its nuclear facilities, a process that will require dismantling three nuclear reactors, two of which are still under construction. North Korea also allows the IAEA to verify compliance through “special inspections,” and it agrees to allow 8,000 spent nuclear reactor fuel elements to be removed to a third country.

In exchange, Pyongyang will receive two LWRs and annual shipments of heavy fuel oil during construction of the reactors. The LWRs will be financed and constructed through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), a multinational consortium.

Calling for movement toward full normalization of political and economic relations, the accord also serves as a jumping-off point for U.S.-North Korean dialogue on Pyongyang’s development and export of ballistic missiles, as well as other issues of bilateral concern.

November 28, 1994: The IAEA announces that it had confirmed that construction has been halted at North Korea’s Nyongbyon and Taochon nuclear facilities and that these facilities are not operational.

1995

March 9, 1995:KEDO is formed in New York with the United States, South Korea, and Japan as the organization’s original members.

1996

January 1996: North Korea agrees in principle to a meeting on missile proliferation issues, which had been requested in a letter by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Thomas Hubbard. However, Pyongyang contends that the United States would have to ease economic sanctions before it could agree on a date and venue for the talks.

In testimony before a House International Relations subcommittee on March 19, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs [Council on Foreign Relations member] Winston Lord says that Washington is willing to ease economic sanctions if progress is made on the missile export issue.

April 21-22, 1996: The United States and North Korea meet in Berlin for their first round of bilateral missile talks. The United States reportedly suggests that North Korea should adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a voluntary international agreement aimed at controlling sales of ballistic missile systems, components, and technology. North Korea allegedly demands that the United States provide compensation for lost missile-related revenue.

May 24, 1996: The United States imposes sanctions on North Korea and Iran for missile technology-related transfers. The sanctions prohibit any imports or exports to sanctioned firms and to those sectors of the North Korean economy that are considered missile-related. The pre-existing general ban on trade with both countries makes the sanctions largely symbolic.*

October 16, 1996: After detecting North Korean preparations for a test of its medium-range Nodong missile, the United States deploys a reconnaissance ship and aircraft to Japan. Following several meetings in New York between U.S. and North Korean diplomats, the State Department confirms on November 8 that the missile test has been canceled.

1997

June 11-13, 1997: The second round of U.S.-North Korean missile talks takes place in New York, with U.S. negotiators pressing North Korea not to deploy the Nodong missile and to end sales of Scud missiles and their components. The parties reach no agreement but reportedly lay the foundation for future talks.

August 6, 1997: The United States imposes new sanctions on two additional North Korean entities for unspecified missile-proliferation activities.*

1998

February 25, 1998: At his inaugural speech, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung announces his “sunshine policy,” which strives to improve inter-Korean relations through peace, reconciliation, and cooperation.

April 17, 1998: The United States imposes sanctions on North Korea and Pakistan in response to Pyongyang’s transfer of missile technology and components to Pakistan’s Khan Research Laboratory.*

June 16, 1998: The official Korean Central News Agency reports that Pyongyang will only end its missile technology exports if it is suitably compensated for financial losses.

July 15, 1998: The bipartisan [Council on Foreign Relations member Donald Rumsfeld] Rumsfeld Commission concludes that the United States may have “little or no warning” before facing a long-range ballistic missile threat from “rogue states,” such as North Korea and Iran.

August 31, 1998: North Korea launches a three-stage Taepo Dong-1 rocket with a range of 1,500-2,000 kilometers that flies over Japan. Pyongyang announces that the rocket successfully placed a small satellite into orbit, a claim contested by U.S. Space Command. Japan suspends signature of a cost-sharing agreement for the Agreed Framework’s LWR project until November 1998. The U.S. intelligence community admits to being surprised by North Korea’s advances in missile-staging technology and its use of a solid-rocket motor for the missile’s third stage.

October 1, 1998: The third round of U.S.-North Korean missile talks begins in New York but makes little progress. The United States repeats its request for Pyongyang to terminate its missile programs in exchange for relief from economic sanctions. North Korea rejects the U.S. proposal on the grounds that the lifting of sanctions is implicit in the 1994 Agreed Framework.

November 12, 1998: [Council on Foreign Relations member] President Bill Clinton appoints former Secretary of Defense [Council on Foreign Relations member]  William Perry to serve as North Korea policy coordinator—a post established by the 1999 Defense Authorization Act. Perry immediately undertakes an interagency review of U.S. policy toward North Korea and begins consultations with South Korea and Japan aimed at forming a unified approach to dealing with Pyongyang.

December 4-11, 1998: The United States and North Korea hold talks to address U.S. concerns about a suspected underground nuclear facility at Kumchang-ni. Pyongyang reportedly accepts in principle the idea of a U.S. inspection of the site but is unable to agree with U.S. proposals for “appropriate compensation.”

1999

February 2, 1999: CIA Director [Council on Foreign Relations member] George Tenet testifies before the Senate Armed Services Committee that, with some technical improvements, North Korea would be able to use the Taepo Dong-1 to deliver small payloads to parts of Alaska and Hawaii. Tenet also says that Pyongyang’s Taepo Dong-2, if it had a third stage like the Taepo Dong-1, would be able to deliver large payloads to the continental United States, albeit with poor accuracy.

March 29-31, 1999: U.S. and North Korean officials hold a fourth round of missile talks in Pyongyang. The United States again expresses concern over North Korea’s missile development and proliferation activities and proposes a deal exchanging North Korean restraint for U.S. sanctions relief. U.S. officials describe the talks as “serious and intensive” but succeed only in reaching agreement to meet again at an unspecified date.

April 25, 1999: The United States, South Korea, and Japan establish the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group to institutionalize close consultation and policy coordination in dealing with North Korea.

May 20-24, 1999: A U.S. inspection team visits the North Korean suspected nuclear site in Kumchang-ni. According to the State Department, the team finds no evidence of nuclear activity or violation of the Agreed Framework.

May 25-28, 1999: Traveling to Pyongyang as a presidential envoy, [Council on Foreign Relations member]Perry meets with senior North Korean political, diplomatic, and military officials to discuss a major expansion in bilateral relations if Pyongyang is willing to address U.S. security concerns. Perry delivers a letter from [Council on Foreign Relations member] President Clinton to North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, but the two do not meet. Perry reportedly calls on North Korea to satisfy U.S. concerns about ongoing nuclear weapons-related activities that are beyond the scope of the Agreed Framework and about ballistic missile development and proliferation in exchange for the lifting of U.S. sanctions, normalization of diplomatic relations, and potentially some form of security guarantee.

September 7-12, 1999: During talks in Berlin, North Korea agrees to a moratorium on testing any long-range missiles for the duration of talks with the United States. The United States agrees to a partial lifting of economic sanctions on North Korea. The two parties agree to continue high-level discussions. (Sanctions are not actually lifted until June 2000.)

September 9, 1999: A U.S. National Intelligence Estimate reports that North Korea will “most likely” develop an ICBM capable of delivering a 200-kilogram warhead to the U.S. mainland by 2015.

September 15, 1999: North Korean policy coordinator [Council on Foreign Relations member] Perry submits his review of U.S. policy toward North Korea to Congress and releases an unclassified version of the report on October 12. The report recommends “a new, comprehensive and integrated approach to…negotiations with the [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] DPRK,” which would involve a coordinated reduction in isolation by the United States and its allies in a “step-by-step and reciprocal fashion.” Potential engagement mechanisms could include the normalization of diplomatic relations and the relaxation of trade sanctions.

November 19, 1999: The United States and North Korea meet in Berlin for talks on bilateral relations and preparations for a North Korean high-level visit to the United States.

December 15, 1999: Five years after the Agreed Framework was signed, KEDO officials sign a turn-key contract with the Korea Electric Power Corporation to begin construction on the two LWRs in Kumho, North Korea. KEDO officials attribute the delay in signing the contract to complex legal and financial challenges and the tense political climate generated by the North Korean Taepo Dong-1 test in August 1998.

2000

April 6, 2000: The United States imposes sanctions on a North Korean firm, Changgwang Sinyong Corporation, for proliferating MTCR Category I items, possibly to Iran. Category I items include complete missile systems with ranges exceeding 300 kilometers and payloads over 500 kilograms, major subsystems, rocket stages or guidance systems, production facilities for MTCR-class missiles, or technology associated with such missiles.*

May 25-27, 2000: The United States conducts its second inspection of the Kumchang-ni site. The inspection team found that conditions had not changed since the first inspection in May 1999.

June 15, 2000: Following a historic summit, North and South Korea sign a joint declaration stating they have “agreed to resolve” the question of reunification of the Korean Peninsula. The agreement includes promises to reunite families divided by the Korean War and to pursue other economic and cultural exchanges. No commitments are made regarding nuclear weapons or missile programs or military deployments in the Demilitarized Zone.

June 19, 2000: Apparently encouraged by the North-South summit, the United States relaxes sanctions on North Korea, allowing a “wide range” of trade in commercial and consumer goods, easing restrictions on investment, and eliminating prohibitions on direct personal and commercial financial transactions. Sanctions related to terrorism and missile proliferation remain in place. The next day, North Korea reaffirms its moratorium on missile tests.

July 12, 2000: The fifth round of U.S.-North Korean missile talks in Kuala Lumpur end without resolution. During the meeting, North Korea repeats its demand for compensation, stated as $1 billion per year, in return for halting missile exports. The United States rejects this proposal but says that it is willing to move toward “economic normalization” in return for addressing U.S. concerns.

July 19, 2000: During a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Kim Jong Il reportedly promises to end his country’s missile program in exchange for assistance with satellite launches from countries that have expressed concern about North Korea’s missile program.

July 28, 2000: At the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum in Bangkok, Thailand, Secretary of State [Council on Foreign Relations member] Madeleine Albright engages in a “substantively modest” meeting with North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun, the highest level of exchange to date. Paek gives no additional details about North Korea’s purported offer to end its missile program in return for space-launch assistance.

August 13, 2000: Kim Jong Il tells a meeting of 46 South Korean media executives in Pyongyang that his missile proposal was meant “in humor, while talking about science and state-of-the-art technologies,” according to the Korea Times. The report of the event is widely interpreted as undercutting the seriousness of Kim’s offer; however, English-language excerpts of Kim’s speech seem to confirm the offer: “I told…Putin that we would stop developing rockets when the United States comes forward and launches our satellites.”

August 28, 2000: U.S. Ambassador [Council on Foreign Relations member] Wendy Sherman travels to Moscow to confirm the details of Kim Jong Il’s apparent missile proposal with her Russian counterparts. At a September 8 briefing, a senior State Department official says the United States is taking the North Korean offer “very seriously.”

September 27, 2000: U.S.-North Korean talks resume in New York on nuclear issues, missiles, and terrorism. The two countries issue a joint statement on terrorism, a move that indicates progress toward removing North Korea from the State Department’s terrorism list.

October 9-12, 2000: Kim Jong Il’s second-in-command, Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, visits Washington as a special envoy. He delivers a letter to [Council on Foreign Relations member] President Clinton and meets with the secretaries of state and defense. The move is seen as an affirmation of Kim’s commitment to improving U.S.-North Korean ties.

October 12, 2000: The United States and North Korea issue a joint statement noting that resolution of the missile issue would “make an essential contribution to fundamentally improved relations” and reiterating the two countries’ commitment to implementation of the Agreed Framework. The statement also says that [Council on Foreign Relations member] Albright will visit North Korea in the near future to prepare for a possible visit by [Council on Foreign Relations member] President Clinton.

October 24, 2000: [Council on Foreign Relations member] Secretary Albright concludes a two-day visit to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Jong Il. During the visit, Kim says that North Korea would not further test the Taepo Dong-1 missile. In addition to discussing Pyongyang’s indigenous missile program, the talks cover North Korean missile technology exports, nuclear transparency, the normalization of relations, and a possible trip by [Council on Foreign Relations member] President Clinton to Pyongyang.

November 1-3, 2000: A seventh round of missile talks between Pyongyang and Washington ends without an agreement in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The failure to build upon the momentum derived from [Council on Foreign Relations member] Secretary Albright’s recent meeting with Kim Jong-Il diminished hopes of a presidential trip to North Korea before the end of [Council on Foreign Relations member] President Clinton’s term.

December 28, 2000: [Council on Foreign Relations member]President Clinton announces that he will not travel to North Korea before the end of his term, citing “insufficient time to complete the work at hand.” According to a March 6 New York Times article, Clinton’s national security adviser [Council on Foreign Relations member] Sandy Berger was hesitant to have the president leave the country during the presidential election dispute, which he deemed “a potential ‘constitutional crisis.'”

2001

January 2, 2001: The United States imposes sanctions on North Korea’s Changgwang Sinyong Corporation for violation of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000.*

March 6, 2001: At a joint press briefing with the Swedish foreign minister, [Council on Foreign Relations member] Secretary of State Colin Powell says that the administration “plan[s] to engage with North Korea to pick up where [Council on Foreign Relations member] President Clinton left off. Some promising elements were left on the table and we will be examining those elements.”

March 7, 2001: In a New York Times op-ed, [Council on Foreign Relations member] Wendy Sherman, former special adviser to the president and secretary of state for North Korea policy, writes that a deal with North Korea to eliminate its medium- and long-range missiles and end its missile exports had been “tantalizingly close” at the end of the [Council on Foreign Relations member] Clinton administration.

fig 4 - bush cabal

Figure 4 George W. Bush’s CFR run Administration

After a working meeting with South Korean President Kim Dae-jung at the White House, [Son of Council on Foreign Relations member H.W Bush] President George W. Bush tells reporters that he “look[s] forward to, at some point in the future, having a dialogue with the North Koreans, but that any negotiation would require complete verification of the terms of a potential agreement.” According to Clinton administration officials, the issue of how to verify a missile deal remained one of the final stumbling blocks to a successful arrangement. Bush also questions whether Pyongyang is “keeping all terms of all agreements.”

Just prior to Bush’s comments, [Council on Foreign Relations member] Powell amended his remarks from the previous day, noting that if “there was some suggestion that imminent negotiations are about to begin—that is not the case.”

March 13, 2001: North Korea, apparently reacting to Washington’s new tone, cancels ministerial-level talks with Seoul. The talks were intended to promote further political reconciliation.

March 15, 2001: Pyongyang threatens to “take thousand-fold revenge” on the United States “and its black-hearted intention to torpedo the dialogue between north and south [Korea].” The statement, issued by the Korean Central News Agency, called Washington’s new policies “hostile” and noted that Pyongyang remains “fully prepared for both dialogue and war.”

May 3, 2001: At a press conference in Pyongyang, a European Union delegation headed by Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson reports that Kim Jong Il pledged that he will extend Pyongyang’s moratorium on missile testing until 2003 and that Kim was “committed” to a second inter-Korean summit.

June 6, 2001: In a press release, [Son of Council on Foreign Relations member H.W.]  President Bush announces the completion of his administration’s North Korea policy review and its determination that “serious discussions” on a “broad agenda” should be resumed with Pyongyang. Bush states his desire to conduct “comprehensive” negotiations, including “improved implementation of the Agreed Framework,” “verifiable constraints” on North Korea’s missile programs, a ban on North Korea’s missile exports, and “a less threatening conventional military posture.”

June 13, 2001: U.S. Special Envoy Jack Pritchard meets in New York with the North Korean representative to the UN, Hyong-ch’ol Yi, to make arrangements for bilateral talks.

June 26, 2001: The State Department announces sanctions under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 on North Korea’s Changgwang Sinyong Corporation, for unspecified missile-related transfers to Iran. The announcement represents the second time that sanctions had been imposed under the act, the first also being on Changgwang Sinyong on January 2.

The sanctions prohibit any U.S. entity from doing business with the North Korean firm, which has been punished several times previously under more general missile transfer sanctions. However, the sanctions are largely symbolic, as Changgwang Sinyong is still subject to the active sanctions imposed on January 2, 2001, and missile sanctions that were imposed on April 6, 2000.*

July 6, 2001: Deputy Secretary of State [Council on Foreign Relations member] Richard Armitage confirms that North Korea tested a rocket “motor engine” in late June, but that there was “nothing in itself wrong with that,” nor did the administration consider the test to have violated Pyongyang’s testing moratorium.

August 4, 2001: During a meeting in Moscow with President Putin, Kim Jong Il reaffirms his pledge to maintain a moratorium on ballistic missile flight-tests until 2003.

2002

January 29, 2002: In his State of the Union address, [Son of Council on Foreign Relations member H.W.]  President Bush criticized North Korea for “arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens.” Bush characterized North Korea, along with Iraq and Iran, as constituting an “axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.”

February 5, 2002: At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, [Council on Foreign Relations member] Powell reiterates the administration’s policy that it is willing to resume a dialogue with North Korea at “any time, any place, or anywhere without any preconditions.” Powell also confirms that the administration believes that Pyongyang continues to “comply with the [missile flight-test] moratorium they placed upon themselves and stay within the KEDO agreement,” which is also known as the Agreed Framework.

March 15, 2002: Following reports that the U.S. nuclear posture review discusses the use of nuclear weapons against North Korea, Pyongyang’s state-run press organ announces that, if the United States “tries to use nuclear weapons” against North Korea, it will be compelled to “examine all the agreements” reached with the United States. The report says that, “if the U.S. inflicts nuclear holocaust upon [North Korea], the former’s mainland will not be safe either.”

April 1, 2002: [Son of Council on Foreign Relations member H.W.] President Bush issues a memorandum stating that he will not certify North Korea’s compliance with the Agreed Framework. However, for national security considerations, Bush waives applicable U.S. law prohibiting Washington from funding KEDO, allowing the United States to continue financially supporting the Agreed Framework.

July 2, 2002: The United States cancels a planned delegation visit to North Korea, citing Pyongyang’s failure to respond to a proposed July 10 meeting date, as well as a June 29 naval skirmish between North and South Korea.

July 31, 2002: [Council on Foreign Relations member] Powell meets briefly with Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun during the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum meeting in Brunei, generating speculation that a U.S. envoy will visit North Korea. It is the highest-level exchange between the two countries since the [Son of Council on Foreign Relations member H.W.]  Bush administration took office.

August 7, 2002: KEDO holds a ceremony to mark the pouring of the concrete foundation for the first LWR that the United States agreed to provide North Korea under the Agreed Framework. Jack Pritchard, the U.S. representative to KEDO and State Department special envoy for negotiations with North Korea, attends the ceremony. Pritchard is the most senior U.S. official to visit North Korea since former Secretary of State [Council on Foreign Relations member] Albright in October 2000.

The United States urges North Korea to comply with IAEA safeguarding procedures for all its nuclear facilities as soon as possible, but Pyongyang states that it will not do so for at least three years, the Japanese newspaper Nihon Keizai Shimbun reports August 8. A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman also states that delays in completing the reactor project might motivate Pyongyang to pull out of the agreement.

August 16, 2002: The United States imposes sanctions on Changgwang Sinyong Corporation of North Korea and on the North Korean government itself for transferring missile technology to Yemen. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer states August 23 that the sanctions were a “pro forma requirement under the law for the State Department” and that Washington remains willing to “talk with North Korea any time, any place.”

August 31, 2002: Responding to an August 29 speech by Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security [Council on Foreign Relations member] John Bolton, North Korea says that “if the U.S. has a will to drop its hostile policy toward the DPRK it will have dialogue…the ball is in the court of the U.S. side.” Bolton had criticized Pyongyang’s missile, nuclear, and biological weapons programs.

September 17, 2002: North Korea announces that it will indefinitely extend its moratorium on missile testing as part of the North Korea-Japan Pyongyang Declaration signed during a meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il.

A portion of the North Korea-Japan declaration references nuclear weapons, saying that the two countries “affirmed the pledge to observe all the international agreements for a comprehensive solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.” It is unclear whether this statement simply affirms a commitment to existing agreements or signals support for additional arms control measures.

October 3-5, 2002: [Council on Foreign Relations member] James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, visits North Korea. The highest-ranking administration official to visit Pyongyang, Kelly reiterates U.S. concerns about North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, export of missile components, conventional force posture, human rights violations, and humanitarian situation. Kelly informs North Korea that it could improve bilateral relations through a “comprehensive settlement” addressing these issues. No future meetings are announced.

Referring to [Council on Foreign Relations member] Kelly’s approach as “high handed and arrogant,” North Korea argues that the U.S. policy “compels the DPRK to take all necessary countermeasures, pursuant to the army-based policy whose validity has been proven.”

October 16, 2002: The United States announces that North Korea admitted to having a clandestine program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons after [Council on Foreign Relations member] James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, confronted representatives from Pyongyang during an October 3-5 visit. Kelly later explained that the North Korean admission came the day after he informed them that the United States was aware of the program. North Korea has denied several times that it admitted to having this program.

State Department spokesman Richard Boucher states that “North Korea’s secret nuclear weapons program is a serious violation of North Korea’s commitments under the Agreed Framework as well as under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement, and the Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”
Boucher also says that the United States wants North Korea to comply with its nonproliferation commitments and seeks “a peaceful resolution of this situation.”

November 5, 2002: North Korea threatens to end its moratorium on ballistic missile tests if North Korea-Japan normalization talks do not achieve progress.

November 14, 2002: KEDO announces that it is suspending heavy-fuel oil deliveries to North Korea in response to Pyongyang’s October 4 acknowledgement that it has a uranium-enrichment program. The last shipment reached North Korea November 18.

November 29, 2002: The IAEA adopts a resolution calling upon North Korea to “clarify” its “reported uranium-enrichment program.” North Korea rejects the resolution, saying the IAEA’s position is biased in favor of the United States.

December 9, 2002: Spanish and U.S. forces intercept and search a ship carrying a shipment of North Korean Scud missiles and related cargo to Yemen. The United States allows the shipment to be delivered because it lacks the necessary legal authority to seize the cargo. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer says that Washington had intelligence that the ship was carrying missiles to the Middle East and was concerned that its ultimate destination might have been Iraq.

December 12, 2002: North Korea sends a letter to the IAEA announcing that it is restarting its one functional reactor and is reopening the other nuclear facilities frozen under the Agreed Framework. The letter requests that the IAEA remove the seals and monitoring equipment from its nuclear facilities. A North Korean spokesman blames the United States for violating the Agreed Framework and says that the purpose of restarting the reactor is to generate electricity-an assertion disputed by U.S. officials.

A November 27 Congressional Research Service report states that the reactor could annually produce enough plutonium for one bomb. The CIA states in a 2002 report to Congress that the spent-fuel rods “contain enough plutonium for several more [nuclear] weapons.”

U.S. estimates on North Korea’s current nuclear status differ. A State Department official said January 3, 2003 that the U.S. intelligence community believes North Korea already possesses one or two nuclear weapons made from plutonium produced before the negotiation of the Agreed Framework. The CIA publicly estimates that Pyongyang “has produced enough plutonium” for one or two weapons.

December 14, 2002: North Korea states in a letter to the IAEA that the status of its nuclear facilities is a matter between the United States and North Korea and “not pursuant to any agreement” with the IAEA. The letter further declares that North Korea will take unilateral action to remove seals and monitoring cameras if the IAEA does not act.

December 22-24, 2002: North Korea cuts all seals and disrupts IAEA surveillance equipment on its nuclear facilities and materials. An IAEA spokesman says December 26 that North Korea started moving fresh fuel rods into the reactor, suggesting that it might be restarted soon.

December 27, 2002: North Korea orders IAEA inspectors out of the country. They leave on December 31.

2003

January 6, 2003: The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution condemning North Korea’s decision to restart its nuclear reactor and resume operation of its related facilities. The resolution “deplores” North Korea’s action “in the strongest terms” and calls on Pyongyang to meet “immediately, as a first step” with IAEA officials. It also calls on North Korea to re-establish the seals and monitoring equipment it dismantled, comply fully with agency safeguards, clarify details about its reported uranium-enrichment program, and allow the agency to verify that all North Korea’s nuclear material is “declared and…subject to safeguards.”

January 10, 2003: North Korea announces its withdrawal from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), effective January 11. Although Article X of the NPT requires that a country give three months’ notice in advance of withdrawing, North Korea argues that it has satisfied that requirement because it originally announced its decision to withdraw March 12, 1993, and suspended the decision one day before it was to become legally binding.

January 12, 2003: Choe Jin Su, North Korea’s ambassador to China, signals that Pyongyang might not adhere to its moratorium on testing long-range missiles, saying that Pyongyang believes it “cannot go along with the self-imposed missile moratorium any longer,” according to a January 12 Los Angeles Times article.

February 12, 2003: Responding to North Korea’s rejection of the November 2002 and January 2003 IAEA resolutions, the IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution declaring Pyongyang in “further non-compliance” with its obligations under the NPT. The board decides to report the matter to the UN Security Council, in accordance with agency mandates.

February 27, 2003: U.S. officials confirm North Korea has restarted the five-megawatt nuclear reactor that had been frozen by the Agreed Framework.

March 19, 2003: North Korea again signals that it might not adhere to its moratorium on testing long-range missiles, asserting in a March 19 KCNA statement that it has the “sovereign right” to have a “peaceful” missile program. North Korea conducted missile tests February 24 and March 10, but both tests involved short-range missiles that did not violate the moratorium.

March 24, 2003: The United States imposes sanctions on the Changgwang Sinyong Corporation of North Korea for transferring missile technology to Khan Research Laboratories in Pakistan. The laboratory was sanctioned for receiving the items. Philip Reeker, deputy State Department spokesman, said April 1 that the sanctions were imposed only for a “missile-related transfer” and not the transfer of nuclear technology from Pakistan to North Korea.

April 23-25, 2003: The United States, North Korea, and China hold trilateral talks in Beijing. North Korea tells the U.S. delegation that it possesses nuclear weapons, according to Boucher on April 28. This constitutes the first time that Pyongyang has made such an admission.

North Korea also tells the U.S. delegation that it has completed reprocessing the spent nuclear fuel from the five-megawatt reactor frozen under the Agreed Framework, according to Secretary of State [Council on Foreign Relations member] Colin Powell during an April 30 hearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee.

Boucher adds that the North Korean delegation told the U.S. officials that Pyongyang “might get rid of all their nuclear programs…[and] stop their missile exports.” Powell states April 28 that North Korea expects “something considerable in return” for this effort.

May 12, 2003
North Korea accuses the United States of violating the spirit of the 1992 Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, calling the agreement a “dead document” in a KCNA statement.

July 15, 2003
State Department spokesman Richard Boucher tells reporters that North Korean officials at their UN mission in New York have told U.S. officials that North Korea has completed reprocessing the 8,000 spent fuel rods from its Yongbyon reactor.

August 27-29, 2003
The first round of six-party talks is held in Beijing. The talks achieve no significant breakthroughs.

North Korea proposes a step-by-step solution, calling for the United States to conclude a “non-aggression treaty,” normalize bilateral diplomatic relations, refrain from hindering North Korea’s “economic cooperation” with other countries, complete the reactors promised under the Agreed Framework, resume suspended fuel oil shipments, and increase food aid. Pyongyang states that, in return, it will dismantle its “nuclear facility,” as well as end missile testing and export of missiles and related components. North Korea issues an explicit denial for the first time that it has a uranium-enrichment program.

The North Korean delegation, however, also threatens to test nuclear weapons or “demonstrate the means that they would have to deliver” them, according to a senior State Department official.

September 14, 2003: [Son of Council on Foreign Relations member H.W. Bush] President George W. Bush agrees to waive the restrictions on U.S. funding to KEDO but only pledges to provide $3.72 million solely for administrative expenses. The United States does not provide any further funding for KEDO after 2003.
October 2, 2003
KCNA reports a statement from a North Korean Foreign Ministry official indicating that North Korea completed reprocessing its 8,000 spent fuel rods and “made a switchover in the use” of the spent fuel “in the direction increasing [sic] its nuclear deterrent force.” The official also states that Pyongyang will continue to produce and reprocess additional spent fuel when deemed necessary.

October 16, 2003
A statement from a North Korean Foreign Ministry official reported by KCNA suggests that Pyongyang may test nuclear weapons, stating that it will “take a measure to open its nuclear deterrent to the public as a physical force” if the United States refuses to change its negotiating stance.

October 19, 2003
[Son of Council on Foreign Relations member H.W.] President George W. Bush states during a trip to Asia that the United States is willing to provide a written, multilateral guarantee that the United States will not attack North Korea, but makes it clear that a formal nonaggression pact is “off the table.” [Council on Foreign Relations member] Powell made a similar statement August 1.

November 6, 2003: North Korean ambassador to the United Kingdom, Ri Yong Ho, tells Reuters that North Korea possesses a workable nuclear device.

November 21, 2003
The KEDO Executive Board announces that it will suspend construction of two light-water nuclear reactors for one year beginning December 1. The Board adds that the project’s future “will be assessed and decided by the Executive Board before the expiration of the suspension period.” Department of State spokesperson Adam Ereli said November 5, however, that [Son of Council on Foreign Relations member]  Bush administration believes there is “no future for the project.”

2004

January 8, 2004
North Korea allows an unofficial U.S. delegation to visit its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and displays what it calls its “nuclear deterrent.” North Korean officials allow delegation member Siegfried Hecker—a senior fellow at the Los Alamos National Laboratory—to handle a jar containing what appears to be plutonium metal. North Korean officials claim that it came from reprocessing the spent fuel rods from its five-megawatt reactor.

The delegation also visits the spent fuel cooling pond that had been monitored under the Agreed Framework and observes that the rods have been removed. The North Korean officials tell the delegation that Pyongyang reprocessed all of the spent fuel rods between January and June 2003.

Hecker later tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he does not know for certain that the substance was plutonium and that he could not determine when it was produced.

February 25-28, 2004
A second round of six-party talks takes place in Beijing. Little progress is made, although both sides agree to hold another round of talks before the end of June 2004, as well as a working group meeting to be held beforehand.

South Korea’s deputy foreign minister, Lee Soo-hyuck, issues a proposal—which China and Russia both support—to provide energy assistance to the North in return for a freeze of its nuclear program, along with a promise to dismantle it.

