How Council on Foreign Relations Republican Justice Sandra Day O’Conner, Republican Justice Anthony Kennedy, and Republican Justice David Souter used their positions to help divide and conquer the bewildered herd

Liberty

 

The way the CFR works is clearly explained by the famous journalist Walter Lippmann. Lippmann was a member of America’s first intelligence organization the INQUIRY, attended the Paris Peace Conference after World War I, and was a founding father of the Council on Foreign Relations. Central to Lippmann’s strategy of achieving government and international relations policy aims were large scale psycho-political operations aimed at the masses. Lippmann and his fellow Council on Foreign Relations members considered themselves superior to their fellows. Lippmann clearly shows how Council on Foreign Relations members feel about us in his book Public opinion, “The public must be put in its place…so that each of us may live free of the trampling and the roar of a bewildered herd.’” The Council on Foreign Relations believes that controlling the minds of the masses is essential to the proper functioning of a modern democracy. The Council on Foreign Relations control of main stream media along with their control of U.S. intelligence organizations is used to achieve these ends.

bernays lippmann

Natural law is the foundation of the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution and religion. We are being taught to forget both human nature and the God who created it. Four Council on Foreign Relations members have been Supreme Court justices: Sandra Day O’Conner, Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Neil Gorsuch. The Council on Foreign Relations are using the Supreme Court to interpret our rights to Life, Liberty and Happiness in fanciful and destructive ways. This results in insurmountable societal divisions used to divide and conquer the bewildered herd by setting us against each other and creating polarized politics.

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) member Republican Justice Sandra Day O’Conner helped the CFR achieve this result in the Planned Parenthood vs Casey, SCOTUS 5-4 decision, in June of 1992. Sandra Day O’Conner and republican justices Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter provided decisive swing votes to uphold Roe Vs. Wade. Their decision upholding the right to abortion stated: “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”

This statement redefines liberty. It suggests there is no universal or absolute set of moral principles by which liberty is bound and we can do anything at all. How can our Creator have created us equal if we have the liberty to define ourselves as better than our neighbors? If  O’Conner’s, Kennedy’s and Souter’s liberty were the liberty defended by the Declaration, we could never have formed a society at all.

natural law

The Declaration of Independence reminds us our freedom comes from the Laws of Nature and the Laws of God  When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”

Thomas Jefferson reminds us “Rightful liberty is unobstructed action according to our will within limits drawn around us by the equal rights of others. I do not add ‘within the limits of the law’ because law is often but the tyrant’s will, and always so when it violates the rights of the individual.”

Thomas Jefferson made the “Golden Rule” the foundation of American Democracy by changing John Locke’s Natural rights law from Life, Liberty and Property to the inalienable rights of Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness. The change insures decisions driven by civic virtue instead of selfishness. The change resulted from Jefferson’s understanding of the “Golden Rule” and his struggle with slavery. The original draft of the Declaration of Independence contained a scathing denunciation of slavery: : “he has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life & liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating & carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their transportation thither. this piratical warfare, the opprobrium of infidel powers, is the warfare of the CHRISTIAN king of Great Britain. determined to keep open a market where MEN should be bought & sold, he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or to restrain this execrable commerce and that this assemblage of horrors might want no fact of distinguished die, he is now exciting those very people to rise in arms among us, and to purchase that liberty of which he has deprived them, by murdering the people upon whom he also obtruded them; thus paying off former crimes committed against the liberties of one people, with crimes which he urges them to commit against the lives of another.” http://www.princeton.edu/~tjpapers/declaration/declaration.html

Jefferson’s change declares it immoral and illegal to consider one person the property of another. If you would be unhappy being owned by someone else it follows that it is wrong to consider another person your property. If the original draft of the Declaration of Independence had been approved there would have been no slavery after the revolution of 1776. The original draft was not approved, slavery was not abolished, and a civil war was fought leaving a legacy of bitterness in America still felt today.

Jefferson advantages of religion

In John Locke’s Second Treatise of Civil Government John Locke (1690) CHAP. IV. Of Slavery, Locke uses Natural Law to show why laws of man permitting slavery are wrong.

Sec.22. THE natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his rule. The liberty of man, in society, is to be under no other legislative power, but that established, by consent, in the commonwealth; nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall enact, according to the trust put in it. Freedom then is not what Sir Robert Filmer tells us, Observations, A. 55. a liberty for every one to do what he lists, to live as he pleases, and not to be tied by any laws: but freedom of men under government is, to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man: as freedom of nature is, to be under no other restraint but the law of nature.

Sec.23. This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to, and closely joined with a man’s preservation, that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his preservation and life together: for a man, not having the power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or his own consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of another, to take away his life, when he pleases. No body can give more power than he has himself; and he that cannot take away his own life, cannot give another power over it. Indeed, having by his fault forfeited his own life, by some act that deserves death; he, to whom he has forfeited it, may (when he has him in his power) delay to take it, and make use of him to his own service, and he does him no injury by it: for, whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery outweigh the value of his life, it is in his power, by resisting the will of his master, to draw on himself the death he desires.

Sec.24. This is the perfect condition of slavery, which is nothing else, but the state of war continued, between a lawful conqueror and a captive: for, if once compact enter between them, and make an agreement for a limited power on the one side, and obedience on the other, the state of war and slavery ceases, as long as the compact endures: for, as has been said, no man can, by agreement, pass over to another that which he hath not in himself, a power over his own life.

I confess, we find among the Jews, as well as other nations, that men did sell themselves; but, it is plain, this was only to drudgery, not to slavery: for, it is evident, the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary, despotical power: for the master could not have power to kill him, at any time, whom, at a certain time, he was obliged to let go free out of his service; and the master of such a servant was so far from having an arbitrary power over his life, that he could not, at pleasure, so much as maim him, but the loss of an eye, or tooth, set him free, Exod. xxi.”

In his Letter from Birmingham jail Martin Luther King Jr. makes clear the distinction between just and unjust laws One may well ask: “How can you advocate breaking some laws and obeying others?”   The answer lies in the fact that there are two types of laws: just and unjust.  I would be the first to advocate obeying just laws.  One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws.  Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws.  I would agree with St. Augustine that “an unjust law is no law at all.”

Now, what is the difference between the two?  How does one determine whether a law is just or unjust?  A just law is a man made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God.  An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law.  To put it in the terms of St. Thomas Aquinas:  An unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law.   Any law that uplifts human personality is just.  Any law that degrades human personality is unjust.”

Council on Foreign Relations member Sandra Day O’Connor and her fellow justices are wrong. “the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life” are not at the heart of liberty. Natural law and the Golden Rule are at the heart of religion, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. They are the law and moral code that will guarantee our rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Natural law and the Golden Rule are at the heart of liberty.

Sanday Day O'Connor Anthony Kennedy David Souter Clarence Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg

Council on Foreign Relations Member Republican Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Republican Justice Anthony Kennedy, Republican Justice David Souter, Clarence Thomas, Council on Foreign Relations Member Ruth Bader Ginsberg

 

 

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Was Council on Foreign Relations Member Francis Fukuyama’s Grandfather a Japanese Internment Camp CIA Informant?

Wesley Yang’s article, The Age of Democrazy, appeared in Esquire Magazine.  The on-line version was re-titled to DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS. Yang writes  “As 2018 draws to a close, tyranny is resurgent around the globe, the postwar order is on the verge of a crack-up,and a Hyperpolarized America is careening toward a constitutional crisis. Now,onetime neocon thinker Francis Fukuyama, who famously declared “The End of History,” asks, Is this just a temporary glitch, or the dawn of a frightening new era?” What Wesley Yang leaves out of his story is that Francis Fukuyamais a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

In the article we learn the fate of Fukuyama’s grandfather who was placed in a Japanese internment camp:

Fukuyama’s grandfather was an immigrant from Japan. He came to the United States in 1905, when it was still a nation with mostly open borders, to evade the draft for the Russo-Japanese war. He built a successful hardware store in downtown Los Angeles and became a community leader in Little Tokyo. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, he was rounded up and sent to an internment camp by the U. S.government for the duration of World War II. Given two weeks to sell off his business, he did so to a white competitor for virtually nothing. “He basically lost his lifetime’s work,” <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyamas aid. After his release, Fukuyama’s grandfather was never able to establish himself in business again. When he finally became a naturalized citizen, he cast his first vote in the U. S. presidential election of 1964. The vote he cast was for Barry Goldwater.

“A lot of immigrants become quite conservative,” <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama noted,explaining why the seemingly perverse vote, which his liberal father regarded as an outrage, was in fact consistent with the experience of migration and loss his grandfather had endured. “They feel that they worked hard to earn their place in this country, that America was a land of opportunity, that they had done well, and what was theirs was theirs.” <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama is skeptical of projections of a “permanent Democratic majority” based on a ruling coalition of white liberals and minorities, in part because of his grandfather’s story. “

Left out of Fukuyama’s grandfather’s story is Council on ForeignRelations Chairman John J. McCloy was responsible for the Japanese internment program. The letter to the New York Times editor that follows was written by Dr. Peter Irons, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. It summarizes Council on Foreign Relations member John J. McCloy’s role in the internment of Japanese Americans:

McCloy (CFR member 1953–89, CFR chairman 1953–70) oversaw the internment of some 120,000 Japanese-Americans, a policy he continued to defend even as the U.S. government disavowed it in the 1980s. 

A Failure of Leadership

JULY 5, 1992

To the Editor:

Respondingto a review of “The Chairman,” Kai Bird’s biography of John J.McCloy, John J. McCloy 2d repeats in his letter (May 31) three serious errorsa bout the wartime internment of Japanese-Americans. He first claims that the internment “was purely and simply a reaction to a heinous attack” on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. The Pearl Harbor attack was, in fact, an excuse for the internment. After thorough research, a Presidential blue-ribbon panel concluded in 1983 that there was “no justification in military necessity” for the internment and that its root causes were “race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership.”

Mr. McCloy also asserts that “the majority of the Japanese living on the West Coast were first-generation” immigrants, born in Japan. In fact,two-thirds of this group were native-born American citizens. From his error, Mr. McCloy presumes widespread disloyalty among Japanese-Americans, claiming that “intelligence gave us clear reason to believe that agents [ of Japan] were present.” Intelligence proved the opposite. J. Edgar Hoover reported that his F.B.I. agents checked “every complaint” of sabotage or espionage by Japanese-Americans and found “no information” to support such charges.

As Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy initiated and directed the internment program. The record shows that he ignored F.B.I. and naval intelligence reports that backed Japanese-American loyalty, and kept these reports from the Supreme Court. Army officials urged in early 1944 that McCloy end the internment, but he cited “political rather than military”reasons for extending it another eight months. President Franklin D.Roosevelt’s re-election was more important than returning loyal Americans to their homes.

Forty years apart, John J. McCloy made telling comments about the internment.Responding in 1942 to an Army general who questioned its legality, he said,”The Constitution is just a scrap of paper.” Before the Presidential commission in 1981, he defended the internment as “retribution” for the Pearl Harbor attack. His lack of repentance gives McCloy a unique and unenviable place in American history. PETER IRONS La Jolla, Calif.

 Left out of Fukuyama’s grandfather’s story was McCloy had been head of the OSS and that Council on Foreign Relations member McCloy and Council on Foreign Relations member Donovan established the Central Intelligence Agency. The Central Intelligence Agency’s website tells us this on in an article on its website which also leaves out any connections to the Council on Foreign Relations:

John J. McCloy, Asst Secretary of War

These comments suggest that Truman viewed strategic warning as the primary mission of his new intelligence establishment,and as a function that had to be handled centrally. His remarks also suggest that he innocently viewed intelligence analysis as largely a matter ofc ollation; the facts would speak for themselves, if only they could only be gathered in one place. That is what he wanted his new intelligence service to do.

The Budget Bureau itself had not proposed anything that looked much clearer than the President’s vague notions. Bureau staffers wanted the State Department to serve as the President’s “principal staff agency” in developing “high-level intelligence,” after taking the lead in establishing the “integrated Government-wide Program.”(24) At the same time, however, Budget Bureau officers wanted the departments to continue to conduct their own intelligence functions, rather than relegating this duty to “any single central agency.” A small interagency group,”under the leadership of the State Department,” could coordinate departmental intelligence operations.(25) This proposed program rested on two assumptions that would soon be tested: that the State Department was ready to take the lead, and that the armed services were willing to follow.

In the meantime, Donovan fumed about the President’s decision yet again to Budget Bureau staffers who met with him on 22 September to arrange the details of the OSS’s dissolution. An oversight in the drafting of EO 9621 had left the originally proposed termination date of 1 October unchanged in the final signed version, and now Donovan had less than two weeks to dismantle his sprawling agency. One official of the Budget Bureau subsequently suggested to Donald Stone that the War Department might ease the transition by keeping its portion of OSS functioning “for the time being,” perhaps even with Donovan in charge. Stone preferred someone other than Donovan for this job and promised to discuss the idea with Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy on 24 September.(26)

Two days later, McCloy stepped into the breach. He glimpsed an opportunity to save OSS components as the nucleus of a peacetime intelligence service. A friend of Donovan’s, McCloy had long promoted an improved national intelligence capability.(27) He interpreted the President’s directive as broadly as possible by ordering OSS’s Deputy Director for Intelligence, Brig. Gen. John Magruder, to preserve his Secret Intelligence (SI) and Counterespionage (X-2) Branches “as a goin goperation” in a new office that McCloy dubbed the “Strategic Services Unit” (SSU):

Left out of Fukuyama’s grandfather’s story is Francis <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama is amember of the Council on Foreign relations. Why wouldn’t a renowned Political Scientist like Mr. Fukuyama ignore the Council on Foreign Relations involvement in the fate that befell his grandfather? Could it be because Fukuyama’s grandfather was a CIA informant? Is Fukuyama’s Council on Foreign Relations membership and  their help with establishing his career due to his grandfather’s willingness to spy on his fellow Japanese American friends and neighbors in the internment camp?

Wesley Yang writes:

Back in 1992, Fukuyama was blithe about the “smallness of actually existing inequalities.” By the early 2010s, he had begun to sound the alarm about the rise of wealthy and powerful elites rigging the political system in their favor. This capture had led to“political decay,” in which special-interest groups were able to block the popular will, including on hot-button issues such as immigration, where polling indicated that a broad consensus existed. He began to call for a renewed left-wing movement to contest the growing consolidation of power.”

Both Yang and Fukuyama mislead their readers. The wealthy and powerful elitesrigging the political system are Council on Foreign Relations members.  The rigging began during Woodrow Wilson’s administration one hundred years ago. The special interest groups able to block popular will were Council on Foreign relations members and Corporate members who have run every presidential administration since Wilsons. Instead of letting the reader know who is behind the problem Yang and Fukuyama turn the problem into a left vs right political issue. Is that honest journalism or political science?

The Council on Foreign Relations are globalists and progressives. The CFR desire for one world government is inconsistent with Nationalism and conservatism. They have hundreds of memberswho work in government and run the nation no matter which party is in power.

Is Yang such an incompetent journalist that he failed to recognize the Council on Foreign Relations ties to his story? Or is the article Council on Foreign Relations propaganda written to shape the mind of the bewildered herd to dislike the Trump/Conservative anti-establishment agenda?

In his article Yang speaks of knowing Council on Foreign Relations member neocon Max Boot and quotes him . “Boot told me, ‘You realized the bankruptcy of conservatism long before I did.’”  Conservatism isn’t bankrupt Journalism is bankrupt due to Council on Foreign Relations propagandists like Yang, Boot and Fukuyama that misinform their reader by leaving the who out of the story. Yang’s article follows. I fixed it and madet he Council on Foreign Relations connections apparent:

THE AGE OF DEMOCRAZY

As 2018 draws to a close, tyranny is resurgent around theglobe, the postwar order is on the verge of a crack-up, and a HyperpolarizedAmerica is careening toward a constitutional crisis. Now, onetime neoconthinker <Council on Foreign Relations Member> Francis Fukuyama, whofamously declared “The End of History,” asks, Is this just a temporary glitch,or the dawn of a frightening new era?

BY WESLEY YANG

OCT 17, 2018

216

I. A Momentous Juncture

<Council on Foreign Relations member> Francis Fukuyama went to bed early on the night of November 8, 2016. The sixty-six-year-old social theorist had accepted a conditional assignment to write about the U. S.presidential election for the Financial Times if and only if the victor in that contest was the man widely assumed to be on his way to a historic defeat. “I didn’t think I would have to write the piece,” he told me.The following morning, he was forced to conclude that liberal democracy, whose triumph as “the final form of human government” he had risen to fame declaring three decades ago, was threatened from within as it had not been in his lifetime. “The risk of sliding into a world of competitive and equally angry nationalisms is huge,” he wrote on November 9, “and if this happens it would mark as momentous a juncture as the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.”

That year signaled not just a new stage of world history but also the emergence of Fukuyama, then thirty-seven, as its oracle. A young man of enormous intellectual energy, ambition, and brio, he published an article titled “The End of History?” in an obscure neoconservative policy journal.Announcing “the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism,” the article set the intellectual world alight and led to profile in Time and The New York Times Magazine. A protégé of the philosophy professor Allan Bloom at Cornell, <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama had distinguished himself as a foreign-policy advisor to <Council on Foreign Relations member> George H.W. Bush by staking out an aggressive position with respect to the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the reunification of Germany, among other inflection points on the way to the sudden collapse of the communist world. <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama was not merely reacting to events but testing an explanatory framework, drawn from the nineteenth-century German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel (the same framework used by Karl Marx to explain the inevitability of worldwide communist revolution).

The claim was never that human conflict was a thing of the pastbut rather that history was a coherent and directional process. By “end,” <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama referred to a “goal” of history rather than a terminus, meaning that the “basic principles of the liberal democratic state could not be improved upon” by the communist utopia, or by any other,because liberal democratic principles were the only ones capable of satisfying the craving, inherent in every individual, for recognition of one’s moral equality. <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama called this craving thymos, borrowing a term from Socrates.

The essay went on to herald the “triumph of the West” and “the endpoint of mankind’s ideological evolution.” Such ringing, peremptory formulations were unsurpassable evocations of the euphoria of that historic moment, permanently inscribing <Council on Foreign Relations member>Fukuyama into the annals of intellectual history—whether as sage or fool, or something in between, only posterity would tell.

<Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama in 1990.

A minor aspect of every geopolitical crisis since then has been the ritualized use of Fukuyama’s name as a piñata in the prestige media,asserting some variant of “The End of the End of History.” But the underlying trend of the succeeding years was a continuous expansion of democracy. Between 1975 and 2005, the number of electoral democracies increased from around 35 to 110 and overall gross domestic product grew by a factor of four.

In the mid-2000s, however, that trend began to reverse itself and the world went into what <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama calls a “democratic recession.” China and Russia have grown more authoritarian and assertive. Hungary, Turkey, Thailand, and Poland have regressed toward increasingly illiberal democracy. The Arab Spring descended into civil war throughout the Middle East. Anti-immigrant and anti–European Union parties gained strength in Germany, Austria, France, the Netherlands, even Sweden. And in 2016, Britain voted to leave the EU, and Donald Trump, running on an explicitly nativist platform, was elected president.

“The world is not moving toward greater democracy or converging toward greater openness,” <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama conceded.“But it’s still too early to tell whether this is just a glitch akin to a market correction or some kind of permanent state of affairs. . . . People still would rather live in a prosperous, well-governed country than in Guatemala or Nepal or Zimbabwe, and so long as that’s the case, there will continue to be a lot of grassroots pressure for the institutions that produces table, rich countries.”

We were speaking in his vacation cottage in Carmel-by-the-Sea,California, several weeks before the publication of his latest book, Identity:The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. It is an airy,open space sparsely furnished with intricately carved wood works of Fukuyama’sown hand. Carmel-by-the-Sea is a place apart from the country at large, a bubble of tranquility blessed with a micro climate several degrees cooler than its surrounding environs, overlooking perhaps the loveliest stretch of coastline anywhere in California. None of the houses in the one-square-mile town has a street number, to protect the privacy of its many well-known residents. <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama speaks rapidly but with such evenness of cadence that he always conveys an impression of leisurely contemplation. His whole being appears to incline toward a temperamental moderation that is instinctively dialectical, always seeking to reconcile apparently contrary truths. This habit of mind seems at once precisely what the country needs more of at the moment and precisely what is being ousted from the discourse as the doomsayers commandeer the airwaves and mob the mobile device.

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“As a citizen, I am horrified,” <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama said of Trump. “As a political scientist, I am delighted.” The rise of such a figure is “a kind of natural experiment where we get to see how theories like checks and balances work in practice and where we can gauge how strong American institutions are. It’s all just theoretical until these concepts are challenged.”

It is perhaps this division into distinct roles of concerned citizen and disinterested analyst that allows <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama to preserve his rhetorical equanimity. He has avoided what he calls the “overdrawn” comparisons to 1930s Germany that have issued from the mouths of some of his colleagues, and he holds himself at a remove from the“Resistance.” “I think in the end our democratic system is perfectly adequate to contain Trump.” Though ultimately, he noted, it’s not the rivalrous branches of government or the federal bureaucracy or the courts upon whom the burden of holding Trump in check rests. “In a democracy, the ultimate check is always electoral,” he said. “If the Democrats manage to win back at least the House,they can start to undo some of the damage Trump has done.” And if not? “Then we’re in deep shit.”


II. A Master Concept

Politics was organized until recently “along a left-right spectrum defined by economic issues,” as  <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama puts it in Identity, which he wrote while shuttling between his vacation cottage and his house in Palo Alto, where he teaches at Stanford. But increasingly, the global political system has become a battleground for competing demands for recognition. Identity can be seen as an earnest attempt to keep the bloody passageway back into historys hut.

In the book, <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama probes beyond the immediate triggers of the populist nationalist upsurge to the deeper sources of the discord threatening to undo liberal democracy. He situates this discord in thymos, the universal craving for recognition,which he argues can serve as a master concept to explain “the dynamic new forces” currently shaping world events. It is thymos,  <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama argues, that is the seat of identity politics—a phrase typically associated with the Left but which he applies more broadly—and thymos that accounts for the increasingly bitter fragmentation of countries around the world into hostile camps.

“THE PASSION FOR EQUAL RECOGNITION…DOES NOT NECESSARILY DIMINISH WITH THE ACHIEVEMENT OF GREATER DEFACTO EQUALITY AND MATERIAL ABUNDANCE, BUT MAY ACTUALLY BE STIMULATED BYIT.”

Indeed, almost anyone can construe themselves as in some manner oppressed, and such claims are inherently more difficult to satisfy than economic ones. <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama divides thymos into two different forms: “isothymia,” the desire to be seen as equal to everyone else, and “megalothymia,” the desire to be seen as superior. Liberal democracy can be “subverted internally” by either. In a remarkable passage <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama notes that “the passion for equal recognition . . . does not necessarily diminish with the achievement of greater de facto equality and material abundance, but may actually be stimulated by it.Tocqueville explained that when the differences between social classes or groups are great and supported by long-standing tradition, people become resigned or accepting of them. But when society is mobile and groups pull closer to one another, people become more acutely aware and resentful of the remaining differences.”

Back in 1992, <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama was blithe about the “smallness of actually existing inequalities.” By the early 2010s, he had begun to sound the alarm about the rise of wealthy and powerful elites rigging the political system in their favor. This capture had led to “political decay,” in which special-interest groups were able to block the popular will, including on hot-button issues such as immigration, where polling indicated that a broad consensus existed. He began to call for a renewed left-wing movement to contest the growing consolidation of power.

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<Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama is hardly a trusted figure among Democrats, though he has, in recent years, taken to railing against what conservatism has become. He is exasperated with the large faction of the electorate willing to be persuaded by the crude and dishonest appeals of a man he took to be “a total idiot completely unqualified to be president.” But while deploring the remedy to which these voters resorted, he acknowledges the grievances that fueled their resentments. “<a href="https://tomjefferson1976.wordpress.com/2013/03/21/how-the-cfr-engineered-the-financial-crisis/&quot; target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener" aria-label=" Fukuyama is hardly a trusted figure among Democrats, though he has, in recent years, taken to railing against what conservatism has become. He is exasperated with the large faction of the electorate willing to be persuaded by the crude and dishonest appeals of a man he took to be “a total idiot completely unqualified to be president.” But while deploring the remedy to which these voters resorted, he acknowledges the grievances that fueled their resentments. “Both the financial crises in the U. S. and the Eurozone and the migrant crises in Europe were regarded as elite-leadership failures, and rightly so in both cases. They did screw up.” (opens in a new tab)”>Both the financial crises in the U. S. and the Eurozone and the migrant crises in Europe were regarded as elite-leadership failures, and rightly so in both cases. They did screw up.”

Yet traditional parties of the Left have been hemorrhaging support throughout Europe despite a three-decade rise in economic inequality in countries all around the globe. <Council on Foreign Relations member>Fukuyama noted that the left-wing Occupy Wall Street movement “marched and demonstrated, then fizzled out,” while the Tea Party “succeeded in taking over both the Republican Party and much of Congress.” Instead of articulating an overarching vision of economic justice, many on the Left seem intent on elaborating ever more fractionated identity categories demanding recognition—a move that is intrinsically at cross-purposes to one that seeks change through mass democratic means. “The Democrats have become the party of minorities,white professionals, and educated white women,” <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama said, “while the Republicans are the white people’s party. It’s a moral disaster for American democracy.”


III. An Incidental Fact

Fukuyama’s grandfather was an immigrant from Japan. He came to the United States in 1905, when it was still a nation with mostly open borders, to evade the draft for the Russo-Japanese war. He built a successful hardware store in downtown Los Angeles and became a community leader in Little Tokyo.After the attack on Pearl Harbor, he was rounded up and sent to an internment camp by the U. S. government for the duration of World War II. Given two weeks to sell off his business, he did so to a white competitor for virtually nothing. “He basically lost his lifetime’s work,” <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama said. After his release, Fukuyama’s grandfather was never able to establish himself in business again. When he finally became a naturalized citizen, he cast his first vote in the U. S. presidential election of 1964. The vote he cast was for Barry Goldwater.

“A lot of immigrants become quite conservative,”  <Council on Foreign Relations member>Fukuyama noted, explaining why the seemingly perverse vote, which his liberal father regarded as an outrage, was in fact consistent with the experience of migration and loss his grandfather had endured. “They feel that they worked hard to earn their place in this country, that America was a land ofopportunity, that they had done well, and what was theirs was theirs.” <Councilo n Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama is skeptical of projections of a“permanent Democratic majority” based on a ruling coalition of white liberals and minorities, in part because of his grandfather’s story. He noted that certain polls show that a slight majority of Hispanics—51 percent, according to Harvard-Harris—support stricter enforcement of immigration laws. I wanted to know about Fukuyama’s background because he has just written a book about identity in which he doesn’t mention his own. <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama is one of a handful of enduring public intellectuals in America. He is also a person of Japanese ancestry. But he has always regarded the latter as an incidental rather than an essential fact about himself. “I grew up in a period when everybody just wanted to be Americans. Not Japanese Americans. Not holding on to our ethnic separateness.” The assertion seems a little quaint coming from an American academic in 2018. His consciousness of that fact imbues it with a touch of defiance.

“I GREW UP IN A PERIOD WHEN EVERYBODY JUST WANTED TO BE AMERICANS. NOT JAPANESE AMERICANS. NOT HOLDING ON TO OUR ETHNIC SEPARATENESS.”

“I never felt like I was different from other people,” <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama said, a statement expressing a certain confident midcentury American consensus on the identity of the nation in which he was born—that the country has a single national identity expansive enough to encompass people of foreign descent like himself. Hearing him express it so bluntly in the context of today’s overheated discourse on identity reminds us just how rapidly the conceptual ground has shifted in a single lifetime.

Fukuyma went to a predominantly Jewish, strongly left-leaning private school in the Bronx, Riverdale Country Day. The progressivism of that time, the 1960s, insisted that America must be held to its own founding ideals.It was the next generation of academic radicals that began to insist that those ideals were themselves part of the apparatus of oppression. Fukuyama’s father always told him that “being forced to speak only English in school was the best thing that ever happened to him,” because it placed him on an equal footing with his peers, and that being Japanese “never prevented me from doing anything I wanted to do.” The message was that his son too should approach the world with this expectation and not that he was psychically vulnerable to small,backhanded slights. One senses that <Council on Foreign Relations member>Fukuyama has no regrets for embracing it.

Getty Images

After a short stint studying deconstruction with the postmodern thinkers Jacques Derrida and Roland Barthes in Paris and comparative literature with Paul de Man at Yale, <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama switched to the government department at Harvard, where he worked with Samuel Huntington. While the peers he left behind in the humanities made the long march through the universities, promulgating the deconstructionist, feminist,postcolonial, multicultural, and queer theories that have unseated the Western canon within those institutions, <Council on Foreign Relations member>Fukuyama and his friends, a group that included  <Council on Foreign Relations member> Paul Wolfowitz (another Bloom protégé) and Lewis “Scooter” Libby, went to Washington, D. C., to work in the Pentagon and the State Department.

The “End of History” thesis, stripped of its internal texture and ambivalence and transformed into a meme, can be said to have played a role in the creation of the Bush Doctrine. But <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama broke with <Council on Foreign Relations member> Wolfowitz and Libby over their advocacy of preemptive war in Iraq. If “The End of History?” was “Marxist” in its framework, <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama said, his neocon friends had become “Leninist” in believing the U. S. had the power to hasten the movement of history through military force. He believes they drew the wrong lessons from the Reagan years,specifically the belief that undemocratic societies would simply default toward democracy if we toppled their dictators. The Trump years have, however, brought<Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama back into contact with some of his old cohort. At a recent private meeting, he ran into < son of a Council on Foreign Relations member> Bill Kristol and <Council on Foreign Relations member> Max Boot. “Boot told me, ‘You realized the bankruptcy of conservatism long before I did.’”

Amazon

 

<Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama was never an exponent of the globalist, open-borders cosmopolitanism with which “The End of History?” came to be associated among those who had never read it. He has always believed, for instance, that the nation-state is the “largest political unit that is viable in terms of actually delivering . . . stability and security” and that some irrational patriotic attachment to the state is a necessary aspect of sustaining its unity. In the last chapter of Identity, <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama proposes compulsory national service to force Americans to encounter and cooperate with one another across class and party lines. He calls for the assimilation of immigrants into a culture tha tisn’t afraid to say what it values and what it rejects.

And finally, while calling for the redress of injustices brought to light by social movements such as Black Lives Matter and #MeToo, he urges the Left to abandon a conception of identity that undermines “the American national story by emphasizing victimization” in favor of “a progressive narrative” that “can also be told about the overcoming of barriers and the ever-broadening circles of people whose dignity the country has recognized,based on its founding principles.” All of which sounds eminently sensible, as many reviewers have largely acknowledged, but will anyone be listening? “I really wrote this book for an audience that is unlikely to heed it,” <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama observed.

IV. A Curious Paradox

In the last paragraph of “The End of History?” <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama posited that history’s finale would be a“very sad time,” in which the heroic exertions made on the road to attaining liberal democracy would give way to “the endless solving of technical problems,environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands.”

The first four sections of his 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man,describe how the thymotic drive, together with science and technology, leads history toward what Hegel called “the universal and homogenous state” of liberal democracy. The fifth, final, and most intriguing section of the book—which is among the most misunderstood and brilliant books of its time—shows why even a liberal democracy that has crossed over into a“post-historical” condition can be undone from within by the very same energy that brought it into existence.

He argued that even though liberal democracy does a better job than any conceivable system of government at satisfying desire, reason,and thymos at once, this does not mean that the problem of thymos is therefore solved. This is because thymos is a volatile aspect of human nature that can be channeled into benign pursuits,constrained by institutions, pacified by abundance, or directed toward great and useful works, but it can never be (nor should we want it to be) permanently quelled. “Human life, then, involves a curious paradox: It seems to require injustice, for the struggle against injustice is what calls forth what is highest in man,” <Council on Foreign Relations member> Fukuyama wrote, before speculating about the emergence of men and women raised in the bosom of liberal democracy who grow bored with its very tranquility and come to“struggle against that peace and prosperity, and against democracy.”

This is the view from the End of History. <More accurately it is the view from a well-polished Council on Foreign Relations member propagandist>

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Daniel Brandt’s Namebase, a One-Of-A-Kind Treasure Trove of CFR/Intelligence Information, Disappears from the Internet & Is Found Again!

11 Might Worlizer

On December 15th Mr. Brandt commented that my article is in error and wrote :

NameBase didn’t disappear, it merely switched to a different top-level domain and a non-standard port:

http://www.namebase.net:82/

No new data has been entered since 2009. 

It is wonderful to know that it is still on-line, it is sad that it is no longer being updated. This is a link to Mr. Brandt’s article

Journalism and the CIA: The Mighty Wurlitzerby Daniel BrandtFrom NameBase NewsLine, No. 17, April-June 1997http://www.namebase.net:82/news17.html

In 1989, ten years before Al Gore claimed he invented the internet, American activists Daniel Brandt and Steve Badrich co-founded a non-profit called Public Information Research (PIR). Brandt and Badrich were database gurus long before the term data mining came into existence. They created a one of a kind database called NameBase.

Namebase included over 125,000 names and 280,000 citations.  The names were drawn from hundreds of books and articles, plus documents recovered using the Freedom of Information Act.  In October 2000 College & Research Libraries News posted a review of Namebase:

You’re at the reference desk and a student asks for the biography of some obscure political figure. You check the usual print sources and can’t find any references. Your school either can’t afford an expensive online database, or perhaps you do subscribe to one, but the service is down for the evening. Out of luck, right? Not. Namebase will rescue (and impress) both you and your students.

What makes this database unique is the collection of nearly 200,000 citations. The service is provided by Public Information Research, Inc., formed in 1989 by former anti-war protesters, Daniel Brandt and Steve Badrich. Citations cover individual and organizational proper names from approximately 500 “investigative” books published since 1962, and thousands of periodicals from 1973. Besides political figures, Namebase cites anyone concerned with the international intelligence community, U.S. foreign policy, crime, and business. Sources concentrate on the post World War era, and emphasize left of center, conspiracy theory, and spy-tell-all publications.

To login to the telnet database, simply type “namebase” at the login prompt. Options include searches by regular name, proximity (related names), source (works cited), and by country. Additional features include the NameBase NewsLine, providing selected essays on names in the news. Each entry includes a citation, along with a two to three paragraph abstract and sketch of the named individual.

The only serious drawback to the telnet database is the telnet protocol itself. For ready reference, most cybernauts will find the web access far more accessible, though less powerful. The only difference between the two versions are the number of options. The web site only provides name search capability.

The web site also includes the “Essays from NameBase NewsLine,” and one additional feature, a subject-oriented list of over 400 book reviews. The essays and reviews will undoubtedly interest many, but lack the usefulness of the citations. The essays, however, are well footnoted. In most cases, essays and reviews maintain the focus on political conspiracy, counter-culture, and gonzo journalism. Sample titles include, “Cold Warriors Woo Generation X,” “Mind Control and the Secret State,” and “The Decline of American Journalism.”

The book reviews cover an equally intriguing array of topics, beginning with Academia, and ending with the Vietnam War. In between lie such topics as Assassinations, Elites, Nazis, Organized Crime, Religions and Cults, Repression, Scandals, and even UFOs.

Perhaps the best feature of Namebase, from a librarian’s viewpoint, is the large number of citations. From these cites students may easily and quickly prepare bibliographies. For a free service, Namebase is quite a useful resource.

fig 1a PIRWhen I started researching the Council on Foreign Relations in the late 90’s. I discovered Namebase. I found Namebase to be an indispensable asset. I gained free access by promoting it on my GeoCities Website. I did that by including a PIR gif on my site. Geocities Disappeared. Unfortunately, Daniel Brandt and Namebase have disappeared from the web too. The Namebase website and database have been removed. No links to any of the information contained on the site are available through the Wayback machine. ( On December 15th Mr. Brandt commented that my article is in error and wrote :  NameBase didn’t disappear, it merely switched to a different top-level domain and a non-standard port:

http://www.namebase.net:82/

No new data has been entered since 2009. )

Nancy O’Hanlon in her article The Right Stuff: Research Strategies for the Internet Age writes:

Much of this Web-accessible information is not available in any other format. For example, NameBase: A Cumulative Index of Books and Clippings [http://www.namebase.org] is a database containing information about people, groups and corporations who have been influential in politics, the military, intelligence, crime and the media since World War II. These names have been drawn from various books, articles and government documents recovered using the Freedom of Information Act. Because of the way it is constructed, this database allows users to find other names that appear on the same pages and thus uncover potential relationships or connections between individuals and groups. NameBase is a unique part of the “deep Web” that could be useful both to investigative journalists and to students

How can you locate useful research tools like NameBase among billions of Web sites? Some rules of the road for effective searching of the Web information space are described in the next section of this essay. Smart Search Techniques

In the years since 1994, when the World Wide Web was invented, a number of powerful search tools have become available to help Web users locate information hiding within this mass of billions of documents. These tools fall into two basic categories: Web directories and Web indexes (or search engines). Success hinges on choosing the right tool as well as using it effectively.”

In 1989 when Namebase was launched there were no search engines. The first search engine appeared in 1990 and was called Archie. Archie searched FTP sites to create index of downloadable files. Due to limited space, only the listings were available and not for the contents for each site. Veronica and Jughead would follow. David Filo and Jerry Yang created Yahoo! in 1994. It began as a collection of favorable web pages that included a man-made description with each URL. Yahoo added informational sites for free, they expanded to include commercial sites. In 1996 Larry Page and Sergey Brin began working on BackRub, a search engine which utilized backlinks for search. It ranked pages using citation notation. This meant any mention of a website on another site would count as a vote. A website’s ranking came from how many people linked to that site, and how trustworthy the linking sites were. In 1998 BackRub would become Google. Google would become a Council on Foreign Relations corporate member. CFR member Eric Schmidt would become Google CEO and NSA spook and Council on Foreign Relations member Jared Cohen would become Google’s director of ideas.

Daniel Brandt didn’t think that Google was giving his database and its links a fair shake. Daniel Brandt’s database included rosters of organizations that included the Association of Former Intelligence Officers and the Council on Foreign Relations. Utilizing the freedom of information act Brandt included reports such as the Tower Commission’s study of the Iran-contra affair. Using Brandt’s database, one could connect numerous Council on Foreign Relations members to the Iran Contra affair both as participants and as members of the committee Investigating it.

In addition, Mr. Brandt drew from publications in Communist countries. He drew from articles in the Cuban press that named United States intelligence agents supposedly operating in Cuba. Brandt’s database was a threat to Council on Foreign Relations run intelligence organizations.

Leroy Fletcher Prouty served as Chief of Special Operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff under President John F. Kennedy. He became a critic of U.S. foreign policy. He had considerable inside knowledge the CIA and focused on CIA covert activities.

2 Prouty

As a critic of the CIA, Prouty pointed out its influence in global matters. He wrote about how it worked outside the realm of U.S. congressional and government oversight. His works detailed the formation and development of the CIA, the origins of the Cold War, the U-2 incident, the Vietnam War, and the John F. Kennedy assassination.

Prouty believed Kennedy’s assassination was the work of a secret, global “power elite,” which operated covertly to protect its interests—and in doing so has frequently subverted democracy around the world.

In the 1970’s Prouty wrote and published the Secret Team to expose the group. It exposed the CIA’s brutal methods of maintaining national security during the Cold War. Virtually all copies were bought up by private buyers and disappeared upon distribution. Prouty’s exposed the U-2 Crisis of 1960 as a CIA psyop to sabotage the Eisenhower–Khrushchev talk. This and other allegations couldn’t have sat well with the Council on Foreign Relations run CIA.

In the reissued 1997 edition of The Secret Team Prouty wrote:

This is the fundamental game of the Secret Team. They have this power because they control secrecy and secret intelligence and because they have the ability to take advantage of the most modern communications system in the world, of global transportation systems, of quantities of weapons of all kinds, and when needed, the full support of a world-wide U.S. military supporting base structure. They can use the finest intelligence system in the world, and most importantly, they have been able to operate under the canopy of an assumed, ever-present enemy called “Communism”. It will be interesting to see what “enemy” develops in the years ahead. It appears that “UFO’s and Aliens” are being primed to fulfill that role for the future. To top all of this, there is the fact that the CIA, itself, has assumed the right to generate and direct secret operations.

The CIA was founded by CFR president John J. McCloy and CFR member William J. Donovan. Eighteen CIA directors have been members of the Council on Foreign Relations. McCloy would head the Warren Commission that investigated the Kennedy assassination.

2 McCloy

Prouty’s book and other writings were in NAMEBASE. Prouty was invited to sit on the Namebase board of advisors. He accepted. Prouty had intimate knowledge of Council on Foreign Relations run Central Intelligence covert operations. Prouty was a valuable asset to the Namebase team.

Conveniently for the Council on Foreign Relations and the CFR intelligence organizations Prouty became associated with the neo-Nazi Liberty Lobby and Lyndon LaRouche.  There after he would be branded a conspiracy theorist, a racist and an anti-Semite and his work discredited from that day to this. In the 60’s the John Birch Society was  smeared as racist and anti-Semitic when they exposed the CFR globalist collective agenda. Today Trump is being targeted in the same manner as are conservatives.

Prouty’s secret team were the group that controlled the Council on Foreign Relations run intelligence organizations. While researching Henry Kissinger I ran across a government group I never heard of called the Psychological Strategy Board. The name peaked my interest. I used Namebase and other sources. I discovered that the psychological strategy board was the Prouty’s secret team. It was created and run by Council on Foreign Relations members.

The Council on Foreign Relations was formally established in Paris in 1919 along with its British Counterpart the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The Council on Foreign Relations and Royal Institute of International Affairs can trace their roots back to a secret organization founded and funded by Cecil Rhodes, who became fabulously wealthy by exploiting the people of South Africa. Rhodes is the father of Apartheid.

4 Paris Peace conference1919 group photo of Inquiry members at the Paris Peace Conference, sitting left to right: Charles Homer Haskins, Western Europe; Isaiah Bowman, Chief of Territorial Intelligence; Sidney Edward Mezes, Director; James Brown Scott, International Law; David Hunter Miller, International Law; standing Charles Seymour, Austria-Hungary; R. H. Lord, Poland; William Linn Westermann, Western Asia; Mark Jefferson, Cartography; Edward Mandell HouseGeorge Louis Beer, Colonies; D.W. Johnson, geography; Clive Day, Balkans; W. E. Lunt, Italy; James T. Shotwell, History; Allyn Abbott Young, Economics

The Council on Foreign Relations was founded by a group of American and British imperialists and racists intent on ruling the world. Many of the American members were American intelligence officers that belonged to the first American Intelligence Agency — THE INQUIRY. Many of the British members were British Intelligence Agents. THE INQUIRY and its members, who included such notable Americans as Col. Edward Mandel House, Walter Lippmann, Isaiah Bowman, and James Shotwell, wrote most of Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points.

5 House &amp; Wilson

The CFR/RIIA method of operation is simple — they control public opinion. They keep the identity of their group secret. They learn the likes and dislikes of influential people. They surround and manipulate them into acting in the best interest of the CFR/RIIA.

The Council on Foreign Relations, and the Royal Institute of International Affairs are adept at using the media to create massive psycho-political operations used to manipulate public opinion. The psycho-political operations are often designed to create tensions between different groups of people. The object is to keep the world in a state of perpetual tension and warfare to maximize profits from CFR/RIIA munition, medicine, media, energy, and food businesses.

The CFR has only 5000 members yet they control over three-quarters of the nations wealth. The CFR runs the State Department and the CIA. The CFR has placed 100 or more CFR members in every Presidential Administration since Woodrow Wilson. There were 500 unelected CFR members in the Obama administration.

CFR membership profile

They work together to misinform and disinform the President to act in the best interest of the CFR not the best interest of the American People. At least five Presidents (Eisenhower, Ford, Carter, Bush, and Clinton) have been members of the CFR. The CFR has packed every Supreme court with CFR insiders. Four CFR members (Sandra Day O’Connor, Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Neil Gorsuch) are or have been Supreme Court Justices. The CFR’s British Counterpart is the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The members of these groups profit by creating tension and hate. Their targets include British and American citizens.

The CFR members that surround the president are “the Secret Team.” The “Secret Team” help carry out psycho-political operations scripted by CFR members in the state department and the Intelligence Organizations. The psycho-political operations are coordinated by a group of Council on Foreign Relations members called the Special Group. The Special Group evolved from the Psychological Strategy Board.

6 Gordon Gray psb

President Truman issued an executive order establishing the Psychological Strategy Board. The Board was run by CFR members Gordon Gray and Henry Kissinger. The PSB has close ties to the State Department and Intelligence Organizations. The purpose of the PSB was to co-ordinate psycho-political operations. Many of those operations were focused at Americans.

7 Kissinger PSB

The people became wary of the Psychological Strategy Board. Eisenhower issued an executive order changing its name to the Operations Coordination Board. The OCB was a bigger more powerful PSB. Gray and Kissinger ran the OCB too.

President Kennedy abolished the OCB. It became an ad hoc committee called the “Special Group,” which exists today. The PSB/OCB/Special Group always has CFR members running and sitting on it. Since the Special Group was not formed by Executive Order it cannot be abolished.

On September 12, 1939, the Council on Foreign Relations began to take control of the Department of State. On that day Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Editor of Foreign Affairs, and Walter H. Mallory, Executive Director of the Council on Foreign Relations, paid a visit to the State Department. The Council proposed forming groups of experts to proceed with research in the general areas of Security, Armament, Economic, Political, and Territorial problems. The State Department accepted the proposal. The project (1939-1945) was called Council on Foreign Relations War and Peace Studies. Hamilton Fish Armstrong was Executive director.

7 Hamilton Fish Armstrong War and Peace Studies

In February 1941 the CFR officially became part of the State Department. The Department of State established the Division of Special Research. It was organized just like the Council on Foreign Relations War and Peace Studies project. It was divided into Economic, Political, Territorial, and Security Sections. The Research Secretaries serving with the Council groups were hired by the State Department to work in the new division. These men also were permitted to continue serving as Research Secretaries to their respective Council groups. Leo Pasvolsky was appointed Director of Research.

In 1942 the relationship between the Department of State and the Council on Foreign Relations strengthened again. The Department organized an Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policies. The Chairman was Secretary Cordell Hull, the vice chairman, Under Secretary Sumner Wells, Dr. Leo Pasvolsky ( director of the Division of Special Research) was appointed Executive Officer. Several experts were brought in from outside the Department. The outside experts were Council on Foreign Relations War and Peace Studies members; Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Isaiah Bowman, Benjamin V. Cohen, Norman H. Davis, and James T. Shotwell.

In total there were 362 meetings of the War and Peace Studies groups. The meetings were held at Council on Foreign Relations headquarters — the Harold Pratt house, Fifty-Eight East Sixty-Eighth Street, New York City. The Council’s wartime work was confidential.

In 1944 members of the Council on Foreign Relations The War and Peace Studies Political Group were invited to be active members at the Dumbarton Oaks conference on world economic arrangements. In 1945 these men and members of Britain’s Royal Institute of International Affairs were active at the San Francisco conference which ensured the establishment of the United Nations.

8 Kennan Mr. X

In 1947 Council on Foreign Relations members George Kennan, Walter Lippmann, Paul Nitze, Dean Achenson, and Walter Krock took part in a psycho-political operation forcing the Marshall Plan on the American public. The PSYOP included a “anonymous” letter credited to a Mr. X, which appeared in the Council on Foreign Relations magazine FOREIGN AFFAIRS. The letter opened the door for the CFR controlled Truman administration to take a hard line against the threat of Soviet expansion. George Kennan was the author of the letter. The Marshall Plan should have been called the Council on Foreign Relations Plan. The so-called Marshall Plan and the ensuing North Atlantic Treaty Organization defined the role of the United States in world politics for the rest of the century.

9 Walter Lippmann

In 1950 another PSYOP resulted in NSC-68, a key cold war document. The NSC (National Security Council) didn’t write it — the Department of State Policy Planning Staff did. The cast of characters included CFR members George Kennan, Paul Nitze, and Dean Achenson. NSC-68 was given to Truman on April 7, 1950. NSC-68 was a practical extension of the Truman doctrine. It had the US assume the role of world policeman and use 20 per cent of its gross national product ($50 billion in 1953) for arms. NSC-68 provided the justification — the WORLD WIDE COMMUNISTHREAT!

NSC-68 realized a major Council on Foreign Relations aim — building the largest military establishment in Peace Time History. Within a year of drafting NSC-68, the security-related budget leaped to $22 billion, armed forces manpower was up to a million — CFR medicine, munition, food, and media businesses were humming again. The following year the NSC-68 budget rose to $44 billion. In fiscal 1953 it jumped to $50 billion. Today (2018) we are still running $650 billion dollar defense budgets despite Russia giving up because it went bankrupt.

America would never turn back from the road of huge military spending. Spending that included the purchase of radioactive fallout on American citizens in the 50’s, and buying thermonuclear waste from the Russians as we approach the year 2019. Spending resulting in a national debt of $22 Trillion Dollars that continues to grow, and interest payments of over $310 billion a year. Is the Council on Foreign Relations trying to make the United States economically vulnerable to influence from outside sources? Isn’t that treason?

THE INQUIRY, the PSB/OCB/Special group, the War and Peace Studies, the “X” Affair, and NSC-68 have had tremendous historical impact. Yet these events and the role played by the Council on Foreign Relations in sponsoring and carrying out the events are missing from our History books. Can any  Political Scientist or Historian explain to me why the Council on Foreign Relations role in History has been left out of the History books?

In 2003 Mark Hand interviewed Daniel Brandt and printed the interview Searching for Daniel Brandt in Counterpunch. Hand tells us:

For almost 30 years, Brandt has operated a one-man intelligence operation, creating the one-of-its-kind NameBase database, which includes about 125,000 names and 280,000 citations. The names are drawn from hundreds of books and serials, plus documents recovered using the Freedom of Information Act…

Today, Brandt continues his research unabated, providing serious journalists and researchers with an indispensable tool for digging up information on the intelligence community and political and business elite.

He sometimes serves as one-man check on the CIA, helping to ensure that the agency doesn’t violate laws against electronic surveillance of Americans. As someone who has spent almost his entire adult life culling information, Brandt now is campaigning to make searching the web as fair as possible. Lately, Brandt has been leading an opposition against what he calls the “hegemony” of the Google search engine. On his Google Watch website, Brandt says his struggle against the search engine’s ranking system “feels like the right thing to do. It’s the cyber equivalent of my draft resistance days.”

It would be Brandt’s struggle with Google that would drive Brandt off the internet. Brandt took on Google and developed a search engine he called Scroogle. On February 21st 2012  Adrianne Jeffries published Scroogle, Privacy-First Search Engine, Shuts Down for Good. Jeffries writes:

Scroogle, the search engine operated by privacy militant and self-appointed Wikipedia watchdog Daniel Brandt, has folded for real. After enduring DDOS attacks “around the clock” that sent a flood of unsustainable traffic to his servers, Mr. Brandt took down the search engine along with his other four domains, namebase.org, google-watch.org, cia-on-campus.org, and book-grab.com. His theory is that he was being attacked by hackers with a personal vendetta.

“These four domains had also been on the web for a long time — NameBase first went online in 1997, and before that had been available on telnet since 1995. I spent 27 years developing NameBase,” he said in an email, and referred to the Wikipedia page.

 “I no longer have any domains online,” Mr. Brandt wrote. “I also took all my domains out of DNS because I want to signal to the criminal element that I have no more servers to trash. This hopefully will ward off further attacks on my previous providers.”

Who was behind the Denial of Service Attacks? In March 2001, Council on Foreign Relations member Eric Schmidt joined Google’s board of directors as chairman, and became the company’s CEO in August 2001. At Google, Schmidt shared responsibility for Google’s daily operations with founders Page and Brin. On 7 September 2010,  Jared Cohen became an adjunct senior fellow at The Council on Foreign Relations focusing on counter-radicalization. In October 2010 Schmidt hired Cohen as the first director of Google Ideas (renamed Jigsaw, in 2016), a new branch within Google.

Jared Cohen was among the early adopters of social media in the U.S. government. In April 2010, Cohen had the third largest number of Twitter followers in the US government, behind Barack Obama and Council on Foreign Relations member John McCain. Cohen and Schmidt authored The New Digital Age: Re-shaping the Future of People, Nations that became a New York Times bestseller.

fig 10 Cohen Schmidt

The book considers the geopolitical future when five billion additional people come online. The authors say terrorism, war, identity theft, conflict and altered relations between nations will result. The book grew out of an article, “The Digital Disruption”, which was published in the Council on Foreign Relations Foreign Affairs magazine in November 2010. In the article Cohen and Schmidt suggest that technology will rewrite the relationship between states and their citizens in the 21st century.

Did Council on Foreign Relations members Schmidt and Cohen use their powerful Council on Foreign Relations member and corporate membership connections along with Council on Foreign Relations connections to the State Department and Intelligence organizations to devise psyops and denial of service attacks against Daniel Brandt and his websites to shut them down?

In April of 1997 Daniel Brandt published an article titled Journalism and the CIA The Mighty Wurlitzer. It is the story of how in 1948 Council on Foreign Relations members Frank Wizner and Alan Dullas  officially created Operation MOCKINGBIRD by raising Reich minister of Propaganda, Paul Josef Goebbels’Nazi mass media propaganda machine in the U.S. to experiment with on the American people, via the newly emerging technology of television.

It was an illegal domestic operation designed to mimic what Goebbels’ had so masterfully crafted for the Third Reich. CFR member Wisner who ran Mockingbird in its earliest days once boasted that the operation was like a mighty Wurlitzer, “… I can play any tune I want on it and America will follow faithfully along.”

CFR member Wisner’s mockingbirds included some of America’s best known reporters and commentators, who eagerly signed on to the CIA’s subsidy to exaggerate the Russian threat. CFR member Wisner was also a co-founder of GLADIO

Goebbels learned his propaganda techniques from Council on Foreign Relations member Walter Lippman and his stooge Edward Bernays. Edward Bernays, was the American nephew of Sigmund Freud. Bernay’s invented the term “Public Relations” which he used in place of propaganda. Bernays believed in “engineering public consent” by creating “false realities” as news. In his first book on the subject, Public Opinion (1922), Lippmann said that Americans functioned as a “bewildered herd” who must be governed by “a specialized class whose interests reach beyond the locality.” That “special class” were the members of the Council on Foreign Relations. The ruling elite who have run the United States government by putting unelected Council on Foreign Relations members in every presidential administration since Woodrow Wilson. This group surrounds the president and turns him into a Council on Foreign Relations puppet that acts in the best interest of the Council on Foreign Relations.

fig 11 Bernays

The American tobacco industry hired Bernays to convince women they should smoke in public. By associating smoking with women’s liberation, he made cigarettes “torches of freedom”. In 1954, he conjured a communist menace in Guatemala as an excuse for overthrowing the democratically elected government, whose social reforms were threatening the United Fruit Company’s monopoly of the banana trade. He called it a “liberation” today it is NEWS.

Brandt’s article disappeared from the web along with Namebase. I am posting the article on this site so people can read and learn from it. Hopefully the day will come when Daniel Brandt gets the credit he deserves, and the Council on Foreign Relations get their just rewards.

 

Journalism And The CIA:

The Mighty Wurlitzer

by Daniel Brandt, NameBase NewsLine, April-June 1997

11 Might Worlizer

Council on Foreign Relations members Frank Wisner & Allen Dulles

Alongside those Greek morality plays and Biblical injunctions, we are also reminded by history itself that the use of unethical means to achieve a worthy end can be self-destructive. Power, by definition, is isolated from the correcting signals of external criticism. Or perhaps the feeling of fighting evil fits so comfortably, that it’s difficult to shed even after objective circumstances change.