Wang Yi, China’s envoy to the six-party talks, states afterwards that “sharp” differences remain between Washington and Pyongyang. According to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, two specific issues divide North Korea and other participants. The first is that the United States, Japan, and South Korea want all of North Korea’s nuclear programs to be dismantled, but North Korea wishes to be allowed to retain one for “peaceful purposes.” The second is that Washington and the other two governments want Pyongyang to acknowledge that it has a uranium-enrichment program.

June 23-26, 2004: A third round of six-party talks is held in Beijing. The United States presents a detailed proposal for resolving the crisis.

The proposal calls for a two-phase process in which North Korea would receive fuel oil from China, South Korea, and Russia after agreeing to first freeze, then dismantle its nuclear programs. The United States and the other parties to the talks would also draft a multilateral security agreement and begin surveying North Korea’s energy needs. Additionally, Washington would begin bilateral discussions with Pyongyang on the removal of U.S. sanctions. The benefits spelled out in the proposal could be withdrawn if North Korea did not comply.

According to a June 28 North Korean Foreign Ministry statement, North Korea counters by proposing to “refrain from” producing, testing, or transferring nuclear weapons and to freeze “all the facilities related to nuclear weapons and products churned out by their operation.” According to the Foreign Ministry, the length of the freeze depends on “whether reward is made or not.”

November 26, 2004: The KEDO Executive Board announces that it will extend its suspension of the light-water reactor project for another year, beginning December 1.

2005

February 2, 2005The New York Times and The Washington Post report that Libya received uranium hexafluoride suspected to be of North Korean origin in 2004. Several knowledgeable U.S. and other diplomatic sources later tell Arms Control Today that the evidence indicates, but does not prove, that the material originated in North Korea.

February 10, 2005: North Korea’s Foreign Ministry announces that Pyongyang has “produced nuclear weapons.” This was Pyongyang’s most definitive public claim to date at the time

 

on the status of its nuclear arsenal.

February 21, 2005: Seoul’s semi-official Yonhap News Agency reports that South Korea’s defense minister, Yoon Kwang-ung, tells a National Assembly Committee that North Korea has reprocessed “only part” of the 8,000 spent fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor.

March 2, 2005: North Korea’s Foreign Ministry states that Pyongyang is no longer bound by its more than five-year-old moratorium on flight-testing longer-range missiles. Pyongyang, however, does not say it will resume such testing.

Early April, 2005: The United States sends an urgent diplomatic message to allies notifying them of U.S. concerns that North Korea might conduct a nuclear test.

April 9, 2005: North Korea expert Selig Harrison tells reporters that, during a recent meeting, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan said Pyongyang might give nuclear weapons to terrorists if “the United States drives us into a corner.”

May 11, 2005: North Korea’s Foreign Ministry announces that it has “successfully finished the unloading of 8,000 spent fuel rods” from its Yongbyon reactor. South Korea has verified the reactor shutdown “through various channels,” Foreign Affairs and Trade Ministry official Kim Sook tells the Korean Broadcasting System the same day.

June 2005: Pyongyang refuels its reactor at Yongbyon and begins reprocessing the 8,000 spent fuel rods removed in March, North Korean officials later tell Hecker.

June 29, 2005: The U.S. Treasury Department announces that the United States has frozen the U.S. assets of three North Korean entities “responsible for WMD and missile programs,” as well as barred U.S. citizens and companies from doing business with those entities. Those measures are taken pursuant to Executive Order 13382 issued that day by [Son of Council on Foreign Relations member H.W.]  President George W. Bush.

July 9, 2005: After a meeting between U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan, North Korea announces its return to the six-party talks. According to a KCNA statement, the “U.S. side clarified its official stand to recognize [North Korea] as a sovereign state, not to invade it and hold bilateral talks within the framework of the six-party talks.”

July 13, 2005: During a meeting with an envoy of Chinese President Hu Jintao, North Korean Leader Kim Jong Il reiterates his father’s [Kim Il Sung] apparent dying wish for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, according to KCNA.

July 26, 2005: A new round of six-party talks begins in Beijing. The talks include an unprecedented number of U.S.-North Korean bilateral talks. While North Korea continued to deny that it has a “uranium-based nuclear weapons program,” Pyongyang suggested that it would “clarify” any relevant “credible information or evidence” presented by the United States in that regard.

The participants agree August 7 to recess for several weeks. The talks resume September 13.

September 15, 2005: The Department of the Treasury designates a Macau bank, Banco Delta Asia, as a “primary money laundering concern” under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, freezing about $25 million in North Korean funds. A department press release states that the bank has provided services to North Korean “government agencies and front companies,” adding that “[e]vidence exists that some of these agencies and front companies are engaged in illicit activities,” such as drug trafficking. The bank also has also circulated North Korean-produced counterfeit U.S. currency, the press release alleges.

September 19, 2005: The participants in the six-party talks conclude a joint statement of principles to guide future negotiations.

According to the statement, North Korea commits “to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards.” It also calls for the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which forbids the two Koreas from possessing uranium-enrichment and plutonium-separation facilities, to be “observed and implemented.” Washington affirms in the statement that it has no intention to attack or invade North Korea.

The statement commits the participants to achieving “the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner” and says that the parties agree “to take coordinated steps to implement” the agreed-upon obligations and rewards “in a phased manner in line with the principle of ‘commitment for commitment, action for action.’”

The statement says that North Korea “stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy” and that the other parties “expressed their respect and agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the provision” of a light-water nuclear power reactor to Pyongyang. This issue had been controversial during the negotiations and the final agreement was the result of a compromise between Washington and Pyongyang. North Korea insisted that the statement recognize its right to a peaceful nuclear energy program and commit the other participants to provide it with light-water reactors while the United States argued that North Korea should not receive any nuclear reactors.

September 20, 2005: North Korea’s Foreign Ministry states that it is “essential” for the United States to provide light-water reactors to Pyongyang “as early as possible,” adding that Washington “should not even dream” that North Korea will dismantle its “nuclear deterrent” before receiving the reactors. However, a speech from North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su Hon two days later appears to back away from this formulation.

October 20, 2005: Democratic New Mexico Governor [Council on Foreign Relations member] Bill Richardson, who visited North Korea earlier in the month, says North Korean officials told him they had reprocessed the 8,000 spent fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor, the Associated Press reports.

October 21, 2005: The Treasury Department announces that it has sanctioned eight North Korean entities pursuant to Executive Order 13382 for their unspecified “involvement” in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or related delivery vehicles. The action freezes the entities’ U.S. assets and prohibits transactions between these entities and any U.S. citizens or companies. The department had similarly designated those entities’ parent companies in June.

November 9-11, 2005: The fifth round of the six-party talks begins in Beijing.

South Korea and Japan present concrete plans for implementing the September statement. Both countries propose that the participants separate outstanding issues into three categories: the dismantlement of Pyongyang’s nuclear program, provision of economic and energy assistance to North Korea, and Pyongyang’s bilateral issues with Washington and Tokyo.

Disagreements between Washington and Pyongyang continue to block progress. The North Korean delegation focuses almost exclusively on the funds frozen by the September Banco Delta Asia designation.

December 19, 2005: North Korea announces that it will “pursue” the construction of larger “graphite-moderated reactors,” an apparent reference to the two reactors whose construction had been frozen under the Agreed Framework in Pyongyang’s most definitive public statement on the matter.

2006

March 7, 2006: Officials from the U.S. Treasury Department brief North Korea’s deputy director-general for North America, Li Gun, as well as other North Korean officials about the U.S. actions taken with respect to Banco Delta Asia. Li tells reporters afterward that his delegation proposed several methods for resolving U.S. concerns, South Korea’s semi-official Yonhap News Agency reports. Among them was a suggestion to form a joint U.S.-North Korean consultative committee of experts that would discuss such issues as counterfeiting and money laundering.

March 17, 2006: Department of State spokesperson Adam Ereli indicates during a press briefing that issues related to North Korea’s financial system could potentially be discussed in the six-party talks.

March 30, 2006: The Treasury Department announces that it has imposed penalties on a Swiss company, along with one of its owners, for procuring “goods with weapons-related applications” for North Korea.

April 13, 2006: North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan tells reporters that Pyongyang would return to the talks if the United States lifted the freeze of Banco Delta Asia’s funds, which total approximately $25 million.

June 1, 2006: The KEDO Executive Board announces that it has formally terminated its project to build two light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea.

The board says its decision was based on the “continued and extended failure” of North Korea to comply with its relevant obligations under the 1994 Agreed Framework.

According to South Korea’s Unification Ministry, KEDO’s executive board adopted a resolution the previous day saying that Seoul is to “cover the costs arising from the liquidation process,” of the KEDO assets, such as resolving compensation claims from subcontractors. In return, the government-owned Korea Electric Power Corp., the prime contractor for the reactor project, would gain ownership over reactor “equipment and materials” located outside of North Korea. The fate of assets remaining in North Korea, such as vehicles and construction equipment, is unclear.

July 4-5, 2006: North Korea test fires seven ballistic missiles, including its longest-range missile, the Taepo Dong-2. The other six tests include a combination of short- and medium-range Scud-C and Nodong ballistic missiles, launched from the Kittaraeyong test site. Although the tests of the six short-range missiles appear to be successful, the Taepo Dong-2 fails less than a minute after launch.

A July 4 State Department press statement describes the launches as a “provocative act” that violated North Korea’s voluntary moratorium on flight-testing longer-range missiles, which Pyongyang had observed since September 1999.

Japan and South Korea punish North Korea for conducting the tests, with Tokyo imposing sanctions on Pyongyang and Seoul halting food and fertilizer assistance.

July 15, 2006: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1695 condemning North Korea’s missile launches. The resolution calls on Pyongyang to return to the six-party talks and “demands” that the country suspend its ballistic-missile activities and re-establish its flight-testing moratorium.

The resolution also requires states to prevent missiles and related “items, materials, goods and technology” from being transferred to North Korea’s missile or weapons of mass destruction programs. In addition, it requires countries to prevent the procurement of such items from Pyongyang and the transfer of any “financial resources in relation to” North Korea’s weapons programs.

North Korea’s Foreign Ministry states the next day that Pyongyang will “not be bound” by the resolution.

September 19, 2006: Japan and Australia announce that they have adopted sanctions targeting multiple foreign entities tied to North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs in response to resolution 1695.

The two countries each punish the same 12 organizations, as well as a Swiss citizen. All entities are already subject to similar U.S. sanctions. Japan also sanctions three additional institutions.

October 3, 2006: North Korea’s Foreign Ministry issues a statement asserting that Pyongyang “will in the future conduct a nuclear test under the condition where safety is firmly guaranteed.” Apparently signaling a degree of restraint, the statement also says that North Korea will refrain from the first-use of nuclear weapons, “strictly prohibit any …nuclear transfer,” and “do its utmost to realize the denuclearization of the [Korean] peninsula.”

October 9, 2006: North Korea conducts an underground nuclear test near the village of P’unggye. Most early analyses of the test based on seismic data collected by South Korean, Japanese, and U.S. institutes estimates the yield to be below one kiloton. Russian estimates differed significantly, and Foreign Minister Sergei Ivanov said Oct. 10 that the estimated yield was between 5 and 15 kilotons.

October 11, 2006: North Korea’s Foreign Ministry states that its “nuclear test was entirely attributable to the US nuclear threat, sanctions and pressure,” adding that North Korea “was compelled to substantially prove its possession of nukes to protect its sovereignty.” The statement also indicates that North Korea might conduct further nuclear tests if the United States “increases pressure” on the country.

However, the Foreign Ministry also says that North Korea remains committed to implementing the September 2005 joint statement, arguing that the test “constitutes a positive measure for its implementation.” Additionally, Pyongyang “still remains unchanged in its will to denuclearize the peninsula through dialogue and negotiations,” the Foreign Ministry statement says, adding that the “denuclearization of the entire peninsula was President Kim Il Sung’s last instruction and an ultimate goal” of North Korea.

October 14, 2006: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1718. The measure demands that North Korea refrain from further nuclear tests and calls on Pyongyang to return to the six-party talks and abandon its nuclear weapons. It also imposes additional sanctions on commerce with Pyongyang, widening the range of prohibited transactions beyond those banned under Resolution 1695.

November 28-December 1, 2006: The Chinese, North Korean, South Korean, and U.S. envoys to the six-party talks hold consultations in Beijing to discuss resuming the fifth round of talks. During the consultations, North Korean envoy Kim Gye Gwan states that North Korea is ready to implement the September 19, 2005 joint statement and abandon its nuclear program, but would not do so “unilaterally.”

December 18-22, 2006: The fifth round of six-party talks resumes in Beijing. The United States presents a multistage denuclearization plan, but the talks make no progress towards implementing the September 19, 2005 joint statement—in part due to continued disagreements regarding the North Korean funds frozen by the United States in Banco Delta Asia. The parties agree to meet again “at the earliest opportunity.”

2007

February 8-13, 2007: The six-party talks concludes its fifth round with an agreed “action plan” of initial steps to implement the September 19, 2005 joint statement on North Korea’s denuclearization.

According to the action plan, North Korea is to halt the operation of its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon during a 60-day initial phase in return for an initial shipment of 50,000 tons of heavy-fuel oil.

The action plan also establishes five working groups to “discuss and formulate specific plans” regarding: economic and energy cooperation; denuclearization; implementation of a “Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism;” North Korean relations with the United States; and North Korean relations with Japan.

The statement indicates that, following the shutdown of North Korea’s nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, Pyongyang is to provide a complete declaration of all of its nuclear programs and disable all of its existing nuclear facilities in return for an additional 950,000 tons of heavy-fuel oil or its equivalent.

In addition to helping to provide energy aid to North Korea, the United States agrees to begin the process of removing Pyongyang from its list of state sponsors of terrorism and to stop the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act toward North Korea.fig 5 - ElBaradei

Figure 5  Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) speaking at the New York office of the Council on Foreign Relations on November 4 2009, discussed ongoing negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program. ElBaradei reiterated that the agency had no evidence that Iran had an ongoing nuclear weapons program or had developed a nuclear weapon. He also expressed hope for the confidence-building plan that calls for Iran to ship much of its low-enriched uranium to Russia for reprocessing. CFR president Richard Haass introduces CFR stooge ElBaradei.

March 13-14, 2007: IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei [who the CFR tried to make president of Egypt] visits North Korea and meets with three officials, including the head of the North Korean General Department of Atomic Energy, Ri Je Son. During the meetings, ElBaradei invites North Korea to return to the IAEA as a member state and discusses the agency’s monitoring and verification role during the implementation of a February 13 six-party talks agreement.

March 19-22, 2007: The sixth round of six-party talks begins in Beijing. The discussions are suspended when North Korean negotiators fly home after four days, explaining that they will not participate until the United States transfers $25 million in frozen North Korean funds held in Banco Delta Asia.

On March 19, Treasury Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes Daniel Glaser announces that the two countries had “reached an understanding” regarding the frozen funds, with Washington accepting a North Korean proposal that the funds would be transferred to a North Korean account in the Bank of China in Beijing. North Korea also pledges that the funds “will be used solely for the betterment of the North Korean people, including for humanitarian and educational purposes.”

April 10, 2007: The United States agrees to unfreeze the $25 million in North Korean funds frozen in its Banco Delta Asia account. U.S. officials insist, meanwhile, that North Korea, “live up to the assurances that these funds will be used for the betterment of the North Korean people and for humanitarian purposes.”

June 25, 2007: A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman confirms that the Banco Delta Asia funds were transferred to Pyongyang and that North Korea would begin shutting down its Yongbyon nuclear facilities. An IAEA delegation led by Deputy Director-General for safeguards Ollie Heinonen arrives in Pyongyang the following day to discuss the verification procedures for the shutdown.

July 16, 2007: The IAEA confirms the shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities.

July 18-20, 2007: The six-party talks reconvenes its sixth round in Beijing. The meeting concludes with a joint communiqué indicating that the five working groups will all meet by the end of August in preparation for another round of plenary talks in September.

September 6, 2007: Israel carries out an air-strike destroying a Syrian facility of an undetermined purpose. Early press reports quoting unnamed U.S. officials suggest that the target of the airstrike was a nuclear facility under construction with North Korean assistance. Days after the strike, Syrian officials deny that the facility was nuclear related, while Israeli and U.S. officials only confirm that an air-strike was carried out. In the following months, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill states on several occasions that he has raised the issue of the Syrian facility with North Korea. U.S. officials later indicate that the facility was believed to have been a nearly completed nuclear reactor modeled on the North Korean nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.

September 11-14, 2007: A team of Chinese, Russian, and U.S. experts visit North Korea to examine the Yongbyon nuclear facilities to determine the steps necessary to disable them. The experts team agrees on a draft disablement plan with North Korean officials which is to be considered by the next plenary meeting of the six-party talks.

September 27-October 3, 2007: The sixth round of six-party talks meets to discuss how to proceed with the second phase of the February 13 agreement. On October 3, the participants issue a joint statement in which North Korea agrees that, by December 31, it would provide a “complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs – including clarification regarding the uranium issue,” and disable its Yongbyon nuclear facilities. Pyongyang also agrees to disable all other nuclear facilities subject to the September 2005 joint statement and not to transfer nuclear material or technology abroad.

In return, the six-parties agree that North Korea would receive the remaining 900,000 tons of heavy-fuel oil or its equivalent pledged in the February 13 agreement.

The United States also agrees that it will fulfill its commitments to begin removing North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism and “advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act” toward North Korea “in parallel with” North Korea’s denuclearization actions.

October 2-4, 2007: South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun travels to Pyongyang to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to discuss prospects for reconciliation and economic cooperation. It is the second time in history that such summit-level discussions have been held.

The summit concludes with a an eight-point joint declaration in which both sides agree to take steps toward reunification, ease military tensions, expand meetings of separated families, and engage in social and cultural exchanges. The declaration also expresses a “shared understanding” by the two countries “on the need for ending the current armistice mechanism and building a permanent peace mechanism.”

November 5, 2007: A team of U.S. experts arrives in North Korea to begin leading the disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. The disablement process consists of 11 agreed steps to be completed by the December 31 deadline stipulated in the October 3 agreement. Funding for the disablement process is provided by the State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF), which is ordinarily reserved for short-term emergency nonproliferation needs.

December 19, 2007: Grand National Party candidate Lee Myung-bak is elected president of South Korea, ushering in the first conservative government in Seoul in 10 years. During his campaign, Lee pledged to review the “Sunshine policy” of short-term reconciliation with North Korea adopted by his two predecessors, instead favoring the application of greater pressure on Pyongyang to denuclearize.

December 21, 2007: The Washington Post reports that U.S. technical teams discovered traces of enriched uranium on aluminum tubes North Korea shared with U.S. officials in November. According to the report, it is unclear whether the contamination originated in North Korea as a result of uranium enrichment carried out by Pyongyang, or if North Korea imported materials which were contaminated abroad and placed these materials in close proximity to the aluminum tubes.

2008

January 2, 2008: Following a December 31, 2007 deadline for North Korea to provide a complete and correct declaration on its nuclear programs and disable its Yongbyon nuclear facilities, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack indicates that “some technical questions about the cooling of the fuel rods” was the reason behind the failure to meet the year-end deadline for disablement. He added that Washington would continue to press Pyongyang for its nuclear declaration.

January 4, 2008: KCNA releases a North Korean Foreign Ministry statement declaring that North Korea “worked out a report on the nuclear declaration in November last year and notified the U.S. side of its contents.” The statement also accuses the other parties of falling behind on their commitments under an October 2007 agreement, including delays in the delivery of heavy-fuel oil to North Korea. Pyongyang indicated that it would slow down the disablement process in response to delays in the delivery of energy assistance.

February 6, 2008: Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and indicates that, in the Fall of 2007, North Korea showed U.S. officials two conventional weapons systems it claimed were the recipients of the thousands of aluminum tubes Pyongyang imported years ago which raised suspicions of a uranium enrichment program. He informs the committee that while the tubes did not work with one of these systems, the U.S. government accepts that the tubes were currently being used for a second conventional weapons system.

Hill also requests from Congress a limited waiver of 1994 Glenn amendment sanctions imposed on North Korea following its nuclear test in 2006. These sanctions, which prohibit the provision of non-humanitarian assistance to non-nuclear-weapon states which have detonated a nuclear weapon, prevent the National Nuclear Security Administration from carrying out work to dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear facilities.

February 25, 2008: South Korean President-elect Lee Myung-bak is inaugurated.

March 13-14, 2008: Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and North Korea Vice-Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan meet in Geneva to discuss ways to make progress on North Korea’s declaration, including the consideration of a compromise approach to the declaration format. Press reports from the Yonhap News Agency and The Washington Times suggest that compromise proposals would include a formal North Korean declaration on its plutonium program, while the uranium enrichment question and the issue of proliferation would be addressed separately. The meeting ends inconclusively.

April 8, 2008: Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and North Korea Vice-Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan meet in Singapore for additional discussions on the North Korean declaration. The two envoys reportedly reached a compromise agreement on the North Korean nuclear declaration which would entail North Korea’s accounting of its plutonium-based nuclear weapons program and its acknowledgement of U.S. allegations regarding its proliferation and uranium enrichment activities.

April 24, 2008: U.S. administration and intelligence officials brief Congress and the public regarding their assessment that the Syrian facility destroyed by Israel in September 2007 was a nuclear reactor under construction with North Korean assistance. The briefings featured a CIA-produced video that includes photographs taken from inside and around the facility at various times during its construction, as well as satellite images and digital renderings of certain elements of the reactor’s operations.

May 8, 2008: North Korea provides a U.S. delegation in Pyongyang with about 18,000 pages of documentation detailing the operations of two of its primary plutonium-related facilities at Yongbyon: a five megawatt nuclear reactor and a reprocessing facility. The records date back to 1986.

June 24, 2008: Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill tells reporters that North Korea’s upcoming nuclear declaration will consist of a “package of items” listing all nuclear materials and programs. The package will reportedly include a formal accounting of North Korea’s plutonium and plutonium-related nuclear facilities and side-documents regarding nuclear proliferation and uranium enrichment. Hill says the declaration will not include an accounting of nuclear weapons, which “are to be determined at a subsequent phase.”

June 26, 2008: Pyongyang delivers a declaration of its nuclear programs to China, the six-party talks chair. The declaration reportedly indicates that North Korea separated a total of about 30 kilograms of plutonium, and used about 2 kilograms for its 2006 nuclear test.

In return for North Korea’s declaration, [Son of Council on Foreign Relations member H.W.] President George W. Bush rescinds the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act toward Pyongyang, and notifies Congress of his intention to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism after 45 days, in accordance with U.S. law.

June 30, 2008: [Son of Council on Foreign Relations member H.W. Bush] President George W. Bush signs into law the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008, which includes a provision allowing the president to waive sanctions on North Korea related to the 1994 Glenn Amendment imposed on Pyongyang following its 2006 nuclear test.

July 12, 2008: The participants in the six-party talks issue a statement outlining broadly the process for verifying North Korea’s nuclear programs. The six parties agree that experts from those countries will be involved in visits to nuclear facilities, the review of documents related to North Korea’s nuclear program, and the interview of technical personnel. The statement also establishes a timeline for completing the disablement of North Korea’s key nuclear facilities and the energy assistance being provided to Pyongyang in return, stating that both processes would be “fully implemented in parallel.”

Mid-July, 2008: The United States tables a draft verification protocol describing procedures used to verify all elements of North Korea’s nuclear programs, including uranium enrichment, weapons, and proliferation. The protocol includes provisions for access upon request for any declared or undeclared site and lists technical recording and detection measures inspectors could undertake. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill tells reporters July 22 that North Korea “indicated some problems” with the draft.

July 23, 2008: The foreign ministers of the six-party talks participants meet informally on the sidelines of an Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit.

Late July 2008: North Korea proposes a draft protocol to verify its nuclear activities. Diplomatic sources later tell Arms Control Today that this proposal is insufficient and it is not used as the basis for further verification negotiations.

August 2008: North Korean leader Kim Jong Il reportedly suffers a stroke, raising questions outside the country as to the status of the leadership in Pyongyang.

August 11, 2008: The 45-day period after which the president may remove North Korea from the State Department’s terrorism list expires. The president does not carry out the de-listing at this time. State Department spokesman Robert Wood tells reporters the next day that the 45-day period is a “minimum” rather than a deadline.

August 13, 2008: Japan and North Korea reach an agreement on procedures for addressing the abduction issue. Pyongyang commits to complete a reinvestigation into the fate of the abducted Japanese nationals by Fall 2008 and to provide Tokyo with access to locations, documents, and interviews in North Korea to conduct its own investigation. In return, Japan agrees to lift certain travel restrictions between the two countries and to discuss easing a ban on North Korea’s access to Japanese ports. The agreement is not implemented in the agreed timeframe.

August 22, 2008: Sung Kim, U.S. special envoy to the six-party talks, meets with North Korean officials in New York regarding revisions to the U.S. draft verification protocol.

August 26, 2008: KCNA carries a statement by a North Korean Foreign ministry official stating that the United States has not carried out its commitment to remove Pyongyang from the State Department’s terrorism list and that agreement on a verification protocol was not a condition of that commitment. In response, the statement indicates that Pyongyang will suspend the disablement of its key nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and consider taking steps to restore them “to their original state.”

September 17, 2008: Jane’s Defense Weekly reports that North Korea has nearly completed a new missile test site on its western coast near the village of Pongdong-ni. The site is believed to be more sophisticated than North Korea’s eastern missile launch site at Musudan-ri, with a capacity to carry out flights tests of larger missiles on a more frequent basis.

September 24, 2008: The IAEA issues a press statement indicating that, at Pyongyang’s request, the agency completed removing seals from North Korea’s reprocessing facility. The statement also said that North Korea informed the agency that it would begin introducing nuclear material at that facility “in one week’s time” and that inspectors would no longer have access to the plant.

October 1-3, 2008: Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill visits Pyongyang to discuss verification.

October 11, 2008: U.S. officials hold a State Department press briefing to announce a preliminary agreement with Pyongyang on measures to verify North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs. The agreement consists of a written joint document and verbal understandings which they say must be approved by the other four six-party talks participants. According to a State Department summary, the new agreement gives inspectors access to all 15 declared sites related to North Korea’s plutonium production program as well as undeclared sites “by mutual consent.” It also allows inspectors to carry out “scientific procedures” such as sampling.

In response to the verification agreement, the United States removes North Korea from the State Department’s terrorism list.

October 13, 2008: KCNA issues a North Korean Foreign Ministry statement indicating that, following its removal from the State Department’s terrorism list, Pyongyang will resume disabling its key nuclear facilities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex.

November 13, 2008: The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement which denies that Pyongyang agreed to allow inspectors to carry out sampling at its nuclear facilities. The statement says that inspection activities are limited to “field visits, confirmation of documents, and interviews with technicians.” Pyongyang also says it is slowing, by half, the rate at which it removed spent fuel rods from its five-megawatt reactor in response to delays in receiving pledged energy aid.

Early December 2008: The United States completes the final shipment of its 200,000 tons of heavy fuel oil pledged to North Korea, bringing the total energy assistance to about 550,000 of 1 million tons.

December 8-11, 2008: Six-party discussions on verification, disablement, and energy assistance in Beijing end in stalemate due to a failure to reach agreement on verification. U.S. officials later claim that North Korea refused to agree in writing what it agreed verbally in October. The six parties issue a chairman’s statement in which they agree “to implement in parallel the disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and the provision of economic and energy assistance.”

December 12, 2008: State Department spokesperson Sean McCormack says that heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea will not continue without a verification agreement, stating that “there is an understanding among the parties…that fuel oil shipments will not go forward absent progress.” China and Russia deny such an understanding and indicate that they intend to complete their share of the energy assistance.

2009

January 13, 2009: The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement insisting that verification activities for nuclear disarmament should be carried out reciprocally between North and South Korea. It states that “free field access should be ensured to verify the introduction and deployment of U.S. nukes in South Korea and details about their withdrawal,” including verification procedures “on a regular basis” to prevent their reintroduction.

January 13-17, 2009: During a visit to Pyongyang, North Korean officials tell scholar Selig Harrison that the country’s declared stock of plutonium has “already been weaponized” and could not be inspected. Harrison relays North Korea’s claims in congressional testimony on February 12.

January 15-19, 2009: Hwang Joon-kook, South Korean deputy six-party talks negotiator, travels to North Korea to discuss Seoul’s potential purchase of about 14,000 fresh nuclear fuel rods previously produced at the Yongbyon complex. South Korean officials later indicate that Pyongyang demanded an exorbitant amount for the fuel and no deal was made.

February 3, 2009: Quoting unnamed South Korean officialsSouth Korea’s Yonhap newspaper reports that North Korea is preparing to test-launch its Taepo Dong 2 missile. Speculation about such a launch increases in the following days.

February 20, 2009: Secretary of State [Wife of Council on Foreign Relations member Bill Clinton]  Hillary Clinton names Ambassador [Council on Foreign Relations member] Stephen Bosworth to serve as U.S. special representative for North Korea policy.

February 24, 2009: KCNA states that “preparations for launching [an] experimental communications satellite…are now making brisk headway.” The United States, Japan, and South Korea later warn North Korea that its planned satellite launch would be in violation of a UN Security Council resolution 1718 and indicate that the council would consider the issue for further action, should North Korea go through with the launch.

March 11, 2009: North Korean authorities inform the International Maritime Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization that they will launch a satellite launch vehicle between April 4-8. North Korea provides these agencies with information regarding expected “dangerous area coordinates” where two of the rocket’s three stages are expected to fall.

March 13, 2009: South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan tells reporters that South Korea may need to review the possibility of formally joining the Proliferation Security Initiative in response to the upcoming North Korean rocket launch.

April 5, 2009: North Korea launches the three-stage Unha-2 rocket, widely believed to be a modified version of its long range Taepo Dong-2 ballistic missile. Although North Korea claims the rocket placed a satellite into orbit, U.S. Northern Command reports that the first stage landed in the Sea of Japan, and that the remaining stages, along with the payload fell into the Pacific Ocean.

April 13, 2009: The UN Security Council issues a presidential statement condemning North Korea’s April 5 rocket launch, and declaring it “in contravention of Security Council resolution 1718.” The statement also calls for strengthening the punitive measures under that resolution.