The history of U.S. intelligence since World War II follows both patterns. The Office of Strategic Services, the CIA’s predecessor, had jurisdiction over wartime covert operations and propaganda in the fight against fascism. OSS chief William Donovan recruited heavily among social and academic elites. When the CIA was launched in 1947 at the beginning of the Cold War, these pioneers felt that they had both the right and the duty to secretly manipulate the masses for the greater good.

OSS veteran Frank Wisner ran most of the early peacetime covert operations as head of the Office of Policy Coordination. Although funded by the CIA, OPC wasn’t integrated into the CIA’s Directorate of Plans until 1952, under OSS veteran Allen Dulles. Both Wisner and Dulles were enthusiastic about covert operations. By mid-1953 the department was operating with 7,200 personnel and 74 percent of the CIA’s total budget.

fig 12 Frank Wisner

U.S. envoy Council on Foreign Relations Member Frank Wisner

U.S. envoy Frank Wisner speaks, O5 November 2007 during a meeting on Kosovo with the troika of EU, Russian and US negotiators in Vienna to reach a solution on the future status of the UN-administered province. Kosovo has been administered by a UN mission since mid-1999, after a NATO bombing campaign ended the brutal crackdown by Serbian forces against Kosovo Albanian separatists. AFP PHOTO/SAMUEL KUBANI (Photo credit should read SAMUEL KUBANI/AFP/Getty Images)

Wisner created the first “information superhighway.” But this was the age of vacuum tubes, not computers, so he called it his “Mighty Wurlitzer.” The CIA’s global network funded the Italian elections in 1948, sent paramilitary teams into Albania, trained Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan, and pumped money into the Congress for Cultural Freedom, the National Student Association, and the Center for International Studies at MIT. Key leaders and labor unions in western Europe received subsidies, and Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were launched. The Wurlitzer, an organ designed for film productions, could imitate sounds such as rain, thunder, or an auto horn. Wisner and Dulles were at the keyboard, directing history.

The ethos of the fight against fascism carried over into the fight against godless communism; for these warriors, the Cold War was still a war. OSS highbrows had already embraced psychological warfare as a new social science: propaganda, for example, was divided into “black” propaganda (stories that are unattributed, or attributed to nonexistent sources, or false stories attributed to a real source), “gray” propaganda (stories from the government where the source is attributed to others), and “white” propaganda (stories from the government where the source is acknowledged as such).[1]

After World War II, these psywar techniques continued. C.D. Jackson, a major figure in U.S. psywar efforts before and after the war, was simultaneously a top executive at Time-Life. Psywar was also used with success during the 1950s by Edward Lansdale, first in the Philippines and then in South Vietnam. In Guatemala, the Dulles brothers worked with their friends at United Fruit, in particular the “father of public relations,” Edward Bernays, who for years had been lobbying the press on behalf of United. When CIA puppets finally took over in 1954, only applause was heard from the media, commencing forty years of CIA-approved horrors in that unlucky country.[2] Bernays’ achievement apparently impressed Allen Dulles, who immediately began using U.S. public relations experts and front groups to promote the image of Ngo Dinh Diem as South Vietnam’s savior.[3]

The combined forces of unaccountable covert operations and corporate public relations, each able to tap massive resources, are sufficient to make the concept of “democracy” obsolete. Fortunately for the rest of us, unchallenged power can lose perspective. With research and analysis — the capacity to see and understand the world around them — entrenched power must constantly anticipate and contain potential threats. But even as power seems more secure, this capacity can be blinded by hubris and isolation.

Troublesome notes were heard from the Wurlitzer in the 1960s — but not from American journalism, which had already sold its soul to the empire. Instead, the announcement that the emperor had no clothes was made by a new generation. Much that was dear to this counterculture was stylistic and superficial, and there were many within this culture itself, and certainly within the straight media, who mistook this excess baggage for its essence. Nevertheless, the youth culture’s rumpled opposition was sufficient to slow down the machine and let in some light.

The ruling class failed to see the naked contradiction that they had created. They expected that the most-privileged, best-educated generation in history could be forcibly drafted to fight a dirty war against popular self-determination some 8,000 miles away — a war that clearly had more to do with anticommunist ideology and corporate greed than it did with the defense of America. The elites didn’t have a clue that this was even a problem; President Johnson’s knee-jerk response to the student antiwar movement, for example, was to pressure the CIA into uncovering the nefarious (and nonexistent) foreign influences behind it.

Thus the crack in the culture that eventually encouraged American media to take a look at themselves. With rare exceptions,[4] it was the alternative press that began to question racism, police brutality, Vietnam, the defense establishment, and the JFK assassination. In 1967 Ramparts magazine exposed a portion of the CIA’s covert funding network, whereupon the New York Times and Washington Post began naming more names. By then the Wurlitzer would never sound the same, particularly after the 1968 assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy invited further suspicions.

The counterculture burned out once the war wound down, but it had already dented the lemming-like consensus that typified an earlier period. For roughly ten years, between 1967 and 1977, Americans learned something of their secret history. From the perspective of twenty additional years, the results were mixed and much remains secret. But it’s scary to think of where we might be now if the counterculture had never happened.

During the last half of those ten years, sandwiched between Watergate coverage on one end, and Congressional investigations of the CIA on the other, the media showed some interest in examining their own intelligence connections. The first shoe was dropped by Jack Anderson in late August, 1973, when he revealed that Seymour Freidin, head of the Hearst bureau in London, was a CIA agent. Freidin, already in the news because the Republicans paid him $10,000 in 1972 to spy on the Democrats, confirmed Anderson’s story. At that point William Colby, the new CIA director, was asked by the New York Times and the Washington Star-News if any of their staff were on the CIA payroll.

James (Scotty) Reston of the NYT was satisfied with an evasive answer, but when the Star-News editorial board met with Colby, they made some progress. The other shoe dropped with an article by Oswald Johnston on November 30: the Star-News learned from an “authoritative source” (Colby) that the CIA had some three dozen American journalists on its payroll. Johnston named only one — Jeremiah O’Leary — who was one of their own diplomatic correspondents. (The Star-News stopped publishing in 1981, at which point O’Leary joined Reagan’s national security staff. >From 1982 until his death in 1993, he was with the Washington Times.)

That was the first and last time that Colby was helpful on this topic. Some believe that the new director was under pressure from the “young Turks” (junior staffers) at the Agency, who were granted a mandate by Colby’s predecessor to cough up the “family jewels” — a list of illegal exploits that could be culled from the CIA’s files. Already there were rumors that the CIA was guilty of illegal spying on the antiwar movement — rumors that were confirmed a year later by Seymour Hersh, whose sources were some of these same “young Turks.”

Why was Colby initially forthcoming on the issue of the CIA and the media, and why did he then start stonewalling? Some believe that he was attempting a “limited hangout” as the best way out of a position that made him nervous, while others feel that he was implicitly threatening to provide additional names in order to scare off the media. Colby had reason to be worried: by late 1973, investigative journalism was in the air because of Watergate — an issue that had more than the usual share of CIA connections.

Colby’s stonewalling continued for the remainder of his tenure, even as a Senate committee led by Frank Church desperately tried to squeeze more names out of him. George Bush replaced Colby in January, 1976, and eventually agreed to a one-paragraph summary of each file of a CIA journalist, with names deleted. When the CIA said it was finished, the Church committee had over 400 summaries.

The committee staff was shocked at the extent of the CIA’s activity in this area, and felt that they still didn’t have the story. But they were running out of time, and expected that the Senate’s new permanent oversight committee would continue their work. The Church committee’s final report contained only a handful of vague and misleading pages on the CIA and the media. “It hardly reflects what was found,” stated Senator Gary Hart. “There was a prolonged and elaborate negotiation [with the CIA] over what would be said.”[5]

The House investigation of the CIA, under Otis Pike, had more problems than the Senate investigation. The full House voted to suppress its committee’s final report under pressure from the executive branch, at which point Daniel Schorr of CBS leaked a copy to the Village Voice. This report contained just twelve paragraphs on the topic of the CIA and the media, including the tidbit about the CIA’s “frequent manipulation of Reuters wire service dispatches.”[6] Another paragraph gave some idea of the scope of the CIA’s efforts in this area:

Some 29 percent of Forty Committee-approved covert actions were for media and propaganda projects. This number is probably not representative. Staff has determined the existence of a large number of CIA internally-approved operations of this type, apparently deemed not politically sensitive. It is believed that if the correct number of all media and propaganda projects could be determined, it would exceed Election Support as the largest single category of covert action projects undertaken by the CIA.[7]

One enterprising researcher took this 29 percent figure, and extrapolating from figures on CIA expenditures for covert operations, found that the cost of propaganda in 1978 was around $265 million and involved 2,000 personnel. Comparing this to figures for other news agencies, he concluded that the CIA “uses far more resources in its propaganda operations than any single news agency…. In fact, the CIA propaganda budget is as large as the combined budgets of Reuters, United Press International and the Associated Press.”[8]
CBS took Daniel Schorr off the air after he leaked the Pike committee report. This was most likely a convenient opportunity for William Paley, chairman of CBS, who didn’t approve of Schorr’s interest in the network’s own CIA connection. Former CBS News president Sig Mickelson, who by 1976 was president of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, said that in October 1954, Paley called him into his office for a friendly discussion with two CIA officials. Schorr mentioned this on Walter Cronkite’s show, and in an op-ed piece for the New York Times (Arthur Hays Sulzberger, the late publisher of the Times, had been cozy with the CIA also). “There are executives and retired executives,” Schorr wrote, “who could help dispel the cloud hanging over the press by coming forward to tell the arrangements they made with the CIA.”[9]

Little had changed since 1974, when Michael J. Harrington, a Democratic congressman from Massachusetts, leaked Colby’s closed-door testimony about CIA involvement in the 1973 coup in Chile. Harrington soon found himself the target of a formal Ethics Committee investigation; now Schorr was also their target. Apparently Congress was fearful that the executive branch might paint them as bungling and irresponsible when it came to keeping secrets, and then use this as a club to deprive them of access to information.

If Congress felt this way, it was more than simple paranoia. In 1976 the CIA began cranking up their Wurlitzer on the matter of Richard Welch, a station chief in Athens who was assassinated by urban guerrillas at the end of 1975. The CIA’s exploitation of this timely tragedy had both an immediate target and a general target. Ostensibly the CIA was complaining about an obscure Washington magazine called CounterSpy, which had been printing CIA names. In the same spirit, Philip Agee’s just-published diary of CIA tricks in Latin America was loaded with names, and was already an international sensation. But the general target of this campaign was more important — the CIA managed to change the nature of the debate. Suddenly it was no longer a question of what dirty work the CIA might be doing, but rather a question of what happens when the press recklessly endangers the lives of our brave boys overseas.

The fact that Welch’s name had been published by the East Germans five years earlier, and that he could be identified as a CIA officer from his listing in the unclassified 1973 State Department Biographic Register, were both ignored. In any case, it was hardly a secret in Athens — the group that killed Welch had been stalking his predecessor, Stacy Hulse, until Welch moved into the Hulse residence five months earlier. Colby eventually admitted to a House subcommittee that Welch’s cover was inexcusably weak, and that the publication of his name in an Athens newspaper had only an indirect effect on his assassination.[10]

Colby could say this two years later because by then his comments were destined for a back page. The battle to rein in the CIA was already lost. In 1982 Congress passed a controversial new law that made publication of CIA names a felony under certain conditions. Although these conditions rarely applied to journalists, the wide coverage on this issue served to intimidate most publishers and editors.

Today the CIA, which once issued an automatic “no comment” when asked anything by reporters, is playing an adept game of “soft cop, hard cop” public relations. In 1991 an internal CIA task force recommended a more active posture by the public affairs office when responding to requests for assistance (that year they handled 3,369 telephone inquires from reporters, provided 174 unclassified background briefings for them at Headquarters, and arranged 164 interviews with senior Agency officials).[11] The “hard cop” was discovered by Katrina vanden Heuvel, editor of The Nation. In 1995 she was telephoned by Vin Swasey, CIA deputy director of public affairs, who strongly objected to an editorial because it included the names of nine former station chiefs in Guatemala.[12] Reuters was persuaded by Swasey’s colleagues to run the story without the names.

The final months of 1977 produced three significant pieces of journalism on the CIA and the media, just before the issue was abandoned altogether. The first, by Joe Trento and Dave Roman, reported the connections between Copley Press and the CIA. Owner James S. Copley cooperated with the CIA for three decades. A subsidiary, Copley News Service, was used as a CIA front in Latin America, while reporters at the Copley-owned San Diego Union and Evening News were instructed to spy on antiwar protesters for the FBI. No less than 23 news service employees were simultaneously working for the CIA. James Copley, who died in 1973, was also a leading figure behind the CIA-funded Inter-American Press Association.[13]

The next article was by Carl Bernstein of Watergate fame. In a long piece in Rolling Stone, he came up with the figure of 400 American journalists over the past 25 years, based primarily on interviews with Church committee staffers. This figure included stringers and freelancers who had an understanding that they were expected to help the CIA, as well as a small number of full-time CIA employees using journalism as a cover. It did not include foreigners, nor did it include numerous Americans who traded favors with the CIA in the normal give-and-take between a journalist and his sources. In addition to some of the names already mentioned above, Bernstein supplied details on Stewart and Joseph Alsop, Henry Luce, Barry Bingham Sr. of the Louisville Courier-Journal, Hal Hendrix of the Miami News, columnist C.L. Sulzberger, Richard Salant of CBS, and Philip Graham and John Hayes of the Washington Post.

Bernstein concentrated more on the owners, executives, and editors of news organizations than on individual reporters. “Lets’s not pick on some poor reporters, for God’s sake,” William Colby said at one point to the Church committee’s investigators. “Let’s go to the management. They were witting.” Bernstein noted that Colby had specific definitions for words such as “contract employee,” “agent,” “asset,” “accredited correspondent,” “editorial employee,” “freelance,” “stringer,” and even “reporter,” and through careful use of these words, the CIA “managed to obscure the most elemental fact about the relationships detailed in its files: i.e., that there was recognition by all parties involved that the cooperating journalists were working for the CIA — whether or not they were paid or had signed employment contracts.”[14]

The reaction to Bernstein’s piece among mainstream media was to ignore it, or to suggest that it was sloppy and exaggerated. Then two months later, the New York Times published the results of their “three- month inquiry by a team of Times reporters and researchers.” This three-part series not only confirmed Bernstein, but added a wealth of far-ranging details and contained twice as many names. Now almost everyone pretended not to notice.

The Times reported that over the last twenty years, the CIA owned or subsidized more than fifty newspapers, news services, radio stations, periodicals and other communications facilities, most of them overseas. These were used for propaganda efforts, or even as cover for operations. Another dozen foreign news organizations were infiltrated by paid CIA agents. At least 22 American news organizations had employed American journalists who were also working for the CIA, and nearly a dozen American publishing houses printed some of the more than 1,000 books that had been produced or subsidized by the CIA. When asked in a 1976 interview whether the CIA had ever told its media agents what to write, William Colby replied, “Oh, sure, all the time.”

Since domestic propaganda was a violation of the their charter, the CIA defined the predictable effects of their foreign publications as “blowback” or “domestic fallout,” which they considered to be “inevitable and consequently permissible.” But former CIA employees told the Times that apart from this unintended blowback, “some CIA propaganda efforts, especially during the Vietnam War, had been carried out with a view toward their eventual impact in the United States.” The Times series concluded that at its peak, the CIA’s network “embraced more than 800 news and public information organizations and individuals.”[15]

By the time the Times series appeared, Congress was looking for a way out of the issue. Obligingly, Stansfield Turner promised that the CIA would avoid journalists “accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station.” There were at least three problems with this that most press coverage overlooked: many stringers and freelancers are not accredited; it didn’t cover any foreign-owned media; and as Gary Hart complained at the time, the new policy included a provision that allowed the CIA to unilaterally make exceptions whenever it wished.[16]

Within several years of this alleged policy, the new Reagan administration ignored it in favor of a shooting war in Central America, one component of which was an illegal CIA-administered propaganda war at home. Edgar Chamorro, a contra sympathizer in Miami with a background in public relations, was recruited by the CIA in late 1982. After two years of following the CIA’s instructions regarding the manipulation of U.S. journalists and even members of Congress, Chamorro went public with his story.[17] By now Congress was clearly out-maneuvered, even though it alone held the purse strings that controlled funding for the war.

The inability of Congress to address the CIA-media problem in the 1970s meant that more powerful forces were at work. In fact, while Congress was wringing its left hand over illegal CIA activities, its right hand was helping the CIA overhaul its Wurlitzer. Ever since 1967, when the Katzenbach committee was tasked by Lyndon Johnson to study the problem of the CIA’s use of domestic organizations, the agenda at the highest levels had been to remove such activities from the CIA’s payroll and continue them under a new umbrella. In the unclassified portion of their report, this committee recommended giving money openly through a “public-private mechanism.” “The CIA’s big mistake was not supplanting itself with private funds fast enough,” observed Gloria Steinem, who had been part of the CIA’s global network.[18]

The Asia Foundation was given a large “severance payment” so that they could find private funding,[19] and the Congress for Cultural Freedom got over $4 million from the Ford Foundation.[20] In 1971, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe were spun off and funded separately by new legislation. While this hardly diminished the CIA’s control of these radio stations, it did help public relations by facilitating “deniability.”[21] Then in 1983, Congress created the National Endowment for Democracy, with funding to carry on many of the activities that the CIA once carried out covertly within its own budget.

Bits and pieces of the old Wurlitzer were still evident everywhere: John Richardson, Jr., the new chairman of NED, had been president and CEO of Radio Free Europe during the 1960s, and some of the NED’s dozens of grants were issued to groups that solicited aid for the contras.[22] “It is not necessary to turn to the covert approach,” commented Colby in regard to the NED program. “Many of the programs which … were conducted as covert operations [can now be] conducted quite openly, and consequentially, without controversy.”[23] As if to prove his point, Colby’s wife was soon a member of NED’s board of directors.

Two major changes since the 1980s — the collapse of socialism and the centralization of domestic and transnational media, suggest that the CIA now has everything well in hand. But it is far too early to tell. The pressure to stay competitive in the global marketplace could provoke economic nationalism in places where the CIA was once free to roam. France and Germany, for example, have recently expelled CIA agents. At the same time, the Soviet people are having second thoughts about all those benefits of U.S.-imposed capitalism. China remains aggressive and uncompromising; they may even tolerate less interference from us in their political process than we do from them.

It’s a different world, and it’s unfamiliar. A blue-ribbon panel of the Council on Foreign Relations suggested last year that the CIA be freed from some policy constraints on covert operations, such as the use of journalists and clergy as cover. This is alarming. Unlike the typical corporate-funded think tank, filled with pro-Pentagon pundits, the folks at CFR are either running the world or they know who does. For 70 years they’ve rarely recommended anything that has not become policy. Furthermore, they’ve thoroughly co-opted the major media (see sidebar).

There have also been official announcements that the CIA is mission-creeping into economic intelligence and computer-age information warfare. This might reflect a bit of nostalgia for the job security and moral clarity of the Cold War, or it could be a premonition that the American Century is over and the masses are expected to get uppity. Perhaps the First Amendment has always been something of a con — a matter of “freedom,” but only for those who own the presses, or for those who lived in an earlier century, before psywar and public relations experts.

Then again, stay tuned — the credibility gap is back. A recent poll shows that Americans are fed up with mainstream news media. “Very favorable” ratings for television network news fell from 30 percent in 1985 to just 15 percent this year, and for large national newspapers it dropped 12 percent. A majority now believe that news stories are often inaccurate.[24]

After factoring in the new global economics and recalculating the prospects for the middle class, all bets are off. The poor performance of Congress and the press on the issue of journalists and the CIA may mean that the next time around, the elites will lack even the credibility to stage another co-opting charade of “oversight.” That could prove beneficial, particularly if next the time threatens to be as inconsequential and diversionary as the last time.

  1. Philip Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1975), pp. 70-71.
  2. Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), pp. 111-114; Thomas P. McCann, An American Company: The Tragedy of United Fruit (New York: Crown Publishers, 1976), pp. 45-48.
  3. Eric Thomas Chester, Covert Network: Progressives, the International Rescue Committee, and the CIA (Armonk NY and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 160-183.
  4. The first anti-CIA book appeared in 1964: David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government (New York: Random House). CIA director John McCone, and other officials acting under his direction, contacted the publisher in an effort to stop it.
  5. Carl Bernstein, “The CIA and the Media,” Rolling Stone, 20 October 1977, pp. 65-67.
  6. “The CIA Report the President Doesn’t Want You to Read,” Village Voice, 20 February 1976, p. 40.
  7. Ibid, p. 36.
  8. Sean Gervasi, “CIA Covert Propaganda Capability,” Covert Action Information Bulletin, No. 7, December 1979 – January 1980, pp. 18-20.
  9. Daniel Schorr, Clearing the Air (New York: Berkley Medallion Books, 1978), pp. 204-206, 275-277.
  10. Norman Kempster, “Identity of U.S. Spies Harder to Hide, Colby Says,” Los Angeles Times, 28 December 1977, pp. 1, 8.
  11. Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence from the Task Force on Greater CIA Openness, 20 December 1991, 15 pages.
  12. Allan Nairn, “The Country Team,” The Nation, 5 June 1995, p. 780.
  13. Joe Trento and Dave Roman, “The Spies Who Came In From the Newsroom,” Penthouse, August 1977, pp. 44-46, 50.
  14. Bernstein, p. 58.
  15. John M. Crewdson and Joseph B. Treaster, “The CIA’s 3-Decade Effort to Mold the World’s Views,” New York Times, 25 December 1977, pp. 1, 12; Terrence Smith, “CIA Contacts With Reporters,” New York Times, p. 13; Crewdson and Treaster, “Worldwide Propaganda Network Built by the CIA,” New York Times, 26 December 1977, pp. 1, 37; Crewdson and Treaster, “CIA Established Many Links to Journalists in U.S. and Abroad,” New York Times, 27 December 1977, pp. 1, 40-41.
  16. While it’s true that Gary Hart’s complaint was not widely covered (there’s one paragraph in the Los Angeles Times on 16 December 1977, p. 2), it is still amazing that when this clause was rediscovered in early 1996, indignant columnists pretended that it had been a secret all along. The truth is, journalists haven’t been doing their homework for the last 18 years. This led the Society of Professional Journalists to earn a flunking grade for their 23 February 1996 press release: “An executive order during the Carter administration was thought to have banned the practice [of the recruitment of journalists by the CIA]. After a Council on Foreign Relations task force recommended that the ban be reconsidered, it was revealed that a ‘loophole’ existed allowing the CIA director or his deputy to grant a waiver. After protests, Deutch refused to rule out the practice, saying in some cases it might be necessary.” To rephrase this politely, it took 18 years for the SPJ to become aware of the fine print in the CIA’s policy. This is probably due to poor reporting from newspapers such as the Washington Post, which the innocents at SPJ must think of as not only “liberal,” but also competent. So why, when the Post’s intelligence reporter, Walter Pincus, was told about the waiver last year, did he write it up as a scoop in the 22 February 1996 Washington Post??? Perhaps Pincus really didn’t know. Or perhaps ever since Pincus took money from the CIA in the early 1960s, it has affected his reporting on this issue.
  17. Edgar Chamorro, Packaging the Contras: A Case of CIA Disinformation (New York: Institute for Media Analysis, 1987), 78 pages; Jacqueline Sharkey, “Back in Control,” Common Cause Magazine, September/October 1986, pp. 28-40.
  18. “CIA Subsidized Festival Trips: Hundreds of Students Were Sent to World Gatherings,” New York Times, 21 February 1967.
  19. Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New York: Dell Publishing, 1975), p. 179.
  20. Peter Coleman, The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe (New York: The Free Press, 1989), pp. 224-225.
  21. Marchetti and Marks, pp. 174-178.
  22. John Kelly, “National Endowment for Reagan’s Democracies,” The National Reporter, Summer 1986, pp. 22-26; Council on Hemispheric Affairs and Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Center, National Endowment for Democracy (NED): A Foreign Policy Branch Gone Awry (Resource Center, Box 4506, Albuquerque NM 87196), 1990, 93 pages.
  23. William Colby, “Political Action — In the Open,” Washington Post, 14 March 1982, p. D8.
  24. Jack Nelson, “Major News Media Trusted Less, Poll Says,” Los Angeles Times, 21 March 1997.


Sidebar from NameBase NewsLine, No. 17, April-June 1997:

Journalists at Work: Who’s Watching the Watchdogs?
In the handful of self-critical articles about the media that appeared twenty years ago, the matter of CIA connections with executives, editors, and reporters was emphasized. While this makes for good copy and is certainly worth repeating, it also fails to challenge American journalism at it weakest point: the corrupting influence of fame and fortune. Someone who has looked at this issue recently is James Fallows, formerly of Atlantic Monthly. Fallows argues in his recent book, Breaking the News: How the Media Undermine American Democracy, that his profession is becoming seriously compromised.

The name recognition that comes from flaccid punditry can be lucrative on the lecture circuit. Or if you have a name already, perhaps by doing something useless or naughty at the White House, you can acquire pundit status by writing a kiss-and-tell book. Big stars such as Cokie Roberts can collect five figures simply by offering up flattering platitudes at a corporate convention.

Another problem is the revolving door between the media and government. It’s considered a badge of honor for a journalist to have spent time working for the White House, whereas it should be seen as a conflict of interest. Some suggest that it’s okay to make the switch once — Bill Moyers can call himself a journalist after working for Lyndon Johnson, but David Gergen has been spinning through the door so often that it makes the rest of us dizzy. Gergen flacked for Nixon, Ford, Reagan and finally Clinton, and between administrations he was an editor at U.S. News & World Report and a commentator for PBS. Come to think of it, James Fallows himself, the new editor at U.S. News & World Report, was the chief speech writer for Jimmy Carter.

Pundits and superstars aside, the larger problem is that the media is owned by the ruling class. With the increased media centralization of the last twenty years, their lock on the masses is now so complete that when they maintain an appearance of objectivity, it’s only out of habit. (Sentences containing the words “ruling class” are scribbled self- consciously these days — a measure of how well they have cornered the market on perception, and perverted what class consciousness we once had into a mass-consumer consciousness.)

How can one distinguish between news and propaganda when the overlaps and interlocks are so pervasive? John Chancellor was with NBC, then with Voice of America, and then again with NBC. John Scali was with ABC, and then with Nixon, and then again with ABC. Ben Bradlee, of Watergate and Washington Post fame, was once a propagandist in Paris, taking orders from the CIA station chief, and was friends with James Angleton. Bradley’s sister-in-law was Mary Meyer, divorced from Cord Meyer. She was JFK’s lover, and her 1964 murder was never solved. Robert John Myers was in the CIA for twenty years, at one time as an assistant to William Colby, and became publisher of the New Republic in 1968. Generoso Paul Pope, Jr. was in the CIA the year before he bought the National Enquirer in 1952. Laughlin Phillips, co-founder of the Washingtonian, was in the CIA for fifteen years. Former top CIA officials Cord Meyer, Jr. and Tom Braden became columnists (unlike Braden, Meyer rarely talks about his CIA career). George R. Packard and L. Bruce van Voorst were with the CIA before they joined Newsweek, and Philip Geyelin worked for the CIA while on leave from the Wall Street Journal.

There’s always Katharine Graham, one of the world’s richest women, who is now recognized as a victim of the male-dominated culture because her new autobiography says it’s so. In a 1988 speech at CIA headquarters, Graham warmed to her audience: “We live in a dirty and dangerous world. There are some things the general public does not need to know and shouldn’t. I believe democracy flourishes when the government can take legitimate steps to keep its secrets, and when the press can decide whether to print what it knows.”