April 14, 2009: In response to UN Security Council statement, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry indicates that Pyongyang is withdrawing from the six-party talks and “will no longer be bound” by any of its agreements. North Korea also says that it will reverse steps taken to disable its nuclear facilities under six-party agreements in 2007 and will “fully reprocess” the 8,000 spent fuel rods from its Yongbyon reactor in order to extract plutonium for nuclear weapons.

April 16, 2009: North Korea ejects IAEA and U.S. monitors from the Yongbyon nuclear complex.

April 24, 2009: The UN Security Council places financial restrictions on three North Korean firms believed to be participating in proliferation: Korea Mining Development Trading Corp., Tanchon Commercial Bank, and Korea Ryongbong General Corp.

May 25, 2009: North Korea conducts its second underground nuclear test a few kilometers from its 2006 test site near the village of P’unggye. Following the test North Korea announces that “the results of the test helped satisfactorily settle the scientific and technological problems arising in furthering increasing the power of nuclear weapons and steadily developing nuclear technology.” Early yield estimates range from 2-8 kilotons, although the Russian Defense Ministry initially suggests a yield of 15-20 kilotons.

The UN Security Council convenes an emergency meeting and releases a presidential statement condemning the test as a violation of UN Security Council resolution 1718. The council also announces that it will meet to pass a new resolution dealing with the test.

May 26, 2009: South Korea officially announces that it will participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative.

May 27, 2009: KCNA carries a statement indicating that Pyongyang considers Seoul’s participation in PSI to be an act of war and that North Korea’s Korean People’s Army will no longer be bound by the 1953 Armistice Agreement which brought an end to hostilities during the Korean War.

June 12, 2009: In response to North Korea’s May 25 nuclear test, the UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1874, which expands sanctions against Pyongyang. The resolution intensified inspection regime to prevent proliferation to and from North Korea, calls for enhanced financial restrictions against North Korea and North Korean firms, a nearly comprehensive arms embargo on the country, and strengthened council oversight over the implementation of the resolution. It also bars North Korea from carrying out any further missile tests.

June 13, 2009: The North Korean Foreign ministry issues a statement outlining “countermeasures” Pyongyang would take in response to UNSC Resolution 1874.  The measures included weaponizing all newly separated plutonium from the spent fuel from its Yongbyon nuclear reactor, continuing to develop a uranium enrichment capability, and responding militarily to any blockade.

July 16, 2009: The UN Security Council places 10 North Korean entities linked to the countries missile and nuclear program on the list of sanctioned organizations and people.

August 4, 2009: Former President [Council on Foreign Relations member]  Bill Clinton visits North Korea in order to secure the release of two U.S. journalists who were accused of spying, meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il.

August 5, 2009: The state-run Korean Central News Agency issues a statement saying that former President [Council on Foreign Relations member] Bill Clinton’s August 4 visit, to secure the release of two U.S. journalists, will help build “bilateral confidence.”

August 10, 2009: Indian police tell reporters that they detained and inspected the North Korean ship MV Mu Sanbut did not discover any radioactive materials.

August 12, 2009: UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appoints a eight-person panel of experts to the UN Security Council’s 1718 committee to assess the implementation of the sanctions on North Korea in accordance with Resolution 1874.

September 11, 2009: State Department spokesman [Council on Foreign Relations member] P. J. Crowley tells reporters that the United States is “prepared to enter into a bilateral discussion with North Korea” as a precursor to resuming the six-party talks.

October 5, 2009: Xinhua News Agency reports that Kim Jong-Il informed Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao that Pyongyang was ready to return to multilateral talks provided bilateral talks with the United States yielded a favorable result.

October 20, 2009: Ian Kelly, State Department spokesman, tells reporters that North Korea issued a standing invitation for [Council on Foreign Relations member] Stephen Bosworth, U.S. special representative for North Korea policy, to visit Pyongyang.

November 3, 2009: KCNA reports that North Korea has reprocessed the last 8,000 fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor.

November 9, 2009: [Council on Foreign Relations member] P. J. Crowley, state department spokesman, tells reporters that Special Representative for North Korea Policy [Council on Foreign Relations member] Stephen Bosworth will lead a group to Pyongyang for direct talks with the North Korean government.

fig 6 obama new hiresFigure  6 Obama Some of the CFR members CFR Puppet Obama hired – Read Laurence H. Shoup’s Wall Streets Think Tank – The Council on Foreign Relations to see CFR influence in administrations from the 1974-2014 and how the CFR is destroying our Nation.

November 19, 2009: At a joint press conference with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, President Obama says that the United States and South Korea are committed to pursuing “concrete” action on Pyongyang’s part to roll back its nuclear program.

December 8-10, 2009: Officials for the Obama administration hold their first senior-level meetings with the North Korean government in Pyongyang. U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy [Council on Foreign Relations member] Stephen Bosworth leads to delegation to Pyongyang, where he delivers a letter from President Obama to Kim Jong-Il.

December 12, 2009: Authorities in Thailand, acting on a tip from the United States, seize 35 tons of weapons from a North Korean plane that made an unscheduled landing in Bangkok. According to the Thai government, the plane was heading to the Middle East.

2010

January 11, 2010: The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement suggesting talks begin on replacing the 1953 ceasefire with a peace treaty.

January 24, 2010: Pyongyang threatens war with South Korea in response to Seoul’s statement that it would invade North Korea if there was the threat of a nuclear strike.

 

February 9, 2010: Xinhua News Agency reports that Kim Jong Il informed Chinese authorities that Pyongyang is still committed to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

February 12, 2010: UN Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lyn Pascoe tells reporters that North Korea “are not eager” to resume the six-party talks.

March 26, 2010: The South Korean patrol ship Cheonan is sunk near the South Korean-North Korean maritime border.

April 14, 2010: [Council on Foreign Relations member] Kurt Campbell, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, tells reporters that the United States supports South Korea’s decision to stop engagement with North Korea until after the Cheonansinking incident is resolved.

April 19, 2010: Yu Myung-hwan, South Korea’s Foreign Minister, says that talks with North Korea will not occur “for some time” if his government uncovers evidence that North Korea was involved in the Cheonan’s sinking.

April 21, 2010: North Korean state media reports that Pyongyang issued a memorandum stating that the country will be party to nonproliferation and disarmament agreements “on an equal footing with other nuclear weapons states.”

April 25, 2010: During a press conference, South Korean Defense Minister Kim Tae-young says that one of the most likely causes of the Cheonan’s sinking is a torpedo. North Korea denies any involvement in the incident.

May 20, 2010: The multinational Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group (JIG) releases its findings regarding the March 26 sinking of the ROKS Cheonan. The JIG concludes that North Korea was responsible for firing the torpedo that sank the South Korean ship.

May 20, 2010: South Korea makes a formal accusation against North Korea for sinking the South Korean ship the Cheonan with a torpedo attack.

May 20, 2010: North Korea denies involvement in the Cheonan sinking, and issues a statement saying that any punishment will be met with “various forms of tough measures.”

May 24, 2010: South Korean President Lee Myung-bak says that South Korea will sever almost all trade with Pyongyang in response to North Korea’s sinking of the ROKS Cheonan.

May 25, 2010: North Korea says that it will cut all links to South Korea in response to Seoul’s accusation that Pyongyang was responsible for sinking the ship Cheonan.

July 21, 2010: The United States imposes new sanctions against Pyongyang for its involvement in the sinking of the South Korean ship the Cheonan.

July 25, 2010: The United States and South Korea begin a four-day joint military exercise in the Sea of Japan as a show of force in response to the Cheonan incident.

August 25, 2010: Former President [Council on Foreign Relations member] Jimmy Carter arrives in Pyongyang on a goodwill mission to bring home U.S. citizen Aijalon Mahli Gomes, who was arrested after entering North Korea from China.

August 30, 2010: President Obama signs an executive order that increases financial restrictions against North Korea. The Department of Treasury also announces that it has sanctioned eight North Korean entities for involvement in Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs.

September 15, 2010: In an op-ed published in the New York Times, former President [Council on Foreign Relations member] Jimmy Carter writes that during his August visit he received “clear, strong signals” that North Korea wants to restart negotiations.

September 15, 2010: [Council on Foreign Relations member] Stephen Bosworth, U.S. special representative for North Korea policy, tells reporters that it will be a slow road to resuming six-party talks with North Korea and the talks will only occur after “specific and concrete” actions by Pyongyang.

September 28, 2010: The ruling Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) convened its third Conference in Pyongyang, the first such gathering in 44 years. The conference entailed a number of leadership changes, including the appointment of Kim Jong Il’s third son, Kim Jong Eun, as a Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission.

November 12, 2010: North Korea reveals that it has constructed a 2,000-centrifuge uranium enrichment facility to a visiting team of North Korea specialists, including former Los Alamos National Laboratory Director Siegfried Hecker. North Korean officials claim that the facility will produce LEU for an LWR which North Korea also reveals is under construction. Pyongyang also admits for the first time that it can produce uranium hexafluoride (UF6), the feedstock for uranium enrichment, confirming long-held suspicions about the presence of such a capability. The construction of the LWR is slated for 2012, the 100-year anniversary of the birth of Kim Il Sung, but in a Nov. 20 trip report, Hecker expresses doubts about that timeline. The enrichment plant is housed in the former fuel fabrication building for the graphite-moderated reactors at Yongbyon, and the LWR is being constructed at the former site of the 5 megawatt reactor’s cooling tower.

November 23, 2010: North Korea fires artillery rounds at the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong, 200 of which hit the island killing two soldiers and injuring seventeen others. Three civilians were also hurt in the attack. South Korea returned fire and scrambled combat aircraft in the area.

November 29, 2010: In response to the Yeonpyeong shelling, China calls for an emergency session of the six-party talks to “exchange views on major issues of concern”.

December 6, 2010: The United States, Japan, and South Korea reject China’s call for an emergency session of six-party talks, maintaining that North-South relations must improve before multilateral discussions can continue.

2011

February 16, 2011: In Senate testimony, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper says that North Korea likely has additional undeclared uranium enrichment facilities beyond the facility first revealed in November of 2010.

February 28, 2011: U.S. and South Korean forces conduct large-scale joint military exercises. North Korea threatens to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire” in response to the exercises, which U.S. officials claim was planned long in advance of the recent peak in tensions.

March 15, 2011: North Korea tells a visiting Russian official that it is willing to return to six-party talks and to talk about its uranium-enrichment activities.

March 17, 2011: South Korea rejects the latest North Korean offer, calling for actions to show the sincerity of North Korea’s commitment to denuclearization before multilateral talks can begin again.

April 18, 2011: China proposes three-step revitalization of multilateral talks, beginning with bilateral talks between North and South Korea, followed by similar talks between the United States and North Korea, and, finally, a resumption of the six-party discussions.

April 18, 2011: U.S. President Barack Obama issues an executive order  reaffirming a ban on the import of goods, services, and technologies from North Korea.

April 26, 2011: Former U.S. President [Council on Foreign Relations member]  Jimmy Carter visits Pyongyang, accompanied by three other former heads of state, in a bid to revitalize negotiations.

May 9, 2011: South Korean President Lee Myung-bak introduces possibility of inviting North Korea to the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, on the condition that the North commits to giving up nuclear weapons. A North Korean spokesperson rejected the precondition, stating that denuclearization was an attempt by the South to open the way for an invasion.

June 13, 2011: U.S. warship forces a North Korean freight vessel to turn back off the coast of China. The vessel was believed to be carrying a shipment of missile components to Burma. The North Korean ship refused to be inspected, but voluntarily reversed course after being shadowed by the U.S. destroyer.

July 22, 2011: Wi Sung-lac, the South Korean envoy to the six-party talks, met with his North Korean counterpart, Ri Yong Ho, on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations meeting in Bali as part of efforts to restart dialog regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

July 24, 2011: The foreign ministers of Japan, South Korea, and the United States issue a statement welcoming the discussion that took place during the North-South meeting and saying that it “should be a ­sustained process going forward.”

July 28-29, 2011: U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy [Council on Foreign Relations member] Stephen Bosworth and North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan meet in New York, as part of efforts to revive multilateral talks on North Korea’s nuclear program. This marked the first high-level meeting between the United States and North Korea in nearly two years, and the United States reportedly reiterated its willingness to restart negotiations if North Korea displayed committed itself to being a constructive partner in the negotiation process.

August 1, 2011: A North Korean Foreign Ministry statement carried by the state-run Korean Central News Agency expresses Pyongyang’s interest in resuming multilateral talks with the United States “at an early date.”

August 24, 2011: After a meeting between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, Pyongyang says that it would be willing to observe a moratorium on the production and testing of nuclear weapons and missiles in the context of resumed talks.

September 24, 2011: During a diplomatic trip to China, North Korea Prime Minister Choe Yong Rim reiterates the position Kim Jong Il expressed to Russia a month earlier, telling China’s top officials that Pyongyang remained willing to consider a moratorium on nuclear testing in the context of the 6 party talks.

October 24-25, 2011: The United States and North Korea hold a round of talks in Geneva on steps to resume the six-party process. Ambassador Glyn Davies takes over for Ambassador [Council on Foreign Relations member] Stephen Bosworth as the U.S. Special representative for North Korea Policy.

December 17, 2011: After holding power for 17 years, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il dies.  He is succeeded by his youngest son, Kim Jong Un, who is believed to be about 28 years old.

December 29, 2011: Kim Jong Un is formally declared North Korea’s new leader.

2012

February 29, 2012: Following a Feb. 23-24 meeting between the United States and North Korea in Beijing, the two countries announce in separate statements an agreement by North Korea to suspend operations at its Yongbyon uranium enrichment plant, invite IAEA inspectors to monitor the suspension, and implement moratoriums on nuclear and long-range missile tests.  The United States says that it would provide North Korea 240,000 metric tons of food aid under strict monitoring.

March 16, 2012: North Korea announces it will launch a satellite in mid-April to celebrate the centennial birthdate of the country’s founder Kim Il Sung. The United States says that the launch would violate a Feb. 29 agreement in which North Korea pledged not to launch any long-range missiles and would undermine Pyongyang’s credibility regarding the monitoring of food aid and other commitments.

March 29, 2012: Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs Peter Lavoy tells the House Armed Services Committee that the United States has suspended arrangements to deliver food aid to North Korea under a Feb. 29 agreement due to the North’s announced satellite launch.

April 13, 2012: North Korea attempts to launch a weather satellite using the Unha-3, a three-stage liquid-fueled rocket, from its Sohae Satellite Launching Station in the southwest corner of the country. During the first stage, after approximately 90 seconds, the rocket falls apart after veering slightly east from its intended course.  The first stage appeared to be comprised of a cluster of four Nodong medium-range ballistic missiles engines. The second stage, which appeared to be based on a BM-25 Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile did not ignite. It is unclear what caused the rocket launch to fail. Analysts speculate that there may have been a structural failure in the second stage, or that not all four of the engines in the first stage fired correctly. North Korea admits that the launch is a failure, which it did not do after the April 2009 launch, when the North Korean public was told that the satellite successfully entered orbit. The US officially halts its plans to send food aid to North Korea.

April 15, 2012: In a parade honoring the 100th birthday of North Korea founder Kim Il-Sung, North Korea reveals six road-mobile ICBMs in a military parade, the KN-08, although most experts conclude that the missiles are mock-ups based on imagery analysis that reveals significant abnormalities in the design features.

April 16, 2012: The United Nations Security Council condemns North Korea’s satellite launch because of applicability to ballistic missile development, declaring that it acted in violation of Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), and calls upon North Korea to comply with the provisions under the resolutions or face a tightening of sanctions.

April 19, 2012: Secretary of Defense [Council on Foreign Relations member] Leon Panetta tells the House Armed Services Committee that North Korea is getting “some help” from China on its missile development, but says that he does not know the extent of the assistance provided.

December 1, 2012: North Korea announces it will attempt another satellite launch using a long-range rocket between the dates of December 10-22. The rocket, also called the Unha-3, will be launched from the Sohae Satellite Launching Station and follow the same trajectory as the April 13, 2012 launch. In response, the United States Department of State issues a statement saying that it would view a satellite launch as a “highly provocative act” that would threaten the peace and security of the region.

December 9, 2012: North Korea detects a deficiency in the first stage of the rocket, after it has been assembled at Sohae, and announces an extension of the launch window through December 29.

December 12, 2012: North Korea launches the Unha-3. Shortly after the launch the North Korean Central News Agency reports that the launch was a success and the satellite entered orbit. Japanese and South Korean officials confirm the launch and report that debris splashed down in the areas that North Korea indicated for the first and second stages. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) also confirms the launch and says that an object appears to have achieved orbit.

2013

January 22, 2013: The United Nations Security Council passes Resolution 2087 in response to North Korea’s Dec. 12 satellite launch, which used technology applicable to ballistic missiles in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). Resolution 2087 strengthens and expands existing sanctions put in place by the earlier resolutions and freezes the assets of additional North Korean individuals and people.

January 24, 2013: The North Korean National Defense Commission announces its intentions to conduct another nuclear test and continue rocket launches.

February 12, 2013: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) detects seismic activity near North Korea’s nuclear test site. CTBTO Executive Secretary Tibor Toth says that the activity has “explosion-like characteristics” and confirms that the activity comes from the area of the 2006 and 2009 nuclear tests. The South Korean Defense Ministry estimated the yield at 6-7 kilotons in the immediate aftermath and called for a UN Security Council Meeting.

March 7, 2013: The United Nations Security Council unanimously passes Resolution 2094 in response to North Korea’s nuclear test on February 12, 2013. Resolution 2094 strengthens existing sanctions by expanding the scope of materials covered and adds additional financial sanctions, including blocking bulk cash transfers. Additional individuals and entities also are identified for asset freezes.

April 23, 2013: The CTBTO announces that its international monitoring system detected radioactive gases at stations in Japan and Russia. The CTBTO concludes that the gases were likely released during an event approximately 50 days prior to the April 9 detection, which coincides with North Korea’s February 13 nuclear test.

April 2013: North Korea announces it plans to restart its heavy water reactor at Yongbyon.

July 15, 2013: A North Korean ship stopped in Panama is found to be carrying weapons from Cuba. The shipment included small arms, light weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, artillery ammunition, and MiG aircraft in violation of UN Security Council resolutions that prohibit North Korea from importing and exporting weaponry.

August 2013: Satellite imagery indicates that North Korea likely restarted a nuclear reactor at its Yongbyon site. The heavy water reactor in question produced the spent fuel from which North Korea separated weapons-usable plutonium for its nuclear arsenal. The reactor was shut down in 2007.

September 20, 2013: The IAEA General Conference adopts a resolution calling on North Korea to come into full compliance with the NPT and cooperate in the full implementation of the IAEA safeguards.

2014

March 8, 2014: China declares a “red line” on North Korea, saying it will not permit war or chaos on the Korean peninsula and that the only path to peace can only come through denuclearization.

March 21, 2014: North Korea test-fires 30 short-range rockets off its east coast, the latest in series of military actions condemned by South Korea.

March 26, 2014: North Korea test-fires two medium-range Rodang  (also known as No Dong) missiles into the Sea of Japan, violating UN sanctions. This is the first time in five years that North Korea has tested medium-range projectiles.

March 27, 2014: UN Security Council unanimously condemns North Korea for launching the midrange missiles, saying the launch violates council resolutions; China joins council in criticizing the launch.

March 30, 2014: North Korea threatens to carry out a ‘new form’ of nuclear test, one year after its third nuclear test raised military tensions on the Korean Peninsula and prompted the UN to tighten sanctions. Pyongyang does not specify what it means by a ‘new form,’ but some speculate that it plans to make nuclear devices small enough to fit on ballistic missiles.

March 31, 2014: North Korea and South Korea fire hundreds of artillery shells across the disputed Western Sea border. While the shells fall harmlessly into the water, it is the most serious confrontation since an artillery duel in 2010.

April 4, 2014: South Korea conducts its own missile test amid rising military threats from North Korea, successfully launching a newly developed ballistic missile capable of striking most of the North.

May 2, 2014: New commercial satellite imagery shows that North Korea is expanding its main rocket-launching site and testing engines of what is believed to be its first road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile, according to the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University.

June 27, 2014: North Korea fires three short-range projectiles off its east coast, day after it warned of retaliation against release of American comedy film The Interview, which involves a plot to kill Kim Jong-un.

August 22, 2014: Satellite images indicate that North Korea is likely to have the ability to launch a longer-range rocket that can carry a heavier payload by the end of this year.

September 6, 2014: South Korean military says North Korea launched three short-range projectiles off its east coast.

October 2014: Analysis from the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins indicates that North Korea has a submarine at the Sinpo South Shipyard that may be a test bed for submarine-launched ballistic missiles. A test-stand, likely for exploring the possibilities of launching ballistic missiles from submarines or ships is also identified at the shipyard.

October 25, 2014: General Curtis Scaparrotti, commander of US forces in South Korea, says he believes that North Korea can fit a nuclear weapon on a ballistic missile, a process known as miniturization.

November, 20 2014: North Korea threatens to conduct a fourth nuclear test after the UN Human Rights Committee refers North Korea to the International Criminal Court for human rights abuses on November 19.

November 20, 2014: Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announces that a North Korean special envoy told Russian President Vladimir Putin that North Korea is ready to resume the Six-Party Talks.

2015

January 2, 2015: The United States expands sanctions on North Korean entities and individuals, some of which are involved with North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

January 10, 2015: North Korea announces it offered to suspend nuclear testing in exchange for the United States and South Korea calling off annual joint-military exercises slated for spring 2015. The United States rejects the offer.

February 7, 2015: North Korea claims to test a new anti-ship missile. Kim Jong Un reportedly oversees the test.

February 8, 2015: North Korea tests five short-range ballistic missiles from Wonsan. The missiles fly approximately 125 miles northeast into the ocean.

April 7, 2015: Adm William Gortney, head of U.S. North Command, tells reporters that North Korea’s ICBM, the KN-08 is operational, despite never having been tested. Experts dispute the assesment.

May 9, 2015: North Korea successfully launches a ballistic missile, which it claims came from a submarine, that traveled about 150 meters. Experts believe the missile was launched from a submerged barge.

November 28, 2015: North Korea tests a ballistic missile from a submarine. The missile test fails.

December 8, 2015: The U.S. Treasury Department announces additional designations under Executive Orders 13551 and 13382. This include the State Department designating North Korea’s Strategic Rocket Force under 13382 for engaging in activities that contribute to delivery vehicles capable of carrying WMDs. Several banks involved with proliferation financing were also named as were three shipping companies.

December 21, 2015: North Korea tests another ballistic missile from a submarine. This test is reported as a success.

2016

January 6, 2016: North Korea announces it conducted a fourth nuclear weapons test, claiming to have detonated a hydrogen bomb for the first time. Monitoring stations from the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization detect the seismic activity from the test. The type of device tested remains unclear, although experts doubt it was of a hydrogen bomb based on seismic evidence.

February 7, 2016: North Korea launches a long-range ballistic missile carrying what it has said is an earth observation satellite in defiance of United Nations sanctions barring it from using ballistic missile technology, drawing strong international condemnation from other governments which believe it will advance North Korea’s military ballistic missile capabilities.

March 2, 2016: The UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 2270 condemning the nuclear test and launch of early 2016, and demanding that North Korea not conduct further tests and immediately suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program. Resolution 2270 expands existing sanctions on North Korea by adding to the list of sanctioned individuals and entities, introducing new financial sanctions, and banning states from supplying aviation fuel and other specified minerals to North Korea. Resolution 2270 also introduces a requirement that UN member states inspect all cargo in transit to or from North Korea for illicit goods and arms.

April 15, 2016: North Korea test launches an intermediate-range ballistic missile, the Mususdan, which was not known to have been flight-tested prior to the April 15 launch. The missile test is a failure. The UN Security Council issues as statement condemning the launch as a “clear violation” of existing Security Council resolutions.

April 23, 2016: North Korea tests a KN-11 submarine launch ballistic missile. The missile flew approximately 30 kilometers before exploding, according to South Korean officials.

April 24, 2016: The UN Security Council condemns North Korea’s submarine-launched ballistic missile test.

April 28, 2016: North Korea tests two intermediate-range Musudan missiles. The tests are reported as a failure.

May 6-9, 2016: North Korea holds its seventh Congress for its ruling Korean Workers’ Party. During the Congress, Kim Jong Un describes North Korea’s nuclear policy, saying North Korea “will not use a nuclear weapon unless its sovereignty is encroached upon by any aggressive hostile forces with nukes, as it had already declared.”

May 30, 2016: North Korea tests another intermediate-range Musudan missile.

May 31, 2016: Satellite imagery analysis from 38 North assess that North Korea is “preparing to commence or has already begun” reprocessing nuclear material to separate additional plutonium for weapons use.

June 21, 2016: North Korea conducts two additional intermediate-range Musudan ballistic missile tests, bringing the total number of Musudan tests to six since April. One of the tests is a partial success, as the missile flew an estimated 400 kilometers. The other explodes in midflight after approximately 150 kilometers.

June 22, 2016: The UN Security Council holds an emergency session to consider North Korea’s missile tests.

June 23, 2016: The Security Council releases a statement strongly condemning North Korea’s recent ballistic missile launches and calls on member states to fully implement UN Security Council measures imposed by council resolutions.

July 6, 2016: North Korea signals a willingness to resume negotiations on denuclearization and defines denuclearization in a statement by a government spokesperson.

July 6, 2016: The US Department of Treasury announces designations on top North Korean officials, including the leader, Kim Jong Un, over ties to human rights abuses in North Korea.

July 8, 2016: South Korea and the United States announce a decision to deploy the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense battery (THAAD), to South Korea. The missile defense system is “a defenisve measure to ensure the security” of South Korea. THAAD is designed to intercept short and medium-range ballistic missiles.

August 3, 2016: North Korea fires a medium-range ballistic missile, the Nodong. The missile splashes down in Japan’s economic exclusion zone, about 200 kilometers off of Japan’s coast.

August 24, 2016: North Korea tests an SLBM, the KN-11. The missile ejects from a submarine and flies approximately 500 kilometers on a lofted trajectory before splashing down in the ocean. The test appears to be a success.

September 5, 2016: North Korea tests three medium-range ballistic missiles simultaneously. The missiles travel about 1,000 kilometers.

September 9, 2016: North Korea conducts a fifth nuclear test. The sesimic activity registers a magnititude of 5.0.

October 14, 2016: North Korea conducts a failed test of what is believed to be the intermediate-range Musudan ballistic missile. The missile explodes soon after lift-off.

October 19, 2016: North Korea conducts a failed test of what is believed to be the intermediate-range Musudan ballistic missile. The missile explodes shortly after lift-off. This is the eighth test of the Musudan in 2016. Only the June launch was a success.

October 25, 2016: U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper says that “the notion of getting the North Koreans to denuclearize is probably a lost cause” and that nuclear weapons are North Korea’s “ticket to survival.”

2017

February 12, 2017: North Korea tests a new ballistic missile, the Pukguksong-2. North Korean media calls the test a success. The missile flew about 500 kilometers at a lofted trajectory. Imagery suggests that the Pukguksong-2 is a solid-fueled, medium-range system based on a submarine launched ballistic missile that North Korea has been testing for several years. The test utilized ‘cold-launch’ technology, meaning that the missile was ejected from its canister using compressed gas. The transport erector launcher used for the missile test was also domestically manufactured in North Korea.

February 13, 2017: Kim Jong Nam, the older half-brother of Kim Jong Un, is killed in an airport in Malaysia. Tests reveal that he died from exposure to VX, a nerve agent. VX is banned under the Chemical Weapons Convention, but North Korea has not signed or ratified that treaty. North Korea denies responsibility for the assassination.

March 6, 2017: North Korea launches four ballistic missiles from a region near North Korea’s border with China. The missiles fly about 1,000 kilometers and land in Japanese economic exclusion zone, about 300 kilometers off the coast Japan.

April 5, 2017: North Korea tests a ballistic missile. The missile explodes shortly after the launch.

April 6, 2017: U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet and agree to cooperate more closely on achieving denuclearization of North Korea.

April 15, 2017: North Korea celebrates the birth of its founder, Kim Il Sung, with a parade that displays several new ballistic missiles, including a new variant of the KN-08 and two cannister systems. It is unclear if the cannisters hold new ICBMS.

April 16, 2017: North Korea tests a ballistic missile. The missile explodes shorterly after the launch.

April 17, 2017: Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, Susan Thornton, tells reporters about the U.S. policy toward North Korea, which officials describe as “maximum pressure and engagement.” Thornton said that Washington is looking for a “tangible signal” from North Korea about its seriousness in engaging in talks and there is not a “specific precondition.”

April 26, 2017: The Trump Administration briefs Congress on its North Korea policy and releases a statement that calls for increasing sanctions pressure on North Korea and working with allies and regional partners on diplomacy.

figure 7 - Tillerson

Figure 7 CFR Stooge Rex Tillerson and CEO of CFR corporate member Exxon-Mobile, the largest publicly traded oil company in the world. Tillerson’s been in that position for six years. He was responsible for the big move into natural gas, a resource that belongs to we the people, the $30 billion acquisition of XTO Energy in 2009. In his new book, “Private Empire,” Steve Coll refers to Exxon Mobil as a corporate state within the American state, with its own intricate web of international relations and, in a sense, its own foreign policy. So I think it’s particularly fitting that Rex Tillerson is speaking to this group at the Council on Foreign Relations. Tillerson is also one of the CFR members who is taking morally straight out of scouting and helping to promote the #lgbt normalization of sodomy in the work place.

April 27, 2017: Secretary of State Rex Tillerson says in an interview with NPR that the United States is open to direct talks with North Korea on the “right agenda.” He says that denuclearization is still the goal for any agreement.

April 28, 2017: Secretary of State Rex Tillerson chairs a special meeting of the UN Security Council. In opening remarks he says that North Korea must take “concrete steps to reduce the threat that its illiegal weapons programs pose” before talks can begin.

May 2, 2017: The THAAD missile defense system becomes operational in South Korea.

May 9, 2017: Moon jae-in is elected president of South Korea. Moon supports engagement with North Korea, but says talks cannot occur while Pyongyang continues to conduct nuclear and missile tests.

May 14, 2017: North Korea tests the Hwasong-12 missile. The missile test is successful with a range of 4,800 kilometers on a standard trajectory, making it an intermediate-range ballistic missile.

June 1, 2017: The United States imposes sanctions on individuals and entities linked to North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.

June 29-30, 2017: South Korean President Moon Jae-in meets with U.S. President Donald Trump at a summit in Washington, DC. The leaders pledge to continue working together on North Korea.

July 3, 3017: North Korea tests its Hwasong-14 ballistic missile. Initial analysis of the test indicate that the range would have been about 6,700 kilometers at a standard trajectory, making it an ICBM.

July 28, 2017: Japan, South Korea, and the United States report that North Korea tested an ICBM. Initial analysis of the test indicates a range of about 10,400km, not taking into account the rotation of the Earth, putting Los Angeles, Denver and Chicago within range. Russia claimed the missile was a medium-range ballistic missile.

August 5, 2017: The UN Security Council unanimously passes Resolution 2371, which imposes additional sanctions, including a complete ban on the export of coal, iron, seafood and lead, on North Korea in response to the July ICBM tests. See UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea for more information.

August 8, 2017: A leaked Defense Intelligence Agency report found that North Korea has produced miniturized nuclear warheads for ballistic missile delivery, including for ICBMs.

On the same day, in response to North Korean criticism of the United States, President Trump told reporters that “North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States…. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.”

August 9, 2017: In response to Trump’s remarks, North Korean made a statement detailing a plan to test four Hwasong-12 intermediate range ballistic missiles, which would fly over Japan and land in the waters 30-40km from the coast of Guam.

August 10, 2017: Trump told reporters that his previous threat of “fire and fury” should North Korea continue to threaten the United States may not have been “tough enough”.

August 11, 2017: Trump tweeted: “military solutions are now fully in place, locked and loaded, should North Korea act unwisely. Hopefully Kim Jong Un will find another path!”

August 14, 2017: Kim Jong Un declares that after receiving Guam strike plans, he will wait to see what Washington’s next move is before making a decision.

August 25, 2017: North Korea tests three short-range ballistic missiles to the northeast, two of which flew about 155 miles, and one of which blew up immediately.

August 28, 2017: North Korea tests its Hwasong-12 missile, which flew over 2,700km and overflew Japan. In a statement the next day, President Trump claims “all options are on the table.”

September 2, 2017: North Korea official state media releases photos of Kim Jong Un with what it claims is a thermonuclear weapon small enough to fit on an ICBM that could reach the continental United States.

September 3, 2017: North Korea conducts its sixth nuclear test, claiming the device tested was a hydrogen bomb and the test was a “perfect success.” Seismic activity indicates that North Korea did conduct its largest nuclear test to date at 3:30 UTC. The initial estimate from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is that the seismic event’s magnitude was around 5.8, occurred at a very shallow depth, and took place in the immediate vicinity of North Korea’s Pyunggye-ri test site. Based on the seismic data, a number of experts assess the device had an explosive yield in excess of 100 kilotons TNT equivalent, which is significantly higher than North Korea’s past nuclear tests. North Korea’s claim that the device was a hydrogen bomb cannot be independently substantiated, but the higher yield could be indicative of a boosted fission or thermonuclear device. The CTBTO’s seismic estimate was later revised to 6.1 on September 7.

September 4, 2017: In remarks at an emergency UN Security Council briefing called in the wake of North Korea’s sixth nuclear test, US Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley states “being a nuclear power is not about using those terrible weapons to threaten others. Nuclear powers understand their responsibilities.”

September 11, 2017: The UN Security Council passes UNSCR 2375 imposing additional sanctions on North Korea, including a ban on textile exports and a cap on refined petroleum product imports.

September 15, 2017: North Korea conducts a ballistic missile test. The test appears to be an intermediate-range Hwasong-12. The missile over flew Japan on a standard trajectory and reportedly traveled about 3,700 kilometers.

September 19, 2017: In his first address to the UN General Assembly, President Trump threatens to “totally destroy North Korea,” if the United States is forced to defend itself or its allies, adding “Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime.”

September 21, 2017: President Trump issues an executive order imposing additional sanctions on entities that facilitate financial transactions and trade with North Korea.

September 21, 2017: Kim Jong Un responds to Trump’s UN speech with an unprecedented statement under his own name, calling Trump’s behavior “mentally deranged” and asserting that “a frightened dog barks louder.” Kim Jong Un further stated that Trump’s words “convinced me, rather than frightening or stopping me, that the path I chose is the correct and that one I have to follow to the last.” He threatened, “exercising…a corresponding, highest level of hardline countermeasure in history” and declared he would make Trump “pay dearly for his speech.”

North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho explains that the “highest level” action Kim Jong Un referred to in his statement could be a hydrogen bomb test in or over the Pacific Ocean, although he claimed he had “no idea what actions could be taken as it will be ordered by leader Kim Jong Un. Ri also says that Trump’s comments make “our rocket’s visit to the U.S. mainland inevitable all the more.””

September 23, 2017: U.S. B1-B strategic bombers fly near North Korea’s coast, the farthest north they have flown in the 21st century.

Trump tweets that North Korea “wouldn’t be around much longer” if he echoes “Little Rocket Man.”

September 25, 2017: At a press conference in New York, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho claims that Trump’s comments at the UN General Assembly and on Twitter constituted a declaration of war and that North Korea therefore has a right to shoot down U.S. strategic bombers.

November 7, 2017: President Trump delivers an address to the South Korean National Assembly, the first address by a U.S. President since President [Council on Foreign Relations member]  Clinton’s in 1993. In his speech, Trump addresses Kim Jong Un directly, warning him not to underestimate the United States. Trump also sets the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea as a precondition for talks.

* Entry dates for the imposition of sanctions indicate the dates the sanctions took effect.

 

Posted: November 7, 2017

 

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How the CFR established the Chinese Elite & sold out the US & Chinese Worker

Source: How the CFR established the Chinese Elite & sold out the US & Chinese Worker

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The National Endowment for Democracy a Council on Foreign Relations Deep State Covert Operations Tool

In Trojan Horses and Color Revolutions: The Role of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) William Blum writes: How many Americans could identify the National Endowment for Democracy? An organization which often does exactly the opposite of what its name implies.

The NED was set up in the early 1980s under President Reagan in the wake of all the negative revelations about the CIA in the second half of the 1970s. The latter was a remarkable period. Spurred by Watergate – the Church committee of the Senate, the Pike committee of the House, and the Rockefeller Commission, created by the president, were all busy investigating the CIA. Seemingly every other day there was a new headline about the discovery of some awful thing, even criminal conduct, the CIA had been mixed up in for years. The Agency was getting an exceedingly bad name, and it was causing the powers-that-be much embarrassment.

Something had to be done. What was done was not to stop doing these awful things. Of course not. What was done was to shift many of these awful things to a new organization, with a nice sounding name – The National Endowment for Democracy. The idea was that the NED would do somewhat overtly what the CIA had been doing covertly for decades, and thus, hopefully, eliminate the stigma associated with CIA covert activities.

It was a masterpiece. Of politics, of public relations, and of cynicism.

Thus it was that in 1983, the National Endowment for Democracy was set up to “support democratic institutions throughout the world through private, nongovernmental efforts”. Notice the “nongovernmental” – part of the image, part of the myth. In actuality, virtually every penny of its funding comes from the federal government, as is clearly indicated in the financial statement in each issue of its annual report. NED likes to refer to itself as an NGO (Non-governmental organization) because this helps to maintain a certain credibility abroad that an official US government agency might not have. But NGO is the wrong category. NED is a GO.

“We should not have to do this kind of work covertly,” said Carl Gershman in 1986, while he was president of the Endowment. “It would be terrible for democratic groups around the world to be seen as subsidized by the C.I.A. We saw that in the 60’s, and that’s why it has been discontinued. We have not had the capability of doing this, and that’s why the endowment was created.”

And Allen Weinstein, who helped draft the legislation establishing NED, declared in 1991: “A lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA.”

In effect, the CIA has been laundering money through NED…”

The NED website identifies NED’s Council on Foreign Relations Connections. Council on Foreign Relations members McCloy and Donovan created the OSS, the CIA and the NSA and run the U.S. intelligence community. NED is just another CFR deep state tool for creating endless war, spreading globalization and creating one world government.

NED’s websites tell us:

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Ronald Reagan Conversing with CFR member John McCloy

“NED’s non-governmental status has a number of advantages that are recognized by those institutions that really do carry out American foreign policy. As pointed out in a letter signed by seven former Secretaries of State in 1995, “We consider the non-governmental character of the NED even more relevant than it was at NED’s founding twelve years ago.” The seven were [Council on Foreign Relations members] James Baker, Laurence Eagleburger, George Shultz, Alexander Haig, Henry Kissinger, Edmund Muskie and Cyrus Vance.

To commemorate the twentieth anniversary of NED’s establishment, the Board of Directors issued an invitation to President George W. Bush [son of CFR member George H.W.Bush] to make a major statement about democracy. In his address, one of the most cited of his Presidency, he articulated a vision of a more democratic Middle East, the one region of the world where democracy has failed to take hold. Much of his speech echoed one of the major themes of the Endowment’s third strategy document, which calls for promoting democratic institutions and values in countries with significant Muslim populations, while maintaining NED’s global grants program. [Was this the real goal or was the real goal to promote Middle East unrest and stir up the War on Terror?]

In January 2009, NED’s Board of Directors elected former congressional leader [CFR member] Richard Gephardt to serve as its Chairman,succeeding former congressman [CFR member] Vin Weber, who had held the position since 2001.  Former U.S. Representative Martin Frost (D-TX),  Ambassador Princeton Lyman, Progressive Policy Institute President Will Marshall, and Ambassador Stephen Sestanovich have joined the Board of Directors of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).  Frost and Sestanovich were elected for a three-year term on June 19, 2009; Lyman and Marshall were elected to a similar term today.

pic 2 gephardt

CFR member Gephardt follows Al Gore, CFR member Bill Clinton and Hillary Clinton

“We can see beyond the present shadows of war in the Middle East to a new world order where the strong work together to deter and stop aggression.” — Richard Gephardt, in the Wall Street Journal (September 1990)

 

Ambassador Princeton N. Lyman is an adjunct senior fellow for Africa policy studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). He is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University [ a CFR rats nest]. Ambassador Lyman’s career in government included assignments as deputy assistant secretary of state for Africa, U.S. ambassador to Nigeria, director of refugee programs, ambassador to South Africa, and assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs. He has published books and articles on foreign policy, African affairs, economic development, HIV/AIDS, UN reform, and peacekeeping.

pic 3 Princeton

CFR Member Princeton N. Lyman

 

Stephen Sestanovich is the George F. Kennan senior fellow for Russian and Eurasian studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis professor of international diplomacy at Columbia University. His particular areas of expertise are Russia and the former Soviet Union, Caucasus and Central Asia, and U.S. foreign policy. From 1997 to 2001, he served as ambassador-at-large and special adviser to the secretary of state for the new independent states. In this capacity, he was the State Department’s principal officer responsible for policy toward the states of the former Soviet Union.

pic 4 Sestanovich

CFR member Stephen Sestanovich 

Congressman Martin Frost is a keen observer of national politics who has held a number of leadership positions for the Democratic Party including Caucus Chair, Ranking Democrat for the Rules Committee, and Chairman of the DCCC — he is considered one of the party’s top strategists. From 1979-2005, Mr. Frost served as a member of Congress representing the Dallas-Fort Worth area in north Texas. From 1990-95, he also chaired a special House Task Force established to help eastern and central European nations transition to democracy after the fall of the Berlin Wall. He has continued democracy building efforts through work with the National Democratic Institute.

Will Marshall is president and founder of the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI), established in 1989 as a center for political innovation in Washington, D.C. In this capacity, he has been one of the chief intellectual architects of the movement to modernize progressive politics for the global age. PPI’s policy analysis and proposals were the source for many of the “New Democrat” innovations that figured prominently in national politics over the past two decades. The Institute also has been integral to the spread of “Third Way” thinking to center-left parties in Europe and elsewhere.”

William Base wrote:

“If one group is effectively in control of national governments and multinational corporations; promotes world government through control of media, foundation grants, and education; and controls and guides the issues of the day; then they control most options available. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), and the financial powers behind it, have done all these things, and promote the “New World Order”, as they have for over seventy years. The CFR is the promotional arm of the ruling Elite in the United States of America. Most influential politicians, academics and media personalities are members, and it uses its influence to infiltrate the New World Order into American life. Its’ “experts” write scholarly pieces to be used in decision making, the academics expound on the wisdom of a united world, and the media members disseminate the message.”

Felix Frankfurter, Justice of the Supreme Court (1939-1962), said:

“The real rulers in Washington are invisible and exercise power from behind the scenes.”

In a letter to an associate dated November 21, 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt wrote,

“The real truth of the matter is, as you and I know, that a financial element in the large centers has owned the government ever since the days of Andrew Jackson.”

February 23, 1954, Senator William Jenner warned in a speech:

“Outwardly we have a Constitutional government. We have operating within our government and political system, another body representing another form of government, a bureaucratic elite which believes our Constitution is outmoded.”

Since 1934 almost every United States Secretary of State has been a CFR member; and ALL Secretaries of War or Defense, from Henry L. Stimson through Richard Cheney. The CIA has been under CFR control almost continuously since its creation, starting with Allen Dulles, founding member of the CFR and brother of Secretary of State under President Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles. Allen Dulles had been at the Paris Peace Conference, joined the CFR in 1926, and later became its president. “The most powerful cliques in these elitist groups have one objective in common: they want to bring about the surrender of the sovereignty and national independence of the United States.” What must be remembered is that this is not some lunatic- fringe group…these are members of one of the most powerful private organizations in the world: the people who determine and control American economic, social, political, and military policy. Members’ influence and control extends to “leaders in academia, public service, business, and the media,” according to the CFR 1993 “Annual Report.”

James Warburg, son of CFR founder Paul Warburg, and a member of FDR’s “brain trust,” testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 17, 1950,

“We shall have world government whether or not you like it – by conquest or consent.”

The National Endowment For Democracy was not created for supporting freedom around the world it is another Council on Foreign Relations tool for destroying freedom and creating a world government under Council on Foreign Relations control.

 

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International Institute for Strategic Studies a CFR/RIIA Psycho-Political Operations Tool

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In 1958 the Royal Institute of International Affairs (aka Chathamhouse) founded the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Many members on the board of directors were RIIA members and members of its U.S. Sister organization the Council on Foreign Relations. It has become the pre-eminent British think-tank peddling the “new NATO” doctrine, and pressing for the United States to accept the role of “policeman of the world.”

The Council on Foreign Relations was formally established in Paris in 1919 along with its British Counterpart the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The Council on Foreign Relations and Royal Institute of International Affairs can trace their roots back to a secret organization founded and funded by Cecil Rhodes, who became fabulously wealthy by exploiting the people of South Africa. Rhodes is the father of Apartheid.

The Council on Foreign Relations was founded by a group of American and British imperialists and racists intent on ruling the world. Many of the American members were American intelligence officers that belonged to the first American Intelligence Agency — THE INQUIRY. Many of the British members were British Intelligence Agents. THE INQUIRY and its members, who included such notable Americans as Col. Edward Mandel House, Walter Lippmann, Isaiah Bowman, and James Shotwell, wrote most of Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points.

The CFR/RIIA method of operation is simple — they control public opinion. They keep the identity of their group secret. They learn the likes and dislikes of influential people. They surround and manipulate them into acting in the best interest of the CFR/RIIA.

The IISS website tells us IISS is “A registered charity headquartered in London, the IISS also has offices in WashingtonSingaporeand Manama, Bahrain. The IISS is a non-partisan organisation, independent of government and other bodies. Its mission is to promote the adoption of sound policies to further global peace and security and maintain civilised international relations.”

This is untrue. Non-partisan is CFR/RIIA euphemism for controlling both sides of political spectrum. The groups are adept at using the media to create massive psycho-political operations used to manipulate public opinion. The psycho-political operations are often designed to create tensions between different groups of people. Keeping the world in a state of perpetual tension and warfare maximizes profits from CFR/RIIA munition, medicine, media, energy, and food businesses.

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IISS is a CFR/RIIA psycho-political operations tool for achieving their goal of one world government under their control. Besides The Military Balance, the definitive reference source on the world’s armed forces, IISS publications include:

London’s IISS Steers U.S. Strategic Doctrine by Scott Thompson and The Hollinger Corp. Propaganda Empire by Scott Thompson and Jeffrey Steinberg are about IISS. They trace its roots back to the Hollinger Corpration which started out in World War II as a front for the British War machine and would grow into a media cartel.  (http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/1999/eirv26n17-19990423/eirv26n17-19990423_039-the_hollinger_corp_propaganda_em.pdf) :

One of IISS’s main ways of reaching out to broader layers is through its publications, which include: Strategic Comments; Adelphi Papers; Survival; an annual report entitled The Military Balance; and the annual reference The World Directory of Strategic Studies Centers. The Strategic Survey 1997-1998, an IISS annual report, argues for the United States to accept its assigned role as global policeman. The only choice that the United States should make, the IISS survey argues, is whether to act unilaterally, to act through multilateral organizations like the United Nations or NATO, or through informal coalitions. “The U.S. is bound to find itself often in the future balancing the benefits of a more multinational approach . . . against the utility of a unilateral approach which allows the U.S. its preferredpolicywithoutthe encumbrancesofinter-alliedconsultation. The quality of U.S. leadership in the future is likely to be judged by the wisdom of the choice it makes between these mutually exclusive methods for dealing with crises.”

Conrad Black is the chairman and CEO of the Hollinger Corp. media cartel, which owns the Telegraph plc in Britain, the Jerusalem Post, the Chicago Sun-Times, and hundreds of other dailies and weeklies across the United States, and which has just launched a new nationwide daily in Canada. On July 6, 1998, Black addressed the annual meeting of the Center for PolicyStudiesinLondon,theflagshipthink-tankoftheradical free market Mont Pelerin Society. In his speech on “Britain’s Final Choice: Europe or America?” Black attacked the European Union as “the greatest engine for collectivism, illiberalism, and hyper-regulation in our national life.” He called upon Britain to abandon plans to join the European Monetary Union, and, instead, to formally press for membership in an expanded, transatlantic “super-NAFTA,” which he proposed be renamed as the “North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement.”

“None of the continental European countries has a particular affinity with the United States and Canada,” Black lied, “or anything slightly comparable to Britain’s dramatic modern historic intimacy with North America. . . . Such an expanded NAFTA would have every commercial advantage over the EU. It is based on the Anglo-American free market model of relatively restrained taxation and social spending. The United States will make no significant concessions of sovereignty and does not expect other countries to do so.” Two years earlier, former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher keynoted the founding “Prague Congress” of the New Atlantic Initiative, where she initiated the call for this super-NAFTA. Lady Thatcher chairs the international advisory board of the Hollinger Corp., and Black is a founder of the NAI.

What is today the Hollinger corporate octopus, started out during World War II as a front company for Britain’s war machine. In April 1940, Edward Plunkett Taylor was recruited into British intelligence by the Minister of Munitions and Supplies, Clarence Decatur Howe. Perhaps drawing on the Taylor family’s experience as smugglers during U.S. Prohibition, Howe assigned E.P. Taylor to secure the flow of U.S. dollars into the British Empire, and to obtain war supplies that were forbidden under the U.S. Neutrality Act. Taylor and his crew—including Conrad Black’s father, George Montagu Black—made a profit working through a British government front company that they had created, called War Supplies Ltd. The New York Times described it at the time as “a virtual merging of the economies of the United States and Canada.” At the end of the war, Taylor & Co. formed the Argus Corporation with the $1.3 billion they had amassed by procuring arms for the British government. Argus proceeded to buy up a number of strategic raw material firms, and Canada’s largest farm equipment manufaturer, Massey Ferguson. Conrad Black was groomed by his father and Taylor to take over Argus. When he assumed control in the 1970s, he changed the company’s name to Hollinger Corp., and he sold off the raw material and manufacturing subsidiaries; then he began a worldwide media grab, such that, today, Hollinger is among the largest print media cartels in the English-speaking world. Using funds from liquidated assets of the Argus Corp., supplemented by contributions from Li Kai Shing, whose family has a virtually hereditary board position on the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, the heroin bank for East Asia’s market, Black purchased 100% control of The Telegraph Ltd., publisher of the Daily Telegraph. The Telegraph is the largest newspaper in London—it is a favorite of the British royal family—and quickly became a mouthpiece for Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Black purchased 100% control of the Jerusalem Post, the foremost English daily in Israel, turning its policies to support for the Likudnik Greater Israel crazies, such as Foreign Minister Gen. Ariel Sharon, “the Butcher of Lebanon.” Hollinger Canadian Publishing Holdings, Inc. began buying up daily and weekly papers across Canada, through its wholly owned Sterling Newspapers Co. and Southam groups. And, in the United States, Black purchased some 240 daily and weekly papers through his Chicago Group, including the Chicago Sun-Times, the Gary, Indiana Post Tribune, and the Community Newspaper Group. The Spectator, a British establishment journal since 1828, was purchased by Hollinger shortly after the takeover of the Telegraph Group Ltd. On July 9, 1990, the Spectatorfeatured an inflammatory anti-German article Thatcher’s Minister of Industry and Trade, Nicholas Ridley. Ridley assailed Chancellor Helmut Kohl for backing reunification of his country, and equating Kohl with Adolf Hitler, and calling a reunified Germany the “Fourth Reich.” The article kicked up such controversy that he was soon thereafter forced to resign. Thatcher, in her Memoirs, the Downing Street Years, acknowledged that it was British Empire policy to do everything to block German reunification. Ridley was merely just taking orders from Thatcher, Black, and the BAC.

The boards of directors and advisory boards of Hollinger and its subsidiaries are a veritable who’s who of the British American& Canadian inner circle, from policy shapers, like Black, to field hands like Anglo-Israeli spy Richard Perle. We provide a partial listing:

Conrad M. Black, Canadian Privy Council, Queen’s Council, Chairman of the Board and CEO of Hollinger, Inc.; Hollinger International, Inc.; Hollinger Canadian Publishing Holdings Inc.; Telegraph Group, Ltd; and, Southam Inc.; 1001 Nature Trust; New Atlantic Initiative.

Barbara Amiel Black, wife of Conrad Black, and VicePresident, Editorial, London. Director, Hollinger, Inc.; and, Hollinger International, Inc. R.

Donald Fullerton, chairman of the executive committee, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce. Director, Hollinger, Inc.

Baroness Margaret Thatcher, LG, OM, Prime Minister of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (1979-90).

Senior International Adviser, Hollinger International, Inc.

Vale´ry Giscard d’Estaing, President of France (1974- 81). Senior International Adviser, Hollinger International, Inc.

Lord Peter Rupert Carrington, KG, GCMG, Senior International Adviser, Hollinger International, Inc.; and, Director, Telegraph Group Ltd.

CFR member Henry A. Kissinger, KCMG, former U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Adviser; former member President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Senior International Adviser, Hollinger International, Inc.; and, Director, Hollinger International, Inc.

CFR member Zbigniew Brzezinski,former U.S. National Security Adviser, former chairman, Trilaterial Commission. Senior International Adviser, Hollinger International, Inc.

Dr. Giovanni Agnelli, Honorary Chairman, Fiat S.p.A. International Advisory Board, Hollinger International, Inc.

Dwayne O. Andreas, Chairman, Archer Daniels Midland Co. Director, International Advisory Board, Hollinger International, Inc. CFR member David Brinkley, ABC News senior correspondent (1981- 97). International Advisory Board, Hollinger International, Inc.

CFR member William F. Buckley, Editor-at-Large, National Review. International Advisory Board, Hollinger International, Inc.

CFR member Newt Gingrich, former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (1995-98). International Advisory Board, Hollinger International, Inc.

Lord Hanson,Chairman, Hanson PLC, London. International Advisory Board, Hollinger International, Inc.

CFR member Richard Perle, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy 1981-87; Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute; International Advisory Board, Hollinger International, Inc.; Director Hollinger International, Inc.; and, Director, Jerusalem Post Publications, Ltd.; Chairman, Hollinger Digital, Inc.

Lord Jacob Rothschild, Chairman, Jacob Rothschild Holdings PLC. International Advisory Board, Hollinger International, Inc.

CFR member Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, James D. Wolfensohn Inc. (1988-96); Chairman, U.S. Federal Reserve System, 1979- 87; North American Chairman, Trilateral Commission.

CFR member Richard Burt, Chairman, International Equity Partners; Chief Negotiator in Strategic Arms Reduction Talks with U.S.S.R., 1989-91; Director, Hollinger International, Inc.

  1. Alfred Taubman (son William is CFR member) , Chairman, Taubman Co.; Chairman, Sotheby’s Holdings, Inc.; and, Director, Hollinger International, Inc.

Lord Weidenfeld of Chelsea, Chairman, Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd., London; Director, Hollinger International, Inc.; and, Director, Jerusalem Post Publications, Ltd. Viscount Cranborne, Leader of the Opposition in the House of Lords; Director, Telegraph Group, Ltd.

Rupert N. Hambro; Chairman, JO Hambro & Co., Ltd.; former officer, British Special Operations Executive; and, Director, Telegraph Group Ltd.

Henry N.L. Keswick, Chairman, Matheson & Co. Ltd. and Jardine Matheson Holdings Ltd., London; Director, Telegraph Group, Ltd. Lord King of Wartnaby, President, British Airways PLC and Babcock International Group, PLC, London; Director, Telegraph Group, Ltd. Lord Rawlinson of Ewell, Privy Council, Queen’s Council, U.K. Solicitor-General, 1962-64 and Attorney General, 1970-74; Director, Telegraph Group, Ltd.

Sir Evelyn Rothschild, Chairman, N.M. Rothschild & Sons, Ltd., London; Director, Telegraph Group, Ltd.

CFR member Raymond G.H. Seitz, Senior Managing Director, Lehman Brothers and former U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom; Director, Telegraph Group, Ltd. Maj. Gen. Shlomo Gazit, Senior Researcher, Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University; Former Chief of Israeli Military Intelligence; and, Director, Jerusalem Post Publications, Ltd

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Snowden Revelations, the CFR run NSA, the CFR packed SCOTUS, the 4th, and You

Snowden photo 1

On Tuesday May 23 2017, a federal appeals court revived a high-profile challenge to the National Security Agency’s warrantless surveillance of internet communications. The ruling, by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, is significant because it increases the chances that the Supreme Court may someday scrutinize whether the N.S.A.’s so-called upstream system for internet surveillance complies with Fourth Amendment privacy rights. The New York Times article about the appeal says  “It is currently an open question about how to apply old legal concepts to 21st-century communications technology.”

The old legal concept the New York Times is referring to is the 4th Amendment to the constitution. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” This old legal concept prevents abuse by government officials against innocent people, including intrusion into their private matters. This old legal concept is not an open question that should be decided by a CFR packed SCOTUS  ( current CFR members include Ginsberg, Breyer & Gorsuch) who have legalized infanticide (Roe vs Wade) and sodomy (Obergefell vs Hodges).

In July of 2013  The CFR run Obama Administration conducted a full-court press to block fugitive Edward J. Snowden from finding refuge in Latin America. Three left-leaning governments that make defying Washington a hallmark of their foreign policies had vowed to take him in.

The CFR took over the State Department in 1945 and have run it ever since. The CFR are the Military Industrial Complex. The CFR can use information gathered by the NSA for CFR corporate member profit. Snowden’s whistle blowing was a major headache to the CFR members, CFR corporate members and the CFR run intelligence community.

CFR members involved in going after Snowden included Susan Rice the 18th Council on Foreign Relations NSA director, David Petraeus the 18th CFR CIA director, Janet Napolitano the 1st CFR DHS director, John Kerry the 22nd CFR Secretary of State. The CFR run Carlyle group owns Booz-Allen the spy company Snowden worked for.  CFR member Bill Richardson, a former American ambassador to the United Nations who visited Venezuela in 2013 backed Kerry up.

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CFR corporate members have bought both houses of congress through legalized bribery we call lobbying. A grand jury should be convened to investigate the Council on Foreign Relations for crimes against humanity as well as other fraudulent acts committed by Council on Foreign Relations Bank and Wall Street CEOs. http://t.co/l9mCMzShttp://www.scribd.com/doc/91528610/Council-on-Foreign-Relations-Chart

CFR members in the NSA can spy on target and kill American citizens. President Obama was surrounded by CFR members and is little more than a CFR puppet, every president since Wilson has been. President Trump is also surrounding himself with CFR members. Trump’s new National Security advisor is CFR member H.R. Macmaster. Macmaster was one of Obama’s CFR devils in the details of endless war.

The article that follows was printed in the ACM journal Communications. It contains a discussion of what Snowden did and what the NSA could have done to prevent it. The constitutionality and morality aspects of the NSA’s spying on all Americans is what Snowden was trying to draw attention. Following the article is a section that explores the NSA’s spying and how it violates the 4th Amendment of the constitution. Read it carefully. Snowden is a hero.

Franklin liberty Obama

The NSA and Snowden: Securing the All-Seeing Eye

By Bob Toxen
Communications of the ACM, Vol. 57 No. 5, Pages 44-51
10.1145/2594502
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snowden ACM photo

 

Edward Snowden, while a contractor for the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) at Booz Allen Hamilton in Hawaii, copied up to 1.7 million top-secret and above documents, smuggling copies on a thumb drive out of the secure facility in which he worked and releasing many of those documents to the press.2This has altered the relationship of the U.S. government with the American people, as well as with other countries. This article examines the computer-security aspects of how the NSA could have prevented this from happening, perhaps the most damaging breach of secrets in U.S. history.19 The accompanying sidebar looks at the Constitutional, legal, and moral issues.