Over 100 pundits, news anchors, columnists, commentators, reporters, editors, executives, owners, and publishers can be found by scanning the 1995 membership roster of the Council on Foreign Relations — the same CFR that issued a report in early 1996 bemoaning the constraints on our poor, beleaguered CIA. By the way, first William Bundy and then William G. Hyland edited CFR’s flagship journal Foreign Affairs between the years 1972-1992. Bundy was with the CIA from 1951-1961, and Hyland from 1954-1969.

Source: http://www.namebase.org/news17.html

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CFR run FED gives CFR run Big Wall Street Banks a Big Reprieve By Killing Wall Street Risky Behavior Rule

 

Jerome Powell Fed Chairman

The current Fed chairman, Jerome H. Powell, seen here in March, and his predecessor, Janet L. Yellen <are CFR members>, and have called for simplification of the rule. Credit Erin Schaff for The New York Times

The New York Times printed an article by Emily Flitter and Alan Rappeport titled Big Banks to Get a Break From Limits on Risky Trading. The article is about how the Trump appointed current Fed chairman, Jerome H. Powell, and his predecessor, Janet L. Yellen, have called for simplification of the Volcker rule. What the CFR run FED is doing is setting us up for a new financial crisis.

The CFR engineered the financial crisis of 2008 by killing the Glass Stegall Act. The Glass Steagall Act, the FDR Banking Bill, was setup over 70 years ago . On November 12, 1999 Council on Foreign Relations member William Jefferson Clinton stated the, ” Glass- Stegall is no longer appropriate for our economy. This was good for the industrial age. The Financial Modernization Bill is the key to rising paycheck and great security for ordinary Americans”. Council on Foreign Relations member William Clinton then signed the ‘Financial Modernization Bill’.

With the signing of the bill old capitalism and free market economics died and the “new capitalism” and markets controlled by a small group of elite investment bankers was born. The repeal was the foundation that provided for non transparent financial manipulation and use of leverage to revolutionize the activities of investment beginning in 1999, to amass huge fortunes for the investment bankers who designed, marketed and oversaw the use of leveraged investments, and to generate awesomely speculative endeavors at hedge funds, which have gone unregulated by government oversight.

Investment leverage snapped with the $20 Billion Council on Foreign Relations run Carlyle Group bond fund experiencing margin calls, where risk was multiplied by 33 to 1 and the underlying assets represented only 3% of the portfolio value; and those assets were illiquid, thinly traded issues: it was reasonable that this fund would be the first of many countless to break causing a sharp sell off in the finance, real estate and banking sectors as investments were sold at fire sale prices to meet the margin calls. Council on Foreign Relations member David Rubenstein, co-founder of Carlyle Group, in a keynote speech at the 15th annual venture capital and private equity conference at Harvard Business School, laid some of the blame for the private equity industry’s troubles on investment banks, “I analogize it to sex,” Council on Foreign Relations member Rubenstein said. “You realize there were certain things you shouldn’t do, but the urge is there and you can’t resist.”

A “Limited hangout” is intelligence jargon for a form of propaganda in which a selected portion of a scandal, criminal act, sensitive or classified information, etc. is revealed or leaked, without telling the whole story. The Flitter Rappeport article is a limited hangout. The story tells its reader what is being done but leaves out who is behind the act. Flitter and Rappeport leave the Council on Foreign Relations out of their story.

The Flitter Rappeport article appears below. I added the CFR connections.

Big Banks in Line For Looser Curbs On Risky Trades

 By Emily Flitter and Alan Rappeport who left the CFR out of the story I fixed it for them TJ

  • May 30, 2018

<CFR run> Big banks are getting a big reprieve from a postcrisis rule aimed at curbing risky behavior on Wall Street.

Federal bank regulators on Wednesday unveiled a sweeping proposal to soften the Volcker Rule <Former FED Chair Volcker was a CFR member>, a cornerstone of the 2010 law that was enacted after the financial crisis to rein in risky trading. The change would give <CFR run> Wall Street banks more freedom to make their own complex bets — activities that can be highly profitable but also leave them more vulnerable to losses.

The rule, part of the broader Dodd-Frank law < CFR member Senator Chris Dodd  and Representive Barny Frank introduced the bill in 2009 >, was put in place to prevent banks from making unsafe bets with depositors’ money. It took five agencies three years to write it and has been criticized by <CFR run> Wall Street as too onerous and harmful to the proper functioning of financial markets. On Wednesday, the <CFR run> Federal Reserve proposed easing several parts of the rule, and four other regulators are expected to soon follow suit, kicking off a public comment period that is expected to last 60 days.

The loosening of the <CFR member> Volcker Rule is part of a coordinated effort underway in <CFR run> Washington to relax rules put into place in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Big banks, emboldened by <CFR puppet> President Trump’s deregulatory agenda and a more favorable political climate in Washington, have begun pressing for changes to several postcrisis rules, including the <CFR Member> Volcker Rule.

 

Last week, <CFR puppet> Mr. Trump signed into law a bipartisan bill that will free thousands of small and medium-size banks from the Dodd-Frank law, and on May 21, he signed a law rescinding a consumer rule aimed at preventing discrimination by auto lenders. The Fed and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency recently proposed easing limits on how much the largest banks can borrow and the Fed also proposed changes to the stress tests that banks must undergo each year to determine whether they can withstand an economic downturn.

Regulators said on Wednesday that the primary intent of the <CFR member> Volcker Rule would remain intact and that banks would not be allowed to return to the wild days of proprietary trading, when traders made big bets with the bank’s money and sometimes lost huge sums. But they said the rule needed to be simplified so that banks could more easily comply with it and Washington could adequately enforce it.

Mr. Trump’s acting director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Mick Mulvaney, has also engaged in a rapid series of regulatory changes since November, including halting new investigations, freezing new hires and preventing the agency from collecting certain data from banks.

“The proposal will address some of the uncertainty and complexity that now make it difficult for firms to know how best to comply, and for supervisors to know that they are in compliance,” the Fed chairman, <CFR member> Jerome H. Powell, said at a board of governors meeting. “Our goal is to replace overly complex and inefficient requirements with a more streamlined set of requirements.”

The Volcker Rule, while not the most significant postcrisis regulation, is arguably the most recognizable. It was included at the behest of <CFR member> Paul Volcker, a former Fed chairman who warned that Wall Street was recklessly gambling with house money. On Wednesday, <CFR member> Mr. Volcker, now the chairman of a nonpartisan think tank called the Volcker Alliance, welcomed efforts to simplify compliance with the rule but said in a statement, “What is critical is that simplification not undermine the core principle at stake — that taxpayer-supported banking groups, of any size, not participate in proprietary trading at odds with the basic public and customers’ interests.”

He added: “I trust the final rule will strongly maintain that position by, as intended, facilitating its practical application.”

All three sitting Fed governors voted to release the proposal, which will be open to public comment and could change before being finalized. At a brief Fed meeting to discuss the rule, officials stressed that the changes were merely refinements that stemmed from their experience overseeing the process of putting the rule into place, including what did and did not work.

Bank lawyers said the Fed was clearly trying to insulate itself from criticism that it was giving banks too much leeway by declaring that the changes were based on experience overseeing the rule.

“For people who are saying ‘you’re going too easy on the banks,’ their rejoinder is ‘we have data saying that’s not true,’” said Douglas Landy, a partner at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy who helps some of the largest banks comply with the Volcker Rule. “It’s the type of language you might not see in a Fed report before the financial crisis or Dodd Frank when they weren’t as aware of the political implications.” < The McCloy in Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy is CFR chairman John J. McCloy. He became a name partner in the Rockefeller-associated prominent New York law firm Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy. In that capacity, he acted for the “Seven Sisters“, the leading multinational oil companies, including Exxon, in their initial confrontations with the nationalization movement in Libya as well as negotiations with Saudi Arabia and OPEC. Because of his stature in the legal world and his long association with the Rockefellers and as a presidential adviser, he was sometimes referred to as the “Chairman of the American Establishment.”>

The six largest United States banks have all lobbied either directly or through trade groups for changes to the rule. Representatives for <CFR coporate member banks> JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and Wells Fargo declined to comment on the proposal while representatives of <CFR corporate member banks> Bank of America and Citigroup had no immediate comment.

But the changes would alter how much time the banks have to spend proving they are following the Volcker Rule and give them more leeway to determine which types of trades comply. It would also shift the burden of proof for determining whether a trade qualifies under Volcker away from the bank to the regulators.

Now, banks must prove that each trade serves a clear purpose that goes beyond a speculative bet by showing regulators specifically how each trade either meets customer demands or acts as a hedge against specific risks. That had curtailed trading in a variety of assets like derivatives, corporate bonds and other complex products.

Under the changes outlined Wednesday, banks will no longer have to offer proof for each specific trade and would instead have to enact strict internal controls and compliance programs to ensure they are meeting the requirements of the Volcker Rule. The change would allow banks to more freely engage in hedging, in which they execute trades in an effort to counteract risk in other parts of their businesses.

Regulators would also give banks more leeway to determine what levels of trading activity are appropriate for meeting customer demands on each of their trading desks. That would be a shift from the current rule, which sets rigid standards that do not differentiate between trading desks that serve different assets, like corporate bonds and derivatives.

In a briefing for journalists on Wednesday, an agency official said letting banks set their own risk and activity limits would help reduce the difficulties big banks face in trying to prove that their various market activities, which can differ greatly from one another, conform to a set of rigid standards.

Regulators will also continue to collect trading information from the largest banks, which are subject to strict oversight and monitoring as part of the enhanced supervisory process put into place after the crisis.

<CFR member> Lael Brainard, a Fed governor appointed by <CFR Puppet> President Barack Obama, said on Wednesday that she supported the proposal, as long as the chief executives of banks were willing to personally attest to future claims that their institutions were adhering to the restriction on speculative betting.

“The requirement of C.E.O. attestation is critical for this to work, in my view,” <CFR member> Ms. Brainard said in prepared remarks.

Other changes would group banks into categories according to how much Wall Street trading they do. Banks engaging in the least amount of trading would have the easiest set of requirements to fulfill under the rule, a change that dovetails with Congress’s recent move to exempt the smallest banks from having to comply with the Volcker Rule at all.

The changes are already prompting outrage among consumer advocates and other financial watchdogs, who warn it will allow a return to the Wild West days on Wall Street.

“This proposal is no minor set of technical tweaks to the Volcker Rule, but an attempt to unravel fundamental elements of the response to the 2008 financial crisis, when banks financed their gambling with taxpayer-insured deposits,” Marcus Stanley, policy director at Americans for Financial Reform, said in a statement.

Senator Elizabeth Warren, the Massachusetts Democrat who has been among the most vocal critics of changes to Dodd-Frank, called the proposal the latest example of corruption in Mr. Trump’s Washington.

“Even as banks make record profits, their former banker buddies turned regulators are doing them favors by rolling back a rule that protects taxpayers from another bailout,” Ms. Warren said.

But business groups applauded watering down of the Volcker Rule on Wednesday as a step in the right direction — one that would allow banks to operate more efficiently.

The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association said that the Fed vote showed that regulators were finally recognizing the “unintended negative impact” of the complex rules governing the financial system. And the American Bankers Association praised policymakers for “taking sensible steps to better tailor regulations consistent with risk.”

David Hirschmann, president of the United States Chamber’s Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, said that it was time for a more efficient Volcker Rule.

“We are pleased that regulators understand that the Volcker Rule is currently impeding important financing for American businesses,” Mr. Hirschmann said.

A version of this article appears in print on May 31, 2018, on Page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: Big Banks in Line For Looser Curbs On Risky Trades.

 

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What CFR member Admiral Stavridis’ article on CFR member H.R. McMaster’s Retirement Hides

stavridis 1

Time’s The View Politics contains an article titled What H.R. McMaster’s Retirement Reveals by James Stavridis. The same article on the web is titled H.R. McMaster Worked for Me. His Retirement From the Military Reveals A Lot About President Trump . Time tells us “Admiral Stavridis was the 16th Supreme Allied Commander at NATO and is Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

The article is about H. R. McMasters replacement as NSA director by John Bolton. The article tells us “McMaster’s 1997 book, Dereliction of Duty, is in many ways a stinging indictment of the Washington culture of subtle deceit, hidden agenda and back-stabbing that helped pull the U.S. into a quagmire in Vietnam. It tells the story of the malfeasance of the uniformed senior military in misleading the nation and the President about the true state of affairs as the war spiraled down to defeat.”

What the article leaves out is that Stavridis, McMaster and Bolton are all members of the Council on Foreign Relations . Times brief bio of Stavridis leaves out that the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy is a Council on Foreign Relations(CFR) rat nest most of whose faculty belong to the CFR. What the article leaves out is that the men who run the “Washington culture of subtle deceit, hidden agenda and back stabbing that helped pull the U.S. into a quagmire in Vietnam” are members of the Council on Foreign Relations deep state that has run the U.S. government for the last 100 years. Today’s CFR run deep state are pulling us into the quagmire of endless war that makes members of the CFR military industrial complex rich and brings our kids home in body bags.

Missing from the article is that McMaster and Bolton are the U.S.A’s 20th and 21st CFR National Security Advisor. Shouldn’t the American people know that the CFR runs the NSA?

CFR National Security Advisor

  1. Dillon Anderson (1955-1956)
  2. Gordon Gray (1958-1961)
  3. McGeorge Bundy (1961-1966)
  4. Walt W. Rostow (1966-1969)
  5. Henry A. Kissinger (1969-1975)
  6. Brent Scowcroft (1975-1977)
  7. Zbigniew Brzezinski (1977-1981)
  8. Richard V. Allen (1981-1982)
  9. Robert C. McFarlane (1983-1985)
  10. Frank C. Carlucci (1986-1987)
  11. Colin L. Powell (1987-1989)
  12. Brent Scowcroft (1989-1993)
  13. Anthony Lake (1993-1997)
  14. Samuel “Sandy” Berger (1997-2001)
  15. Condoleezza Rice (2001-2005)
  16. Stephen J. Hadley (2005-2009)
  17. (Gen.) James L. Jones Jr. (2009-2010)
  18. Thomas E. Donilon (2010-2013)
  19. Susan E. Rice (2013-2016
  20. R. McMaster (2017-2018)
  21. John Bolton(2018-Present)

 

Missing from the article is that Admiral James Stavridis is the 16th Council on Foreign Relations NATO commander. Shouldn’t NATO troops all over the world know that they are fighting for a small influential group of elites that belong to a think tank called the Council on Foreign Relations?

CFR Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (NATO)

  1. Dwight D. Eisenhower Army (1951-1952)
  2. Matthew Ridgway Army (1952-1953)
  3. Alfred Gruenther Army (1953-1956)
  4. Lauris Norstad Air Force (1956-1963)
  5. Lyman L. Lemnitzer Army (1963-1969)
  6. Andrew J. Goodpaster Army (1969-1974)
  7. Alexander M. Haig Jr. Army (1974-1979)
  8. Bernard W. Rogers Army (1979-1987)
  9. John R. Galvin Army (1987-1992)
  10. John M. Shalikashvili Army (1992-1993)
  11. George A. Joulwan Army (1993-1997)
  12. Wesley K. Clark Army (1997-2000)
  13. Joseph W. Ralston Air Force (2000-2003)
  14. James L. Jones Jr. Marines (2003-2007)
  15. Bantz J. Craddock Army (2007-2009)
  16. James G. Stavridis Navy (2009-2013)

limited hangout or partial hangout is, according to former special assistant to the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Victor Marchetti, “spy jargon for a favorite and frequently used gimmick of the clandestine professionals.“ The gimmick is to misinform the public by leaving key information out of the article.

Stavridis’s article disinforms the reader by leaving all references of connections to the Council on Foreign Relations out of the story. There is no doubt in my mind that McMaster’s 1997 book Dereliction of Duty does the same. I’ll leave it up to the reader to confirm or disprove that allegation.

Stavridis and Time magazine are toying with the reader’s head. How do you feel about that?

The article follows. I have modified it to identify Council on Foreign relations connections.

(Council on Foreign Relations Member) H.R. Mcmaster Worked for Me His Retirement From the Military Reveals A Lot About President Trump

STAVRIDUS - 1

<CFR member> H.R. McMaster, national security advisor, listens as U.S. President Donald Trump, not pictured, speaks during a meeting with North Korean defectors in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, Feb. 2, 2018. Zach Gibson—Bloomberg/Getty Images

By JAMES STAVRIDIS <CFR member> March 23, 2018

<CFR member>  Admiral Stavridis was the 16th Supreme Allied Commander at NATO and is Dean of the <CFR rats nest>   Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University

 picture trump twitter

I met <CFR member>   Colonel H.R. McMaster in 2004, when he was in command of the Third Calvary Regiment in Tal Afar, Iraq. It was a hot and dusty day, and I <a CFR member> was a three-star Vice Admiral traveling with my boss at the time, <CFR member> Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld. <CFR member> McMaster, who looks like he ought to be working as a bouncer in a city bar in the Badlands neighborhood of his Philadelphia hometown, briefed us on his work in pacifying the violent region with an adept blend of hard and soft power — what some have called “smart power.”

That is one smart Colonel is what I thought, and it solidified in my mind the superb intellect combined with operational skills that have characterized his career. Barrel-chested, shaven head and direct of manner, he radiates both brains and brawn. As the NATO Commander a few years later, and wearing four stars, I requested his assignment to my Afghan command as a one-star to take on the dark heart of our challenges there: corruption in the Afghani government. He did hard work in a difficult place there, and my respect for him grew.

<CFR member> McMaster’s 1997 book, Dereliction of Duty, is in many ways a stinging indictment of the Washington <CFR shaped> culture of subtle deceit, hidden agenda and back-stabbing that helped pull the U.S. into a quagmire in <CFR produced war we couldn’t win>Vietnam. It tells the story of the malfeasance of the uniformed senior military in misleading the nation and the President about the true state of affairs as the war spiraled down to defeat. It is also a cautionary tale for <CFR member> McMaster himself. In his time in the White House, he tried to rise above what <CFR shill>  Rex Tillerson called in an outburst of candor (and an understatement, frankly) this “mean-spirited town.” <CFR member>  McMaster’s short tenure as President Donald Trump’s National Security Advisor certainly reinforced that assessment.

pic 2 mcmaster and trump

The media accounts of his relationship with the President are largely true. <CFR member> McMaster is a good judge of character and certainly knew what he was getting into when the President tapped him as his second National Security Advisor. When we get an assignment in the military, we call them “orders,” and this was a set of orders he would gladly have passed on. But like a good soldier, he shouldered the pack and stepped into the White House to do what he could to create at least part of a guardrail system around this mercurial and unstable President.

 

From the beginning, he knew he would deal with whipsaw views on the key elements of foreign policy, like watching North Korea policy lurching from “fire and fury” one minute to accepting a meeting with Kim Jong Un to cut a big, beautiful deal the next. No National Security Advisor could bring order out of the policy chaos any more than his fellow General John Kelly could bring order to the process chaos. This is a President who loves and revels in chaos. For a national security team, that gives birth to the worst quality of all from an international and especially an allied perspective: inconsistency. Trump has famously said he doesn’t want our enemies to know what we are thinking; the problem is, neither do our friends nor even, it seems at times, do we ourselves.

<CFR member> McMaster worked hard to bring talent to the National Security Council staff, avoid turf battles and generate a coherent National Security Strategy. When the strategy came out, I chatted with <CFR member> McMaster about it, and he said, “America First doesn’t have to mean America Alone.” He managed to make the document shockingly normal. While dropping out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership <a CFR production> and the Paris climate accord  <a CFR production> were battles he could not win, he managed to at least keep a sense of mainstream foreign policy choices in play: a strong NATO <a CFR production>, Asian alliances, countering a resurgent Russia and a rising China <a CFR production>, a focus on cyber <a new CFR military industrial profit center> and energy<a major CFR profit center>, and other reasonable positions.

But by the end of a year, both the pace and above all the bureaucratic stresses in the White House were beginning to show. Over time, the insulation started to come off his wires; disagreements with cabinet departments started to undermine his position. He began to receive less support from the Pentagon and the Chief of Staff in the White House, and his solid, thoughtful and measured personality naturally grated on the boss. The rumors of his dismissal have been circulating seriously for months. The fact that he has chosen retirement instead of moving on to a fourth star speaks volumes about how this journey has concluded.

pic 4 bolton 3rd security advisor

Going forward, I suspect and hope we will see more of <CFR member>H.R. McMaster. His intellect and depth of experience will be valuable assets for the private sector, and hopefully he will eventually return to government in an administration more in line with both his sensible, centrist views and, perhaps more importantly, with his rational personality. In shifting to <my fellow CFR member>  John Bolton, we go from a centrist to a neo-con <always remember the CFR are non-partisan>; from a calming personality who builds teams to a harsh ideologue who drives them into the ground <and can both participate in a CFR Hegelian dialect to shape public opinion to CFR ends>; and from a practitioner of smart power to a theorist of hard power. The drums of war are beating louder, and in the Pentagon they are taking a deep breath and preparing for conflict not only on the banks of the Potomac in the <CFR run> interagency but also, more dangerously, around the world. We are poorer for the departure of <CFR member> H.R. McMaster. He deserved a better ending to his short, strange voyage.

bolton at UN

IDEAS

TIME Ideas hosts the world’s leading voices, providing commentary on events in news, society, and culture. We welcome outside contributions. Opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of TIME editors <but they do reflect the views of the CFR>

 

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CFR member Bolton Replaces CFR member McMaster to become the 21st Unelected CFR National Security Advisor

The Washington Post Article, Trump Names Former Ambassador John Bolton as His New National Security Advisor, tells us about Bolton replacing McMaster as our new National Security Advisor.

limited hangout or partial hangout is, according to former special assistant to the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Victor Marchetti, “spy jargon for a favorite and frequently used gimmick of the clandestine professionals.“ The gimmick is to misinform the public by leaving key information out of the article. The key information Jaffe and Dawsey leave out of their article is that the Council on Foreign Relations runs the NSA, that McMaster was the twentieth CFR NSA director, and that Bolton is the twenty first. Here is a list of CFR NSA Advisors:

CFR National Security Advisor

  1. Dillon Anderson (1955-1956)
  2. Gordon Gray (1958-1961)
  3. McGeorge Bundy (1961-1966)
  4. Walt W. Rostow (1966-1969)
  5. Henry A. Kissinger (1969-1975)
  6. Brent Scowcroft (1975-1977)
  7. Zbigniew Brzezinski (1977-1981)
  8. Richard V. Allen (1981-1982)
  9. Robert C. McFarlane (1983-1985)
  10. Frank C. Carlucci (1986-1987)
  11. Colin L. Powell (1987-1989)
  12. Brent Scowcroft (1989-1993)
  13. Anthony Lake (1993-1997)
  14. Samuel “Sandy” Berger (1997-2001)
  15. Condoleezza Rice (2001-2005)
  16. Stephen J. Hadley (2005-2009)
  17. (Gen.) James L. Jones Jr. (2009-2010)
  18. Thomas E. Donilon (2010-2013)
  19. Susan E. Rice (2013-2016
  20. H.R. McMaster (2017-2018)
  21. John Bolton(2018-Present)

Leaving this key bit of information out of their story keeps the American people in the dark about who is stirring up conflict around the world. It is not an individual like Bolton or McMaster or Trump or Obama – it is a small group of less than 5000 people called the Council on Foreign Relations.

Jaffe and Dawsey tell us about Colin Powell, Richard B. Cheny, and Condoleezza Rice. What they leave out is that they are all members of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Hardly one person in 1000 ever heard of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).

The Council on Foreign Relations was formally established in Paris in 1919 along with its British Counterpart the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The Council on Foreign Relations and Royal Institute of International Affairs can trace their roots back to a secret organization founded and funded by Cecil Rhodes, who became fabulously wealthy by exploiting the people of South Africa. Rhodes is the father of Apartheid.

The Council on Foreign Relations was founded by a group of American and British imperialists and racists intent on ruling the world. Many of the American members were American intelligence officers that belonged to the first American Intelligence Agency — THE INQUIRY. Many of the British members were British Intelligence Agents. THE INQUIRY and its members, who included such notable Americans as Col. Edward Mandel House, Walter Lippmann, Isaiah Bowman, and James Shotwell, wrote most of Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points.

The CFR/RIIA method of operation is simple — they control public opinion. They keep the identity of their group secret. They learn the likes and dislikes of influential people. They surround and manipulate them into acting in the best interest of the CFR/RIIA.

The Council on Foreign Relations, and the Royal Institute of International Affairs are adept at using the media to create massive psycho-political operations used to manipulate public opinion. The psycho-political operations are often designed to create tensions between different groups of people. The object is to keep the world in a state of perpetual tension and warfare to maximize profits from CFR/RIIA munition, medicine, media, energy, and food businesses.

The CFR has only 5000 members yet they control over three-quarters of the nations wealth. The CFR runs the State Department and the CIA. The CFR has placed 100 CFR members in every Presidential Administration since Woodrow Wilson. They work together to misinform and disinform the President to act in the best interest of the CFR not the best interest of the American People. At least five Presidents (Eisenhower, Ford, Carter, Bush, and Clinton) have been members of the CFR. The CFR has packed every Supreme court with CFR insiders. Three CFR members (Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsberg, and Sandra Day O’Connor) sit on the supreme court. The CFR’s British Counterpart is the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The members of these groups profit by creating tension and hate. Their targets include British and American citizens.

The 100 CFR members that surround the president are “the Secret Team.” The “Secret Team” help carry out psycho-political operations scripted by CFR members in the state department and the Intelligence Organizations. The psycho-political operations are coordinated by a group of Council on Foreign Relations members called the Special Group. The Special Group evolved from the Psychological Strategy Board.

President Truman issued an executive order establishing the Psychological Strategy Board. The Board was run by CFR members Gordon Gray and Henry Kissinger. The PSB has close ties to the State Department and Intelligence Organizations. The purpose of the PSB was to co-ordinate psycho-political operations. Many of those operations were focused at Americans. The people became wary of the Psychological Strategy Board. Eisenhower issued an executive order changing its name to the Operations Coordination Board. The OCB was a bigger more powerful PSB. Gray and Kissinger ran the OCB too. President Kennedy abolished the OCB. It became an ad hoc committee called the “Special Group,” which exists today. The PSB/OCB/Special Group always has CFR members running and sitting on it. Since the Special Group was not formed by Executive Order it cannot be abolished.

On September 12, 1939, the Council on Foreign Relations began to take control of the Department of State. On that day Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Editor of Foreign Affairs, and Walter H. Mallory, Executive Director of the Council on Foreign Relations, paid a visit to the State Department. The Council proposed forming groups of experts to proceed with research in the general areas of Security, Armament, Economic, Political, and Territorial problems. The State Department accepted the proposal. The project (1939-1945) was called Council on Foreign Relations War and Peace Studies. Hamilton Fish Armstrong was Executive director.

In February 1941 the CFR officially became part of the State Department. The Department of State established the Division of Special Research. It was organized just like the Council on Foreign Relations War and Peace Studies project. It was divided into Economic, Political, Territorial, and Security Sections. The Research Secretaries serving with the Council groups were hired by the State Department to work in the new division. These men also were permitted to continue serving as Research Secretaries to their respective Council groups. Leo Pasvolsky was appointed Director of Research.

In 1942 the relationship between the Department of State and the Council on Foreign Relations strengthened again. The Department organized an Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policies. The Chairman was Secretary Cordell Hull, the vice chairman, Under Secretary Sumner Wells, Dr. Leo Pasvolsky ( director of the Division of Special Research) was appointed Executive Officer. Several experts were brought in from outside the Department. The outside experts were Council on Foreign Relations War and Peace Studies members; Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Isaiah Bowman, Benjamin V. Cohen, Norman H. Davis, and James T. Shotwell.