According to Presidential Executive Order 13526, ” ‘Top Secret’ shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.”24 There are clearance levels above top secret, such as SCI (sensitive compartmented information), SAP (special access programs), and CNWDI (critical nuclear weapon design information).9 The British equivalent to top secret is most secret.

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What Did Snowden Do?

Snowden was a computer system administrator. Guarding against rogue system administrators (a.k.a sys admins) is more difficult than guarding against users, but it can be done. Note that the NSA has an almost infinite budget and resources, and thus could have been following good security practices all along. In the words of White House cybersecurity adviser Richard Clarke, “If you spend more on coffee than on IT security, you will be hacked. What’s more, you deserve to be hacked.”20

National Public Radio’s “All Things Considered” last December 17 stated the stolen documents were on Microsoft’s SharePoint document-management system. Of the 1.7 million documents likely copied, Snowden shared up to 200,000 documents with reporters; the NSA did not dispute this.2,19 Rick Ledgett, head of the NSA’s task force accessing the “damage” done by Snowden, claimed “system administrators…have passwords that give them the ability to go around those… security measures, and that’s what Snowden did.”19

That the NSA’s Ledgett claims to be unaware of the past 30 years of computer-security techniques and technology for preventing a system administrator from stealing data is puzzling.10,15,29 This is discussed later in the section “Orange Book and Two-Person Authorization.” The NSA no longer uses SharePoint for this purpose, which begs the question, why did the NSA abandon secure Orange Book compliance and other good security practices for computer systems that handle classified data?

In an interview with CBS’s “60 Minutes,” on December 15, 2013 General Keith B. Alexander, director of the NSA, admitted that part of Snowden’s job was to transfer large amounts of classified data between NSA computer systems.19 Snowden then copied files to a USB memory stick and concealed it on his person to smuggle vast amounts of data out of the NSA.11,26 A simple one-minute scan on the way out by a handheld metal detector—”wanding,” as used by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and at courthouses—would have found any flash memory device.

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Rings of Security

Let’s digress briefly to discuss the important concept of rings of security, my term for the industry-standard but less obvious term security in depth. This means having multiple concentric rings of security so that if attackers get through the first or outermost ring they encounter, then, hopefully, the second or third or fourth ring will stop them; no one security measure is 100% effective. These rings mostly are about authentication and are unrelated to what a user is allowed to do once authenticated. Consider how rings of security might apply to an ordinary network; this “ordinary” level of security is insufficient where very high security is needed such as the NSA, banks, systems handling large numbers of Social Security or credit-card numbers, among others.

There are a number of security methods the NSA could have used that would have stopped Snowden. Many of these have been in use for a decade or more, yet the NSA did not use them.

Suppose we want to have a network in which sys admins are able to SSH (Secure Shell) into a server from home. In the first ring the firewall might allow SSH access only from a short list of IP addresses of the sys admins’ home systems. Thus, instead of being able to attack from any of a billion systems on the Internet someone would have to launch her attack from one of, perhaps, a dozen system administrators’ home networks, a vastly reduced vulnerability profile. Modern TCP/IP implementations, used by SSH, are very immune to IP spoofing. When combined with end-to-end encryption person-in-the-middle attacks are virtually eliminated.

The second ring might allow SSH authentication only via public/private keys on these home Linux or Unix systems. Prohibiting SSH from accepting passwords prevents password-guessing risks and thus access from unauthorized systems. The third ring would monitor log files for attacks and block those IPs, preferably automatically. The fourth ring would be a strong passphrase on that SSH private key. A fifth ring could require sys admins’ home systems (and, of course, all systems at the office) to lock the screen after a few minutes of inactivity.

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Stopping Snowden

There are a number of security methods the NSA could have used that would have stopped Snowden. Many of these have been in use for a decade or more, yet the NSA did not use them.

Islands of Security. The obvious place to start in this case is with preventing sys admins or others from getting into unauthorized systems. The islands-of-security concept is a safeguard in case someone manages to penetrate the network. In a high-security organization, different segments, even different systems, should be treated as islands of security that do not trust each other or the network in the vast ocean of systems. This means different systems should have different root passwords, different user passwords, different SSH passphrases, and almost all traffic between systems should be encrypted. Systems should have encrypted file systems and encrypted backups.

Physical Security. Each island of security should be physically protected against attack. This certainly would include the systems and peripherals and the network carrying any unencrypted confidential data. Even large commercial collocation facilities have steel cages around some systems and video cameras watching these areas. The payment card industry (PCI) security standard requires such protection for large credit-card processors. High-security operations should install video cameras and keep the recordings for a long time.

One simple safeguard is to put two high-security locks on each cage, each lock needing a different key possessed by a different person. Thus, two people must be present when the hardware is accessed. Similarly, networking cables could be secured (for example, inside of steel pipe), or the data encrypted before sending it around the LAN or WAN. There is no indication that Snowden took advantage of any lack of physical security, although it is critical for protection.

Prevent Unauthorized Copying. The ability to plug in a USB memory stick or insert a blank DVD for writing should be disabled. Most DVD burners and USB jacks should be removed as well. Cameras, recorders, mobile phones, and any other unauthorized storage devices should be forbidden and guarded against. Metal detectors at doors would detect violators. Radio frequency (RF) emissions should be monitored, and Faraday cages could be incorporated to block RF emissions. None of these techniques is expensive.

Two-Factor Authentication. Even Snowden’s top-secret clearance was not sufficient to allow him access to some of the documents he stole. The NSA admitted that Snowden used the higher-than-top-secret clearances of the user accounts of some top NSA officials. This was possible because he had created these accounts or used his sys admin privileges to modify the accounts to access even more highly classified documents remotely using NSAnet, the NSA’s classified intranet.13 Snowden’s access to accounts with higher security clearance than his violated the long-accepted security policy that the system should prevent anyone from accessing data with a higher clearance than the user’s. It would have been a trivial matter for the computer to prevent this and instead require the services of a system administrator with that higher clearance level to adjust those accounts as needed.

This also violated the concept of two-factor authentication. Authentication is the ability of a computer (or security guard or even a store clerk) to determine if you really are who you claim to be. Typically, an authentication method consists of what you know (password or PIN), what you have (credit card or RFID-equipped badge issued to employees and consultants or USB dongle), or what you are (your signature or fingerprint or retina scan or your picture on a hard-to-forge document such as a driver’s license, employee badge, or passport). Each of these is called a factor. None of these methods is expensive, and all are effective. While fingerprints can be faked with some effort, this is more difficult with modern high-quality fingerprint readers, which are available commercially.

Many organizations use the very popular two-factor authentication to grant access to computers or facilities or money, requiring, for example, that one does not get access without providing a password or an RFID-equipped badge and a fingerprint. Three-factor authentication would be even better.

Had the NSA required good two-factor authentication, such as a fingerprint and password compared against central databases to which Snowden did not have administrative access, it would have prevented him from impersonating others to use their accounts—which is how he obtained documents above his security clearance. Collecting these factors for the databases would be done by two different sets of people, neither being the set that manages classified documents as Snowden did. This separation of authority is critical for good security as it requires multiple people to effect a compromise.

Even if the person managing users’ passwords went rogue, she would not have access to the fingerprint database. The password manager could be prevented from seeing the user entering his password by having the user enter a separate inner room via a one-person mantrap to which the person managing password changes does not have access. That room would have a virtual keyboard on a physically hardened touchscreen, making rogue use of a keystroke logger difficult. Lack of space here does not allow discussion of deeper exploits such as spoofing fingerprints, guarding against keyloggers, TEMPEST (the NSA’s own set of security standards for radio frequency leakage of information), social engineering, and more.

Social engineering is where an attacker tricks someone into revealing information that he should not reveal. Email messages falsely claiming to be from your bank asking you to click on a link and provide your password or offering to share stolen money with you are examples. Snowden used social engineering to obtain the password of at least one NSA employee who subsequently resigned; it has been addressed extensively in other papers and books. Good recurrent education and strict policy forbidding sharing one’s passwords, badge, or dongle under any circumstance might have prevented this part of Snowden’s breach.

Orange Book and Two-Person Authorization. Someone is less likely to do something dishonest if someone else is watching. This is why many stores have at least two people working and why armored car services use two people. It also is why you see “Two signatures required for amounts over $5,000” at the bottom of some checks.

The NSA created the Orange Book specification for Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria 30 years ago, requiring the federal government and contractors to use it for computers handling data with multiple levels of security classification. This author enhanced one Orange Book-compliant Unix system to have additional security capabilities. Such a computer would prevent, say, a user with only secret clearance from viewing a top-secret document. One also could create different “compartments” in which to keep separate sets of documents. Only someone allowed access to a particular named compartment could access documents in that compartment, even if that person otherwise has sufficient security clearance.

This high-security clearance is known as “compartmentalized security” (a.k.a. “need to know”). An important aspect of protecting a body of secrets is that very few people should have access to more than a small portion of them. A person working with one critical compartment should be barred from accessing other critical compartments. Those that know many of the secrets, such as General Alexander, get constant Secret Service protection.

One compartment might be “spying on Americans’ phone records without a valid warrant.” Another might be “listening to Americans’ domestic phone conversations and reading email without a valid warrant.”3,12,17,22 A third might be “hacking the phones of leaders of allied countries.” As Snowden should not have been involved in any of those projects and thus should lack sufficient clearance, he would not have been able to access those programs’ documents or even know that they existed. In reality, however, the NSA allowed one person, Snowden, unfettered, unmonitored access to 1.7 million documents.

Also important is the Orange Book concept of not trusting any one system administrator. Instead, a role-1 sys admin queues system changes, such as new accounts or changes to an existing accounts. A second person, in role 2, cannot initiate such requests but must approve the queued requests before they can take effect. An Orange Book OS also prevents use of a login simulator by displaying a special symbol when soliciting a password that no other program can display. Snowden may have used a login simulator.

How expensive might this two-person authorization have been? In 2013, the NSA had approximately 40,000 employees and perhaps 40,000 contractors, including 1,000 system admins.8,25 Adding another 1,000 system administrators to watch the first set would have increased the payroll by a trivial 1%.

Given this, is the NSA going to adopt two-person authorization and the Orange Book policy that it created? No, the NSA is going to fire 90% of its system administrators to limit human access and put most of the servers in the NSA’s own cloud.1 A cloud is just another name for a set of computers remotely accessible over a network and typically managed by others, usually a vendor (a.k.a., contractor). Maybe it will hire Booz Allen, Snowden’s former employer, to manage this cloud.

Log Events and Monitor. The NSA should monitor how many documents one accesses and at what rate, and then detect and limit this. It is astonishing, both with the NSA’s breach and similar huge thefts of data such as Target’s late-2013 loss of data for 40 million credit cards (including mine), that nobody noticed and did anything. Decent real-time monitoring and automated response to events would have detected both events early on and could have prevented most of each breach.

The open source Logcheck and Log-watch programs will generate alerts of abnormal events in near real time, and the Fail2Ban program will lock out the attacker. All are free and easily can be customized to detect excessive quantities of downloads of documents. There are many comparable commercial applications, and the NSA certainly has the budget to create its own.

No Internet Access or Homework Whatsoever. Obvious, this policy is to prevent classified data from leaving a secure building. For after-hours problems, a sys admin either must drive to the office or be on-site at all times. One former CIA director nearly was fired for taking classified data home to work on, violating a strict policy against it. (He was not stealing the data; he just wanted to work at home.) Snowden took classified material home and worked on it with a hood covering him and the computer so that his girlfriend could not see it.19 Clearly, then, he could have photographed the screen.

Prevent Removable Media from Leaving the Building. Recall the rings of security. One ring would prevent removable media from leaving the building. Every gas-station owner has figured this out, attaching a large object to each restroom key. The NSA could put each thumb drive inside a large steel box, or it could replace the standard USB connectors and those of the computers with custom-designed connectors that are difficult to duplicate.

Creatively Use Encryption. Consider that one of Snowden’s jobs was copying large amounts of classified data from one computer to a thumb drive and then connecting that thumb drive to another computer and downloading the data. He likely secreted the thumb drive on his person after downloading the data he wanted and took it home. This theft could have been prevented rather easily with the use of public-key encryption.33In public-key encryption there are two related keys: a public key and a secret key, also called a private key. If the original “clear text” is encrypted with the public key, then it can be decrypted only with the secret key, not with the public key used to encrypt the data.

The NSA should have had a public/secret-key pair created for each sys admin needing to transfer data and a separate account on each computer for each sys admin to transfer this data. The person generating this encrypted data on the source computer (for example, Snowden) would have to provide the ID of the public key of a different sys admin—say, Julia—to the custom program allowed to write to the USB thumb drive; software would not allow his own public key to be used. The set of sys admins allowed to do transfers of data would have no members in common with the set of sys admins on the source and destination computers with root access. In other words, a “Data Transfer System Administrator” such as Snowden would not have root or physical access to computers and sys admins having root or physical access would be prohibited from transferring data between systems. This separation of responsibilities is critical. Only that custom program, not sys admins, would be allowed to write to the thumb drive. That computer would encrypt the data with Julia’s public key and write that encrypted data to the thumb drive.

Snowden then would download the encrypted data to the destination computer via the thumb drive using a custom program on the destination computer (with that program having sole access to the USB drive) after he had logged into his account. That program would prompt Snowden for the account in which to transfer that encrypted data to (for example, Julia’s), and then move the encrypted file to her account. Julia would log in to the destination computer and provide the passphrase that unlocks her encrypted secret key and her fingerprint or RFID-equipped badge to that custom program, which then would decrypt that data into Julia’s account. After that, she could move the data to the final location on the destination computer. The implementation is trivial.

An outside security audit performed quarterly or annually would have found the NSA’s problems and, perhaps, fixed them in time to stop Snowden.

Needless to say, the sys admins tasked with this data transfer would not have the root (administrative) access to these computers that would allow getting around this custom program’s restrictions, and these computers would be running modern versions of Orange Book-compliant operating systems that would require two system administrators for privileged access in any case. Furthermore, Snowden would not have Julia’s fingerprint or passphrase or, if used, her badge for authentication. The open source GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) stores private keys on disk or elsewhere in an encrypted form that can be decrypted only by providing a passphrase or other authentication.15

Thus, no sys admin acting alone could decrypt data that he or she encrypted to a thumb drive. This would have prevented Snowden’s theft by thumb drive. These custom programs (which would run on the source and destination computers) could be written in a day or two using the open source GPG encryption program by a substantial percentage of those reading this article. Thus, even if a USB drive was smuggled out of a secure NSA facility, it would have no value.

Similarly, there could be an additional ring of file-level encryption for highly classified files with separate public/secret key pairs. Only those users entitled to read these documents (and not even sys admins tasked with copying files) would have the secret keys to decrypt them. Those using the destination system (after legitimate copying by Snowden and Julia) would be able to decrypt the files. The system administrator, however, never would have seen the decrypted documents even by reading the raw disk. By itself, this simple precaution would have prevented the wholesale theft of many documents by Snowden. Combined with the use of public-key encryption for transferring data between systems, Snowden would have had to defeat two extremely challenging rings of security to steal data. Using encrypted file systems or whole-disk encryption on all computers handling classified data would offer an additional ring of security.

Plan for Break-in to Minimize Damage. The NSA’s Ledgett acknowledges, “We also learned for the first time that part of the damage assessment considered the possibility that Snowden could have left a bug or virus behind on the NSA’s system[s], like a time bomb.”19 The agency should have planned for a possible break-in to minimize the harm and quickly and reliably assess the damage. For example, it could be prepared to compare a system’s current state with a trusted backup taken before the break-in. This comparison could be run on a different and trusted system.29 The use of islands of security and not putting all of its eggs in one basket would have minimized the damage greatly. It could have been running a file-system integrity checker all along to detect tampering with files.

Periodic Security Audits. Security is an ongoing process. An outside security audit performed quarterly or annually would have found the NSA’s problems and, perhaps, fixed them in time to stop Snowden. Such an audit is quite common and considered good practice. This is similar to the outside financial audit of large companies required by… the U.S. government. The report should be reviewed by the highest levels of management to avoid lower levels simply ignoring inconvenient findings.

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Summary

The NSA seemingly had become lax in utilizing even the most important, simple, and cheap good computer-security practices with predictable consequences, even though it has virtually unlimited resources and access—if it wants it—to the best computer-security experts in the country.

Most of the good security practices covered here were discussed in the author’s Real World Linux Security first published in 2000.29 The most important of these security practices also were discussed in this author’s article, “The Seven Deadly Sins of Linux Security,” published in the May/June 2007 issue of ACM Queue.

I am honored there are autographed copies of my book in the NSA’s headquarters. The vast majority of NSA employees and contractors are eminently talented law-abiding dedicated patriots. It is unfortunate that a tiny percentage no doubt ignored warnings that these security problems desperately needed fixing to avoid a serious breach.

Related articles
on queue.acm.org

Communications Surveillance: Privacy and Security at Risk
Whitfield Diffie and Susan Landau
http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=1613130

More Encryption Is Not the Solution
Poul-Henning Kamp
http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2508864

Four Billion Little Brothers?: Privacy, mobile phones, and ubiquitous data collection
Katie Shilton
http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=1597790

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References

  1. Allen, J. NSA to cut system administrators by 90 percent to limit data access. Reuters. Aug. 9, 2013; http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/09/us-usa-security-nsa-leaks-idUSBRE97801020130809.
  2. Block, M. Snowden’s document leaks shocked the NSA, and more may be on the way. National Public Radio. Dec. 17, 2013; http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=252006951.
  3. Brosnahan, J. and West, T. Brief of Amicus Curiae Mark Klein. May 4, 2006; https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/kleinamicus.pdf.
  4. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969).
  5. Cohn, C. and Higgins, P. Rating Obama’s NSA reform plan: EFF scorecard explained. Electronic Frontier Foundation, Jan. 17, 2014; https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/01/rating-obamas-nsa-reform-plan-eff-scorecard-explained.
  6. Coke’s Reports 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1604).
  7. Davidson, A. Judge Pauley to the N.S.A.: Go Big. The New Yorker. Dec. 28, 2013; http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/closeread/2013/12/judge-pauley-to-the-nsa-go-big.html.
  8. Davidson, J. NSA to cut 90 percent of systems administrators. Washington Post. Aug. 13, 2013; http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2013/08/13/nsa-to-cut-90-percent-of-systems-administrators/.
  9. Defense Logistics Agency. Critical nuclear weapon design information access certificate; http://www.dla.mil/dss/forms/fillables/DL1710.pdf.
  10. Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, a.k.a., Orange Book 1985; http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/history/dod85.pdf.
  11. Dilanian, K. Officials: Edward Snowden took NSA secrets on thumb drive. Los Angeles Times. June 13, 2013; http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/13/news/la-pn-snowden-nsa-secrets-thumb-drive-20130613.
  12. Electronic Frontier Foundation (eff.org). NSA spying video, includes comments from many well-known respected people and reminders of past violations; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aGmiw_rrNxk.
  13. Esposito, R. Snowden impersonated NSA officials, sources say. NBC News. Aug. 28, 2013; http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/08/28/20234171-snowden-impersonated-nsa-officials-sources-say?lite.
  14. Everett, B. and Min Kim, S. Lawmakers praise, pan President Obama’s NSA plan. Politico. Jan. 17, 2014; http://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/rand-paul-response-nsa-speech-102319.html.
  15. GNU Privacy Guard; http://www.gnupg.org.
  16. Howell’s State Trials 1029, 95 Eng. 807 (1705).
  17. Klein, M. and Bamford, J. Wiring Up the Big Brother Machine…and Fighting It. Booksurge Publishing, 2009.
  18. Legal Information Institute, Cornell University Law School. Fourth Amendment: an overview; http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fourth_amendment.
  19. Miller, J. CBS News “60 Minutes.” Dec. 15, 2013; http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nsa-speaks-out-on-snowden-spying/.
  20. Lemos, R. Security guru: Let’s secure the Net. ZDnet, 2002; http://www.zdnet.com/news/security-guru-lets-secure-the-net/120859.
  21. Mears, B. and Perez, E. Judge: NSA domestic phone data-mining unconstitutional. CNN. Dec. 17, 2013; http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/16/justice/nsa-surveillance-court-ruling/.
  22. Nakashima, E. A story of surveillance. Washington Post. Nov 7, 2007; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/07/AR2007110700006.html.
  23. Napolitano, A.P. A presidential placebo – Obama’s massive NSA spying program still alive and well. Fox News. Jan. 23, 2014; http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2014/01/23/presidential-placebo-obama-massive-nsa-spying-program-still-alive-and-well/.
  24. Presidential Executive Order 13526 12/29/2009; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-classified-national-security-information.
  25. Rosenbach, M. Prism exposed: Data surveillance with global implications. Spiegel Online International. June 10, 2013: 2; http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/prism-leak-inside-the-controversial-us-data-surveillance-program-a-904761.html.
  26. Schwartz, M. Thumb drive security: Snowden 1, NSA 0. InformationWeek. June 14, 2013; http://www.informationweek.com/infrastructure/storage/thumb-drive-security-snowden-1-nsa-0/d/d-id/1110380.
  27. Shiffman, J., Cooke, K. Exclusive: U.S. directs agents to cover up program used to investigate Americans. Reuters. Aug. 05, 2013; http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/05/us-dea-sod-idUSBRE97409R20130805.
  28. Smith, C. BGR. Jan. 23, 2014; http://news.yahoo.com/watchdog-says-nsa-phone-spying-program-illegal-end-130014396.html.
  29. Toxen, B. Real-world Linux Security: Intrusion Detection, Prevention, and Recovery. 2nd Edition. Prentice Hall, 2002.
  30. U. S. Courts. What does the Fourth Amendment mean?; http://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/get-involved/constitution-activities/fourth-amendment/fourth-amendment-mean.aspx.
  31. U.S. Government Printing Office. Fourth Amendment; http://beta.congress.gov/content/conan/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2013-10-5.pdf.
  32. Washington Post. Transcript of President Obama’s Jan. 17 speech on NSA reforms, 2014; http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of-president-obamas-jan-17-speech-on-nsa-reforms/2014/01/17/fa33590a-7f8c-11e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html.
  33. Wikipedia. Public-key cryptography; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography
  34. Wikipedia. Edward Snowden; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Snowden#NSA_rulings_in_federal_court.

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Author

Bob Toxen (bob@VerySecureLinux.com) is chief technical officer at Horizon Network Security, which specializes in Linux and network security. He was one of the developers of Berkeley Unix.

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Another critical aspect of the NSA’s spying on all Americans is the constitutionality and morality, which is what Snowden was trying to draw attention to—and succeeded in a big way. The Constitution’s Fourth Amendment says this:

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

Why did the framers of the Constitution care, and why should we care? In short, because when enforced by honest and competent judges, the Fourth Amendment prevents serious abuse by government officials against innocent people, including intrusion into their private matters. In colonial America, Britain’s King George empowered officials to conduct mass searches of houses, persons, their effects, and so on without a warrant or probable cause, despite the English Court’s Saman’s Case of 1603, which recognized the right of the homeowner to defend his house against unlawful entry even by the king’s agents in the absence of a specific warrant based on probable cause.6,31 This is the meaning behind “Every man’s house is his castle.” (One of the most powerful expressions of that maxim came from William Pitt speaking to Parliament in 1763, “The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the crown. It may be frail… but the King of England cannot enter—all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.”)

It was confirmed again in England in 1705 in Entick v. Carrington. The English court decided that a general warrant that caused the raiding of many homes—including Entick’s, which the king’s men broke into and whose locked desks and boxes were broken into as well, with the seizure of many documents unrelated to what was being searched for—was against English law. The court held the warrant used against Entick was too general, not based on probable cause, and allowed the seizing of unrelated material; and, further, no record was made of what was seized. Take note the court case was initiated by Entick suing the crown.16,31 Is not one’s computer and phone the modern equivalent of a locked desk? Electronics certainly qualify as personal belongings, which is how the Oxford English Dictionary defines effects. One’s effects are protected by the Fourth Amendment.

On December 28, 2013, U.S. Judge William H. Pauley III held that an American may not file suit against the NSA for spying on Americans. Specifically, he dismissed a lawsuit by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), saying, “The ACLU would never have learned about the section 215 order authorizing collection of telephone metadata related to its telephone numbers but for the unauthorized disclosures of Edward Snowden.”7,34 Section 215 of the Patriot Act requires that this spying on Americans be kept secret forever.

Pauley’s ruling says an American may not challenge the constitutionality of a government action because the American found out about it only through the illegal action of another. That ruling sounds more like the former Soviet Union to the author. It also is contrary to more than 200 years of U.S. Constitutional law precedent, which holds a person, regardless of citizenship, always is entitled to all Constitutional rights and always may challenge a violation. The only government defense is that no violation took place.

A 1969 U.S. court ruling found “the [Fourth] Amendment was in large part a reaction to the general warrants and warrantless searches that had so alienated the colonists and had helped speed the movement for independence [e.g., the American Revolution]. In the scheme of the Amendment, therefore, the requirement that ‘no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause’ plays a crucial part.”4,31 More similar U.S. court rulings can be found with little effort. In short, a reasonable search without a warrant requires probable cause, meaning a good reason to believe that someone possesses something illegal or evidence of a crime.

According to the judicial branch of the U.S. government, “Whether a particular type of search is considered reasonable in the eyes of the law is determined by balancing two important interests. On one side of the scale is the intrusion on an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. On the other side of the scale are legitimate government interests, such as public safety.”30 “Yet, the parameters of the Fourth Amendment do not cease in the realm of searching electronic devices.”18

President Obama’s own independent Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) says the NSA’s phone-spying program is illegal and should end, The Washington Post revealed. “We have not identified a single instance involving a threat to the United States in which the telephone records program made a concrete difference in the outcome of a counterterrorism investigation,” the 238-page report says.

PCLOB’s report also says the NSA phone data program cannot be grounded in section 215 of The Patriot Act, which “requires that records sought by the government [e.g., phone numbers] be relevant to an authorized investigation.”28 Seizing all phone records of all Americans “just in case” clearly is not reasonable by any possible interpretation of the Constitution.

On December 16, 2013, U.S. Federal Judge Richard J. Leon ruled that bulk collection of telephone metadata of American telephone companies likely violates the U.S. Constitution. The judge wrote, “I cannot imagine a more ‘indiscriminate’ and ‘arbitrary’ invasion than this systematic and high-tech collection and retention of personal data on virtually every single citizen for purposes of querying and analyzing it without prior judicial approval… Surely, such a program infringes on ‘that degree of privacy’ that the founders enshrined in the Fourth Amendment.” Leon said the government “does not cite a single instance in which… the NSA’s bulk metadata collection actually stopped an imminent attack, or otherwise aided the government…”21

Recently my friend Josh asked me about the NSA’s spying on Americans, adding, “Well, if it helps to catch terrorists, I don’t mind them spying on me.” I pointed out that in sworn testimony before Congress, General Keith B. Alexander, director of the NSA, admitted that not a single American life has been saved from the NSA’s deliberate spying on 300 million Americans. I asked him what he thought about some NSA analyst listening in on a romantic conversation with his wife. He did not seem so happy about it now.

Josh has a young daughter, so I asked, “What if in a few years as a 16-year-old, your daughter phones you saying, ‘Daddy, I’m at a friend’s. Could you come get me? I’ve been drinking and I’m not safe to drive. I’m really sorry.’ ” How would Josh like it if the NSA listened to that conversation and provided the local police with his daughter’s location using the phone’s GPS and a transcript of that private phone conversation, and the police then arrested his daughter for underage drinking? Josh got real unhappy at this point. Are you trying to keep your sexual orientation or interests private? How about your religious beliefs or even whom you voted for in the Presidential election? What about that stock tip or patent idea? Is it the government’s business to know whom you are telephoning?

Yes, the NSA really is listening to your domestic phone calls and reading your email in addition to obtaining your private information on the people you telephone.3,12,17,22 Reuters reported on August 5, 2013, that the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) admitted to covering up the use of information illegally obtained from the NSA and falsifying the source of evidence. This included information obtained by the NSA from intelligence intercepts, wiretaps, informants, and a massive database of telephone records, all without benefit of a proper warrant or probable cause. The DEA then gave this information to authorities across the nation to help them launch criminal investigations of Americans.27 Clearly this is exactly what the Fourth Amendment was intended to prevent. Is it the government’s place to be doing this?

Judge Andrew P. Napolitano, the youngest person ever to serve on the New Jersey Superior Court, called President Obama’s promised NSA reforms, announced January 17, 2014, a presidential placebo.23,32 The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) rated the President’s reforms 3.5 out of 12.5 (The EFF is a nonprofit organization dedicated to fighting for people’s rights in the electronic world and is, perhaps, the most active organization to fight in the courts and elsewhere against the NSA’s spying on Americans.) Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY.) argued that Obama’s suggested changes will amount to “the same unconstitutional program with a new configuration.”14 Many of these actions by the NSA were started under the second Bush Administration following 9/11. Is the NSA’s spying on all Americans an unconstitutional and illegal violation of the Constitution’s Fourth Amendment? Given the 400 years of history we have examined, this author can see only one conclusion.

Copyright held by Owner/Author.

The Digital Library is published by the Association for Computing Machinery. Copyright © 2014 ACM, Inc.

Comments

Ajoy Bhatia

May 27, 2014 09:51

Just goes to show that sometimes, some entity not following good security practices can be good for the people.

Harry Moore

July 01, 2014 04:04

There are a couple of corrections needed in the opening section.
1. There are no clearance levels above Top Secret. SCI and SAP are not clearance levels but special programs with access restrictions. CNWDI is category of classified restricted data.
2. THE UKs equivalent to US Top Secret is Top Secret as well. The old term of most secret was replaced on April 2, 2014 by the revision of HM Government Security Classifications Guide.
I have not read the entire article so I am not sure if there are any other mistakes.