In total there were 362 meetings of the War and Peace Studies groups. The meetings were held at Council on Foreign Relations headquarters — the Harold Pratt house, Fifty-Eight East Sixty-Eighth Street, New York City. The Council’s wartime work was confidential.17

In 1944 members of the Council on Foreign Relations The War and Peace Studies Political Group were invited to be active members at the Dumbarton Oaks conference on world economic arrangements. In 1945 these men and members of Britain’s Royal Institute of International Affairs were active at the San Francisco conference which ensured the establishment of the United Nations.

In 1947 Council on Foreign Relations members George Kennan, Walter Lippmann, Paul Nitze, Dean Achenson, and Walter Krock took part in a psycho-political operation forcing the Marshall Plan on the American public. The PSYOP included a “anonymous” letter credited to a Mr. X, which appeared in the Council on Foreign Relations magazine FOREIGN AFFAIRS. The letter opened the door for the CFR controlled Truman administration to take a hard line against the threat of Soviet expansion. George Kennan was the author of the letter. The Marshall Plan should have been called the Council on Foreign Relations Plan. The so-called Marshall Plan and the ensuing North Atlantic Treaty Organization defined the role of the United States in world politics for the rest of the century.

In 1950 another PSYOP resulted in NSC-68, a key cold war document. The NSC (National Security Council) didn’t write it — the Department of State Policy Planning Staff did. The cast of characters included CFR members George Kennan, Paul Nitze, and Dean Achenson. NSC-68 was given to Truman on April 7, 1950. NSC-68 was a practical extension of the Truman doctrine. It had the US assume the role of world policeman and use 20 per cent of its gross national product ($50 billion in 1953) for arms. NSC-68 provided the justification — the WORLD WIDE COMMUNIST THREAT!

NSC-68 realized a major Council on Foreign Relations aim — building the largest military establishment in Peace Time History. Within a year of drafting NSC-68, the security-related budget leaped to $22 billion, armed forces manpower was up to a million — CFR medicine, munition, food, and media businesses were humming again. The following year the NSC-68 budget rose to $44 billion. In fiscal 1953 it jumped to $50 billion. Today (1997) we are still running $300 billion dollar defense budgets despite Russia giving up because it went bankrupt.

America would never turn back from the road of huge military spending. Spending that included the purchase of radioactive fallout on American citizens in the 50’s, and buying thermonuclear waste from the Russians as we approach the year 2000. Spending resulting in a national debt of $5.5 Trillion Dollars that continues to grow, and interest payments of over $270 billion a year. Is the Council on Foreign Relations trying to make the United States economically vulnerable to influence from outside sources? Isn’t that treason?

THE INQUIRY, the PSB/OCB/Special group, the War and Peace Studies, the “X” Affair, and NSC-68 have had tremendous historical impact. Yet these events and the role played by the Council on Foreign Relations in sponsoring and carrying out the events are missing from our History books. You represent the people. Can you explain to me why the Council on Foreign Relations role in History has been left out of the History books? Why don’t we learn about them in High School History courses? Why don’t History majors in college learn about the Council on Foreign Relations?

Isn’t the real story in Jaffe and Dawsey’s article that one small group, the Council on Foreign Relations controls the US National Security Agency? Jaffe and Dawsey’s article follows, it has been modified to show CFR member connections.

 

National Security

Trump names former ambassador <Council on Foreign Relations(CFR) member> John Bolton as his new national security adviser

By Greg Jaffe and Josh Dawsey March 22 Email the author  < Advisor vs Adviser adviser is the strongly preferred spelling everywhere apart from North America. In the U.S. and Canada, it’s more common to see advisor as a part of official titles, and it’s also the spelling that’s seemingly preferred by the U.S. Government. I guess Jaffe and Dawsey are globalists>

President Trump said Thursday that he was naming former ambassador < CFR member> John Bolton, a Fox News commentator and conservative firebrand, as his new national security adviser, replacing < CFR member>  Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster.

The president announced the news in a tweet, saying that < CFR member>  Bolton would take the job starting April 9, making him Trump’s third national security adviser in the first 14 months of his presidency. In dismissing< CFR member>  McMaster from the job, Trump praised the Army general for his “outstanding job” and said he would “always remain my friend.”

Despite the kind words, Trump and  McMaster never clicked on a personal basis and often seemed at odds on matters of policy related to Iran and North Korea.

The appointment of < CFR member>  Bolton, which doesn’t require Senate confirmation, could lead to dramatic changes in the administration’s approach to crises around the world.

His appointment is certain to scramble the White House’s preparations for a proposed summit by the end of May between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. < CFR member>  Bolton is a fierce North Korea hawk who, in his prolific writings and television commentary, has said that preemptive war would likely be the only way to stop North Korea from obtaining the capability to attack the United States with a nuclear missile.

< CFR member>  Bolton has touted “the legal case for striking North Korea first” in an editorial in the Wall Street Journal. In a subsequent interview with Breitbart News, < CFR member> Bolton warned that the North was on the cusp of being able to strike the continental United States and raised the specter of Pyongyang selling nuclear devices to other hostile actors such as Iran, the Islamic State or ­al-Qaeda.

“We have to ask ourselves whether we’re prepared to take preemptive action, or live in a world where North Korea — and a lot of other people — have nuclear weapons,” he said.

[Kim Jong Un wants to be seen as Donald Trump’s equal. ]

< CFR member>  Bolton, who had dismissed negotiations with North Korea as a waste of time, moderated his views slightly after Trump announced he would sit down with Kim. He described Trump’s decision as “diplomatic shock and awe” and suggested that the encounter between the two leaders would be short and largely devoid of traditional diplomacy.

“Tell me you have begun total denuclearization, because we’re not going to have protracted negotiations,” he imagined Trump telling the North Korean. “You can tell me right now or we’ll start thinking of something else.”

< CFR member>  Bolton has been even more hawkish than Trump on Iran, pushing for the president to withdraw from the nuclear agreement that the United States and five other world powers reached with Tehran during the Obama administration.

In January, < CFR member>  Bolton told Fox News that Trump should dump the nuclear deal, reimpose economic sanctions on Tehran, and work toward an overthrow of the government there.

How many days has it been since a high-profile White House departure? View Graphic

“There’s a lot we can do, and we should do it,” < CFR member>  Bolton said. “Our goal should be regime change in Iran.” He similarly called for bombing Iran in a New York Times editorial in 2015.

< CFR member> McMaster’s departure and < CFR member>  Bolton’s ascension will come about one month before a deadline for Trump to decide whether the United States will remain a party to the deal.

[Europeans look for a way to preserve nuclear deal while punishing Iran and satisfying Trump]

< CFR member> Bolton, 69, served in the <Son of CFR mbr George H.W. Bush> George W. Bush administration in a key arms-control job. Then-Secretary of State <CFR member> Colin Powell said he was strongly encouraged to take <CFR member> Bolton by Vice President <CFR member> Richard B. Cheney, who shared <CFR member> Bolton’s belief in American military power.

<CFR member> Bolton required a recess appointment for his next position as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations after Democrats and several Republicans blocked his nomination in 2005.

His critics cited a brusque and sometimes belittling manner with colleagues and underlings and his many put-downs of the United Nations itself. Those included an oft-quoted remark that no one would notice if the high-rise U.N. building lost several of its floors. He resigned the following year after Democrats had taken control of Congress and it was clear he could not be confirmed.

During his brief run at the U.N., Bolton was often at odds with then-Secretary of State <CFR member> Condoleezza Rice. She told colleagues that <CFR member> Bolton undermined her and went behind her back to <CFR member> Cheney, his old friend and patron.

Those old grievances resurfaced before Trump took office, when as president-elect he considered selecting <CFR member> Bolton as deputy secretary of state. That job would have been subject to Senate confirmation, and opposition to the potential choice was swift and bipartisan. Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) vowed to block it, and the nomination never materialized.

Trump’s selection of <CFR member> Bolton as his national security adviser drew raves from more hawkish members of Congress. “Selecting <CFR member> John Bolton as national security adviser is good news for America’s allies and bad news for America’s enemies,” said Sen. Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.).

Democrats and some Republicans reacted with concern that <CFR member> Bolton’s hawkish positions could lead to more conflict. <CFR member> Bolton’s positions on Iran and North Korea “are overly aggressive at best and downright dangerous at worst,” said. Sen. Christopher A. Coons (D-Del.).

White House officials said that Trump made the final offer to <CFR member> Bolton on Thursday afternoon and then called <CFR member> McMaster a few minutes later and thanked him for his service.

A senior White House official said that Trump did not want to embarrass <CFR member>  McMaster publicly as he had done with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who learned of his dismissal through a presidential tweet.

<CFR member>  McMaster thanked Trump for the opportunity to serve in the White House, though his tenure has been dogged by recent rumors that he would be soon fired.

“Everyone in the White House knew that,” said a senior official who spoke on the condition of anonymity. “It was the same as Rex. Everyone knew their days were numbered, so people didn’t take them seriously.”

<CFR member>  McMaster came to the Trump administration with a highly accomplished combat record in Iraq and a reputation as one of the Army’s best thinkers on the subject of battling insurgents and the future of war.

His struggles with Trump were often personal. When the president would receive his morning schedule and see that he was expected to spend 30 minutes or longer with <CFR member>  McMaster outside of his intelligence briefing, Trump would complain and ask aides to cut it back, according to two people familiar with the matter, who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations.

At times, Trump would tell <CFR member>  McMaster that he understood an issue largely to make him stop talking, these people said. “I get it, general, I get it,” Trump would say, according to two people who were present at the time.

Some days, Trump would tell his staff that he did not want to see <CFR member>  McMaster at all, one of these people said.

<CFR member> McMaster’s biggest win — and area of greatest influence — was the war in Afghanistan, where he persuaded the president to nearly double the size of the U.S. force to 15,000 troops. But Trump, who said he went against his instincts when he approved the surge, never seemed to buy into the new strategy and resented <CFR member>  McMaster for pushing it on him, U.S. officials said.

<CFR member> McMaster is credited with improving morale and bringing order to the National Security Council following the forced departure of his predecessor, Michael Flynn, early last year. But at the NSC, <CFR member>  McMaster often struggled to steer the foreign policy debate. He lacked the backing of Trump and had a tense relationship with Defense Secretary Jim Mattis. Efforts to push Mattis to produce military options that Trump had requested for Iran and North Korea often went unanswered from the Pentagon.

One big question going forward is how <CFR member>  Bolton will work with Mattis, who has often tried to restrain Trump’s more impulsive and unconventional instincts on foreign policy matters.

White House Chief of Staff John F. Kelly and Mattis both pushed Trump to remove <CFR member>  McMaster, with Kelly leading the effort. But Kelly and Mattis are said to be skeptical of Bolton, according to a senior White House official who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

Trump often praised <CFR member>  Bolton’s commentary and defense of the president on Fox News even as he expressed skepticism about the pundit’s mustache.

In a Fox News interview minutes after the president’s tweet announcing his appointment, Bolton said he was surprised to receive the offer from Trump on Thursday.

“I think I still am a Fox News contributor,” <CFR member>  Bolton told the host.

“No, you’re not apparently,” she replied.

Anne Gearan, John Hudson, Karen DeYoung and Robert Costa contributed to this report.

Greg Jaffe is a national security reporter for The Washington Post, where he has been since March 2009. Previously, he covered the White House and the military for The Post.

Jaffe

Follow @GregJaffe

Josh Dawsey is a White House reporter for The Washington Post. He joined the paper in 2017. He previously covered the White House for Politico, and New York City Hall and New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie for the Wall Street Journal.

Dawsey

Follow @jdawsey1

 

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Trump Nominates Obama’s Fed Council On Foreign Relations Carlyle Group member pick Jerome Powell as FED Chairman

powell pic 1

 

On Thursday, November 2nd, 2017  President Donald Trump nominated Council on Foreign Relations member Jerome Powell, a member of the Federal Reserve’s governing body, to replace Council on Foreign Relations member Janet Yellen as the chair of the Federal Reserve.

 

Council on Foreign Relations member Yellen is the first woman to lead the Federal Reserve. Yellen is not the first CFR Fed Chairman, she is the eighth. CFR member Powell will be the ninth. The other CFR Chairman of the Federal  were:

 

Eugene Meyer (1930-1933)

Thomas B. McCabe (1948-1951)

William McC. Martin Jr. (1951-1970)

Arthur F. Burns (1970-1978)William Miller (1978-1979)

Paul A. Volcker (1979-1987)

Alan Greenspan (1987-2006)

Janet Yellen(2014-2017)

 

Former President Barack Obama nominated Powell to his current position on the central bank’s Board of Governors in 2011. CFR member Powell served as a former Treasury official in CFR member George H.W. Bush’s administration.

Before joining the Treasury Department, Powell worked as an investment banker in New York City. He was a partner at the Washington, D.C.-based asset management firm  the CFR created and run Carlyle Group from 1997 to 2005, and became a managing partner at the private equity Global Environment Fund in 2008. The Carlyle group would kick of the financial crisis that was engineered by CFR member Bill Clinton.

The Glass Steagall Act, the FDR Banking Bill, was setup over 70 years ago . On November 12, 1999 Council on Foreign Relations member William Jefferson Clinton stated the, ” Glass- Stegall is no longer appropriate for our economy. This was good for the industrial age. The Financial Modernization Bill is the key to rising paycheck and great security for ordinary Americans”. Council on Foreign Relations member William Clinton then signed the ‘Financial Modernization Bill’.

With the signing of the bill old capitalism and free market economics died and the “new capitalism” and markets controlled by a small group of elite investment bankers was born. The repeal was the foundation that provided for non transparent financial manipulation and use of leverage to revolutionize the activities of investment beginning in 1999, to amass huge fortunes for the investment bankers who designed, marketed and oversaw the use of leveraged investments, and to generate awesomely speculative endeavors at hedge funds, which have gone unregulated by government oversight.

Investment leverage snapped with the $20 Billion Council on Foreign Relations run Carlyle Group bond fund experiencing margin calls, where risk was multiplied by 33 to 1 and the underlying assets represented only 3% of the portfolio value; and those assets were illiquid, thinly traded issues: it was reasonable that this fund would be the first of many countless to break causing a sharp sell off in the finance, real estate and banking sectors as investments were sold at fire sale prices to meet the margin calls. Council on Foreign Relations member David Rubenstein, co-founder of Carlyle Group, in a keynote speech at the 15th annual venture capital and private equity conference at Harvard Business School, laid some of the blame for the private equity industry’s troubles on investment banks, “I analogize it to sex,” Council on Foreign Relations member Rubenstein said. “You realize there were certain things you shouldn’t do, but the urge is there, and you can’t resist.”

carlyle pic 2

The CFR engineered financial crisis transferred $40T in wealth to the CFR elite who had the inside information and means to profit from the disaster. These would include members of the Carlyle Group who also have ties to the intelligence organizations. The Carlyle group owns Booz-Allen, the NSA spy nest that Snowden blew the whistle on.  That the CFR control the FED is evident in CFR control of the FED Board of Governors, FED Chairs, FED Vice Chairs, and FED positions at State FED banks.

CFR FED Board of Governors

*Paul Warburg (1914-1918)

*Albert Strauss (1918-1920)

*Eugene Meyer (1930-1933)

*Ralph W. Morrison (1936)

*Thomas McCabe (1948-1951)

*William McC. Martin Jr. (1951-1970)

Andrew F. Brimmer (1966-1974)

*Arthur F. Burns (1970-1978)

*Robert C. Holland (1973-1976)

*Henry C. Wallich (1974-1986)

*G. William Miller (1978-1979)

*Nancy H. Teeters (1978-1984)

*Emmett J. Rice (1979-1986)

Paul A. Volcker (1979-1987)

Alan Greenspan (1987-2006)

Alan S. Blinder (1994-1996)

Alice M. Rivlin (1996-1999)

Roger W. Ferguson (1997-2006)

Daniel K. Tarullo (2009-present)

Janet L. Yellen (1994-1997, 2010-present)

Jerome H. Powell (2012-present)

 

CFR Chairman of the Federal Reserve

*Eugene Meyer (1930-1933)

*Thomas B. McCabe (1948-1951)

*William McC. Martin Jr. (1951-1970)

*Arthur F. Burns (1970-1978)

*G. William Miller (1978-1979)

Paul A. Volcker (1979-1987)

Alan Greenspan (1987-2006)

Janet Yellen(2014-2017)

 

CFR Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve

*Paul Warburg (1916-1918)

*Albert Strauss (1918-1920)

*Edmund Platt (1920-1930)

*Frederick H. Schultz (1979-1982)

Alan S. Blinder (1994-1996)

Alice M. Rivlin (1996-1999)

Roger W. Ferguson (1999-2006)

Donald L. Kohn  (2006-2010)

Janet L. Yellen (2010-2014)

 

CFR Federal Reserve Bank of New York

William C. Dudley – President

Christine M. Cumming – First Vice President

Terrence J. Checki – Executive Vice President

Jamie Dimon – Director (Class A)

James S. Tisch – Director (Class B)

Lee C. Bollinger – Director (Class C)

Century of Enslavement: The History of The Federal Reserve

The Two Step Plan to National Economic Reform and Recovery

If enough people demand that our representatives reign in the Council on Foreign Relations members that run the USA we can save our nation.

CFR FED Volker Greenspan Yellen

CFR PSB 1

CFR PSB 2

 

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The CFR devil in Nuclear Diplomacy Exposed

The Arms Control Association (ACA) about link tells us, “The Arms Control Association, founded in 1971, is a national nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. Through its public education and media programs and its magazine, Arms Control Today, we provide policy-makers, the press and the interested public with authoritative information, analysis and commentary on arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements, and related national security issues. In addition to the regular press briefings the Arms Control Association holds on major arms control developments, the staff provides commentary and analysis on a broad spectrum of issues for journalists and scholars both in the United States and abroad.

The ACA just published a fact sheet titled Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy. The Chronology begins in 1985 and follows the diplomatic negotiations up to today. The fact sheet names a host of people who played parts in the negotiations which have resulted in North Korea becoming a nuclear threat. People named include Jimmy Carter, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, William Perry, Sandy Berger, James Woolsey, Winston Lord, Donald Rumsfeld, George Tenet, Wendy Sherman, Madeleine Albright. Colin Powell, Richard Armitage, John Bolton, James Kelly, Bill Richardson, Stephen Bosworth, P. J. Crowley, Kurt Campbell, Leon Panetta. Missing from the article is a key fact, all are members of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Organizations that played key roles in the negotiation process were the CIA and the State Department. Both organizations are headed and staffed by CFR members. CFR Directors of Central Intelligence include Agency Gen. Walter Bedell Smith (1950-1953), Allen W. Dulles (1953-1961), John Alex McCone (1961-1965), Richard Helms (1966-1973), James R. Schlesinger (1973), William E. Colby (1973-1976), George H.W. Bush (1976-1977), Stansfield Turner (1977-1981), William J. Casey (1981-1987), William H. Webster (1987-1991), Robert M. Gates (1991-1993), R. James Woolsey (1993-1995), Adm. William Studeman (1995), [acting] John M. Deutch (1995-1996), George J. Tenet (1997-2004), Porter Goss (2004-2006), Gen. Michael V. Hayden (2006-2009), Gen. David H. Petraeus (2011-2012). CFR U.S. Secretaries of State Include Elihu Root (1905-1909),Charles Evans Hughes (1921-1925),Frank B. Kellogg (1925-1929),Henry L. Stimson (1929-1933),Edward R. Stettinius Jr. (1944-1945),Dean G. Acheson (1949-1953),John Foster Dulles (1953-1959),Christian A. Herter (1959-1961),Dean Rusk (1961-1969),William P. Rogers (1969-1973),Henry A. Kissinger (1973-1977),Cyrus R. Vance (1977-1980),Edmund S. Muskie (1980-1981),Alexander M. Haig Jr. (1981-1982),George P. Shultz (1982-1989),James A. Baker III (1989-1992),Lawrence S. Eagleburger (1992-1993),Warren M. Christopher (1993-1997),Madeleine K. Albright (1997-2001),Colin L. Powell (2001-2005),Condoleezza Rice (2005-2009),John Forbes Kerry (2013-2016).

By leaving CFR negotiation ties out of the fact sheet is the ACA really providing “policy-makers, the press and the interested public with authoritative information, analysis and commentary on arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements, and related national security issues” or is it misinforming us?

If CFR members have been the negotiators for 32 years, and if CFR members and the Military Industrial Complex which it controls can make more profit from endless war than from peace then did the CFR negotiators plan on letting N. Korea end up as a Nuclear threat?  Shouldn’t ACA include the CFR ties to negotiation in the Fact Sheet?

In 2015 a Bipartisan Group of 60 Senior National Security Leaders endorsed the  Iran Nuclear Deal. Thirty-nine of the group are members of the Council on Foreign Relations. They are identified in the figure below :

fig 1 - 39 CFR sr officialsFigure 1 Thirty-Nine out of Sixty National Security Who Endorsed the Iran Nuke Deal are CFR Members

 

Why is the Council on Foreign Relations so interested in allowing countries to develop Nuclear Capabilities that can stir up tension and conflict in the Middle East and Asia? A Land Destroyer report by Tony Carllucci provides insight. Mr. Carllucci writes, “The West has no intention of striking any lasting deal with Iran, as nuclear capabilities, even the acquirement of nuclear weapons by Iran was never truly an existential threat to Western nations or their regional partners. The West’s issue with Iran is its sovereignty and its ability to project its interests into spheres traditionally monopolized by the US and UK across the Middle East. Unless Iran plans on turning over its sovereignty and regional influence along with its right to develop and use nuclear technology, betrayal of any “nuclear deal” is all but inevitable, as is the war that is to shortly follow.” Is the Council on Foreign Relations orchestrating a psyop that will result in a Nuclear incident to keep people all over the world in a state of fear that will result in generating trillions of endless war bucks? Are you ok with that?

The Arms Control Association article follows. I have modified it to identify CFR members and CFR ties and included figures that provide further information about the CFR. If you agree that the CFR is not working in the best interest of the American people I urge you to send a link to this webpage to your local, state, and federal representatives and demand an investigation of the Council on Foreign Relations members who are running our government and negotiating endless war.

 

 

 

Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy

 

Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, (202) 463-8270 x102

Updated: November 2017

For years, the United States and the international community have tried to negotiate an end to North Korea’s nuclear and missile development and its export of ballistic missile technology. Those efforts have been replete with periods of crisis, stalemate, and tentative progress towards denuclearization, and North Korea has long been a key challenge for the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.

The United States has pursued a variety of policy responses to the proliferation challenges posed by North Korea, including military cooperation with U.S. allies in the region, wide-ranging sanctions, and non-proliferation mechanisms such as export controls. The United States also engaged in two major diplomatic initiatives to have North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons efforts in return for aid.

In 1994, faced with North Korea’s announced intent to withdraw from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which requires non-nuclear weapon states to forswear the development and acquisition of nuclear weapons, the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework. Under this agreement, Pyongyang committed to freezing its illicit plutonium weapons program in exchange for aid.

Following the collapse of this agreement in 2002, North Korea claimed that it had withdrawn from the NPT in January 2003 and once again began operating its nuclear facilities.

The second major diplomatic effort were the Six-Party Talks initiated in August of 2003 which involved China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. In between periods of stalemate and crisis, those talks arrived at critical breakthroughs in 2005, when North Korea pledged to abandon “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” and return to the NPT, and in 2007, when the parties agreed on a series of steps to implement that 2005 agreement.

Those talks, however, broke down in 2009 following disagreements over verification and an internationally condemned North Korea rocket launch. Pyongyang has since stated that it would never return to the talks and is no longer bound by their agreements. The other five parties state that they remain committed to the talks, and have called for Pyongyang to recommit to its 2005 denuclearization pledge.

The following chronology summarizes in greater detail developments in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, and the efforts to end them, since 1985.

Skip to: 19851991199219931994199519961997199819992000200120022003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,2008, 2009, 20102011201220132014201520162017

1985

December 12, 1985: North Korea accedes to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) but does not complete a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Under Article III of the NPT, North Korea has 18 months to conclude such an arrangement. In coming years, North Korea links adherence to this provision of the treaty to the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea.

fig 2 - highway of deathFigure 2 Council on Foreign Relations member George H.W. Bush’s Highway of Death

1991

September 27, 1991: President [Council on Foreign Relations member]  George Bush announces the unilateral withdrawal of all naval and land-based tactical nuclear weapons deployed abroad. Approximately 100 U.S. nuclear weapons had been based in South Korea. Eight days later, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev reciprocates.

November 8, 1991: In response to [Council on Foreign Relations member]  President Bush’s unilateral move, President Roh Tae Woo of South Korea announces the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, under which South Korea promises not to produce, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons. In addition, the declaration unilaterally prohibits South Korea from possessing nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities. These promises, if enacted, would satisfy all of North Korea’s conditions for allowing IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities.

1992

January 20, 1992: The two Koreas sign the South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Under the declaration, both countries agree not to “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons” or to “possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.” They also agree to mutual inspections for verification.

January 30, 1992: More than six years after signing the NPT, North Korea concludes a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

March 6, 1992: The United States imposes sanctions on North Korea’s Lyongaksan Machineries and Equipment Export Corporation and Changgwang Sinyong Corporation for missile proliferation activities.*

April 9, 1992: North Korea ratifies the safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

May 4, 1992: North Korea submits its nuclear material declarations to the IAEA, declaring seven sites and some 90 grams of plutonium that could be subject to IAEA inspection. Pyongyang claims that the nuclear material was the result of reprocessing 89 defective fuel rods in 1989. The IAEA conducted inspections to verify the completeness of this declaration from mid-1992 to early 1993.

June 23, 1992: The United States imposes “missile sanctions” on the North Korean entities sanctioned in March.*

September 1992: IAEA inspectors discover discrepancies in North Korea’s “initial report” on its nuclear program and ask for clarification on several issues, including the amount of reprocessed plutonium in North Korea.

1993

February 9, 1993: The IAEA demands special inspections of two sites that are believed to store nuclear waste. The request is based on strong evidence that North Korea has been cheating on its commitments under the NPT. North Korea refuses the IAEA’s request.

March 12, 1993: Amid demands for special inspections, North Korea announces its intention to withdraw from the NPT in three months, citing Article X provisions that allow withdrawal for supreme national security considerations.

April 1, 1993: The IAEA declares that North Korea is not adhering to its safeguards agreement and that it cannot guarantee that North Korean nuclear material is not being diverted for nonpeaceful uses.

June 11, 1993: Following talks with the United States in New York, North Korea suspends its decision to pull out of the NPT just before the withdrawal would have become legally effective. North Korea also agrees to the full and impartial application of IAEA safeguards.

For its part, the United States grants assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons. Washington also promises not to interfere with North Korea’s internal affairs.

July 19, 1993: After a second round of talks with the United States, North Korea announces in a joint statement that it is “prepared to begin consultations with the IAEA on outstanding safeguards and other issues” and that it is ready to negotiate IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. The joint statement also indicates that Pyongyang might consider a deal with the United States to replace its graphite nuclear reactors with light-water reactors (LWRs), which are proliferation resistant.

Late 1993: The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency estimate that North Korea had separated about 12 kilograms of plutonium. This amount is enough for at least one or two nuclear weapons.

fig 3 - ben garrison CIAFigure 3  Council on Foreign Relations run CIA Unleashed

1994

January 1994: The director of the CIA estimates that North Korea may have produced one or two nuclear weapons.

February 15, 1994: North Korea finalizes an agreement with the IAEA to allow inspections of all seven of its declared nuclear facilities, averting sanctions by the United Nations Security Council.

March 1, 1994: IAEA inspectors arrive in North Korea for the first inspections since 1993.

March 21, 1994: Responding to North Korea’s refusal to allow the inspection team to inspect a plutonium reprocessing plant at Yongbyon, the IAEA Board of Governors approves a resolution calling on North Korea to “immediately allow the IAEA to complete all requested inspection activities and to comply fully with its safeguards agreements.”

May 19, 1994: The IAEA confirms that North Korea has begun removing spent fuel from its 5-megawatt nuclear research reactor even though international monitors were not present. The United States and the IAEA had insisted that inspectors be present for any such action because spent fuel can potentially be reprocessed for use in nuclear weapons.

June 13, 1994: North Korea announces its withdrawal from the IAEA. This is distinct from pulling out of the NPT—North Korea is still required to undergo IAEA inspections as part of its NPT obligations. The IAEA contends that North Korea’s safeguards agreement remains in force. However, North Korea no longer participates in IAEA functions as a member state.

June 15, 1994: Former U.S. President [Council on Foreign Relations member] Jimmy Carter negotiates a deal with North Korea in which Pyongyang confirms its willingness to “freeze” its nuclear weapons program and resume high-level talks with the United States. Bilateral talks are expected to begin, provided that North Korea allows the IAEA safeguards to remain in place, does not refuel its 5-megawatt nuclear reactor, and does not reprocess any spent nuclear fuel.

July 9, 1994: North Korean President Kim Il Sung dies and is succeeded by his son, Kim Jong Il.

August 12, 1994: An “agreed statement” is signed that establishes a three-stage process for the elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. In return, the United States promises to move toward normalized economic and diplomatic relations and assures North Korea that it will provide assistance with the construction of proliferation-resistant LWRs to replace North Korea’s graphite-moderated reactors.

October 21, 1994: The United States and North Korea conclude four months of negotiations by adopting the “Agreed Framework” in Geneva. To resolve U.S. concerns about Pyongyang’s plutonium-producing reactors and the Yongbyon reprocessing facility, the agreement calls for North Korea to freeze and eventually eliminate its nuclear facilities, a process that will require dismantling three nuclear reactors, two of which are still under construction. North Korea also allows the IAEA to verify compliance through “special inspections,” and it agrees to allow 8,000 spent nuclear reactor fuel elements to be removed to a third country.

In exchange, Pyongyang will receive two LWRs and annual shipments of heavy fuel oil during construction of the reactors. The LWRs will be financed and constructed through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), a multinational consortium.

Calling for movement toward full normalization of political and economic relations, the accord also serves as a jumping-off point for U.S.-North Korean dialogue on Pyongyang’s development and export of ballistic missiles, as well as other issues of bilateral concern.

November 28, 1994: The IAEA announces that it had confirmed that construction has been halted at North Korea’s Nyongbyon and Taochon nuclear facilities and that these facilities are not operational.

1995

March 9, 1995:KEDO is formed in New York with the United States, South Korea, and Japan as the organization’s original members.

1996

January 1996: North Korea agrees in principle to a meeting on missile proliferation issues, which had been requested in a letter by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Thomas Hubbard. However, Pyongyang contends that the United States would have to ease economic sanctions before it could agree on a date and venue for the talks.

In testimony before a House International Relations subcommittee on March 19, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs [Council on Foreign Relations member] Winston Lord says that Washington is willing to ease economic sanctions if progress is made on the missile export issue.

April 21-22, 1996: The United States and North Korea meet in Berlin for their first round of bilateral missile talks. The United States reportedly suggests that North Korea should adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a voluntary international agreement aimed at controlling sales of ballistic missile systems, components, and technology. North Korea allegedly demands that the United States provide compensation for lost missile-related revenue.

May 24, 1996: The United States imposes sanctions on North Korea and Iran for missile technology-related transfers. The sanctions prohibit any imports or exports to sanctioned firms and to those sectors of the North Korean economy that are considered missile-related. The pre-existing general ban on trade with both countries makes the sanctions largely symbolic.*

October 16, 1996: After detecting North Korean preparations for a test of its medium-range Nodong missile, the United States deploys a reconnaissance ship and aircraft to Japan. Following several meetings in New York between U.S. and North Korean diplomats, the State Department confirms on November 8 that the missile test has been canceled.

1997

June 11-13, 1997: The second round of U.S.-North Korean missile talks takes place in New York, with U.S. negotiators pressing North Korea not to deploy the Nodong missile and to end sales of Scud missiles and their components. The parties reach no agreement but reportedly lay the foundation for future talks.

August 6, 1997: The United States imposes new sanctions on two additional North Korean entities for unspecified missile-proliferation activities.*

1998

February 25, 1998: At his inaugural speech, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung announces his “sunshine policy,” which strives to improve inter-Korean relations through peace, reconciliation, and cooperation.

April 17, 1998: The United States imposes sanctions on North Korea and Pakistan in response to Pyongyang’s transfer of missile technology and components to Pakistan’s Khan Research Laboratory.*

June 16, 1998: The official Korean Central News Agency reports that Pyongyang will only end its missile technology exports if it is suitably compensated for financial losses.

July 15, 1998: The bipartisan [Council on Foreign Relations member Donald Rumsfeld] Rumsfeld Commission concludes that the United States may have “little or no warning” before facing a long-range ballistic missile threat from “rogue states,” such as North Korea and Iran.

August 31, 1998: North Korea launches a three-stage Taepo Dong-1 rocket with a range of 1,500-2,000 kilometers that flies over Japan. Pyongyang announces that the rocket successfully placed a small satellite into orbit, a claim contested by U.S. Space Command. Japan suspends signature of a cost-sharing agreement for the Agreed Framework’s LWR project until November 1998. The U.S. intelligence community admits to being surprised by North Korea’s advances in missile-staging technology and its use of a solid-rocket motor for the missile’s third stage.

October 1, 1998: The third round of U.S.-North Korean missile talks begins in New York but makes little progress. The United States repeats its request for Pyongyang to terminate its missile programs in exchange for relief from economic sanctions. North Korea rejects the U.S. proposal on the grounds that the lifting of sanctions is implicit in the 1994 Agreed Framework.

November 12, 1998: [Council on Foreign Relations member] President Bill Clinton appoints former Secretary of Defense [Council on Foreign Relations member]  William Perry to serve as North Korea policy coordinator—a post established by the 1999 Defense Authorization Act. Perry immediately undertakes an interagency review of U.S. policy toward North Korea and begins consultations with South Korea and Japan aimed at forming a unified approach to dealing with Pyongyang.

December 4-11, 1998: The United States and North Korea hold talks to address U.S. concerns about a suspected underground nuclear facility at Kumchang-ni. Pyongyang reportedly accepts in principle the idea of a U.S. inspection of the site but is unable to agree with U.S. proposals for “appropriate compensation.”

1999

February 2, 1999: CIA Director [Council on Foreign Relations member] George Tenet testifies before the Senate Armed Services Committee that, with some technical improvements, North Korea would be able to use the Taepo Dong-1 to deliver small payloads to parts of Alaska and Hawaii. Tenet also says that Pyongyang’s Taepo Dong-2, if it had a third stage like the Taepo Dong-1, would be able to deliver large payloads to the continental United States, albeit with poor accuracy.

March 29-31, 1999: U.S. and North Korean officials hold a fourth round of missile talks in Pyongyang. The United States again expresses concern over North Korea’s missile development and proliferation activities and proposes a deal exchanging North Korean restraint for U.S. sanctions relief. U.S. officials describe the talks as “serious and intensive” but succeed only in reaching agreement to meet again at an unspecified date.

April 25, 1999: The United States, South Korea, and Japan establish the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group to institutionalize close consultation and policy coordination in dealing with North Korea.

May 20-24, 1999: A U.S. inspection team visits the North Korean suspected nuclear site in Kumchang-ni. According to the State Department, the team finds no evidence of nuclear activity or violation of the Agreed Framework.

May 25-28, 1999: Traveling to Pyongyang as a presidential envoy, [Council on Foreign Relations member]Perry meets with senior North Korean political, diplomatic, and military officials to discuss a major expansion in bilateral relations if Pyongyang is willing to address U.S. security concerns. Perry delivers a letter from [Council on Foreign Relations member] President Clinton to North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, but the two do not meet. Perry reportedly calls on North Korea to satisfy U.S. concerns about ongoing nuclear weapons-related activities that are beyond the scope of the Agreed Framework and about ballistic missile development and proliferation in exchange for the lifting of U.S. sanctions, normalization of diplomatic relations, and potentially some form of security guarantee.

September 7-12, 1999: During talks in Berlin, North Korea agrees to a moratorium on testing any long-range missiles for the duration of talks with the United States. The United States agrees to a partial lifting of economic sanctions on North Korea. The two parties agree to continue high-level discussions. (Sanctions are not actually lifted until June 2000.)

September 9, 1999: A U.S. National Intelligence Estimate reports that North Korea will “most likely” develop an ICBM capable of delivering a 200-kilogram warhead to the U.S. mainland by 2015.

September 15, 1999: North Korean policy coordinator [Council on Foreign Relations member] Perry submits his review of U.S. policy toward North Korea to Congress and releases an unclassified version of the report on October 12. The report recommends “a new, comprehensive and integrated approach to…negotiations with the [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] DPRK,” which would involve a coordinated reduction in isolation by the United States and its allies in a “step-by-step and reciprocal fashion.” Potential engagement mechanisms could include the normalization of diplomatic relations and the relaxation of trade sanctions.

November 19, 1999: The United States and North Korea meet in Berlin for talks on bilateral relations and preparations for a North Korean high-level visit to the United States.

December 15, 1999: Five years after the Agreed Framework was signed, KEDO officials sign a turn-key contract with the Korea Electric Power Corporation to begin construction on the two LWRs in Kumho, North Korea. KEDO officials attribute the delay in signing the contract to complex legal and financial challenges and the tense political climate generated by the North Korean Taepo Dong-1 test in August 1998.

2000

April 6, 2000: The United States imposes sanctions on a North Korean firm, Changgwang Sinyong Corporation, for proliferating MTCR Category I items, possibly to Iran. Category I items include complete missile systems with ranges exceeding 300 kilometers and payloads over 500 kilograms, major subsystems, rocket stages or guidance systems, production facilities for MTCR-class missiles, or technology associated with such missiles.*

May 25-27, 2000: The United States conducts its second inspection of the Kumchang-ni site. The inspection team found that conditions had not changed since the first inspection in May 1999.

June 15, 2000: Following a historic summit, North and South Korea sign a joint declaration stating they have “agreed to resolve” the question of reunification of the Korean Peninsula. The agreement includes promises to reunite families divided by the Korean War and to pursue other economic and cultural exchanges. No commitments are made regarding nuclear weapons or missile programs or military deployments in the Demilitarized Zone.

June 19, 2000: Apparently encouraged by the North-South summit, the United States relaxes sanctions on North Korea, allowing a “wide range” of trade in commercial and consumer goods, easing restrictions on investment, and eliminating prohibitions on direct personal and commercial financial transactions. Sanctions related to terrorism and missile proliferation remain in place. The next day, North Korea reaffirms its moratorium on missile tests.

July 12, 2000: The fifth round of U.S.-North Korean missile talks in Kuala Lumpur end without resolution. During the meeting, North Korea repeats its demand for compensation, stated as $1 billion per year, in return for halting missile exports. The United States rejects this proposal but says that it is willing to move toward “economic normalization” in return for addressing U.S. concerns.

July 19, 2000: During a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Kim Jong Il reportedly promises to end his country’s missile program in exchange for assistance with satellite launches from countries that have expressed concern about North Korea’s missile program.

July 28, 2000: At the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum in Bangkok, Thailand, Secretary of State [Council on Foreign Relations member] Madeleine Albright engages in a “substantively modest” meeting with North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun, the highest level of exchange to date. Paek gives no additional details about North Korea’s purported offer to end its missile program in return for space-launch assistance.

August 13, 2000: Kim Jong Il tells a meeting of 46 South Korean media executives in Pyongyang that his missile proposal was meant “in humor, while talking about science and state-of-the-art technologies,” according to the Korea Times. The report of the event is widely interpreted as undercutting the seriousness of Kim’s offer; however, English-language excerpts of Kim’s speech seem to confirm the offer: “I told…Putin that we would stop developing rockets when the United States comes forward and launches our satellites.”

August 28, 2000: U.S. Ambassador [Council on Foreign Relations member] Wendy Sherman travels to Moscow to confirm the details of Kim Jong Il’s apparent missile proposal with her Russian counterparts. At a September 8 briefing, a senior State Department official says the United States is taking the North Korean offer “very seriously.”

September 27, 2000: U.S.-North Korean talks resume in New York on nuclear issues, missiles, and terrorism. The two countries issue a joint statement on terrorism, a move that indicates progress toward removing North Korea from the State Department’s terrorism list.

October 9-12, 2000: Kim Jong Il’s second-in-command, Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, visits Washington as a special envoy. He delivers a letter to [Council on Foreign Relations member] President Clinton and meets with the secretaries of state and defense. The move is seen as an affirmation of Kim’s commitment to improving U.S.-North Korean ties.

October 12, 2000: The United States and North Korea issue a joint statement noting that resolution of the missile issue would “make an essential contribution to fundamentally improved relations” and reiterating the two countries’ commitment to implementation of the Agreed Framework. The statement also says that [Council on Foreign Relations member] Albright will visit North Korea in the near future to prepare for a possible visit by [Council on Foreign Relations member] President Clinton.

October 24, 2000: [Council on Foreign Relations member] Secretary Albright concludes a two-day visit to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Jong Il. During the visit, Kim says that North Korea would not further test the Taepo Dong-1 missile. In addition to discussing Pyongyang’s indigenous missile program, the talks cover North Korean missile technology exports, nuclear transparency, the normalization of relations, and a possible trip by [Council on Foreign Relations member] President Clinton to Pyongyang.

November 1-3, 2000: A seventh round of missile talks between Pyongyang and Washington ends without an agreement in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The failure to build upon the momentum derived from [Council on Foreign Relations member] Secretary Albright’s recent meeting with Kim Jong-Il diminished hopes of a presidential trip to North Korea before the end of [Council on Foreign Relations member] President Clinton’s term.

December 28, 2000: [Council on Foreign Relations member]President Clinton announces that he will not travel to North Korea before the end of his term, citing “insufficient time to complete the work at hand.” According to a March 6 New York Times article, Clinton’s national security adviser [Council on Foreign Relations member] Sandy Berger was hesitant to have the president leave the country during the presidential election dispute, which he deemed “a potential ‘constitutional crisis.'”

2001

January 2, 2001: The United States imposes sanctions on North Korea’s Changgwang Sinyong Corporation for violation of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000.*

March 6, 2001: At a joint press briefing with the Swedish foreign minister, [Council on Foreign Relations member] Secretary of State Colin Powell says that the administration “plan[s] to engage with North Korea to pick up where [Council on Foreign Relations member] President Clinton left off. Some promising elements were left on the table and we will be examining those elements.”

March 7, 2001: In a New York Times op-ed, [Council on Foreign Relations member] Wendy Sherman, former special adviser to the president and secretary of state for North Korea policy, writes that a deal with North Korea to eliminate its medium- and long-range missiles and end its missile exports had been “tantalizingly close” at the end of the [Council on Foreign Relations member] Clinton administration.

fig 4 - bush cabal

Figure 4 George W. Bush’s CFR run Administration

After a working meeting with South Korean President Kim Dae-jung at the White House, [Son of Council on Foreign Relations member H.W Bush] President George W. Bush tells reporters that he “look[s] forward to, at some point in the future, having a dialogue with the North Koreans, but that any negotiation would require complete verification of the terms of a potential agreement.” According to Clinton administration officials, the issue of how to verify a missile deal remained one of the final stumbling blocks to a successful arrangement. Bush also questions whether Pyongyang is “keeping all terms of all agreements.”

Just prior to Bush’s comments, [Council on Foreign Relations member] Powell amended his remarks from the previous day, noting that if “there was some suggestion that imminent negotiations are about to begin—that is not the case.”

March 13, 2001: North Korea, apparently reacting to Washington’s new tone, cancels ministerial-level talks with Seoul. The talks were intended to promote further political reconciliation.

March 15, 2001: Pyongyang threatens to “take thousand-fold revenge” on the United States “and its black-hearted intention to torpedo the dialogue between north and south [Korea].” The statement, issued by the Korean Central News Agency, called Washington’s new policies “hostile” and noted that Pyongyang remains “fully prepared for both dialogue and war.”

May 3, 2001: At a press conference in Pyongyang, a European Union delegation headed by Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson reports that Kim Jong Il pledged that he will extend Pyongyang’s moratorium on missile testing until 2003 and that Kim was “committed” to a second inter-Korean summit.

June 6, 2001: In a press release, [Son of Council on Foreign Relations member H.W.]  President Bush announces the completion of his administration’s North Korea policy review and its determination that “serious discussions” on a “broad agenda” should be resumed with Pyongyang. Bush states his desire to conduct “comprehensive” negotiations, including “improved implementation of the Agreed Framework,” “verifiable constraints” on North Korea’s missile programs, a ban on North Korea’s missile exports, and “a less threatening conventional military posture.”

June 13, 2001: U.S. Special Envoy Jack Pritchard meets in New York with the North Korean representative to the UN, Hyong-ch’ol Yi, to make arrangements for bilateral talks.

June 26, 2001: The State Department announces sanctions under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 on North Korea’s Changgwang Sinyong Corporation, for unspecified missile-related transfers to Iran. The announcement represents the second time that sanctions had been imposed under the act, the first also being on Changgwang Sinyong on January 2.

The sanctions prohibit any U.S. entity from doing business with the North Korean firm, which has been punished several times previously under more general missile transfer sanctions. However, the sanctions are largely symbolic, as Changgwang Sinyong is still subject to the active sanctions imposed on January 2, 2001, and missile sanctions that were imposed on April 6, 2000.*

July 6, 2001: Deputy Secretary of State [Council on Foreign Relations member] Richard Armitage confirms that North Korea tested a rocket “motor engine” in late June, but that there was “nothing in itself wrong with that,” nor did the administration consider the test to have violated Pyongyang’s testing moratorium.

August 4, 2001: During a meeting in Moscow with President Putin, Kim Jong Il reaffirms his pledge to maintain a moratorium on ballistic missile flight-tests until 2003.

2002

January 29, 2002: In his State of the Union address, [Son of Council on Foreign Relations member H.W.]  President Bush criticized North Korea for “arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens.” Bush characterized North Korea, along with Iraq and Iran, as constituting an “axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.”

February 5, 2002: At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, [Council on Foreign Relations member] Powell reiterates the administration’s policy that it is willing to resume a dialogue with North Korea at “any time, any place, or anywhere without any preconditions.” Powell also confirms that the administration believes that Pyongyang continues to “comply with the [missile flight-test] moratorium they placed upon themselves and stay within the KEDO agreement,” which is also known as the Agreed Framework.

March 15, 2002: Following reports that the U.S. nuclear posture review discusses the use of nuclear weapons against North Korea, Pyongyang’s state-run press organ announces that, if the United States “tries to use nuclear weapons” against North Korea, it will be compelled to “examine all the agreements” reached with the United States. The report says that, “if the U.S. inflicts nuclear holocaust upon [North Korea], the former’s mainland will not be safe either.”

April 1, 2002: [Son of Council on Foreign Relations member H.W.] President Bush issues a memorandum stating that he will not certify North Korea’s compliance with the Agreed Framework. However, for national security considerations, Bush waives applicable U.S. law prohibiting Washington from funding KEDO, allowing the United States to continue financially supporting the Agreed Framework.

July 2, 2002: The United States cancels a planned delegation visit to North Korea, citing Pyongyang’s failure to respond to a proposed July 10 meeting date, as well as a June 29 naval skirmish between North and South Korea.

July 31, 2002: [Council on Foreign Relations member] Powell meets briefly with Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun during the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum meeting in Brunei, generating speculation that a U.S. envoy will visit North Korea. It is the highest-level exchange between the two countries since the [Son of Council on Foreign Relations member H.W.]  Bush administration took office.

August 7, 2002: KEDO holds a ceremony to mark the pouring of the concrete foundation for the first LWR that the United States agreed to provide North Korea under the Agreed Framework. Jack Pritchard, the U.S. representative to KEDO and State Department special envoy for negotiations with North Korea, attends the ceremony. Pritchard is the most senior U.S. official to visit North Korea since former Secretary of State [Council on Foreign Relations member] Albright in October 2000.

The United States urges North Korea to comply with IAEA safeguarding procedures for all its nuclear facilities as soon as possible, but Pyongyang states that it will not do so for at least three years, the Japanese newspaper Nihon Keizai Shimbun reports August 8. A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman also states that delays in completing the reactor project might motivate Pyongyang to pull out of the agreement.

August 16, 2002: The United States imposes sanctions on Changgwang Sinyong Corporation of North Korea and on the North Korean government itself for transferring missile technology to Yemen. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer states August 23 that the sanctions were a “pro forma requirement under the law for the State Department” and that Washington remains willing to “talk with North Korea any time, any place.”

August 31, 2002: Responding to an August 29 speech by Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security [Council on Foreign Relations member] John Bolton, North Korea says that “if the U.S. has a will to drop its hostile policy toward the DPRK it will have dialogue…the ball is in the court of the U.S. side.” Bolton had criticized Pyongyang’s missile, nuclear, and biological weapons programs.

September 17, 2002: North Korea announces that it will indefinitely extend its moratorium on missile testing as part of the North Korea-Japan Pyongyang Declaration signed during a meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il.

A portion of the North Korea-Japan declaration references nuclear weapons, saying that the two countries “affirmed the pledge to observe all the international agreements for a comprehensive solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.” It is unclear whether this statement simply affirms a commitment to existing agreements or signals support for additional arms control measures.

October 3-5, 2002: [Council on Foreign Relations member] James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, visits North Korea. The highest-ranking administration official to visit Pyongyang, Kelly reiterates U.S. concerns about North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, export of missile components, conventional force posture, human rights violations, and humanitarian situation. Kelly informs North Korea that it could improve bilateral relations through a “comprehensive settlement” addressing these issues. No future meetings are announced.

Referring to [Council on Foreign Relations member] Kelly’s approach as “high handed and arrogant,” North Korea argues that the U.S. policy “compels the DPRK to take all necessary countermeasures, pursuant to the army-based policy whose validity has been proven.”

October 16, 2002: The United States announces that North Korea admitted to having a clandestine program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons after [Council on Foreign Relations member] James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, confronted representatives from Pyongyang during an October 3-5 visit. Kelly later explained that the North Korean admission came the day after he informed them that the United States was aware of the program. North Korea has denied several times that it admitted to having this program.

State Department spokesman Richard Boucher states that “North Korea’s secret nuclear weapons program is a serious violation of North Korea’s commitments under the Agreed Framework as well as under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement, and the Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”
Boucher also says that the United States wants North Korea to comply with its nonproliferation commitments and seeks “a peaceful resolution of this situation.”

November 5, 2002: North Korea threatens to end its moratorium on ballistic missile tests if North Korea-Japan normalization talks do not achieve progress.

November 14, 2002: KEDO announces that it is suspending heavy-fuel oil deliveries to North Korea in response to Pyongyang’s October 4 acknowledgement that it has a uranium-enrichment program. The last shipment reached North Korea November 18.

November 29, 2002: The IAEA adopts a resolution calling upon North Korea to “clarify” its “reported uranium-enrichment program.” North Korea rejects the resolution, saying the IAEA’s position is biased in favor of the United States.

December 9, 2002: Spanish and U.S. forces intercept and search a ship carrying a shipment of North Korean Scud missiles and related cargo to Yemen. The United States allows the shipment to be delivered because it lacks the necessary legal authority to seize the cargo. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer says that Washington had intelligence that the ship was carrying missiles to the Middle East and was concerned that its ultimate destination might have been Iraq.

December 12, 2002: North Korea sends a letter to the IAEA announcing that it is restarting its one functional reactor and is reopening the other nuclear facilities frozen under the Agreed Framework. The letter requests that the IAEA remove the seals and monitoring equipment from its nuclear facilities. A North Korean spokesman blames the United States for violating the Agreed Framework and says that the purpose of restarting the reactor is to generate electricity-an assertion disputed by U.S. officials.

A November 27 Congressional Research Service report states that the reactor could annually produce enough plutonium for one bomb. The CIA states in a 2002 report to Congress that the spent-fuel rods “contain enough plutonium for several more [nuclear] weapons.”

U.S. estimates on North Korea’s current nuclear status differ. A State Department official said January 3, 2003 that the U.S. intelligence community believes North Korea already possesses one or two nuclear weapons made from plutonium produced before the negotiation of the Agreed Framework. The CIA publicly estimates that Pyongyang “has produced enough plutonium” for one or two weapons.

December 14, 2002: North Korea states in a letter to the IAEA that the status of its nuclear facilities is a matter between the United States and North Korea and “not pursuant to any agreement” with the IAEA. The letter further declares that North Korea will take unilateral action to remove seals and monitoring cameras if the IAEA does not act.

December 22-24, 2002: North Korea cuts all seals and disrupts IAEA surveillance equipment on its nuclear facilities and materials. An IAEA spokesman says December 26 that North Korea started moving fresh fuel rods into the reactor, suggesting that it might be restarted soon.

December 27, 2002: North Korea orders IAEA inspectors out of the country. They leave on December 31.

2003

January 6, 2003: The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution condemning North Korea’s decision to restart its nuclear reactor and resume operation of its related facilities. The resolution “deplores” North Korea’s action “in the strongest terms” and calls on Pyongyang to meet “immediately, as a first step” with IAEA officials. It also calls on North Korea to re-establish the seals and monitoring equipment it dismantled, comply fully with agency safeguards, clarify details about its reported uranium-enrichment program, and allow the agency to verify that all North Korea’s nuclear material is “declared and…subject to safeguards.”

January 10, 2003: North Korea announces its withdrawal from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), effective January 11. Although Article X of the NPT requires that a country give three months’ notice in advance of withdrawing, North Korea argues that it has satisfied that requirement because it originally announced its decision to withdraw March 12, 1993, and suspended the decision one day before it was to become legally binding.

January 12, 2003: Choe Jin Su, North Korea’s ambassador to China, signals that Pyongyang might not adhere to its moratorium on testing long-range missiles, saying that Pyongyang believes it “cannot go along with the self-imposed missile moratorium any longer,” according to a January 12 Los Angeles Times article.

February 12, 2003: Responding to North Korea’s rejection of the November 2002 and January 2003 IAEA resolutions, the IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution declaring Pyongyang in “further non-compliance” with its obligations under the NPT. The board decides to report the matter to the UN Security Council, in accordance with agency mandates.

February 27, 2003: U.S. officials confirm North Korea has restarted the five-megawatt nuclear reactor that had been frozen by the Agreed Framework.

March 19, 2003: North Korea again signals that it might not adhere to its moratorium on testing long-range missiles, asserting in a March 19 KCNA statement that it has the “sovereign right” to have a “peaceful” missile program. North Korea conducted missile tests February 24 and March 10, but both tests involved short-range missiles that did not violate the moratorium.

March 24, 2003: The United States imposes sanctions on the Changgwang Sinyong Corporation of North Korea for transferring missile technology to Khan Research Laboratories in Pakistan. The laboratory was sanctioned for receiving the items. Philip Reeker, deputy State Department spokesman, said April 1 that the sanctions were imposed only for a “missile-related transfer” and not the transfer of nuclear technology from Pakistan to North Korea.

April 23-25, 2003: The United States, North Korea, and China hold trilateral talks in Beijing. North Korea tells the U.S. delegation that it possesses nuclear weapons, according to Boucher on April 28. This constitutes the first time that Pyongyang has made such an admission.

North Korea also tells the U.S. delegation that it has completed reprocessing the spent nuclear fuel from the five-megawatt reactor frozen under the Agreed Framework, according to Secretary of State [Council on Foreign Relations member] Colin Powell during an April 30 hearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee.

Boucher adds that the North Korean delegation told the U.S. officials that Pyongyang “might get rid of all their nuclear programs…[and] stop their missile exports.” Powell states April 28 that North Korea expects “something considerable in return” for this effort.

May 12, 2003
North Korea accuses the United States of violating the spirit of the 1992 Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, calling the agreement a “dead document” in a KCNA statement.

July 15, 2003
State Department spokesman Richard Boucher tells reporters that North Korean officials at their UN mission in New York have told U.S. officials that North Korea has completed reprocessing the 8,000 spent fuel rods from its Yongbyon reactor.