Raju K

December 09, 2014 03:05

Secureness is undisturbed as long as everyone refrains from doing what they are not supposed to do. The moment someone deviates from this principle, what we have is a system that has been compromised. Snowden’s actions led to an insecure environment as he did what he was not supposed to do. However, security consciousness should not be tied to people and their practices. If a piece of software or hardware cannot be refrained from doing things it is not supposed to do, then too, we have a compromised system. How do we ensure that software or hardware components are not indulging in activities that they are not supposed to do ? It is here that accessibility to software sources and accessibility to hardware design details play a crucial role in ensuring a secure environment. With proprietary binary-only software or with a proprietary closed-design hardware, therefore, we can never guarantee a fool-proof secure environment to users. It is here that Snowden-exposed documents become significant – these documents go on to elaborate on how proprietary software binaries could be tweaked for doing insecure or even unlawful things. Without Snowden, such a possibility for committing security breaches would have remained invalidated for long.

CACM Administrator

February 03, 2015 03:53

The following letter was published in the Letters to the Editor of the July 2014 CACM (http://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2014/7/176205).
–CACM Administrator

I wish reality were as simple as Bob Toxen made it out to be in his article “The NSA and Snowden: Securing the All-Seeing Eye” (May 2014) where he said, “A simple one-minute scan on the way out by a handheld metal detector — ‘wanding,’ as used by the Transportation Security Administration and at courthouses — would have found any flash memory device.” However, flash devices have shrunk to minuscule size, even as their capacity has increased dramatically. Consider the micro-SD flash storage device in a typical smartphone; it can store more than 32GB and be small enough to be hidden practically anywhere. Moreover, its small mass makes detection especially difficult for a typical handheld metal detector. A spy could even attach one with chewing gum to a tooth, defeating practically any routine check.

So the real problem in the case of Edward J. Snowden is not that Snowden carried a flash memory device in and out of National Security Agency facilities but that he was able to transfer sensitive data to the device in the first place.

In most secure environments, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to attach an external device to a secure system. If it could be done, the system would no longer be secure, as the device would be able to transfer malware to, as well as steal data from, the secure system.

In 2008, an infected USB flash drive was famously connected to a military laptop. The malicious code uploaded itself to a secure network under the control of U.S. Central Command. This incident should have alerted the NSA to the dangers inherent in the use of removable memory devices. Moreover, the Stuxnet affair, two years later, demonstrated that U.S. security services were clearly aware that removable memory devices are potential attack vectors. The NSA should have anticipated these risks and taken necessary measures well in advance of Snowden’s leaks.

The reason for the apparent indifference to such risks is that insider attacks are particularly difficult to address. The esprit-de-corps culture prevalent in the NSA made it essentially unthinkable that one in their midst could betray the organization, and is why Snowden was able, apparently, to convince coworkers to grant him additional access.

Security is an overhead; by controlling access, security makes it inherently difficult for people to carry out their work, so a compromise between utility and security must be established. In the Snowden case, though the compromise went too far toward utility, it would be a mistake to go to the other extreme by imposing security procedures that impede the NSA’s useful work.

Vassilis Prevelakis
Braunschweig, Germany

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

Wanding would have caught a USB memory stick due to the metal in its plug. No security ring is perfect. Defeating the rings involving encryption, physical access to systems, and software limiting the number of documents one may access would be extremely difficult. I demonstrated that stopping even system administrator insider attacks can be done reasonably easily. The reason Prevelakis claimed for NSA “indifference” is unsubstantiated. Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, and other convicted American traitors should have convinced the NSA (and the CIA) to avoid unlimited trust. (I do not consider Snowden a traitor, as he was alerting Americans to the apparently unconstitutional and illegal actions of the government.)

Bob Toxen
Duluth, GA

CACM Administrator

February 03, 2015 03:54

The following letter was published in the Letters to the Editor of the July 2014 CACM (http://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2014/7/176205).
–CACM Administrator

I was disturbed by the cover headline — “The NSA and Snowden: How better security measures could have stopped the leak” — publicizing Bob Toxen’s article (May 2014) for implying that Snowden simply produced “leaks” that should have been “stopped.” Moreover, I found it odd that the article focused on how the NSA’s poor security allowed these leaks to take place. It would have been more appropriate to acknowledge the alternative interpretation, that Snowden’s revelations brought to light abhorrent violations of privacy on the part of the U.S. and U.K. governments. After all, the constitutionality of the NSA’s spying was critiqued in the article’s sidebar. Why not follow through to address the apparent contradiction between “good security practices” and the supposed “transparency” of agencies with the power to tap all our communications (including this one)?

William Gaver
London U.K.

 

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Council on Foreign Relations inner circle member Zbigniew Brzezinksi joins CFR David Rockefeller’s New UnderWorld Order

CFR Ben Garrison Rockefeller CFR

In Zbigniew Brzezinski’s NYT obituary Daniel Lews May writes:

Into his 80s Mr. Brzezinski was still fully active as a teacher, author and consultant: a professor of foreign policy at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and a frequent expert commentator on PBS and ABC News.

Missing from Mr. May’s summary is any connection of Mr. Brzezinski and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).

With meticulous detail and an abundance of original research, Patrick M. Wood uses Technocracy Rising to connect the dots of modern globalization. Wood’s maintains that dark horse of the New World Order is not Communism, Socialism or Fascism. It is Technocracy.

In the heat of the Great Depression during the 1930s, prominent scientists and engineers proposed a Utopian energy-based economic system called Technocracy. The technocracy movement was founded by Howard Scott . The term technocracy came to mean, ‘government by technical decision making’, using an energy metric of value. Scott proposed that money be replaced by energy certificates denominated in units such as ergs or joules, equivalent in total amount to an appropriate national net energy budget, and then distributed equally among the North American population, according to resource availability. This radical movement lost momentum by 1940,

In his 1970 piece Between Two Ages: America’s Role in the Technetronic Era, CFR member Brzezinski argued that a coordinated policy among developed nations was necessary to counter global instability. Out of this thesis, CFR member Brzezinski co-founded the Trilateral Commission with CFR member David Rockefeller, serving as director from 1973 to 1976. Technocracy regained its status when it was conceptually adopted by the elitist Trilateral Commission. However equal distribution of the energy budget disappeared and was replaced by people earning energy certificates by the sweat of their brow.

The Trilateral Commission is a group of prominent political and business leaders and academics primarily from the United States, Western Europe and Japan. The majority of U.S. Trilateral members are also members of the CFR. The purpose of the Trilateral Commission was to strengthen relations among the elites of the three most industrially advanced regions of the capitalist world. In 1974, CFR member Brzezinski selected Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter as a member of the Trilateral commission and the CFR.

In the ensuing 41 years, the modern expression of Technocracy and the New International Economic Order is clearly seen in global programs such as Agenda 21, Sustainable Development,  Green Economy, Councils of Governments, Smart Growth, Smart Grid, Total Awareness surveillance initiatives and more.

Wood contends that the only logical outcome of Technocracy is Scientific Dictatorship, as already seen in dystopian literature such as Brave New World by Aldous Huxley (1932) and Nineteen Eighty-Four by George Orwell (1948), both of whom looked straight into the face of Technocracy when it was still in its infancy.

In Between Two Ages CFR member Brzezinski writes :

“The technotronic era involves the gradual appearance of a more controlled society. Such a society would be dominated by an elite, unrestrained by traditional values. Soon it will be possible to assert almost continuous surveillance over every citizen and maintain up-to-date complete files containing even the most personal information about the citizen. These files will be subject to instantaneous retrieval by the authorities. ”

 Daniel Lewis May’s Obituary follows. It’s updated to include Brzezinski’s ties to the Council on Foreign Relations. Is leaving these ties out of story good journalism or an example of disinformation to keep the people ignorant of the role the Council on Foreign Relations plays in shaping their destiny? A destiny decided by a small inner circle of members of the Council on Foreign Relations.

<CFR member> Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to <CFR member> Jimmy Carter, Dies at 89

By DANIEL LEWIS MAY 26, 2017

zbig 1 <CFR member> Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1987. He had considerable influence in global affairs, both before and long after his official tour of duty in the White House. Credit Terry Ashe/The LIFE Images Collection, via Getty Images

<CFR member> Zbigniew Brzezinski, the hawkish strategic theorist who was national security adviser to <CFR member>  President Jimmy Carter in the tumultuous years of the Iran hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the late 1970s, died on Friday at a hospital in Virginia. He was 89.

His death, at Inova Fairfax Hospital in Falls Church, was announced on Friday by his daughter, <CFR member> Mika Brzezinski, a co-host of the MSNBC program <CFR member Joe Scarbourgh’s>  “Morning Joe.”

zbig 1-A<The Morning Joe show is a Propaganda Arm of the Council on Foreign Relations used to shape public opinion to further CFR member ends – photo credit @TJefferson1976>

Like his predecessor <CFR member> Henry A. Kissinger, <CFR member> Mr. Brzezinski was a foreign-born scholar (he in Poland, Mr. Kissinger in Germany) with considerable influence in global affairs, both before and long after his official tour of duty in the White House. In essays, interviews and television appearances over the decades, he cast a sharp eye on six successive administrations, including that of Donald J. Trump, whose election he did not support and whose foreign policy, he found, lacked coherence.

<CFR member> Mr. Brzezinski was nominally a Democrat <the CFR advertises they are bipartisan, a euphemism for controlling both the Deomocrat and Republican parties>, with views that led him to speak out, for example, against the “greed,” as he put it, of an American system that compounded inequality <compounded by “greed” of members of the Council on Foreign Relations who no matter how much power and money they have are never find it to be enough>. He was one of the few foreign policy experts to warn against the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

zbig 2Seated from left in the Oval Office in 1977: Huang Chen of the Chinese Liaison Office, the interpreter Hsu Shan Wei, <CFR member>  Mr. Brzezinski and <CFR member> President Jimmy Carter. Credit Harvey Georges/Associated Press

But in at least one respect — his rigid hatred of the Soviet Union — he had stood to the right of many Republicans, including <CFR member> Mr. Kissinger and <CFR member> President Richard M. Nixon. And during his four years under <CFR member> Mr. Carter, beginning in 1977, thwarting Soviet expansionism at any cost guided much of American foreign policy, for better or worse.

He supported billions in military aid for Islamic militants fighting invading Soviet troops in Afghanistan. He tacitly encouraged China to continue backing the murderous regime of Pol Pot in Cambodia, lest the Soviet-backed Vietnamese take over that country.

He managed to delay implementation of the SALT II arms treaty in 1979 by raising objections to Soviet behavior in Vietnam, Africa and Cuba; and when the Soviets went into Afghanistan late that year, “SALT disappeared from the U.S.-Soviet agenda,” as he noted in a memoir four years later.

<CFR member> Mr. Brzezinski, a descendant of Polish aristocrats (his name is pronounced Z-BIG-nyehv breh-ZHIHN-skee), was a severe, even intimidating figure, penetrating eyes and strong Polish accent. Washington quickly learned that he had sharp elbows as well. He was adept at seizing the spotlight and freezing out the official spokesman on foreign policy, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, provoking conflicts that ultimately led to Mr. Vance’s resignation.

zbig 3<CFR member> Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, right, with <CFR member>  Mr. Brzezinski in 1978. Conflicts between them ultimately led to <CFR member>  Mr. Vance’s resignation. Credit The White House Where <CFR member>  Mr. Vance had endorsed the <CFR member>  Nixon-Kissinger policy of a “triangular” power balance among the United States, China and the Soviet Union, <CFR member> Mr. Brzezinski scorned such “acrobatics,” as he called them. He advocated instead what he called a deliberate “strategic deterioration” in relations with Moscow, and closer ties to China.

Moving Fast

By his own account, he blitzed <CFR member>  Mr. Carter with memos until he got permission to go to Beijing in May 1978, over State Department resistance, to begin talks that would lead to full diplomatic relations seven months later. Immediately after the trip, he appeared on “Meet the Press,” unleashing a slashing attack on the Soviet Union that <CFR member> Mr. Vance deplored as “loose talk.”

<CFR member> Mr. Brzezinski was also a prime mover behind the commando mission sent to rescue the American hostages held by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s revolutionary forces in Iran after the overthrow of the shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi — a disastrous desert expedition in April 1980 that claimed eight lives and never reached Tehran. Mr. <CFR member> Vance had not been informed of the mission until a few days before. It was the final straw: He quit, “stunned and angry,” he said.

<CFR member> Mr. Brzezinski’s rationale for the rescue attempt was, perhaps inevitably, rooted in his preoccupation with Soviet influence. He contended that trying to gain the release of the hostages through sanctions and other diplomatic measures “would deliver Iran to the Soviets,” although many thought that outcome highly improbable, given the fundamentalism of the clerics running the country. Besides, he said, success would “give the United States a shot in the arm, which it has badly needed for 20 years,” a reference to the quagmire of the Vietnam War.

 

zbig 4

<CFR member> Mr. Brzezinski fingered worry beads as he watched <CFR member> Mr. Carter and Anwar el-Sadat, president of Egypt, address Parliament in Cairo in 1979. Credit Associated Press

Soviet aggression in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America was by no means a figment of <CFR member> Mr. Brzezinki’s imagination. But his strict adherence to ideas in which virtually every issue circled back to the threat of Soviet domination was remarkable even for those tense times, when many in the foreign policy establishment had come to regard détente — a general easing of the geopolitical tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States — as the best course.

In his scholarly certitude, <CFR member> Mr. Brzezinski sometimes showed a tendency to believe that any disagreement between theory and reality indicated some fault on the part of reality. In his 1962 book “Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics,” for example, he asserted that the Communist bloc “is not splitting and is not likely to split” just as Beijing and Moscow were breaking apart.

With the breakup of the Soviet Union, <CFR member> Mr. Brzezinski allowed that it would make sense for the United States to engage with Russia, though cautiously, as well as China, “to support global stability.” And although he condemned Russian meddling in elections in the United States and elsewhere, he thought the effects were only marginal relative to the underlying problems shaking up Western societies.

In any case, aside from his ideological principles, he had both personal and historical reasons for abhorring the Soviet system.

zbig 5Visiting a Pakistani Army outpost in 1980, <CFR member> Mr. Brzezinski used the sights of a machine gun to look across the Afghan border. He supported billions in military aid for Islamic militants fighting invading Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Credit Bettmann

A Soviet Refugee

<CFR member> Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzezinski was born in Warsaw on March 28, 1928. His father, Tadeusz, was a diplomat who took the family along to France, then to Germany during the rise of Hitler in the 1930s and, fortuitously, to Canada on the eve of World War II. When the Russians took over Poland at the end of the war, Tadeusz Brzezinski chose to retire in Canada rather than return home.

The younger <CFR member> Mr. Brzezinski graduated from McGill University in Montreal in 1949 and earned a master’s degree there in 1950. Then it was on to Harvard, which granted him a doctorate in political science in 1953 and appointed him as an instructor. He and <CFR member>  Mr. Kissinger were among the candidates for a faculty position; when Mr. Kissinger won an associate professorship in 1959, Mr. Brzezinski decamped to Columbia University.

He was not always consistent in his positions as he moved between one situation and another. When he was appointed to the State Department’s Policy Planning Council in 1966, he had already become an outspoken defender of United States engagement in the Vietnam conflict.

In 1968, after riotous antiwar protests at Columbia and elsewhere, he wrote in The New Republic that students should not be allowed to “rally again under the same leadership,” meaning they should be tried and incarcerated.

zbig 5-A<<CFR member> Caspar Weinberger found guilty in the Iran Contra affair and He was pardoned by <CFR member> George H. W. Bush in 1992 .  He lied to Congress about his knowledge of the arms sales to Iran and efforts by other countries to help underwrite the Nicaraguan rebels but was too big to serve his time>

 

zbig 6<CFR member>  Brezezinski second from right, joined top-ranking officials from past administration sat the White House in 1981 to endorse President Ronald Reagan’s bid to sell Awacs radar planes to Saudi Arabia. Credit Bettmann

 

“If that leadership cannot be physically liquidated, it can at least be expelled from the country,” he wrote.

That same year, however, he resigned from the State Department planning council as a protest against expanded American involvement in the war in Indochina under President Lyndon B. Johnson.

Then he became a foreign policy adviser to <CFR member> Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, who defended the expansion in his 1968 presidential campaign.

His bond with <CFR member> Jimmy Carter developed through the Trilateral Commission, the group <CFR member> David Rockefeller created in 1973 as a forum for political and business leaders from North America, Western Europe and Japan to consider the challenges facing industrialized countries. Mr. Brzezinski was the commission’s first director. (<CFR member> Mr. Rockefeller died in March.)

Photo

zbig 7<CFR member> Mr. Brzezinski, left, listened to <CFR member>  President Bill Clinton in the Cabinet Room at the White House in 1995 during a meeting of the Committee for American Leadership in Bosnia. Credit Stephen Crowley/The New York Times

In 1974, <CFR member> Mr. Brzezinski invited <CFR member> Mr. Carter, then the governor of Georgia and a rising Democratic star, to become a member. Two years later, <CFR member> Mr. Carter was the Democratic nominee for president, and he hired <CFR member> Mr. Brzezinski as a foreign affairs adviser.

Vying for Influence

From the start of his tenure as <CFR member> Mr. Carter’s national security adviser, <CFR member> Mr. Brzezinski jockeyed for power. He reserved for himself the right to give <CFR member> Mr. Carter his daily intelligence briefing, which had previously been the prerogative of the Central Intelligence Agency. He frequently called journalists to his office for what he called “exclusive” not-for-attribution briefings in which he would put his own spin on events, to the annoyance of Mr. Vance.

And although he was familiarly called Zbig and could be very engaging, he was quick to smack down reporters who dared to challenge his ideas. “I just cut off your head,” he told a journalist after one such retort.

A prolific author, <CFR member> Mr. Brzezinski published a memoir in 1983 about his White House years, “Power and Principle,” in which he recalled a range of policy objectives that went beyond containing the Soviets. “First,” he wrote, “I thought it was important to try to increase America’s ideological impact on the world” — to make it again the “carrier of human hope, the wave of the future.”

zbig 8<CFR member> Mr. Brzezinski, right, and <CFR member>Brent Scowcroft, another former national security adviser, testified in 2009 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at a hearing on American strategy regarding Iran. Credit Matthew Cavanaugh/European Pressphoto Agency

He also said that he had aimed to restore America’s appeal in the developing world through better economic relations, but acknowledged that he had concentrated too much of his attention on those countries that he felt were threatened by Soviet or Cuban takeovers.

More recently, in opposing the invasion of Iraq, he predicted that “an America that decides to act essentially on its own” could “find itself quite alone in having to cope with the costs and burdens of the war’s aftermath, not to mention widespread and rising hostility abroad.”

In “Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower,” published in 2007, he assessed the consequences of that war and criticized the successive administrations of <CFR member> George Bush, <CFR member> Bill Clinton and <Son of a CFR member> George W. Bush for failing to take advantage of the possibilities for American leadership from the time the Berlin Wall came down in 1989. He considered <Son of a CFR member>  George W. Bush’s record, especially, “catastrophic.” And in the 2008 presidential campaign, he wholeheartedly supported Barack Obama.

Four years later, he once again assessed the United States’ global standing in “Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power.” Here he argued that continued American strength abroad was vital to global stability, but that it would depend on the country’s ability to foster “social consensus and democratic stability” at home.

Essential to those goals, he wrote, would be a narrowing of the yawning income gap between the wealthiest and the rest, a restructuring of the financial system so that it no longer mainly benefited “greedy Wall Street speculators” and a meaningful response to climate change.

A United States in decline, he said — one “unwilling or unable to protect states it once considered, for national interest and/or doctrinal reasons, worthy of its engagement” — could lead to a “protracted phase of rather inconclusive and somewhat chaotic realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers.”

<CFR member> Mr. Brzezinski, who had homes in Washington and Northeast Harbor, Me., was married to the Czech-American sculptor Emilie Benes, with whom he had two children in addition to Ms. Brzezinski: <CFR member> Mark Brzezinski, a lawyer and former ambassador to Sweden under President Barack Obama, and Ian Brzezinski, whose career has included serving as a deputy assistant secretary of defense. All survive him. He is also survived by a brother, Lech, and five grandchildren.

Into his 80s <CFR member> Mr. Brzezinski was still fully active as a teacher, author and consultant: a professor of foreign policy at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and a frequent expert commentator on PBS and ABC News.

He was, in short, a man who could be counted on to have strong opinions, and a boundless eagerness to share them. Once, in 1994, he even put forward a sort of disarmament program to solve the problem of breaking ties in the final game of the soccer World Cup.

“In the event of a tie,” he wrote to the sports editor of The Times, “the game should be resumed as a sudden-death overtime, but played with only nine players on each side, with each team compelled to remove two of its defensive players. That change increases the probability of a score and places more emphasis on offensive play. If after 10 minutes of play there is still no score, the game continues with four defenders removed from each team.”

David Binder, Daniel E. Slotnik and Matthew Haag contributed reporting.

A version of this article appears in print on May 27, 2017, on Page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: Zbigniew Brzezinski, Security Adviser to Carter, Dies at 89. Order Reprints| Today’s Paper|Subscribe

Enjoy your reunion with your David Rockefeller Zbig! Get ready to greet War Criminal CFR member Henry Kissinger 😉

CFR Ben Garrison Rockefeller CFR

 

 

 

 

 

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The Council on Foreign Relations: Promoting Global Governance for over 100 years – Re-conceptualizing “sovereignty” in an age of globalization

Visit the Council on Foreign Relations FAQ page and the first question is :

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the Council on Foreign Relations? When and why was it formed?

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. Founded in 1921, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy and has no affiliation with the U.S. government. Visit this page to learn more about CFR.

This statement is untrue. The meaning of non-partisan is unbiased. When it comes to Foreign Policy the CFR is extremely biased. The CFR’s Foreign Policy goal for over 100 years has been to achieve Global Governance.

CFR Dvaid Rockefeller Quote

On May 1, 2008 the CFR published a paper titled International Institutions and Global Governance Program World Order in the 21st Century A New Initiative of the Council on Foreign Relations. The Global Governance Initiative is anything but new.

The Council on Foreign Relations was formally established in Paris in 1919 along with its British Counterpart the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The Council on Foreign Relations and Royal Institute of International Affairs can trace their roots back to a secret organization founded and funded by Cecil Rhodes, who became fabulously wealthy by exploiting the people of South Africa. Rhodes is the father of Apartheid.

The Council on Foreign Relations was founded by a group of American and British imperialists and racists intent on ruling the world. Many of the American members were American intelligence officers that belonged to the first American Intelligence Agency — THE INQUIRY. Many of the British members were British Intelligence Agents. THE INQUIRY included such notable Americans as Col. Edward Mandel House, Walter Lippmann, Isaiah Bowman, and James Shotwell. The INQUIRY was America’s first Central Intelligence Agency. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, and Woodrow Wilson’s close political advisor and friend, Edward Mandel House, suggested the idea to Wilson.

Edward Mandell House 1920

CFR founding father Edward Mandell House 1920 First US National Security Advisor

House became the INQUIRY’s first director, Lippmann was House’s first recruit. The existence of the INQUIRY such a well kept secret, that to this day hardly any Americans have heard of the INQUIRY or are aware that it ever existed. Wilson paid for the INQUIRY from the President’s Fund for National Safety and Defense. He directed that it not be housed in Washington. A remote room in the New York Public Library was its first office. Later it moved to offices in the American Geographical Society at West 155th Street and Broadway. James T. Shotwell, a Columbia University historian and an early recruit, came up with the agency name the INQUIRY, which, he said, would be a “blind to the general public, but would serve to identify it among the initiated.” Shotwell probably chose the name because the word History is derived from the Greek word meaning “a learning by inquiry.” Ironically the INQUIRY would use psychological warfare techniques to warp history by stressing favorable and unfavorable truths and leaving out facts completely to shape public opinion to support INQUIRY goals.

On January 18th 1919 in Paris, France, some of the most powerful people in the world meet to begin the long, complicated negotiations that would officially mark the end of the First World War. The United States representatives included Edward Mandel House and the other members of the INQUIRY. The INQUIRY and its members wrote most of Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points. Many of the members of the INQUIRY and the US State department delegates at the Paris Peace conference belonged to the American branch of Cecil Rhodes’ secret society, the Roundtable. At the Paris Peace conference, they would trade off most of the 14 points to establish the League of Nations. After the conference, they would attend the meeting at the Hotel Majestic and become the founding fathers of the Council on Foreign Relations. Woodrow Wilson caught onto the betrayal and was so upset that he suffered a stroke and refused to speak to Edward Mandel House ever again. The American people didn’t want to belong to an organization that could force them to go to war and would be turned into an international police force. America would never join the League of Nations.

The Council on Foreign Relations would not give up their pursuit of a global governing body. It would take another World War for them to achieve their goal. On September 12, 1939, the Council on Foreign Relations began to take control of the Department of State. On that day Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Editor of Foreign Affairs, and Walter H. Mallory, Executive Director of the Council on Foreign Relations, paid a visit to the State Department. The Council proposed forming groups of experts to proceed with research in the general areas of Security, Armament, Economic, Political, and Territorial problems. The State Department accepted the proposal. The project (1939-1945) was called Council on Foreign Relations War and Peace Studies. Hamilton Fish Armstrong was Executive director.

In February 1941 the CFR officially became part of the State Department. The Department of State established the Division of Special Research. It was organized just like the Council on Foreign Relations War and Peace Studies project. It was divided into Economic, Political, Territorial, and Security Sections. The Research Secretaries serving with the Council groups were hired by the State Department to work in the new division. These men also were permitted to continue serving as Research Secretaries to their respective Council groups. Leo Pasvolsky was appointed Director of Research.

In 1942 the relationship between the Department of State and the Council on Foreign Relations strengthened again. The Department organized an Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policies. The Chairman was Secretary Cordell Hull, the vice chairman, Under Secretary Sumner Wells, Dr. Leo Pasvolsky ( director of the Division of Special Research) was appointed Executive Officer. Several experts were brought in from outside the Department. The outside experts were Council on Foreign Relations War and Peace Studies members; Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Isaiah Bowman, Benjamin V. Cohen, Norman H. Davis, and James T. Shotwell.

In total there were 362 meetings of the War and Peace Studies groups. The meetings were held at Council on Foreign Relations headquarters — the Harold Pratt house, Fifty-Eight East Sixty-Eighth Street, New York City. The Council’s wartime work was confidential.17

In 1944 members of the Council on Foreign Relations The War and Peace Studies Political Group were invited to be active members at the Dumbarton Oaks conference on world economic arrangements. In 1945 these men and members of Britain’s Royal Institute of International Affairs were active at the San Francisco conference which ensured the establishment of the United Nations.

When the CFR states that it  “takes no institutional positions on matters of policy and has no affiliation with the U.S. government” they are simply lying. Their role in in forcing Global Governance on the people of the United States stretches back over 100 years.

In 1998 Title-50 War and National Defense § 783 stated – “It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to combine, conspire, or agree with any other person to perform any act which would substantially contribute to the establishment within the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship, the direction and control of which is to be vested in, or exercised by or under the domination of control of, any foreign government.”

In a letter to congress I pointed out that “The Council on Foreign Relations are in violation of Title-50 War and National Defense § 783. The Council on Foreign Relations has unlawfully and knowingly combined, conspired, and agreed to substantially contribute to the establishment of one world order under the totalitarian dictatorship, the direction and the control of members of Council on Foreign Relations, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and members of their branch organizations in various nations throughout the world. That is totalitarianism on a global scale.”

After pointing this out to congress Title 50 disappeared. Today we have a totally new 50 U.S.C. § 783 – U.S. Code – Unannotated Title 50. War and National Defense § 783. See it  at: http://codes.findlaw.com/us/title-50-war-and-national-defense/50-usc-sect-783.html#sthash.yiDjEuTd.dpuf

A Royal Institute of International affairs global governance paper International Economic Governance:Last Chance for the G20? is here https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/20151113InternationalEconomicGovernanceG20SubacchiPickford.pdf

The CFR Global Governance Initiative Paper Follows :

CFR rockefeller-in-hell-ben-garrison_1_orig

cfr address logo

International Institutions and Global Governance Program World Order in the 21st Century  A New Initiative of the Council on Foreign Relations

May 1, 2008

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) has launched a comprehensive five-year program on international institutions and global governance. The purpose of this cross-cutting initiative is to explore the institutional requirements for world order in the twenty-first century. The undertaking recognizes that the architecture of global governance—largely reflecting the world as it existed in 1945—has not kept pace with fundamental changes in the international system, including but not limited to globalization. Existing multilateral arrangements thus provide an inadequate foundation for addressing today’s most pressing threats and opportunities and for advancing U.S. national and broader global interests. The program seeks to identify critical weaknesses in current frameworks for multilateral cooperation; propose specific reforms tailored to new global circumstances; and promote constructive U.S. leadership in building the capacities of existing organizations and in sponsoring new, more effective regional and global institutions and partnerships. This program is made possible by a generous grant from the Robina Foundation.

The program draws on the resources of CFR’s David Rockefeller Studies Program to assess existing regional and global governance mechanisms and offer concrete recommendations for U.S. policymakers on specific reforms needed to improve their performance, both to advance U.S. national interests and to ensure the provision of critical global public goods. The program will take an issue area approach, focusing on arrangements governing state conduct and international cooperation in meeting four broad sets of challenges: (1) Countering Transnational Threats, including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and infectious disease; (2) Protecting the Environment and Promoting Energy Security; (3) Managing the Global Economy; and (4) Preventing and Responding to Violent Conflict. In each of these spheres, the program will consider whether the most promising framework for governance is a formal organization with universal membership (e.g., the United Nations); a regional or sub-regional organization; a narrower, informal coalition of like-minded countries; or some combination of all three. Building on these issue-area investigations, the program will also consider the potential to adapt major bedrock institutions (e.g., the UN, G8, NATO, IMF) to meet today’s challenges, as well as the feasibility of creating new frameworks. It will also address the participation of non-state actors.

CFR Rockefeller New World Order

The program falls squarely within CFR’s historic mission as an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens  in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. In fulfilling its mandate, the program draws on the CFR’s unique attributes as a premier think tank on matters of foreign policy; as a prominent forum for convening American and international statesmen and opinion leaders; and as a platform for forging bipartisan consensus on the priorities, terms, and conditions of the nation’s global engagement. Throughout its activities, CFR will engage stakeholders and constituencies in the United States and abroad, including governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society representatives, and the private sector, whose input and endorsement are critical to ensure the appropriateness and feasibility of any institutional reforms. The program is led by Senior Fellow Stewart Patrick.

This concept note summarizes the rationale for the program, describes potential areas of research and policy engagement, and outlines the envisioned products and activities. We believe that the research and policy agenda outlined here constitutes a potentially significant contribution to U.S. and international deliberations on the requirements for world order in the twenty-first century.

RATIONALE AND CONTEXT

The Significance of the Issue

The creation of new frameworks for global governance will be a defining challenge for the twenty-first century world, and the attitude of the United States will be among the most important factors in determining the shape and stability of the world order that results from these efforts. The need for a reformed, robust system of multilateral cooperation has never been more obvious. Today’s global agenda is dominated by a host of issues—from terrorism to climate change to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—that no single country, no matter how powerful, can address on its own. Tomorrow’s challenges and policy agendas will only be more transnational in scope. At the same time, existing multilateral institutions are increasingly divorced from global realities, hindering their capacity to deliver global public goods and mitigate global “bads.” Since the end of the Cold War, world politics have been transformed in fundamental ways. As outlined in the accompanying box, these changes include an ongoing shift in global power to non-Western countries; the rise of transnational threats to the top of the global security and development agendas; a growing concern with state weakness, as opposed to state strength; the emergence of agile and increasingly powerful non-state actors (both malignant and benign); the evolution of new norms of state sovereignty and new criteria for armed intervention; the proliferation of regional and sub-regional organizations; the increasing importance of cross-border networks; and a growing reliance on ad hoc “coalitions of the willing” as an adjunct to—and sometimes a replacement for—more formal, standing international bodies.

CFR Dvaid Rockefeller Quote

A New World The point of departure for the program is a recognition that the world of 1945 has evolved dramatically, fundamentally, and irrevocably. New rules and institutions of global governance will need to take into account several fundamental changes in world politics. These include:

A shift in power to the global “South.” While the United States remains at the apex of the international system, the global distribution of power—political, economic, demographic, technological, and to some degree military— is shifting toward the developing world, driven by the rise of China, India, Brazil, and other nations (and the relative decline of Europe). Core international institutions, from the UN Security Council to the Group of Eight industrialized nations (G-8), have not yet adapted to accommodate these seismic shifts, reducing both their perceived legitimacy and their practical effectiveness.

The rise of transnational threats. While great power war will always be possible in a system of sovereign states, the principal foreign policy challenges of the twenty-first century are likely to be transnational threats—from terrorism to pandemics to climate change. Such challenges will necessitate new forms of institutionalized cooperation and pose particular challenges to the United States, historically ambivalent toward multilateral institutions.

 

The specter of weak and failing states. For the first time in modern history, the main threats to world security emanate less from states with too much power (e.g., Nazi Germany) than from states with too little (e.g., Afghanistan). The goal of collective security has thus shifted from counter-balancing aggressive powers to assisting fragile and post-conflict countries in achieving effective sovereign statehood, including control over “ungoverned spaces.”

The mounting influence of non-state actors. A corollary to state weakness is the rise of non-state groups and individuals that are capable of operating across multiple sovereign jurisdictions. These include illicit organizations motivated by political grievance (e.g., al-Qaeda) or simple greed (e.g., Russian crime syndicates). But non-state actors also include more benign forces, such as humanitarian NGOs and civil society actors, philanthropic institutions like the Gates Foundation, and “super-empowered” individuals like Bono, all clamoring for entrée into decision-making forums that have traditionally been the purview of states alone. How to integrate these new stakeholders into multilateral deliberations remains a major challenge for global governance.

Evolving norms of sovereignty and intervention. There is growing recognition that each state owes certain fundamental obligations to its own citizens and to wider international society. These responsibilities include an obligation not to commit atrocities against one’s own population; a prohibition against sponsoring or providing a safe haven to transnational terrorist groups; and a duty to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Yet the effort to make these new norms operational and enforceable remains a Herculean challenge.

The spread of regional and sub-regional organizations. Although the UN Charter of 1945 explicitly endorsed regional organizations, such bodies truly began to flower only with the end of the Cold War, both as complements to universal-membership organizations and as substitutes for them. The task for U.S. policymakers is to assess the comparative advantages of different institutions and encourage a judicious division of labor (between, say, the UN and the African Union) that ensures effective burden sharing, rather than unwarranted “burden shifting.”

The increasing prominence of transnational government networks. In past decades, the process of multilateral cooperation and rule-making tended to be hierarchical and centralized, reflecting formal negotiations among high-level national delegations. In the twenty-first century, multilateral cooperation frequently unfolds in a distributed and networked manner, through the collaboration of transnational networks of government officials from regulatory agencies, executives, legislatures, and courts.

A growing reliance on coalitions of the willing. A recent trend in global governance has been to rely less on large, formal organizations (like the UN), which are vulnerable to paralysis and inaction, than on narrower collective action among like-minded countries, as in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). An ongoing dilemma for U.S.

policymakers will be to exploit the flexibility of such coalitions without undercutting formal, large-membership organizations whose technical expertise, legitimacy, and resources the United States will need over the long haul.

 

 

Despite these tremendous changes in the context, content, and conduct of international relations, there has been no “act of creation” analogous to the flurry of institution building that occurred in the 1940s and early 1950s. Indeed, many of the central institutions of global governance, such as the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), remain substantially unchanged since the days of Roosevelt, Truman, Churchill, and Stalin. Recent efforts to reform the architecture of global governance, including at the UN High Level Summit of September 2005, have produced at best incremental change, as states disagree over how to reallocate power and authority in existing organizations and bring old rules in line with new realities. The world community thus makes do with creaky institutional machinery that is increasingly obsolete, ineffective, and unrepresentative, and which makes few allowances for the potential role of the private sector and global civil society in shaping and addressing the global agenda. As hard as it is to create rules of global governance, it is even harder to rewrite them when institutions already exist.

The United States and its partners have a critical window of opportunity to update the architecture of international cooperation to reflect today’s turbulent world. The creation of a more effective framework for global governance will depend on a clear and common understanding among the world’s major nations of the new dynamics and forces at play in world politics, and their recognition that there can be no one-size-fits-all solution to the management of transnational problems. It will also depend on the willingness of the United States to exercise the same creative, enlightened leadership that it exercised in the mid-twentieth century, when it chose to champion and defend new forms of international cooperation.

A New Era of American Leadership? 

CFR Rockefeller Media

Among the most important factors determining the future of global governance will be the attitude of the United States, likely to remain the world’s most prominent actor at least until 2050. Historically, Americans have adopted an ambivalent and selective posture toward multilateral cooperation. On the one hand, no country has done as much to create the institutional infrastructure of world order, including the bedrock institutions dating from the 1940s, such as the United Nations, the Bretton Woods Institutions, and NATO. Over the past six decades, the United States has benefited tremendously from this architecture, which has helped to legitimate U.S. global leadership, improve predictability in world affairs, and permit the joint pursuit of shared objectives across a wide range of countries.

On the other hand, few countries have been as sensitive as the United States to restrictions on their freedom of action or as jealous in guarding their sovereign prerogatives. This ambivalent orientation can be attributed to at least three factors: America’s overwhelming power, its unique political culture, and its constitutional traditions. First, given its massive weight, the United States enjoys unparalleled unilateral and bilateral options, as well as a plausible claim to special exemption from some rules binding on others, since it serves as the ultimate custodian and guarantor of world order. Second, the country’s longstanding tradition of liberal “exceptionalism” inspires U.S. vigilance in protecting the domestic sovereignty and institutions from the perceived incursions of international bodies. Finally, the separation of powers enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, which gives Congress a critical voice in the ratification of treaties and endorsement of global institutions, complicates U.S. assumptions of new international obligations.

This instinctual skepticism toward multilateral cooperation, which was particularly pronounced in the first term of the administration of George W. Bush, is unlikely to disappear. Nevertheless, the first years of the new millennium have also demonstrated limits to unilateral U.S. action, military or otherwise, in mitigating the threats and taking advantage of the opportunities posed by globalization. Regardless of whether the administration that takes office in January

2009 is Democratic or Republican, the thrust of U.S. foreign policy is likely to be multilateral to a significant degree.

Multilateralism can come in many forms, however. From a U.S. perspective, the ideal vehicle for international cooperation in a given instance will depend on a number of factors, including whether other countries share a common conception of the nature of the policy challenge (to say nothing of its appropriate remedy). Although the United Nations has distinct advantages, given its perceived international legitimacy and universal membership, it will not always be the instrument of choice; regional organizations or narrower affinity groups sharing common purposes may have a comparative advantage. The United States and other countries are likely to require a diverse array of frameworks—formal and informal, universal and regional, and functional—to address particular tasks. In some cases, effective governance may require public-private partnerships involving a range of stakeholders, including private corporations and non-governmental organizations. Accordingly, global governance in the twenty-first century may well come to resemble what Francis Fukuyama terms “multi-multilateralism.”

New Thinking for a New Era

 The program on international institutions and global governance aims to assist the architects of U.S. foreign policy and their counterparts in other countries and in regional and global organizations in drafting the blueprints for new structures of international cooperation that are more closely tailored to global realities, consistent with long-term U.S.

national interests, and sensitive to historic U.S. concerns about domestic sovereignty and international freedom of action. The program’s approach to global governance will remain a pragmatic and flexible one, emphasizing customized solutions rather than “one-size-fits-all” responses.

 

The process of formulating policy recommendations will be an open and consultative one. CFR research staff will meet with and solicit input from the main constituencies—American and foreign, public and private – with a stake in the relevant deliberations. For example, discussions on strengthening the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) would necessarily involve both arms control advocacy organizations and major chemical firms, among others. In a similar manner, deliberations on a post-Kyoto framework to respond to climate change would solicit views from environmental groups, industry representatives, developing country officials and civil society, and U.S. officials at the federal, state, county, and municipal levels. Such consultations are imperative to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the stumbling blocks to change, the trade-offs of alternative institutional options, and the feasibility of new arrangements.

 

CFR recognizes that identifying where current international institutions are deficient and where new ones are appropriate is but one dimension of reforming global governance. The harder chore is to persuade the relevant parties to adopt a new way of doing business, including (in some cases) the loss of current privileges. For this reason, CFR will include in any proposed recommendations a practical strategy to win multilateral support for needed changes, as well as forging domestic consensus among the major U.S. stakeholders.

 

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

 

The agenda of the program on international institutions and global governance is potentially vast. To make it more tractable, we have adopted a sector-based approach, in which we will assess the institutional arrangements governing specific global challenges. In each case selected, the program will work with CFR fellows to examine (a) how the nature of this particular challenge has changed in recent decades; (b) what international regimes and frameworks— informal and formal, permanent and temporary, global and regional—exist to regulate behavior or advance cooperation in this issue area; (c) whether these mechanisms are adequate to the task at hand or must be modified; and (d) what institutional reforms and new divisions of labor would be appropriate, consistent with long-term U.S. national interests, and sustainable within the U.S. domestic context. In conducting this analysis, the program will draw on expertise of many of the fifty-five full- and part-time fellows in the CFR’s Studies Program. CFR would also seek out expertise in those areas where it does not currently exist in-house. The program will employ several standards to judge the adequacy and appropriateness of existing regimes, organizations, and other arrangements of global governance. These criteria will include:

Effectiveness, in terms of actual performance in accomplishing the stated objective(s), ideally measured through independent monitoring and evaluation.

Legitimacy, assessed in terms of whether existing arrangements accurately reflect the current distribution of global political power and interest, are consistent with international legal regimes, and reflect broadly accepted procedures for multilateral decision-making.

Accountability, evaluated according to whether the institutional agents can be held to account for their performance and whether the institution provides opportunities for expressions of democratic will both in the United States and abroad.

Consistency with U.S. interests and values, including whether the proposed framework promises to advance U.S. national security and welfare, legitimate U.S. purposes abroad, and resonate with the democratically-expressed will of the American people.

Building on this sector-based audit and analysis, the program will likely recommend reforms to a number of “bedrock” institutions of world order—including the UN (particularly the composition of the Security Council), the G-8,

NATO, and the Bretton Woods institutions—as well as major regional organizations, such as the European Union

(EU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the African Union (AU), and the Organization of American States (OAS). Where appropriate, the Council will also explore the potential for global governance arrangements that are less state-centric. Recommendations for major institutional reform will proceed from (rather than precede) this issue area analysis. Moreover, wherever such reforms are recommended, the Council will include a plausible strategy for winning international backing for this new governance framework.

Issues and Sectors for Analysis

The program has identified four critical areas of global governance where current frameworks for multilateral cooperation are increasingly outdated. These include (1) Countering Transnational Threats; (2) Protecting the

Environment and Promoting Energy Security; (3) Managing the Global Economy; and (4) Preventing and

Responding to Violent Conflict. In this section, we highlight what we consider to be the most compelling issues within these four broad clusters, and where the program might add value through policy research and engagement over its five year time frame. These clusters include:

(I) Countering Transnational Threats

Terrorism. The struggle against Salafist-inspired Islamist terrorism is likely to be a generational one for the United States and the world community, and an effective response will require a variety of international partnerships. To date, however, the “Global War on Terrorism” has often borne a “made in the USA” stamp, rather than representing a genuinely multilateral undertaking. The United Nations has made some progress in enlisting member states in the struggle against al-Qaeda and affiliated organizations, including through UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which established the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, as well as multilateral efforts to combat terrorist financing.

The United States has also expanded its intelligence cooperation on counterterrorism matters with scores of states. Nevertheless, the global anti-terror campaign has been less multilateral than it might be, both in terms of consolidating new norms (e.g., a common definition of terrorism) and ensuring robust operational responses to the threat (including building the counterterrorism capacity of weak but willing states). The program will work with Council Fellows to review promising multilateral initiatives and needed reforms within both UN and regional organizations that are essential if the struggle against terrorism is to become a more effective effort.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The spread of catastrophic technologies has placed the ability to kill vast numbers of people in the hands of a growing number of governments and non-state actors. At the same time, the international regimes and institutions charged with controlling the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons—from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention—are under increasing strain. Despite high hopes, the Outcome Document of the UN High-Level Summit of September 2005 failed to include a single significant reform to global non-proliferation regimes. Frustrated by the shortcomings of established frameworks to halt proliferation, the United

States in recent years has experimented with a number of ad hoc, flexible groupings, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). It has also adopted a differentiated response to proliferators – most notable in the case of India’s nuclear program – that grants special treatment to regimes that Washington believes can be trusted. The program will work with CFR’s experts in arms control and international security to assess needed reforms to existing nonproliferation regimes, including the potential creation of an international facility to provide nuclear fuel to participants in the NPT regime. The program will also evaluate the appropriate balance between such formal organizations and treaties like the IAEA and NPT and narrower, informal arrangements of like-minded parties, such as PSI, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Homeland Security. The rise of transnational terrorist networks and the spread of catastrophic technologies have made homeland security a priority for all nations, particularly Western democracies. The United States and other countries face a number of common challenges, including policing maritime and land frontiers and national airspace; protecting civil aviation; improving border control; regulating immigration; hardening critical infrastructure; inspecting cargo; and tagging and tracking suspicious individuals and shipments. Effective homeland security increasingly relies on creative multilateral partnerships, such as the Container Security Initiative, which among other things implies the placement of U.S. customs officials in foreign ports (and vice-versa). It also requires deeper intelligence- and information-sharing and more intensive law enforcement cooperation. These innovative partnerships have forced the United States and its allies to tolerate some sacrifice of national sovereignty, reconcile distinct constitutional and legal traditions, and (at times) overcome divergent threat perceptions. The program will work with CFR scholars to assess promising areas for expanding and formalizing multilateral cooperation in this arena.

Infectious Disease, Biosecurity, and Global Public Health. Among the most sobering concerns on the global security agenda is the specter of massive death at the hands of naturally occurring or man-made pathogens. Over the past three decades, the world has experienced the emergence of more than thirty previously unknown disease agents, including HIV/AIDS, Ebola, SARS, and avian influenza, for which no cures are yet available, as well as the reemergence and spread of more than twenty well-known diseases, including TB, malaria, and cholera, often in more virulent and drugresistant forms. At the same time, the U.S. and other governments are increasingly fearful of the purposeful design and release of biological toxins by international terrorists. Unfortunately, as the belated response to SARS revealed, serious shortcomings exist in national and global systems for epidemiological surveillance, preparedness, and response. The program will work with CFR fellows to identify what reforms to current frameworks of global health governance, including the World Health Organization, are required to meet this burgeoning threat.

  • Protecting the Environment and Ensuring Energy Security

Global Climate Change. New international institutions to mitigate the degradation of the global commons will likely be a defining feature of global governance in the twenty-first century. The global environmental agenda includes a broad array of oceanic, terrestrial, and atmospheric challenges, from the exhaustion of marine resources like fish stocks and coral reefs to deforestation and desertification, the loss of biodiversity and endangered species, air pollution, and the depletion of the ozone layer. Nowhere is the need for a new global compact more imperative, however, than in the case of climate change, which unless corrected will irrevocably alter the biosphere on which all humanity depends. Moreover, the effects of global warming are predicted to affect most dramatically some of the most fragile, poor and unstable developing countries that are least equipped to adapt. The program will work with

CFR fellows in examining the institutional preconditions for a post-Kyoto framework agreement to which the United States and the major developing countries, including China, India, and Brazil, can agree, as well as a potential expansion of the Global Environmental Facility to create incentives for carbon-neutral development.

Energy Insecurity. The recent dramatic rise in global petroleum prices—combined with the exhaustion of many proven oil reserves, the insatiable Chinese appetite for fossil fuels, political instability in oil-producing regions from Nigeria to Iraq, and the rise of “petro-autocracies” from Russia to Venezuela—has focused the attention of U.S. policymakers on the security of world energy supplies. The United States and its international partners need new frameworks to ensure adequate global production, refining and transportation capacity, and new strategies to prevent potential interruption of supplies. There is also growing awareness that shifting the U.S. economy away from its current heavy reliance on fossil fuels—particularly from the Middle East—makes good strategic sense. New frameworks of multilateral cooperation will be essential components of any U.S. strategy to improve global energy security and create the incentives for international movement toward cleaner and more reliable forms of energy. The program will work with CFR fellows to examine promising steps, including through the International Energy Agency, to improve long-term global and U.S. energy security.

  • Managing the Global Economy

The International Financial System. The program will support the work of the Center for Geoeconomic Studies (CGS) in casting a sober eye on the current framework of global financial and monetary relations, including rules governing exchange rates, proposals to create regional currency unions, and initiatives by individual countries to dollarize or euro-ize. It will promote work by CFR fellows to evaluate current trends in the global financial system— including strains caused by the twin U.S. deficits, the emerging role of China in the global monetary system, and the rise of alternative reserve currencies (including the euro)—and explore promising means to improve coordination among the world’s major governments and central banks in dealing with structural weaknesses. The program will also support CFR’s work in reevaluating the mandate of the IMF, which has lost much of its relevance with the growth of private capital markets.

International Trade: The stagnation of the current Doha Round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations and the ongoing expansion of bilateral and regional trade arrangements have called into question the commitment of the United States and other major countries to the vision of an open, reciprocal, and non-discriminatory system of international trade and payments. Stumbling blocks in the current WTO round include the resistance of wealthy countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to liberalize trade in protected agricultural commodities and the unwillingness of developing countries to quicken their own embrace of Western standards on foreign investment, intellectual property, and trade in manufactures. In the absence of sustained forward movement on global trade liberalization, we are likely to see an increased fragmentation of world trade into

regional—and potentially discriminatory and protectionist—blocs. The program will support the ongoing work of the

CGS in examining the preconditions for a North-South compromise, and in assessing the trade-offs for the United States of bilateral, regional, and global approaches to trade liberalization. The program will also seek to advance CFR’s work on new regional and international frameworks to regulate global labor mobility.

International Investment. The economic gains from cross-border investment are as great as those from cross-border trade, and corporate investment in multi-country supply chains is a large driver of growing trade flows. Moreover, the rapidly growing sovereign wealth funds of several East Asian countries and energyexporting states are complicating the picture. The huge capital surpluses now in the hands of foreign governments may trigger a political backlash in the countries where these funds are invested). Yet international investment is not subject to any multilateral regime comparable to the World Trade Organization. Instead, a crazy-quilt of bilateral investment treaties, together with an OECD-effort led by the OECD, attempt to set global norms for investment rules. In the 1990s an effort to upgrade this framework with a Multilateral Agreement on Investment was defeated by civil society critics. The program will support work by CFR fellows to consider the case for a global investment agreement, as well as to examine the need for rules to govern sovereign wealth funds and the recipients of their capital.

Global Development Policy. Contemporary policy discourse concerning global development has been dominated by two extreme camps: advocates of enormous expenditures of foreign aid to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, on the one hand, and skeptics of development assistance, on the other, who contend that it is wasteful, redundant (given private sources of investment) and often counterproductive (since it breeds dependency). Often missing from this dialogue of the deaf is a careful appraisal of what targeted foreign aid can (and cannot) accomplish, as well as a recognition that aid is but one component—and rarely the most important—in development outcomes. The program will support efforts by CFR fellows to evaluate the continued relevance and appropriate mission of the World Bank, the regional multilateral development banks, the UN Development Program, and other UN development agencies, with an eye to assessing how their aid windows and technical expertise complement one another and the capacities of donor governments. The analysis will also consider arguments for institutional reforms, such as transforming the governing structure of the World Bank and correcting the UN’s fragmented approach to global development. It will consider ways to harness the growing interest of the private sector in corporate social responsibility programs in developing countries: While spending by multinational corporations on development is growing, the sophistication with which these funds are disbursed is perhaps two decades behind that of the public sector. This work will be undertaken in collaboration with the CGS.

(4) Preventing and Responding to Violent Conflict

Preventing State Failure and Internal Conflict. In an age of transnational threats, states that cannot control their borders and territory and that collapse into violence pose a danger not simply to their own populations but indeed to the entire world. Unfortunately, the international community continues to struggle in its efforts to prevent states from sliding into failure and internal violence. To date, no major international actor—whether the United States, other major governments, or international institutions like the United Nations, World Bank, and African Union—has made prevention a strategic priority. Notwithstanding the UN’s rhetorical commitment to conflict prevention, its actual policy remains modest, ad hoc and reactive, limited in most cases to occasional “good offices” efforts by the SecretaryGeneral. The G8, likewise, has devoted little attention to reducing critical sources of insecurity and instability in the developing world, including cutting the illicit revenue streams that fuel corruption and violence in weak states and conflict zones, curbing illegal trade in weapons, shutting down offshore financial havens for the ill-gotten gains, and insisting on transparent management of natural resource revenues. The program will collaborate with CFR’s Center for Preventive Action (CPA) to assess what institutional reforms can be made to improve the capacity of the UN, G8, World Bank, AU and other international frameworks and partnerships to address the underlying sources of instability and mitigate and manage conflict in the world’s most vulnerable states through a mixture of diplomatic, economic, political, and military means. It will also address private sector and public-private initiatives to reduce conflict, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Kimberley Process for conflict diamonds.

The Use of Force. Today more than at any other time in the past sixty years, the rules governing the use of armed force are up for grabs. The diplomatic deadlock over Iraq during 2002-2003—like the preceding Kosovo crisis of 1999— raised fundamental questions about the recourse available to the United States when disagreement among the Permanent Five blocks Security Council action. In the aftermath of both episodes, some observers have suggested the need for alternative (or surrogate) sources of legitimacy for armed force, whereas others have cautioned against setting a dangerous precedent. At the same time, there has been growing international support—particularly among Western governments—for a doctrine of contingent sovereignty, whereby countries guilty of genocide, terrorism, and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction would forfeit their presumption against external intervention. Despite these normative shifts, however, the United States and its international partners have made little headway in determining  the circumstances in which the Security Council might be legitimately bypassed or the evidentiary criteria required to justify armed intervention into a sovereign state. The program will work with CPA and CFR fellows to clarify these criteria, building on the CFR’s previous work on such questions, including on the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine.

Peace Operations and Post-Conflict Peace-Building. Notwithstanding setbacks and shortcomings in UN peace operations since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations is being called upon as never before to keep – and in some cases enforce – peace between warring parties, as well as to pick up the pieces when the shooting stops. Today, more than 100,000 blue helmets are deployed in a score of operations around the globe – more than at any time in the

UN’s history. Yet the complexity and pace of such multidimensional efforts have strained the modest capacities of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which struggles on its modest budget and capabilities to develop a robust doctrine; to procure logistical support from member states; to ensure the quality and discipline of contributed troops; to negotiate an effective division of labor with regional organizations (such as the AU); and to realize the vision of “integrated missions” that unite the humanitarian, reconstruction, governance, and security components of international interventions. Meanwhile, the UN Peacebuilding Commission—one of the few significant results of the 2005 UN High Level Summit—has thus far failed to live up to its potential in ensuring effective state-building and sustainable recovery in war-torn societies. The program will collaborate with the Center for Preventive Action and CFR fellows on proposals to deepen recent UN reforms, as well as explore potential partnerships between the UN and the AU as well as other regional and sub-regional bodies.

In advancing this ambitious agenda, the program will draw on both core program staff and also the fifty-five other permanent and adjunct members of CFR’s Studies Program. This will permit the program to generate a steady stream of research, publication, and policy engagement in all four clusters over the five-year span of the program.

 

Reforming the Bedrock Institutions of World Order

Building on these issue-area investigations and the identified shortcomings of existing organizations and frameworks, the program will, over five years, seek to propose reforms to some of the bedrock institutions of world order, including the United Nations, regional organizations, and major ad hoc groupings.

The United Nations Security Council.  Among the biggest disappointments of the UN High-Level Summit of September 2005 was the failure of UN member states to cut the Gordian knot with respect to UN Security Council Membership, particularly the extension of permanent (or semi-permanent) membership to accommodate the shifting balance of world power since 1945. Although the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel outlined two realistic and balanced alternatives for enlargement, forward progress was blocked by a combination of regional rivalries, intraEuropean differences, and U.S. disengagement. The program will examine prospects and preconditions for a renewed reform effort that would satisfy the aspirations of critical players (including Japan, India, Germany, and Brazil) while extending Security Council representation to Africa and the Middle East.  

 

The Group of Eight. The obsolescence of current mechanisms of global governance is increasingly apparent in the management of the world economy, not least during the annual summits of the G-8. It simply makes no sense to exclude from this ostensible global directorate the world’s largest emerging economies, including China, India, and Brazil, as well as multiple other middle powers. The program will examine the merits of recent proposals to expand the membership of the G-8 (such as the “L-20” proposal championed by former Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin); as well as to create unique groupings tailored to discrete political, economic, or functional issues (e.g., energy or migration). 

Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations. One of the hallmarks of the past two decades has been the formation, deepening, and enlargement of formal regional organizations in many corners of the globe. The mandates, competencies, capacities, and effectiveness of these heterogeneous bodies vary enormously. The United States has a critical interest—and a central role to play—in ensuring that these bodies play their full and appropriate role in managing global insecurity and in providing public goods for their respective regions. The program intends to examine the current status and potential role of multilateral bodies in at least some of the following regions, drawing on relevant CFR scholars:

Europe, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

Asia-Pacific, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum, and potential sub-regional security architecture for Northeast Asia.

Africa, notably the African Union (including its new Peace and Security Council), the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and other relevant organs.

South and Central Asia, including the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and other potential multilateral arrangements for these two subregions.

Latin America, including the Organization of American States, the Summit of the Americas, sub-regional trade groupings (e.g., NAFTA, CAFTA, Mercosur), and potential groupings of like-minded countries to manage transnational challenges like energy security, migration and narcotics.

The Middle East, including the G-8 sponsored Forum for the Future, the Arab League, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

Big Picture Issues

 As we explore the most appropriate international frameworks to address today’s global agenda, the program will seek to break new ground on three big picture issues: the changing nature of sovereignty in an age of globalization; the challenges of accommodating non-state actors in global decision-making; and the preconditions for democratic accountability in multilateral institutions.

Re-conceptualizing “sovereignty” in an age of globalization. The post-Cold War era has posed challenges to traditional concepts of state sovereignty, in at least four respects. First, some failing and post-conflict states have become wards of the international community, submitting to a form of UN “neo-trusteeship.” Second, some countries by their conduct have lost their immunity from intervention, as part of an emerging doctrine of “contingent sovereignty.” Third, nearly all states – including the United States – have voluntarily forfeited some historic freedom of action to manage transnational threats and exploit international opportunities. Finally, some countries, particularly in the EU, have chosen to “pool” their sovereignty in return for economic, social, and political benefits. The program could provide a valuable intellectual contribution by tracing the scope and implications of these transformations.

Accommodating non-state actors in global governance. Although states remain the foundation of international order, they face growing competition as wielders of influence and (often) legitimacy from non-state actors. In designing new frameworks of global governance, the United States and other governments must provide opportunities for partnership with and input from interested stakeholders, including civil society actors, advocacy groups, and corporations—without allowing the global agenda to be hijacked by unrepresentative interests. The program can identify lessons from recent experience about how to strike this delicate balance.

Overcoming the “democratic deficit” in global governance arrangements. Efforts at international cooperation, particularly of a supranational character (as in the European Union), often become divorced from the democratic will of the national publics of member states. By examining multilateral institutions across a variety of sectors, the program may generate useful insights about how to improve the democratic accountability of multilateral bodies. It might also evaluate the frequent contention that an Alliance of Democracies represents a plausible framework for global order and a realistic alternative to the UN (which obviously includes authoritarian as well as democratic regimes).

THE PROGRAM’S VALUE ADDED

CFR’s program on international institutions and global governance seeks to make a significant contribution to U.S. and international understanding of the institutional infrastructure required for effective multilateral cooperation in the twenty-first century. The program is envisioned as a multi-year effort, rather than a one to two-year project geared toward a specific event or electoral cycle. This relative permanence will hopefully permit CFR to become a center of excellence in thinking about global governance, and a repository of useful knowledge and lessons learned available to other scholars and institutions. It will also facilitate the difficult process of building domestic political consensus— within the executive and legislative branches, the policy community, and the informed public—about the appropriate parameters of U.S. engagement in multilateral cooperation.