August 27-29, 2003
The first round of six-party talks is held in Beijing. The talks achieve no significant breakthroughs.

North Korea proposes a step-by-step solution, calling for the United States to conclude a “non-aggression treaty,” normalize bilateral diplomatic relations, refrain from hindering North Korea’s “economic cooperation” with other countries, complete the reactors promised under the Agreed Framework, resume suspended fuel oil shipments, and increase food aid. Pyongyang states that, in return, it will dismantle its “nuclear facility,” as well as end missile testing and export of missiles and related components. North Korea issues an explicit denial for the first time that it has a uranium-enrichment program.

The North Korean delegation, however, also threatens to test nuclear weapons or “demonstrate the means that they would have to deliver” them, according to a senior State Department official.

September 14, 2003: [Son of Council on Foreign Relations member H.W. Bush] President George W. Bush agrees to waive the restrictions on U.S. funding to KEDO but only pledges to provide $3.72 million solely for administrative expenses. The United States does not provide any further funding for KEDO after 2003.
October 2, 2003
KCNA reports a statement from a North Korean Foreign Ministry official indicating that North Korea completed reprocessing its 8,000 spent fuel rods and “made a switchover in the use” of the spent fuel “in the direction increasing [sic] its nuclear deterrent force.” The official also states that Pyongyang will continue to produce and reprocess additional spent fuel when deemed necessary.

October 16, 2003
A statement from a North Korean Foreign Ministry official reported by KCNA suggests that Pyongyang may test nuclear weapons, stating that it will “take a measure to open its nuclear deterrent to the public as a physical force” if the United States refuses to change its negotiating stance.

October 19, 2003
[Son of Council on Foreign Relations member H.W.] President George W. Bush states during a trip to Asia that the United States is willing to provide a written, multilateral guarantee that the United States will not attack North Korea, but makes it clear that a formal nonaggression pact is “off the table.” [Council on Foreign Relations member] Powell made a similar statement August 1.

November 6, 2003: North Korean ambassador to the United Kingdom, Ri Yong Ho, tells Reuters that North Korea possesses a workable nuclear device.

November 21, 2003
The KEDO Executive Board announces that it will suspend construction of two light-water nuclear reactors for one year beginning December 1. The Board adds that the project’s future “will be assessed and decided by the Executive Board before the expiration of the suspension period.” Department of State spokesperson Adam Ereli said November 5, however, that [Son of Council on Foreign Relations member]  Bush administration believes there is “no future for the project.”

2004

January 8, 2004
North Korea allows an unofficial U.S. delegation to visit its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and displays what it calls its “nuclear deterrent.” North Korean officials allow delegation member Siegfried Hecker—a senior fellow at the Los Alamos National Laboratory—to handle a jar containing what appears to be plutonium metal. North Korean officials claim that it came from reprocessing the spent fuel rods from its five-megawatt reactor.

The delegation also visits the spent fuel cooling pond that had been monitored under the Agreed Framework and observes that the rods have been removed. The North Korean officials tell the delegation that Pyongyang reprocessed all of the spent fuel rods between January and June 2003.

Hecker later tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he does not know for certain that the substance was plutonium and that he could not determine when it was produced.

February 25-28, 2004
A second round of six-party talks takes place in Beijing. Little progress is made, although both sides agree to hold another round of talks before the end of June 2004, as well as a working group meeting to be held beforehand.

South Korea’s deputy foreign minister, Lee Soo-hyuck, issues a proposal—which China and Russia both support—to provide energy assistance to the North in return for a freeze of its nuclear program, along with a promise to dismantle it.

Wang Yi, China’s envoy to the six-party talks, states afterwards that “sharp” differences remain between Washington and Pyongyang. According to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, two specific issues divide North Korea and other participants. The first is that the United States, Japan, and South Korea want all of North Korea’s nuclear programs to be dismantled, but North Korea wishes to be allowed to retain one for “peaceful purposes.” The second is that Washington and the other two governments want Pyongyang to acknowledge that it has a uranium-enrichment program.

June 23-26, 2004: A third round of six-party talks is held in Beijing. The United States presents a detailed proposal for resolving the crisis.

The proposal calls for a two-phase process in which North Korea would receive fuel oil from China, South Korea, and Russia after agreeing to first freeze, then dismantle its nuclear programs. The United States and the other parties to the talks would also draft a multilateral security agreement and begin surveying North Korea’s energy needs. Additionally, Washington would begin bilateral discussions with Pyongyang on the removal of U.S. sanctions. The benefits spelled out in the proposal could be withdrawn if North Korea did not comply.

According to a June 28 North Korean Foreign Ministry statement, North Korea counters by proposing to “refrain from” producing, testing, or transferring nuclear weapons and to freeze “all the facilities related to nuclear weapons and products churned out by their operation.” According to the Foreign Ministry, the length of the freeze depends on “whether reward is made or not.”

November 26, 2004: The KEDO Executive Board announces that it will extend its suspension of the light-water reactor project for another year, beginning December 1.

2005

February 2, 2005The New York Times and The Washington Post report that Libya received uranium hexafluoride suspected to be of North Korean origin in 2004. Several knowledgeable U.S. and other diplomatic sources later tell Arms Control Today that the evidence indicates, but does not prove, that the material originated in North Korea.

February 10, 2005: North Korea’s Foreign Ministry announces that Pyongyang has “produced nuclear weapons.” This was Pyongyang’s most definitive public claim to date at the time

 

on the status of its nuclear arsenal.

February 21, 2005: Seoul’s semi-official Yonhap News Agency reports that South Korea’s defense minister, Yoon Kwang-ung, tells a National Assembly Committee that North Korea has reprocessed “only part” of the 8,000 spent fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor.

March 2, 2005: North Korea’s Foreign Ministry states that Pyongyang is no longer bound by its more than five-year-old moratorium on flight-testing longer-range missiles. Pyongyang, however, does not say it will resume such testing.

Early April, 2005: The United States sends an urgent diplomatic message to allies notifying them of U.S. concerns that North Korea might conduct a nuclear test.

April 9, 2005: North Korea expert Selig Harrison tells reporters that, during a recent meeting, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan said Pyongyang might give nuclear weapons to terrorists if “the United States drives us into a corner.”

May 11, 2005: North Korea’s Foreign Ministry announces that it has “successfully finished the unloading of 8,000 spent fuel rods” from its Yongbyon reactor. South Korea has verified the reactor shutdown “through various channels,” Foreign Affairs and Trade Ministry official Kim Sook tells the Korean Broadcasting System the same day.

June 2005: Pyongyang refuels its reactor at Yongbyon and begins reprocessing the 8,000 spent fuel rods removed in March, North Korean officials later tell Hecker.

June 29, 2005: The U.S. Treasury Department announces that the United States has frozen the U.S. assets of three North Korean entities “responsible for WMD and missile programs,” as well as barred U.S. citizens and companies from doing business with those entities. Those measures are taken pursuant to Executive Order 13382 issued that day by [Son of Council on Foreign Relations member H.W.]  President George W. Bush.

July 9, 2005: After a meeting between U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan, North Korea announces its return to the six-party talks. According to a KCNA statement, the “U.S. side clarified its official stand to recognize [North Korea] as a sovereign state, not to invade it and hold bilateral talks within the framework of the six-party talks.”

July 13, 2005: During a meeting with an envoy of Chinese President Hu Jintao, North Korean Leader Kim Jong Il reiterates his father’s [Kim Il Sung] apparent dying wish for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, according to KCNA.

July 26, 2005: A new round of six-party talks begins in Beijing. The talks include an unprecedented number of U.S.-North Korean bilateral talks. While North Korea continued to deny that it has a “uranium-based nuclear weapons program,” Pyongyang suggested that it would “clarify” any relevant “credible information or evidence” presented by the United States in that regard.

The participants agree August 7 to recess for several weeks. The talks resume September 13.

September 15, 2005: The Department of the Treasury designates a Macau bank, Banco Delta Asia, as a “primary money laundering concern” under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, freezing about $25 million in North Korean funds. A department press release states that the bank has provided services to North Korean “government agencies and front companies,” adding that “[e]vidence exists that some of these agencies and front companies are engaged in illicit activities,” such as drug trafficking. The bank also has also circulated North Korean-produced counterfeit U.S. currency, the press release alleges.

September 19, 2005: The participants in the six-party talks conclude a joint statement of principles to guide future negotiations.

According to the statement, North Korea commits “to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards.” It also calls for the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which forbids the two Koreas from possessing uranium-enrichment and plutonium-separation facilities, to be “observed and implemented.” Washington affirms in the statement that it has no intention to attack or invade North Korea.

The statement commits the participants to achieving “the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner” and says that the parties agree “to take coordinated steps to implement” the agreed-upon obligations and rewards “in a phased manner in line with the principle of ‘commitment for commitment, action for action.’”

The statement says that North Korea “stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy” and that the other parties “expressed their respect and agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the provision” of a light-water nuclear power reactor to Pyongyang. This issue had been controversial during the negotiations and the final agreement was the result of a compromise between Washington and Pyongyang. North Korea insisted that the statement recognize its right to a peaceful nuclear energy program and commit the other participants to provide it with light-water reactors while the United States argued that North Korea should not receive any nuclear reactors.

September 20, 2005: North Korea’s Foreign Ministry states that it is “essential” for the United States to provide light-water reactors to Pyongyang “as early as possible,” adding that Washington “should not even dream” that North Korea will dismantle its “nuclear deterrent” before receiving the reactors. However, a speech from North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su Hon two days later appears to back away from this formulation.

October 20, 2005: Democratic New Mexico Governor [Council on Foreign Relations member] Bill Richardson, who visited North Korea earlier in the month, says North Korean officials told him they had reprocessed the 8,000 spent fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor, the Associated Press reports.

October 21, 2005: The Treasury Department announces that it has sanctioned eight North Korean entities pursuant to Executive Order 13382 for their unspecified “involvement” in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or related delivery vehicles. The action freezes the entities’ U.S. assets and prohibits transactions between these entities and any U.S. citizens or companies. The department had similarly designated those entities’ parent companies in June.

November 9-11, 2005: The fifth round of the six-party talks begins in Beijing.

South Korea and Japan present concrete plans for implementing the September statement. Both countries propose that the participants separate outstanding issues into three categories: the dismantlement of Pyongyang’s nuclear program, provision of economic and energy assistance to North Korea, and Pyongyang’s bilateral issues with Washington and Tokyo.

Disagreements between Washington and Pyongyang continue to block progress. The North Korean delegation focuses almost exclusively on the funds frozen by the September Banco Delta Asia designation.

December 19, 2005: North Korea announces that it will “pursue” the construction of larger “graphite-moderated reactors,” an apparent reference to the two reactors whose construction had been frozen under the Agreed Framework in Pyongyang’s most definitive public statement on the matter.

2006

March 7, 2006: Officials from the U.S. Treasury Department brief North Korea’s deputy director-general for North America, Li Gun, as well as other North Korean officials about the U.S. actions taken with respect to Banco Delta Asia. Li tells reporters afterward that his delegation proposed several methods for resolving U.S. concerns, South Korea’s semi-official Yonhap News Agency reports. Among them was a suggestion to form a joint U.S.-North Korean consultative committee of experts that would discuss such issues as counterfeiting and money laundering.

March 17, 2006: Department of State spokesperson Adam Ereli indicates during a press briefing that issues related to North Korea’s financial system could potentially be discussed in the six-party talks.

March 30, 2006: The Treasury Department announces that it has imposed penalties on a Swiss company, along with one of its owners, for procuring “goods with weapons-related applications” for North Korea.

April 13, 2006: North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan tells reporters that Pyongyang would return to the talks if the United States lifted the freeze of Banco Delta Asia’s funds, which total approximately $25 million.

June 1, 2006: The KEDO Executive Board announces that it has formally terminated its project to build two light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea.

The board says its decision was based on the “continued and extended failure” of North Korea to comply with its relevant obligations under the 1994 Agreed Framework.

According to South Korea’s Unification Ministry, KEDO’s executive board adopted a resolution the previous day saying that Seoul is to “cover the costs arising from the liquidation process,” of the KEDO assets, such as resolving compensation claims from subcontractors. In return, the government-owned Korea Electric Power Corp., the prime contractor for the reactor project, would gain ownership over reactor “equipment and materials” located outside of North Korea. The fate of assets remaining in North Korea, such as vehicles and construction equipment, is unclear.

July 4-5, 2006: North Korea test fires seven ballistic missiles, including its longest-range missile, the Taepo Dong-2. The other six tests include a combination of short- and medium-range Scud-C and Nodong ballistic missiles, launched from the Kittaraeyong test site. Although the tests of the six short-range missiles appear to be successful, the Taepo Dong-2 fails less than a minute after launch.

A July 4 State Department press statement describes the launches as a “provocative act” that violated North Korea’s voluntary moratorium on flight-testing longer-range missiles, which Pyongyang had observed since September 1999.

Japan and South Korea punish North Korea for conducting the tests, with Tokyo imposing sanctions on Pyongyang and Seoul halting food and fertilizer assistance.

July 15, 2006: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1695 condemning North Korea’s missile launches. The resolution calls on Pyongyang to return to the six-party talks and “demands” that the country suspend its ballistic-missile activities and re-establish its flight-testing moratorium.

The resolution also requires states to prevent missiles and related “items, materials, goods and technology” from being transferred to North Korea’s missile or weapons of mass destruction programs. In addition, it requires countries to prevent the procurement of such items from Pyongyang and the transfer of any “financial resources in relation to” North Korea’s weapons programs.

North Korea’s Foreign Ministry states the next day that Pyongyang will “not be bound” by the resolution.

September 19, 2006: Japan and Australia announce that they have adopted sanctions targeting multiple foreign entities tied to North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs in response to resolution 1695.

The two countries each punish the same 12 organizations, as well as a Swiss citizen. All entities are already subject to similar U.S. sanctions. Japan also sanctions three additional institutions.

October 3, 2006: North Korea’s Foreign Ministry issues a statement asserting that Pyongyang “will in the future conduct a nuclear test under the condition where safety is firmly guaranteed.” Apparently signaling a degree of restraint, the statement also says that North Korea will refrain from the first-use of nuclear weapons, “strictly prohibit any …nuclear transfer,” and “do its utmost to realize the denuclearization of the [Korean] peninsula.”

October 9, 2006: North Korea conducts an underground nuclear test near the village of P’unggye. Most early analyses of the test based on seismic data collected by South Korean, Japanese, and U.S. institutes estimates the yield to be below one kiloton. Russian estimates differed significantly, and Foreign Minister Sergei Ivanov said Oct. 10 that the estimated yield was between 5 and 15 kilotons.

October 11, 2006: North Korea’s Foreign Ministry states that its “nuclear test was entirely attributable to the US nuclear threat, sanctions and pressure,” adding that North Korea “was compelled to substantially prove its possession of nukes to protect its sovereignty.” The statement also indicates that North Korea might conduct further nuclear tests if the United States “increases pressure” on the country.

However, the Foreign Ministry also says that North Korea remains committed to implementing the September 2005 joint statement, arguing that the test “constitutes a positive measure for its implementation.” Additionally, Pyongyang “still remains unchanged in its will to denuclearize the peninsula through dialogue and negotiations,” the Foreign Ministry statement says, adding that the “denuclearization of the entire peninsula was President Kim Il Sung’s last instruction and an ultimate goal” of North Korea.

October 14, 2006: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1718. The measure demands that North Korea refrain from further nuclear tests and calls on Pyongyang to return to the six-party talks and abandon its nuclear weapons. It also imposes additional sanctions on commerce with Pyongyang, widening the range of prohibited transactions beyond those banned under Resolution 1695.

November 28-December 1, 2006: The Chinese, North Korean, South Korean, and U.S. envoys to the six-party talks hold consultations in Beijing to discuss resuming the fifth round of talks. During the consultations, North Korean envoy Kim Gye Gwan states that North Korea is ready to implement the September 19, 2005 joint statement and abandon its nuclear program, but would not do so “unilaterally.”

December 18-22, 2006: The fifth round of six-party talks resumes in Beijing. The United States presents a multistage denuclearization plan, but the talks make no progress towards implementing the September 19, 2005 joint statement—in part due to continued disagreements regarding the North Korean funds frozen by the United States in Banco Delta Asia. The parties agree to meet again “at the earliest opportunity.”

2007

February 8-13, 2007: The six-party talks concludes its fifth round with an agreed “action plan” of initial steps to implement the September 19, 2005 joint statement on North Korea’s denuclearization.

According to the action plan, North Korea is to halt the operation of its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon during a 60-day initial phase in return for an initial shipment of 50,000 tons of heavy-fuel oil.

The action plan also establishes five working groups to “discuss and formulate specific plans” regarding: economic and energy cooperation; denuclearization; implementation of a “Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism;” North Korean relations with the United States; and North Korean relations with Japan.

The statement indicates that, following the shutdown of North Korea’s nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, Pyongyang is to provide a complete declaration of all of its nuclear programs and disable all of its existing nuclear facilities in return for an additional 950,000 tons of heavy-fuel oil or its equivalent.

In addition to helping to provide energy aid to North Korea, the United States agrees to begin the process of removing Pyongyang from its list of state sponsors of terrorism and to stop the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act toward North Korea.fig 5 - ElBaradei

Figure 5  Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) speaking at the New York office of the Council on Foreign Relations on November 4 2009, discussed ongoing negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program. ElBaradei reiterated that the agency had no evidence that Iran had an ongoing nuclear weapons program or had developed a nuclear weapon. He also expressed hope for the confidence-building plan that calls for Iran to ship much of its low-enriched uranium to Russia for reprocessing. CFR president Richard Haass introduces CFR stooge ElBaradei.

March 13-14, 2007: IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei [who the CFR tried to make president of Egypt] visits North Korea and meets with three officials, including the head of the North Korean General Department of Atomic Energy, Ri Je Son. During the meetings, ElBaradei invites North Korea to return to the IAEA as a member state and discusses the agency’s monitoring and verification role during the implementation of a February 13 six-party talks agreement.

March 19-22, 2007: The sixth round of six-party talks begins in Beijing. The discussions are suspended when North Korean negotiators fly home after four days, explaining that they will not participate until the United States transfers $25 million in frozen North Korean funds held in Banco Delta Asia.

On March 19, Treasury Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes Daniel Glaser announces that the two countries had “reached an understanding” regarding the frozen funds, with Washington accepting a North Korean proposal that the funds would be transferred to a North Korean account in the Bank of China in Beijing. North Korea also pledges that the funds “will be used solely for the betterment of the North Korean people, including for humanitarian and educational purposes.”

April 10, 2007: The United States agrees to unfreeze the $25 million in North Korean funds frozen in its Banco Delta Asia account. U.S. officials insist, meanwhile, that North Korea, “live up to the assurances that these funds will be used for the betterment of the North Korean people and for humanitarian purposes.”

June 25, 2007: A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman confirms that the Banco Delta Asia funds were transferred to Pyongyang and that North Korea would begin shutting down its Yongbyon nuclear facilities. An IAEA delegation led by Deputy Director-General for safeguards Ollie Heinonen arrives in Pyongyang the following day to discuss the verification procedures for the shutdown.

July 16, 2007: The IAEA confirms the shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities.

July 18-20, 2007: The six-party talks reconvenes its sixth round in Beijing. The meeting concludes with a joint communiqué indicating that the five working groups will all meet by the end of August in preparation for another round of plenary talks in September.

September 6, 2007: Israel carries out an air-strike destroying a Syrian facility of an undetermined purpose. Early press reports quoting unnamed U.S. officials suggest that the target of the airstrike was a nuclear facility under construction with North Korean assistance. Days after the strike, Syrian officials deny that the facility was nuclear related, while Israeli and U.S. officials only confirm that an air-strike was carried out. In the following months, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill states on several occasions that he has raised the issue of the Syrian facility with North Korea. U.S. officials later indicate that the facility was believed to have been a nearly completed nuclear reactor modeled on the North Korean nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.

September 11-14, 2007: A team of Chinese, Russian, and U.S. experts visit North Korea to examine the Yongbyon nuclear facilities to determine the steps necessary to disable them. The experts team agrees on a draft disablement plan with North Korean officials which is to be considered by the next plenary meeting of the six-party talks.

September 27-October 3, 2007: The sixth round of six-party talks meets to discuss how to proceed with the second phase of the February 13 agreement. On October 3, the participants issue a joint statement in which North Korea agrees that, by December 31, it would provide a “complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs – including clarification regarding the uranium issue,” and disable its Yongbyon nuclear facilities. Pyongyang also agrees to disable all other nuclear facilities subject to the September 2005 joint statement and not to transfer nuclear material or technology abroad.

In return, the six-parties agree that North Korea would receive the remaining 900,000 tons of heavy-fuel oil or its equivalent pledged in the February 13 agreement.

The United States also agrees that it will fulfill its commitments to begin removing North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism and “advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act” toward North Korea “in parallel with” North Korea’s denuclearization actions.

October 2-4, 2007: South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun travels to Pyongyang to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to discuss prospects for reconciliation and economic cooperation. It is the second time in history that such summit-level discussions have been held.

The summit concludes with a an eight-point joint declaration in which both sides agree to take steps toward reunification, ease military tensions, expand meetings of separated families, and engage in social and cultural exchanges. The declaration also expresses a “shared understanding” by the two countries “on the need for ending the current armistice mechanism and building a permanent peace mechanism.”

November 5, 2007: A team of U.S. experts arrives in North Korea to begin leading the disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. The disablement process consists of 11 agreed steps to be completed by the December 31 deadline stipulated in the October 3 agreement. Funding for the disablement process is provided by the State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF), which is ordinarily reserved for short-term emergency nonproliferation needs.

December 19, 2007: Grand National Party candidate Lee Myung-bak is elected president of South Korea, ushering in the first conservative government in Seoul in 10 years. During his campaign, Lee pledged to review the “Sunshine policy” of short-term reconciliation with North Korea adopted by his two predecessors, instead favoring the application of greater pressure on Pyongyang to denuclearize.

December 21, 2007: The Washington Post reports that U.S. technical teams discovered traces of enriched uranium on aluminum tubes North Korea shared with U.S. officials in November. According to the report, it is unclear whether the contamination originated in North Korea as a result of uranium enrichment carried out by Pyongyang, or if North Korea imported materials which were contaminated abroad and placed these materials in close proximity to the aluminum tubes.

2008

January 2, 2008: Following a December 31, 2007 deadline for North Korea to provide a complete and correct declaration on its nuclear programs and disable its Yongbyon nuclear facilities, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack indicates that “some technical questions about the cooling of the fuel rods” was the reason behind the failure to meet the year-end deadline for disablement. He added that Washington would continue to press Pyongyang for its nuclear declaration.

January 4, 2008: KCNA releases a North Korean Foreign Ministry statement declaring that North Korea “worked out a report on the nuclear declaration in November last year and notified the U.S. side of its contents.” The statement also accuses the other parties of falling behind on their commitments under an October 2007 agreement, including delays in the delivery of heavy-fuel oil to North Korea. Pyongyang indicated that it would slow down the disablement process in response to delays in the delivery of energy assistance.

February 6, 2008: Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and indicates that, in the Fall of 2007, North Korea showed U.S. officials two conventional weapons systems it claimed were the recipients of the thousands of aluminum tubes Pyongyang imported years ago which raised suspicions of a uranium enrichment program. He informs the committee that while the tubes did not work with one of these systems, the U.S. government accepts that the tubes were currently being used for a second conventional weapons system.

Hill also requests from Congress a limited waiver of 1994 Glenn amendment sanctions imposed on North Korea following its nuclear test in 2006. These sanctions, which prohibit the provision of non-humanitarian assistance to non-nuclear-weapon states which have detonated a nuclear weapon, prevent the National Nuclear Security Administration from carrying out work to dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear facilities.

February 25, 2008: South Korean President-elect Lee Myung-bak is inaugurated.

March 13-14, 2008: Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and North Korea Vice-Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan meet in Geneva to discuss ways to make progress on North Korea’s declaration, including the consideration of a compromise approach to the declaration format. Press reports from the Yonhap News Agency and The Washington Times suggest that compromise proposals would include a formal North Korean declaration on its plutonium program, while the uranium enrichment question and the issue of proliferation would be addressed separately. The meeting ends inconclusively.

April 8, 2008: Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and North Korea Vice-Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan meet in Singapore for additional discussions on the North Korean declaration. The two envoys reportedly reached a compromise agreement on the North Korean nuclear declaration which would entail North Korea’s accounting of its plutonium-based nuclear weapons program and its acknowledgement of U.S. allegations regarding its proliferation and uranium enrichment activities.

April 24, 2008: U.S. administration and intelligence officials brief Congress and the public regarding their assessment that the Syrian facility destroyed by Israel in September 2007 was a nuclear reactor under construction with North Korean assistance. The briefings featured a CIA-produced video that includes photographs taken from inside and around the facility at various times during its construction, as well as satellite images and digital renderings of certain elements of the reactor’s operations.

May 8, 2008: North Korea provides a U.S. delegation in Pyongyang with about 18,000 pages of documentation detailing the operations of two of its primary plutonium-related facilities at Yongbyon: a five megawatt nuclear reactor and a reprocessing facility. The records date back to 1986.

June 24, 2008: Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill tells reporters that North Korea’s upcoming nuclear declaration will consist of a “package of items” listing all nuclear materials and programs. The package will reportedly include a formal accounting of North Korea’s plutonium and plutonium-related nuclear facilities and side-documents regarding nuclear proliferation and uranium enrichment. Hill says the declaration will not include an accounting of nuclear weapons, which “are to be determined at a subsequent phase.”

June 26, 2008: Pyongyang delivers a declaration of its nuclear programs to China, the six-party talks chair. The declaration reportedly indicates that North Korea separated a total of about 30 kilograms of plutonium, and used about 2 kilograms for its 2006 nuclear test.

In return for North Korea’s declaration, [Son of Council on Foreign Relations member H.W.] President George W. Bush rescinds the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act toward Pyongyang, and notifies Congress of his intention to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism after 45 days, in accordance with U.S. law.

June 30, 2008: [Son of Council on Foreign Relations member H.W. Bush] President George W. Bush signs into law the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008, which includes a provision allowing the president to waive sanctions on North Korea related to the 1994 Glenn Amendment imposed on Pyongyang following its 2006 nuclear test.

July 12, 2008: The participants in the six-party talks issue a statement outlining broadly the process for verifying North Korea’s nuclear programs. The six parties agree that experts from those countries will be involved in visits to nuclear facilities, the review of documents related to North Korea’s nuclear program, and the interview of technical personnel. The statement also establishes a timeline for completing the disablement of North Korea’s key nuclear facilities and the energy assistance being provided to Pyongyang in return, stating that both processes would be “fully implemented in parallel.”

Mid-July, 2008: The United States tables a draft verification protocol describing procedures used to verify all elements of North Korea’s nuclear programs, including uranium enrichment, weapons, and proliferation. The protocol includes provisions for access upon request for any declared or undeclared site and lists technical recording and detection measures inspectors could undertake. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill tells reporters July 22 that North Korea “indicated some problems” with the draft.

July 23, 2008: The foreign ministers of the six-party talks participants meet informally on the sidelines of an Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit.

Late July 2008: North Korea proposes a draft protocol to verify its nuclear activities. Diplomatic sources later tell Arms Control Today that this proposal is insufficient and it is not used as the basis for further verification negotiations.

August 2008: North Korean leader Kim Jong Il reportedly suffers a stroke, raising questions outside the country as to the status of the leadership in Pyongyang.

August 11, 2008: The 45-day period after which the president may remove North Korea from the State Department’s terrorism list expires. The president does not carry out the de-listing at this time. State Department spokesman Robert Wood tells reporters the next day that the 45-day period is a “minimum” rather than a deadline.