The program’s location within the Council on Foreign Relations will prove invaluable in furthering its ambitious aims. The program will exploit the CFR’s convening power, offering forums in New York, Washington, and around the country where domestic and international opinion leaders can debate proposed institutional reforms with the Council’s membership. Through co-hosting events with partner institutions in the United State and abroad, the program will solicit input and buy-in from foreign governments and publics, as well as representatives from civil society and the private sector, for proposed recommendations on global governance. Finally, the program will serve a broader role in bipartisan consensus-building and public education by engaging administration officials and members of Congress on new directions in global governance, and by making its products widely available through a variety of media.

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The Banality of ‘Don’t Be Evil’ & the CFR

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Google Chairman CFR member Eric Schmidt shares a joke with  Hillary Clinton, wife of CFR member Bill Clinton, during a special “fireside chat” with Google staff. The talk was held on 21 Jul 2014 at Google’s headquarters in Mountain View, California.

Julian Assange’s article The Banality of Don’t Be Evil appeared in the New York Times on June 1, 2013. It is about Google, Google Chairman Eric Schmidt and Google’s director of Google Ideas Jared Cohen. Missing from the article are connections to the Council on Foreign Relations. Both Schmidt and Cohen are members. Just about every other person mentioned in the article is also a CFR member.

Assange’s book Google Met Wikileaks makes the connection clear. I have modified the article to make the connection clear in The Banality of ‘Don’t Be Evil’ too.

The golden rule of CFR members is the ends justify the means. CFR member Madeleine Albright gives a disturbing illustration of this in a video where she rationalizes the murder of 500,000 women and children.

The CFR took control of the government of the U.S. in 1921`and has kept the world in a state of endless war ever since. They are now in the process of developing a new kind of war – cyberwar. They will add a new cyberwar branch to the military which will become another CFR military industrial complex profit center. The CFR membership is evil and is the rat in RATionalization. Read all about them.

SundayReview | Opinion

The Banality of ‘Don’t Be Evil’

By JULIAN ASSANGE JUNE 1, 2013

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“THE New Digital Age” is a startlingly clear and provocative blueprint for technocratic imperialism, from two of its leading witch doctors, [CFR member] Eric Schmidt and [CFR member] Jared Cohen, who construct a new idiom for United States global power in the 21st century. This idiom reflects the ever closer union between the [CFR run] State Department and Silicon Valley, as personified by [CFR member] Mr. Schmidt, the executive chairman of Google, and [CFR member] Mr. Cohen, a former adviser to [CFR member] Condoleezza Rice and Hillary Clinton [wife of CFR member Bill Clinton & mother of CFR member Chelsea Clinton] who is now director of Google Ideas.

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Director of Google Ideas, and “geopolitical visionary” CFR member Jared Cohen shares his vision with US Army recruits in a lecture theater at West Point Military Academy on 26 Feb 2014 (Instagram by Eric Schmidt) The vision includes censoring the internet using his new software being developed in project Jigsaw. Do you think the NSA/CIA might be helping Jared develop jigsaw?

The authors met in occupied Baghdad in 2009, when the book was conceived. [Could the authors met long before at the CFR and been sent to Baghdad by the CFR run NSA/CIA to try and help shape things?]  Strolling among the ruins, the two became excited that consumer technology was transforming a society flattened by United States military occupation. They decided the tech industry could be a powerful agent of American foreign policy.

The book proselytizes the role of technology in reshaping the world’s people and nations into likenesses of the world’s dominant superpower, whether they want to be reshaped or not. The prose is terse, the argument confident and the wisdom — banal. But this isn’t a book designed to be read. It is a major declaration designed to foster alliances.

“The New Digital Age” is, beyond anything else, an attempt by Google to position itself as America’s geopolitical visionary — the one company that can answer the question “Where should America go?” It is not surprising that a respectable cast of the world’s most famous warmongers has been trotted out to give its stamp of approval to this enticement to Western soft power. The acknowledgments give pride of place to [CFR member] Henry Kissinger, who along with [Chatham House member] Tony Blair and the former C.I.A. director [CFR member] Michael Hayden provided advance praise for the book.

kiss

Google’s Chairman,  CFR member Eric Schmidt, photographed in a New York elevator, carrying CFR member Henry Kissinger’s new book, “World Order”, 25 Sep 2014

In the book the authors happily take up the white geek’s burden. A liberal sprinkling of convenient, hypothetical dark-skinned worthies appear: Congolese fisherwomen, graphic designers in Botswana, anticorruption activists in San Salvador and illiterate Masai cattle herders in the Serengeti are all obediently summoned to demonstrate the progressive properties of Google phones jacked into the informational supply chain of the Western empire.

The authors offer an expertly banalized version of tomorrow’s world: the gadgetry of decades hence is predicted to be much like what we have right now — only cooler. “Progress” is driven by the inexorable spread of American consumer technology over the surface of the earth. Already, every day, another million or so Google-run mobile devices are activated. Google will interpose itself, and hence the United States government, between the communications of every human being not in China (naughty China). Commodities just become more marvelous; young, urban professionals sleep, work and shop with greater ease and comfort; democracy is insidiously subverted by technologies of surveillance, and control is enthusiastically rebranded as “participation”; and our present world order of systematized domination, intimidation and oppression continues, unmentioned, unafflicted or only faintly perturbed.

The authors are sour about the Egyptian triumph of 2011. They dismiss the Egyptian youth witheringly, claiming that “the mix of activism and arrogance in young people is universal.” Digitally inspired mobs mean revolutions will be “easier to start” but “harder to finish.” Because of the absence of strong leaders, the result, or so [CFR member] Mr. Kissinger tells the authors, will be coalition governments that descend into autocracies. They say there will be “no more springs” (but China is on the ropes).

hills.jpg

CFR member Eric Schmidt’s Instagram of CFR spouse Hillary Clinton and CFR member David Rubinstein, taken at the Holbrooke Forum Gala, 5 Dec 2013. CFR member Richard Holbrooke (who died in 2010) was a high-profile US diplomat, managing director of Lehman brothers, a board member of NED, CFR, the Trilateral Commission, the Bilderberg steering group and an advisor to Hillary Clinton and CFR member John Kerry. CFR member Schmidt donated over $100k to the the Holbrooke Forum

The authors fantasize about the future of “well resourced” revolutionary groups. A new “crop of consultants” will “use data to build and fine-tune a political figure.”

“His” speeches (the future isn’t all that different) and writing will be fed “through complex feature-extraction and trend-analysis software suites” while “mapping his brain function,” and other “sophisticated diagnostics” will be used to “assess the weak parts of his political repertoire.”

The book mirrors State Department institutional taboos and obsessions. It avoids meaningful criticism of Israel and Saudi Arabia. It pretends, quite extraordinarily, that the Latin American sovereignty movement, which has liberated so many from United States-backed plutocracies and dictatorships over the last 30 years, never happened. Referring instead to the region’s “aging leaders,” the book can’t see Latin America for Cuba. And, of course, the book frets theatrically over Washington’s favorite boogeymen: North Korea and Iran.

Google, which started out as an expression of independent Californian graduate student culture — a decent, humane and playful culture — has, as it encountered the big, bad world, thrown its lot in with traditional Washington power elements, from the State Department to the National Security Agency.

Despite accounting for an infinitesimal fraction of violent deaths globally, terrorism is a favorite brand in United States policy circles. This is a fetish that must also be catered to, and so “The Future of Terrorism” gets a whole chapter. The future of terrorism, we learn, is cyberterrorism. A session of indulgent scaremongering follows, including a breathless disaster-movie scenario, wherein cyberterrorists take control of American air-traffic control systems and send planes crashing into buildings, shutting down power grids and launching nuclear weapons. The authors then tar activists who engage in digital sit-ins with the same brush.

I have a very different perspective. The advance of information technology epitomized by Google heralds the death of privacy for most people and shifts the world toward authoritarianism. This is the principal thesis in my book, “Cypherpunks.” But while [CFR members] Mr. Schmidt and Mr. Cohen tell us that the death of privacy will aid governments in “repressive autocracies” in “targeting their citizens,” they also say governments in “open” democracies will see it as “a gift” enabling them to “better respond to citizen and customer concerns.” In reality, the erosion of individual privacy in the West and the attendant centralization of power make abuses inevitable, moving the “good” societies closer to the “bad” ones.

The section on “repressive autocracies” describes, disapprovingly, various repressive surveillance measures: legislation to insert back doors into software to enable spying on citizens, monitoring of social networks and the collection of intelligence on entire populations. All of these are already in widespread use in the United States. In fact, some of those measures — like the push to require every social-network profile to be linked to a real name — were spearheaded by Google itself.

THE writing is on the wall, but the authors cannot see it. They borrow from William Dobson the idea that the media, in an autocracy, “allows for an opposition press as long as regime opponents understand where the unspoken limits are.” But these trends are beginning to emerge in the United States. No one doubts the chilling effects of the investigations into The Associated Press and Fox’s James Rosen. But there has been little analysis of Google’s role in complying with the Rosen subpoena. I have personal experience of these trends.

The Department of Justice admitted in March that it was in its third year of a continuing criminal investigation of WikiLeaks. Court testimony states that its targets include “the founders, owners, or managers of WikiLeaks.” One alleged source, Bradley Manning, faces a 12-week trial beginning tomorrow, with 24 prosecution witnesses expected to testify in secret.

This book is a balefully seminal work in which neither author has the language to see, much less to express, the titanic centralizing evil they are constructing. “What [CFR member Corporation] Lockheed Martin was to the 20th century,” they tell us, “technology and cybersecurity companies will be to the 21st.” Without even understanding how, they have updated and seamlessly implemented George Orwell’s prophecy. If you want a vision of the future, imagine Washington-backed Google Glasses strapped onto vacant human faces — forever. Zealots of the cult of consumer technology will find little to inspire them here, not that they ever seem to need it. But this is essential reading for anyone caught up in the struggle for the future, in view of one simple imperative: Know your enemy.

Julian Assange is the editor in chief of WikiLeaks and author of “Cypherpunks: Freedom and the Future of the Internet.”

A version of this op-ed appears in print on June 2, 2013, on page SR4 of the New York edition with the headline: The Banality of ‘Don’t Be Evil’. Today’s Paper|Subscribe

 

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TRAITORS WITHIN THE GATES: CFR’S MILITARY MEMBERSHIP ROSTER by Charleston Voice

Charleston Voice

Somehow the text on the Charleston Voice web page has become hidden. Go to the page and it appears blank. Type ctrl-A to select the page and the text appears. Wonder how that happened. Since it did I am posting a copy of the page here.

NOPE. YOU WON’T FIND ANY SMEDLEY BUTLERS AMONGST THESE TRAMPS.
AMERICA’S CFR-led US Military:

Once a Marine, always a Marine until 

you betray your countrymen.

image: http://www.cfr.org/content/bios/Buhl_dl.jpg
Colonel Willard Buhl

buhl-pic

“I am currently a military fellow,
U.S. Marine Corps, at the Council
on Foreign Relations (CFR) in New York.
I joined CFR after the great privilege
and honor of commanding the “Fighting”
Fifth Marine Regiment for the past two
years.”

GEN David Petraeus – Director CIA (Aug. 2011) Resigned 11/9/12 Admitted Adulterer present Commander of U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan, 

former Commander of Central Command (CENTCOM), former Commander of U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq, former Commander of 101st Airborne Division

                                      http://en.wikipedia.org

 

GEN Stan McChrystal – former Commander of U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan[ “spent (a) year as a military fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.”]

                                             http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanley_A._McChrystal

 

GEN John Abizaid – former Commander of Central Command (CENTCOM)

 

GEN John Shalikashvili – former Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (1993-1997)

 

GEN Colin Powell – former Secretary of State (2001-2005); former Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (1989-1993)

 

GEN Richard Myers – former Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (2001-2005)

 

GEN Wesley Clark – former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe under Clinton; a Rhodes Scholar; “Clark commanded Operation Allied Force in the Kosovo War during his term as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATOfrom 1997 to 2000.” US Presidential candidate 2004

                                  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wesley_Clark

 

GEN Alexander Haig Jr. – former Secretary of State (1981-1982); former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (1974-1979)

                                                http://www.christianlifeandliberty.net/2010-02-28-Gen-Alexander-Haig-dead-at-85-CFR-Bilderberg-RC-       Knight-of-Malta-Newsmax-NWO-servant.doc

 

GEN Carl Vuono – former Army Chief of Staff (1987-1991)

 

ADM William Crowe – USN – former Ambassador to Great Britain (1994-1997); former Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (1985-1989)

 

GEN John Wickham – former Army Chief of Staff (1983-1987)

 

GEN Fred Woerner – former Commander of U.S. Southern Command (1987-1989)

 

GEN Larry Welch – former Air Force Chief of Staff (1986-1990)

 

MAJ GEN William Usher – former Air Force general

 

GEN Andrew Goodpaster – former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (1969-1974), former Superintendent of U.S. Military Academy at West Point (1977-1981)

 

GEN William Westmoreland – Chief of Staff of the United States Army (1968-1972), commanded US military operations in the Vietnam War (1964-1968), former Superintendent of U.S. Military Academy at West Point (1960-1963)

 

LT GEN Bernard Trainor – United States Marine Corps

 

ADM Harry Train II – former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (1978-1982); former Commander of Sixth Fleet (1976-1978)

 

GEN Gordon Sullivan – former Army Chief of Staff (1991-1995)

 

MAJ GEN Perry Smith – United States Air Force – former Commandant of National War College (1983-1986)

 

GEN Eric Shinseki – former Army Chief of Staff (1999-2003)

 

LTG Brent Scowcroft – USAF – former National Security Advisor (1989-1993, 1975-1977)

 

GEN Norton Schwartz – USAF – Commander of U.S. Transportation Command (begin 2005)

 

GEN Michael Ryan – former Air Force Chief of Staff (1997-2001)

 

VICE ADM Ann Rondeau – Director of Navy Staff; former Commander of Naval Training Center Great Lakes

 

BG Frederick Roggero – USAF – Deputy Director of Operations at the Air Mobility Command Headquarters

 

GEN Dennis Reimer – former Army Chief of Staff (1995-1999)

 

ADM William Owens – former Vice Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (1994-1996)

 

COL Lee Olvey – former Head of Department of Social Sciences at U.S. Military Academy at West Point (at some point promoted to rank of BG)

 

COL Douglas Murray – USAF – Head of Department of Political Science at Air Force Academy

 

GEN Carl Mundy – former Commandant of the Marine Corps (1991-1995)

 

GEN Teed Moseley – USAF – Air Force Chief of Staff (begin 2005)

 

GEN Edward Meyer – former Army Chief of Staff (1979-1983)

 

GEN Merrill McPeak – USAF – former Air Force Chief of Staff (1990-1994)

 

GEN Barry McCaffrey – former Commander of U.S. Southern Command (1994-1996); Clinton’s “drug czar”

 

CPT David Marquet – United States Navy (O-6) – former Commander of Submarine Squadron Three

 

COL Thomas Lynch – former Commander, U.S. Army Forces Central Command at Qatar

 

LTG William Lennox – former Superintendent of U.S. Military Academy at West Point (2001-2006)

 

ADM Charles Larson – USN – former Superintendent of U.S. Naval Academy under Reagan and Clinton

 

LTG James Lampert – former Superintendent of U.S. Military Academy at West Point (1963-1966), Lampert was a member of the Board of Director[s] of West Point’s Association of Graduates (AOG) and became AOG’s president in 1978.

 

MG William Knowlton – former Superintendent of U.S. Military Academy at West Point (1970-1974)

 

LTG Frank Klotz – USAF – Vice Commander of Air Force Space Command (begin 2005); a Rhodes Scholar

 

LTG Jack Klimp – USMC – former Commander of Task Force Mogadishu in 1993

 

GEN Paul X. Kelley – USMC – former Commandant of the Marine Corps (1983-1987)

 

GEN John Jumper – USAF – former Air Force Chief of Staff (2001-2005)

 

LTG Bradley Hosmer – USAF – former Superintendent of U.S. Air Force Academy (1991-1994)

 

GEN Joseph Hoar – USMC – Marine Corps general; former CENTCOM commander (1991-1994)

 

COL Peter Henry – former Chief of Staff of Multinational Security Transition Command in Iraq and former Deputy Commander of Civilian Police Assistance Training Team in Baghdad, Iraq.

 

ADM Thomas Hayward – USN – former Chief of Naval Operations (1978-1982)

 

LTG Michael Hamel – USAF – Commander of Space and Missile Systems Center, Air Force Space Command

 

MG Craig Hackett – Commander, U.S. Army Security Assistance Command at Fort Belvoir, Virginia

 

REAR ADM Jeffrey Fowler – USN – Commander, U.S. Navy Recruiting Command

 

ADM Robert Foley Jr. – USN – former Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (1982-1985); former Commander of Seventh Fleet

 

GEN Ronald Fogleman – USAF – former Air Force Chief of Staff (1994-1997)

 

BG George Flynn – USMC – Chief of Staff, U.S. Special Operations Command under [ President George W. Bush ]

 

GEN Ralph Eberhart – USAF – former Commander of Northern Command and NORAD (2000-2004)

 

LTG Daniel Christman – former Superintendent of U.S. Military Academy at West Point (1996-2001)

 

GEN Burwell Bell – Commander, U.S. Forces Korea; former Commander of U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR)

 

LTG Sid Berry – former Superintendent of U.S. Military Academy at West Point (1974-1977) – USMA Superintendent when U.S. Congress ruinously forced admission of females into the U.S. Service Academies for the first time in 1976.

 

GEN Donald Bennett – former Superintendent of U.S. Military Academy at West Point (1966-1968)

 

GEN Lew Allen Jr. – USAF – former Air Force Chief of Staff (1978-1982); director of National Security Agency (1973-1977)

 

ADM Charles “Steve” Abbot – USN – former Deputy Commander of U.S. European Command; a Rhodes Scholar
Source is doc file& is dated March 2011

Labels: betrayals CFR Conspiracy Military Treason VA Veterans
Read more at http://chasvoice.blogspot.com/2011/12/cfrs-military-membership-roster.html#MhJYYJk2xzy5QvFC.99

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Hannity-Gingrich Interview A Limited Hangout

hannity-gingrich

 A ‘limited hangout’ is spy jargon for a favorite and frequently used gimmick of the clandestine professionals. When their veil of secrecy is shredded and they can no longer rely on a phony cover story to misinform the public, they resort to admitting–sometimes even volunteering–some of the truth while still managing to withhold the key and damaging facts in the case. The public, however, is usually so intrigued by the new information that it never thinks to pursue the matter further.

 On October 27th Sean Hannity, who works for FOX news interviewed Newt Gingrich.  Newt’s topic was Newt Gingrich on Clinton corruption, liberal bias.  FOX news is owned by Council on Foreign Relations member Rupert Murdoch. Newt Gingrich is a CFR member and a paid contributor to FOX news. The Gingrich interview attacks CFR spouse Hillary Clinton whose daughter Chelsea is also a CFR member. The story faults a liberal main stream media run by the “elite” as misleading the American people. What is never discussed in the interview is that the CFR runs all the media  – conservative and liberal. What is never discussed in the interview is that CFR member Walter Lippmann and his sidekick Bernay’s are the fathers of modern propaganda. What is left out of the interview is that 22 Secretaries of State, 18 CIA directors and 18 NSA directors are members of the CFR.  By leaving out the CFR role in the story, in main stream media and in our government Hannity and Gingrich are doing exactly what they accuse the liberal elite media of doing – mis-directing their audience and participating in a limited hangout.

CFR Lippmann quote

 CFR member Newt tells us “… it’s almost unpatriotic to have the level of deliberate disinformation and deliberate censorship that we’re getting out of the elite media. And I think it’s something the average American gets…”  What the average American doesn’t seem to get, largely because the news media doesn’t make it known, is that the problem is the CFR shadow government that moves from administration to administration. What the average American doesn’t seem to get is that they must insist the Justice department investigate the CFR and their connection to the JFK assassination, Iran Contra affair, the FED, the Economic Crisis, the Endless Wars, Main Stream Media, the Intelligence Department, The Banks, the Defense Industry, the Universities and insist all members be tried for treason and caged for the rest of their lives.

cfr-edward-r-murrow-lippmann

Below is the Hannity-Gingrich transcript. The transcript has been modified to clarify CFR connections in the story.

Newt Gingrich on Clinton corruption, liberal bias

gingrich

Here with reaction, the author of the best-seller “Treason,” former speaker of the House, Fox News contributor [CFR member] Newt Gingrich is with us.

We’re talking about $116 million. I want to put these revelations next to an AP story that said, remember, 55 percent of individuals that got to see [CFR spouse] Hillary when she was secretary of state were either donors or people committing money to the foundation.

Now add that to the Haiti story. They raise this money, separate list for foundation donors and friends of [CFR member] Bill so they can cash in on the contracts after 150,000 people died and they raised money and they would be first in line to make more money so they could funnel it back to the[CFR run] Clinton Foundation.

How does this not get picked up — how is this not Watergate in the minds of the rest of the media?

[CFR member] NEWT GINGRICH, R, FMR. HOUSE SPEAKER, FOX CONTRIBUTOR: Well, it’s beginning to get picked up. You know, I think somebody pointed out that on [CFR member Joe Scarbourgh’s] “Morning Joe,” they spent 13 minutes attacking the [CFR member] Clintons [yet never made reference to their CFR affiliations]  this morning.
Now, that’s unheard of. That’s a breakdown in [CFR member run aka] elite media discipline that is hard to imagine. [BTW CFR member Gingrich is a paid contributor to CFR member Rupert Murdoch’s Fox News]

 

And I’ll be interesting to see by tomorrow, where is The Washington Post [Founded by the CFR member Graham family], where’s [The CFR run] The New York Times. This stuff’s getting so big and smelling so bad that I think they’re going to have a very hard time hiding from it.

You know, if the Federal Bureau of Investigation was still a law enforcement agency, we would have a grand jury impaneled to be taking testimony right now and not negotiating but issuing subpoenas.

HANNITY: Well, wait a minute. I beg to differ. On, no, they’re a law enforcement organization because if you did it, they would have impaneled that grand jury right now. If I did it, that grand jury would be impaneled right now. Therein lies a big problem with have with our Justice Department.

[CFR member] GINGRICH: Right because — because that’s not law enforcement. That’s selective prosecution. Law enforcement says that all of us are under the law. All of us have to obey the law. All of us have to face the same consequences.

We know for a fact from all this stuff that you have the head of the [CFR family] Clinton campaign, John Podesta, going off to dinner with the Justice Department. You have weird negotiations with various Clinton officials, things nobody gets from the FBI. You have the president — the former president [CFR member Bill Clinton] and the attorney general meeting on a plane in secret the same week they’re going to interrogate Hillary.

I mean, this is the kind of stuff that in a place like Venezuela, you would understand because they don’t have the rule of law. [ This is the kind of stuff orchestrated by a CFR run government]

But what we’re seeing right now — and WikiLeaks, in a sense, is ripping the scar off of the largest amount of corruption in American history. This beats any prior corruption scandal I know of, including the 1868 period where Grant was president, including the Harding administration, I mean, including some of the things that happened under Truman. None of those things were like this.

This is the largest scandal affecting a senior American politician I think in the history of the United States. And it’s as you yourself just pointed out, you have Hillary Clinton clearly trading on the office of secretary of state in a way which has to be — I’m not a lawyer, but my guess is you’ve got probably 60 or 70 counts against her just in terms of scheduling people to come into her office…[ What CFR member Gingrich fails to point out is that the Office of secretary of state was taken over officially by the CFR and the scandal and the failure to explore the CFR role in the scandle is due to him and other CFR members in the media and government leaving the CFR connection out of the story]

HANNITY: And yet she could be elected president.

[CFR MEMBER] GINGRICH: … who they knew…

HANNITY: And yet according to polls, she’s in this race.

[CFR MEMBER] GINGRICH: And she might (INAUDIBLE)

HANNITY: In 12 days, she could possibly win this election. What does that say?[It says the American people’s reality world is being tampered with by a CFR run government and main stream media – of which you Sean and Newt are a part of]

[CFR MEMBER] GINGRICH: That’s right. Well, it says that our country is a culture in crisis. Our country has got to decide, does the rule of law apply to everyone, or are we now going to be a country where some people are above the law, and no matter how corrupt they are — you know, putting [CFR member] Bill Clinton back in the White House, given everything we’re learning, I think would be almost a sign of sickness.

And I [also a member of the CFR just like Bill, his daughter Chelsea, 22 Secretaries of State 18 CIA directors and 18 NSA directors] personally — this is why I’ve always told you I thought that she would lose and Donald Trump would win. In the end, I don’t think the majority of American people are going to put somebody who is a liar and a crook in the White House. I just — I have enough faith in the American people that when they get down to voting — I’ve had several people say this to me this week, that when they got right down to it, they simply couldn’t vote for her.

HANNITY: All right, we’ll take a break. We’ll come back. We have more with Newt Gingrich right after this break.

HANNITY: And we continue with former speaker of the House [CFR member] Newt Gingrich.

“The greatest pile-on in history” — in many ways, you know, we’ve discussed, for example, last night we’ve learned Wikileaks that a lot of these reporters, mainstream media, they’re being wined and dined by the [CFR run] Clinton campaign. And this is from [CFR run] ABC, the Associated Press, Bloomberg, CBS, CNBC, CNN, MSNBC, The New York Times, Politico, The Hill, The Wall Street Journal!

I never got the invitation. Did you get one? Because I’ve never been invited to any of these things.

[CFR MEMBER] GINGRICH: Well, I don’t think you’re going to be, either. [says CFR member Newt Gingrich who avoided the answer to the question because he has a tight relationship with CFR member Bill Clinton ]

HANNITY: I don’t want to be. I really don’t want it!

(LAUGHTER)

[CFR MEMBER] GINGRICH: I don’t think — I don’t think the Clintons have you on their list of possible allies. [ where as Bill and Newt not only are fellow CFR members but have a lot in common in the way they treat their women ]

HANNITY: But let me tell you one other thing! I’ve never been to Mar-a- Lago. I’ve never stayed in a Trump hotel. I’ve never been to a Trump golf course, and never been invited there, either. Everyone hates me, I guess!
You know, what’s up with that? I’m beginning to get a complex.

[CFR MEMBER] GINGRICH: Well, I don’t know. I think — you know, I’m confident that if you ask, Donald will get you on a golf course.

HANNITY: I’ll pay my way. I don’t need anything for free.

[CFR MEMBER] GINGRICH: I don’t know. I don’t know — I don’t know — that’s right.
You’re (INAUDIBLE) Look, a couple quick things just so the audience gets the full flavor of this. And let me say, by the way, because I know you’re going to cover later on on a very important part of this show, the “New Deal” for African-Americans and for the black community is a really big idea.

Donald Trump has done more to communicate concern and to communicate solutions to the African-American community than any Republican presidential candidate in my lifetime. And the speech yesterday was a big deal.

I know it’s going to be on later on in the show, and I just want to tell you — I think people should note how many things he’s saying and doing that are substantive, his contract with the American voter, which, again, as a guy who wrote the “Contract With America,” I’m very sympathetic to contracts. It’s a great contract. Everybody should go look at it and should see at the Web site for the contract, that in fact, this is something that’s real. It is specific. It is totally different from where Hillary Clinton would take us. And I think these are big breakthroughs, but you’re not going to see much of it in the elite media because it’s all positive.

HANNITY: I actually have — and this is actually signed by Trump. This is his “Contract With America.” Now, he talks about six measures to clean up corruption, drain the swamp, as he calls it, special interests, seven actions to protect American workers, five actions to restore security and constitutional rule of law, middle class tax simplification, Ending the Offshoring Act, American Energy and Infrastructure Act, School Choice and Education Opportunity Act, Repeal and Replace “Obama care” Act, Affordable Child Care and Elder Care Act, Illegal — End the Illegal Immigration Act, Restoring Community Safety Act, Restoring National Security Act and cleaning up corruption in Washington.

There are two pages. I’ve put it up on my Web site, Hannity.com, and people say he’s not substantive. They don’t want to cover the substance of Donald Trump. They don’t want to cover this. And maybe he needs to do what you did when you were running, pull it out of his pocket in every interview and say, This is what I’m going to do. I don’t want to talk about A, B and C, what you want to talk about.

[CFR MEMBER] GINGRICH: Look, I mean, I think he should probably hold it up at every single rally and tell people that they can go to his Web site and they can sign up and they can be part of this contract between him and the American people, and I think — you know, because we did it and he knows how we did it, he knows we kept our word, he knows we voted on every single thing in the 1994 “Contract With America.”

And I think he’s trying to make a case here that he is really committed to very, very dramatic change. I think it’s pathetic that The New York Times, The Washington Post, et cetera, NBC, CBS, ABC — none of these guys can serve America by letting them see that there is a real alternative.

I mean, it’s almost unpatriotic to have the level of deliberate disinformation and deliberate censorship that we’re getting out of the elite media.[Which is run by the CFR – the organization Newt and Fox News owner Murdoch belong & like Newt and Murdoch leave the CFR out of story – a lie of omission and same mis-direction technique used by the CFR run liberal media and the CFR run intelligence community. The technique even has a name – Limited Hangout.]

And I think it’s something the average American gets. And one of the reasons you’re getting these huge voter turnouts, I think, is to send a signal to the news media, You’re not going to dictate to us that we have to vote for some corrupt left-winger. We’re going to show you. And I think you’re going to find some very surprising results this fall.[  What the average American doesn’t seem to get, or which the news media doesn’t make known is that the problem is the CFR shadow government that moves from administration to administration. What the average American doesn’t seem to get is that they must insist the Justice department investigate the CFR and their connection to the JFK assassination, Iran Contra affair, the FED, the Economic Crisis, the Endless Wars, Main Stream Media, the Intelligence Department, The Banks, the Defense Industry, the Universities and insist all members be tried for treason and caged for the rest of their lives.]

HANNITY: All right, can only hope so. Twelve days to go, Mr. Speaker.
Appreciate you being with us.

 

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