August 13, 2008: Japan and North Korea reach an agreement on procedures for addressing the abduction issue. Pyongyang commits to complete a reinvestigation into the fate of the abducted Japanese nationals by Fall 2008 and to provide Tokyo with access to locations, documents, and interviews in North Korea to conduct its own investigation. In return, Japan agrees to lift certain travel restrictions between the two countries and to discuss easing a ban on North Korea’s access to Japanese ports. The agreement is not implemented in the agreed timeframe.

August 22, 2008: Sung Kim, U.S. special envoy to the six-party talks, meets with North Korean officials in New York regarding revisions to the U.S. draft verification protocol.

August 26, 2008: KCNA carries a statement by a North Korean Foreign ministry official stating that the United States has not carried out its commitment to remove Pyongyang from the State Department’s terrorism list and that agreement on a verification protocol was not a condition of that commitment. In response, the statement indicates that Pyongyang will suspend the disablement of its key nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and consider taking steps to restore them “to their original state.”

September 17, 2008: Jane’s Defense Weekly reports that North Korea has nearly completed a new missile test site on its western coast near the village of Pongdong-ni. The site is believed to be more sophisticated than North Korea’s eastern missile launch site at Musudan-ri, with a capacity to carry out flights tests of larger missiles on a more frequent basis.

September 24, 2008: The IAEA issues a press statement indicating that, at Pyongyang’s request, the agency completed removing seals from North Korea’s reprocessing facility. The statement also said that North Korea informed the agency that it would begin introducing nuclear material at that facility “in one week’s time” and that inspectors would no longer have access to the plant.

October 1-3, 2008: Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill visits Pyongyang to discuss verification.

October 11, 2008: U.S. officials hold a State Department press briefing to announce a preliminary agreement with Pyongyang on measures to verify North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs. The agreement consists of a written joint document and verbal understandings which they say must be approved by the other four six-party talks participants. According to a State Department summary, the new agreement gives inspectors access to all 15 declared sites related to North Korea’s plutonium production program as well as undeclared sites “by mutual consent.” It also allows inspectors to carry out “scientific procedures” such as sampling.

In response to the verification agreement, the United States removes North Korea from the State Department’s terrorism list.

October 13, 2008: KCNA issues a North Korean Foreign Ministry statement indicating that, following its removal from the State Department’s terrorism list, Pyongyang will resume disabling its key nuclear facilities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex.

November 13, 2008: The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement which denies that Pyongyang agreed to allow inspectors to carry out sampling at its nuclear facilities. The statement says that inspection activities are limited to “field visits, confirmation of documents, and interviews with technicians.” Pyongyang also says it is slowing, by half, the rate at which it removed spent fuel rods from its five-megawatt reactor in response to delays in receiving pledged energy aid.

Early December 2008: The United States completes the final shipment of its 200,000 tons of heavy fuel oil pledged to North Korea, bringing the total energy assistance to about 550,000 of 1 million tons.

December 8-11, 2008: Six-party discussions on verification, disablement, and energy assistance in Beijing end in stalemate due to a failure to reach agreement on verification. U.S. officials later claim that North Korea refused to agree in writing what it agreed verbally in October. The six parties issue a chairman’s statement in which they agree “to implement in parallel the disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and the provision of economic and energy assistance.”

December 12, 2008: State Department spokesperson Sean McCormack says that heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea will not continue without a verification agreement, stating that “there is an understanding among the parties…that fuel oil shipments will not go forward absent progress.” China and Russia deny such an understanding and indicate that they intend to complete their share of the energy assistance.

2009

January 13, 2009: The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement insisting that verification activities for nuclear disarmament should be carried out reciprocally between North and South Korea. It states that “free field access should be ensured to verify the introduction and deployment of U.S. nukes in South Korea and details about their withdrawal,” including verification procedures “on a regular basis” to prevent their reintroduction.

January 13-17, 2009: During a visit to Pyongyang, North Korean officials tell scholar Selig Harrison that the country’s declared stock of plutonium has “already been weaponized” and could not be inspected. Harrison relays North Korea’s claims in congressional testimony on February 12.

January 15-19, 2009: Hwang Joon-kook, South Korean deputy six-party talks negotiator, travels to North Korea to discuss Seoul’s potential purchase of about 14,000 fresh nuclear fuel rods previously produced at the Yongbyon complex. South Korean officials later indicate that Pyongyang demanded an exorbitant amount for the fuel and no deal was made.

February 3, 2009: Quoting unnamed South Korean officialsSouth Korea’s Yonhap newspaper reports that North Korea is preparing to test-launch its Taepo Dong 2 missile. Speculation about such a launch increases in the following days.

February 20, 2009: Secretary of State [Wife of Council on Foreign Relations member Bill Clinton]  Hillary Clinton names Ambassador [Council on Foreign Relations member] Stephen Bosworth to serve as U.S. special representative for North Korea policy.

February 24, 2009: KCNA states that “preparations for launching [an] experimental communications satellite…are now making brisk headway.” The United States, Japan, and South Korea later warn North Korea that its planned satellite launch would be in violation of a UN Security Council resolution 1718 and indicate that the council would consider the issue for further action, should North Korea go through with the launch.

March 11, 2009: North Korean authorities inform the International Maritime Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization that they will launch a satellite launch vehicle between April 4-8. North Korea provides these agencies with information regarding expected “dangerous area coordinates” where two of the rocket’s three stages are expected to fall.

March 13, 2009: South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan tells reporters that South Korea may need to review the possibility of formally joining the Proliferation Security Initiative in response to the upcoming North Korean rocket launch.

April 5, 2009: North Korea launches the three-stage Unha-2 rocket, widely believed to be a modified version of its long range Taepo Dong-2 ballistic missile. Although North Korea claims the rocket placed a satellite into orbit, U.S. Northern Command reports that the first stage landed in the Sea of Japan, and that the remaining stages, along with the payload fell into the Pacific Ocean.

April 13, 2009: The UN Security Council issues a presidential statement condemning North Korea’s April 5 rocket launch, and declaring it “in contravention of Security Council resolution 1718.” The statement also calls for strengthening the punitive measures under that resolution.

April 14, 2009: In response to UN Security Council statement, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry indicates that Pyongyang is withdrawing from the six-party talks and “will no longer be bound” by any of its agreements. North Korea also says that it will reverse steps taken to disable its nuclear facilities under six-party agreements in 2007 and will “fully reprocess” the 8,000 spent fuel rods from its Yongbyon reactor in order to extract plutonium for nuclear weapons.

April 16, 2009: North Korea ejects IAEA and U.S. monitors from the Yongbyon nuclear complex.

April 24, 2009: The UN Security Council places financial restrictions on three North Korean firms believed to be participating in proliferation: Korea Mining Development Trading Corp., Tanchon Commercial Bank, and Korea Ryongbong General Corp.

May 25, 2009: North Korea conducts its second underground nuclear test a few kilometers from its 2006 test site near the village of P’unggye. Following the test North Korea announces that “the results of the test helped satisfactorily settle the scientific and technological problems arising in furthering increasing the power of nuclear weapons and steadily developing nuclear technology.” Early yield estimates range from 2-8 kilotons, although the Russian Defense Ministry initially suggests a yield of 15-20 kilotons.

The UN Security Council convenes an emergency meeting and releases a presidential statement condemning the test as a violation of UN Security Council resolution 1718. The council also announces that it will meet to pass a new resolution dealing with the test.

May 26, 2009: South Korea officially announces that it will participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative.

May 27, 2009: KCNA carries a statement indicating that Pyongyang considers Seoul’s participation in PSI to be an act of war and that North Korea’s Korean People’s Army will no longer be bound by the 1953 Armistice Agreement which brought an end to hostilities during the Korean War.

June 12, 2009: In response to North Korea’s May 25 nuclear test, the UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1874, which expands sanctions against Pyongyang. The resolution intensified inspection regime to prevent proliferation to and from North Korea, calls for enhanced financial restrictions against North Korea and North Korean firms, a nearly comprehensive arms embargo on the country, and strengthened council oversight over the implementation of the resolution. It also bars North Korea from carrying out any further missile tests.

June 13, 2009: The North Korean Foreign ministry issues a statement outlining “countermeasures” Pyongyang would take in response to UNSC Resolution 1874.  The measures included weaponizing all newly separated plutonium from the spent fuel from its Yongbyon nuclear reactor, continuing to develop a uranium enrichment capability, and responding militarily to any blockade.

July 16, 2009: The UN Security Council places 10 North Korean entities linked to the countries missile and nuclear program on the list of sanctioned organizations and people.

August 4, 2009: Former President [Council on Foreign Relations member]  Bill Clinton visits North Korea in order to secure the release of two U.S. journalists who were accused of spying, meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il.

August 5, 2009: The state-run Korean Central News Agency issues a statement saying that former President [Council on Foreign Relations member] Bill Clinton’s August 4 visit, to secure the release of two U.S. journalists, will help build “bilateral confidence.”

August 10, 2009: Indian police tell reporters that they detained and inspected the North Korean ship MV Mu Sanbut did not discover any radioactive materials.

August 12, 2009: UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appoints a eight-person panel of experts to the UN Security Council’s 1718 committee to assess the implementation of the sanctions on North Korea in accordance with Resolution 1874.

September 11, 2009: State Department spokesman [Council on Foreign Relations member] P. J. Crowley tells reporters that the United States is “prepared to enter into a bilateral discussion with North Korea” as a precursor to resuming the six-party talks.

October 5, 2009: Xinhua News Agency reports that Kim Jong-Il informed Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao that Pyongyang was ready to return to multilateral talks provided bilateral talks with the United States yielded a favorable result.

October 20, 2009: Ian Kelly, State Department spokesman, tells reporters that North Korea issued a standing invitation for [Council on Foreign Relations member] Stephen Bosworth, U.S. special representative for North Korea policy, to visit Pyongyang.

November 3, 2009: KCNA reports that North Korea has reprocessed the last 8,000 fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor.

November 9, 2009: [Council on Foreign Relations member] P. J. Crowley, state department spokesman, tells reporters that Special Representative for North Korea Policy [Council on Foreign Relations member] Stephen Bosworth will lead a group to Pyongyang for direct talks with the North Korean government.

fig 6 obama new hiresFigure  6 Obama Some of the CFR members CFR Puppet Obama hired – Read Laurence H. Shoup’s Wall Streets Think Tank – The Council on Foreign Relations to see CFR influence in administrations from the 1974-2014 and how the CFR is destroying our Nation.

November 19, 2009: At a joint press conference with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, President Obama says that the United States and South Korea are committed to pursuing “concrete” action on Pyongyang’s part to roll back its nuclear program.

December 8-10, 2009: Officials for the Obama administration hold their first senior-level meetings with the North Korean government in Pyongyang. U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy [Council on Foreign Relations member] Stephen Bosworth leads to delegation to Pyongyang, where he delivers a letter from President Obama to Kim Jong-Il.

December 12, 2009: Authorities in Thailand, acting on a tip from the United States, seize 35 tons of weapons from a North Korean plane that made an unscheduled landing in Bangkok. According to the Thai government, the plane was heading to the Middle East.

2010

January 11, 2010: The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement suggesting talks begin on replacing the 1953 ceasefire with a peace treaty.

January 24, 2010: Pyongyang threatens war with South Korea in response to Seoul’s statement that it would invade North Korea if there was the threat of a nuclear strike.

 

February 9, 2010: Xinhua News Agency reports that Kim Jong Il informed Chinese authorities that Pyongyang is still committed to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

February 12, 2010: UN Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lyn Pascoe tells reporters that North Korea “are not eager” to resume the six-party talks.

March 26, 2010: The South Korean patrol ship Cheonan is sunk near the South Korean-North Korean maritime border.

April 14, 2010: [Council on Foreign Relations member] Kurt Campbell, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, tells reporters that the United States supports South Korea’s decision to stop engagement with North Korea until after the Cheonansinking incident is resolved.

April 19, 2010: Yu Myung-hwan, South Korea’s Foreign Minister, says that talks with North Korea will not occur “for some time” if his government uncovers evidence that North Korea was involved in the Cheonan’s sinking.

April 21, 2010: North Korean state media reports that Pyongyang issued a memorandum stating that the country will be party to nonproliferation and disarmament agreements “on an equal footing with other nuclear weapons states.”

April 25, 2010: During a press conference, South Korean Defense Minister Kim Tae-young says that one of the most likely causes of the Cheonan’s sinking is a torpedo. North Korea denies any involvement in the incident.

May 20, 2010: The multinational Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group (JIG) releases its findings regarding the March 26 sinking of the ROKS Cheonan. The JIG concludes that North Korea was responsible for firing the torpedo that sank the South Korean ship.

May 20, 2010: South Korea makes a formal accusation against North Korea for sinking the South Korean ship the Cheonan with a torpedo attack.

May 20, 2010: North Korea denies involvement in the Cheonan sinking, and issues a statement saying that any punishment will be met with “various forms of tough measures.”

May 24, 2010: South Korean President Lee Myung-bak says that South Korea will sever almost all trade with Pyongyang in response to North Korea’s sinking of the ROKS Cheonan.

May 25, 2010: North Korea says that it will cut all links to South Korea in response to Seoul’s accusation that Pyongyang was responsible for sinking the ship Cheonan.

July 21, 2010: The United States imposes new sanctions against Pyongyang for its involvement in the sinking of the South Korean ship the Cheonan.

July 25, 2010: The United States and South Korea begin a four-day joint military exercise in the Sea of Japan as a show of force in response to the Cheonan incident.

August 25, 2010: Former President [Council on Foreign Relations member] Jimmy Carter arrives in Pyongyang on a goodwill mission to bring home U.S. citizen Aijalon Mahli Gomes, who was arrested after entering North Korea from China.

August 30, 2010: President Obama signs an executive order that increases financial restrictions against North Korea. The Department of Treasury also announces that it has sanctioned eight North Korean entities for involvement in Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs.

September 15, 2010: In an op-ed published in the New York Times, former President [Council on Foreign Relations member] Jimmy Carter writes that during his August visit he received “clear, strong signals” that North Korea wants to restart negotiations.

September 15, 2010: [Council on Foreign Relations member] Stephen Bosworth, U.S. special representative for North Korea policy, tells reporters that it will be a slow road to resuming six-party talks with North Korea and the talks will only occur after “specific and concrete” actions by Pyongyang.

September 28, 2010: The ruling Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) convened its third Conference in Pyongyang, the first such gathering in 44 years. The conference entailed a number of leadership changes, including the appointment of Kim Jong Il’s third son, Kim Jong Eun, as a Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission.

November 12, 2010: North Korea reveals that it has constructed a 2,000-centrifuge uranium enrichment facility to a visiting team of North Korea specialists, including former Los Alamos National Laboratory Director Siegfried Hecker. North Korean officials claim that the facility will produce LEU for an LWR which North Korea also reveals is under construction. Pyongyang also admits for the first time that it can produce uranium hexafluoride (UF6), the feedstock for uranium enrichment, confirming long-held suspicions about the presence of such a capability. The construction of the LWR is slated for 2012, the 100-year anniversary of the birth of Kim Il Sung, but in a Nov. 20 trip report, Hecker expresses doubts about that timeline. The enrichment plant is housed in the former fuel fabrication building for the graphite-moderated reactors at Yongbyon, and the LWR is being constructed at the former site of the 5 megawatt reactor’s cooling tower.

November 23, 2010: North Korea fires artillery rounds at the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong, 200 of which hit the island killing two soldiers and injuring seventeen others. Three civilians were also hurt in the attack. South Korea returned fire and scrambled combat aircraft in the area.

November 29, 2010: In response to the Yeonpyeong shelling, China calls for an emergency session of the six-party talks to “exchange views on major issues of concern”.

December 6, 2010: The United States, Japan, and South Korea reject China’s call for an emergency session of six-party talks, maintaining that North-South relations must improve before multilateral discussions can continue.

2011

February 16, 2011: In Senate testimony, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper says that North Korea likely has additional undeclared uranium enrichment facilities beyond the facility first revealed in November of 2010.

February 28, 2011: U.S. and South Korean forces conduct large-scale joint military exercises. North Korea threatens to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire” in response to the exercises, which U.S. officials claim was planned long in advance of the recent peak in tensions.

March 15, 2011: North Korea tells a visiting Russian official that it is willing to return to six-party talks and to talk about its uranium-enrichment activities.

March 17, 2011: South Korea rejects the latest North Korean offer, calling for actions to show the sincerity of North Korea’s commitment to denuclearization before multilateral talks can begin again.

April 18, 2011: China proposes three-step revitalization of multilateral talks, beginning with bilateral talks between North and South Korea, followed by similar talks between the United States and North Korea, and, finally, a resumption of the six-party discussions.

April 18, 2011: U.S. President Barack Obama issues an executive order  reaffirming a ban on the import of goods, services, and technologies from North Korea.

April 26, 2011: Former U.S. President [Council on Foreign Relations member]  Jimmy Carter visits Pyongyang, accompanied by three other former heads of state, in a bid to revitalize negotiations.

May 9, 2011: South Korean President Lee Myung-bak introduces possibility of inviting North Korea to the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, on the condition that the North commits to giving up nuclear weapons. A North Korean spokesperson rejected the precondition, stating that denuclearization was an attempt by the South to open the way for an invasion.

June 13, 2011: U.S. warship forces a North Korean freight vessel to turn back off the coast of China. The vessel was believed to be carrying a shipment of missile components to Burma. The North Korean ship refused to be inspected, but voluntarily reversed course after being shadowed by the U.S. destroyer.

July 22, 2011: Wi Sung-lac, the South Korean envoy to the six-party talks, met with his North Korean counterpart, Ri Yong Ho, on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations meeting in Bali as part of efforts to restart dialog regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

July 24, 2011: The foreign ministers of Japan, South Korea, and the United States issue a statement welcoming the discussion that took place during the North-South meeting and saying that it “should be a ­sustained process going forward.”

July 28-29, 2011: U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy [Council on Foreign Relations member] Stephen Bosworth and North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan meet in New York, as part of efforts to revive multilateral talks on North Korea’s nuclear program. This marked the first high-level meeting between the United States and North Korea in nearly two years, and the United States reportedly reiterated its willingness to restart negotiations if North Korea displayed committed itself to being a constructive partner in the negotiation process.

August 1, 2011: A North Korean Foreign Ministry statement carried by the state-run Korean Central News Agency expresses Pyongyang’s interest in resuming multilateral talks with the United States “at an early date.”

August 24, 2011: After a meeting between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, Pyongyang says that it would be willing to observe a moratorium on the production and testing of nuclear weapons and missiles in the context of resumed talks.

September 24, 2011: During a diplomatic trip to China, North Korea Prime Minister Choe Yong Rim reiterates the position Kim Jong Il expressed to Russia a month earlier, telling China’s top officials that Pyongyang remained willing to consider a moratorium on nuclear testing in the context of the 6 party talks.

October 24-25, 2011: The United States and North Korea hold a round of talks in Geneva on steps to resume the six-party process. Ambassador Glyn Davies takes over for Ambassador [Council on Foreign Relations member] Stephen Bosworth as the U.S. Special representative for North Korea Policy.

December 17, 2011: After holding power for 17 years, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il dies.  He is succeeded by his youngest son, Kim Jong Un, who is believed to be about 28 years old.

December 29, 2011: Kim Jong Un is formally declared North Korea’s new leader.

2012

February 29, 2012: Following a Feb. 23-24 meeting between the United States and North Korea in Beijing, the two countries announce in separate statements an agreement by North Korea to suspend operations at its Yongbyon uranium enrichment plant, invite IAEA inspectors to monitor the suspension, and implement moratoriums on nuclear and long-range missile tests.  The United States says that it would provide North Korea 240,000 metric tons of food aid under strict monitoring.

March 16, 2012: North Korea announces it will launch a satellite in mid-April to celebrate the centennial birthdate of the country’s founder Kim Il Sung. The United States says that the launch would violate a Feb. 29 agreement in which North Korea pledged not to launch any long-range missiles and would undermine Pyongyang’s credibility regarding the monitoring of food aid and other commitments.

March 29, 2012: Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs Peter Lavoy tells the House Armed Services Committee that the United States has suspended arrangements to deliver food aid to North Korea under a Feb. 29 agreement due to the North’s announced satellite launch.

April 13, 2012: North Korea attempts to launch a weather satellite using the Unha-3, a three-stage liquid-fueled rocket, from its Sohae Satellite Launching Station in the southwest corner of the country. During the first stage, after approximately 90 seconds, the rocket falls apart after veering slightly east from its intended course.  The first stage appeared to be comprised of a cluster of four Nodong medium-range ballistic missiles engines. The second stage, which appeared to be based on a BM-25 Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile did not ignite. It is unclear what caused the rocket launch to fail. Analysts speculate that there may have been a structural failure in the second stage, or that not all four of the engines in the first stage fired correctly. North Korea admits that the launch is a failure, which it did not do after the April 2009 launch, when the North Korean public was told that the satellite successfully entered orbit. The US officially halts its plans to send food aid to North Korea.

April 15, 2012: In a parade honoring the 100th birthday of North Korea founder Kim Il-Sung, North Korea reveals six road-mobile ICBMs in a military parade, the KN-08, although most experts conclude that the missiles are mock-ups based on imagery analysis that reveals significant abnormalities in the design features.

April 16, 2012: The United Nations Security Council condemns North Korea’s satellite launch because of applicability to ballistic missile development, declaring that it acted in violation of Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), and calls upon North Korea to comply with the provisions under the resolutions or face a tightening of sanctions.

April 19, 2012: Secretary of Defense [Council on Foreign Relations member] Leon Panetta tells the House Armed Services Committee that North Korea is getting “some help” from China on its missile development, but says that he does not know the extent of the assistance provided.

December 1, 2012: North Korea announces it will attempt another satellite launch using a long-range rocket between the dates of December 10-22. The rocket, also called the Unha-3, will be launched from the Sohae Satellite Launching Station and follow the same trajectory as the April 13, 2012 launch. In response, the United States Department of State issues a statement saying that it would view a satellite launch as a “highly provocative act” that would threaten the peace and security of the region.

December 9, 2012: North Korea detects a deficiency in the first stage of the rocket, after it has been assembled at Sohae, and announces an extension of the launch window through December 29.

December 12, 2012: North Korea launches the Unha-3. Shortly after the launch the North Korean Central News Agency reports that the launch was a success and the satellite entered orbit. Japanese and South Korean officials confirm the launch and report that debris splashed down in the areas that North Korea indicated for the first and second stages. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) also confirms the launch and says that an object appears to have achieved orbit.

2013

January 22, 2013: The United Nations Security Council passes Resolution 2087 in response to North Korea’s Dec. 12 satellite launch, which used technology applicable to ballistic missiles in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). Resolution 2087 strengthens and expands existing sanctions put in place by the earlier resolutions and freezes the assets of additional North Korean individuals and people.

January 24, 2013: The North Korean National Defense Commission announces its intentions to conduct another nuclear test and continue rocket launches.

February 12, 2013: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) detects seismic activity near North Korea’s nuclear test site. CTBTO Executive Secretary Tibor Toth says that the activity has “explosion-like characteristics” and confirms that the activity comes from the area of the 2006 and 2009 nuclear tests. The South Korean Defense Ministry estimated the yield at 6-7 kilotons in the immediate aftermath and called for a UN Security Council Meeting.

March 7, 2013: The United Nations Security Council unanimously passes Resolution 2094 in response to North Korea’s nuclear test on February 12, 2013. Resolution 2094 strengthens existing sanctions by expanding the scope of materials covered and adds additional financial sanctions, including blocking bulk cash transfers. Additional individuals and entities also are identified for asset freezes.

April 23, 2013: The CTBTO announces that its international monitoring system detected radioactive gases at stations in Japan and Russia. The CTBTO concludes that the gases were likely released during an event approximately 50 days prior to the April 9 detection, which coincides with North Korea’s February 13 nuclear test.

April 2013: North Korea announces it plans to restart its heavy water reactor at Yongbyon.

July 15, 2013: A North Korean ship stopped in Panama is found to be carrying weapons from Cuba. The shipment included small arms, light weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, artillery ammunition, and MiG aircraft in violation of UN Security Council resolutions that prohibit North Korea from importing and exporting weaponry.

August 2013: Satellite imagery indicates that North Korea likely restarted a nuclear reactor at its Yongbyon site. The heavy water reactor in question produced the spent fuel from which North Korea separated weapons-usable plutonium for its nuclear arsenal. The reactor was shut down in 2007.

September 20, 2013: The IAEA General Conference adopts a resolution calling on North Korea to come into full compliance with the NPT and cooperate in the full implementation of the IAEA safeguards.

2014

March 8, 2014: China declares a “red line” on North Korea, saying it will not permit war or chaos on the Korean peninsula and that the only path to peace can only come through denuclearization.

March 21, 2014: North Korea test-fires 30 short-range rockets off its east coast, the latest in series of military actions condemned by South Korea.

March 26, 2014: North Korea test-fires two medium-range Rodang  (also known as No Dong) missiles into the Sea of Japan, violating UN sanctions. This is the first time in five years that North Korea has tested medium-range projectiles.

March 27, 2014: UN Security Council unanimously condemns North Korea for launching the midrange missiles, saying the launch violates council resolutions; China joins council in criticizing the launch.

March 30, 2014: North Korea threatens to carry out a ‘new form’ of nuclear test, one year after its third nuclear test raised military tensions on the Korean Peninsula and prompted the UN to tighten sanctions. Pyongyang does not specify what it means by a ‘new form,’ but some speculate that it plans to make nuclear devices small enough to fit on ballistic missiles.

March 31, 2014: North Korea and South Korea fire hundreds of artillery shells across the disputed Western Sea border. While the shells fall harmlessly into the water, it is the most serious confrontation since an artillery duel in 2010.

April 4, 2014: South Korea conducts its own missile test amid rising military threats from North Korea, successfully launching a newly developed ballistic missile capable of striking most of the North.

May 2, 2014: New commercial satellite imagery shows that North Korea is expanding its main rocket-launching site and testing engines of what is believed to be its first road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile, according to the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University.

June 27, 2014: North Korea fires three short-range projectiles off its east coast, day after it warned of retaliation against release of American comedy film The Interview, which involves a plot to kill Kim Jong-un.

August 22, 2014: Satellite images indicate that North Korea is likely to have the ability to launch a longer-range rocket that can carry a heavier payload by the end of this year.

September 6, 2014: South Korean military says North Korea launched three short-range projectiles off its east coast.

October 2014: Analysis from the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins indicates that North Korea has a submarine at the Sinpo South Shipyard that may be a test bed for submarine-launched ballistic missiles. A test-stand, likely for exploring the possibilities of launching ballistic missiles from submarines or ships is also identified at the shipyard.

October 25, 2014: General Curtis Scaparrotti, commander of US forces in South Korea, says he believes that North Korea can fit a nuclear weapon on a ballistic missile, a process known as miniturization.

November, 20 2014: North Korea threatens to conduct a fourth nuclear test after the UN Human Rights Committee refers North Korea to the International Criminal Court for human rights abuses on November 19.

November 20, 2014: Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announces that a North Korean special envoy told Russian President Vladimir Putin that North Korea is ready to resume the Six-Party Talks.

2015

January 2, 2015: The United States expands sanctions on North Korean entities and individuals, some of which are involved with North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

January 10, 2015: North Korea announces it offered to suspend nuclear testing in exchange for the United States and South Korea calling off annual joint-military exercises slated for spring 2015. The United States rejects the offer.

February 7, 2015: North Korea claims to test a new anti-ship missile. Kim Jong Un reportedly oversees the test.

February 8, 2015: North Korea tests five short-range ballistic missiles from Wonsan. The missiles fly approximately 125 miles northeast into the ocean.

April 7, 2015: Adm William Gortney, head of U.S. North Command, tells reporters that North Korea’s ICBM, the KN-08 is operational, despite never having been tested. Experts dispute the assesment.

May 9, 2015: North Korea successfully launches a ballistic missile, which it claims came from a submarine, that traveled about 150 meters. Experts believe the missile was launched from a submerged barge.

November 28, 2015: North Korea tests a ballistic missile from a submarine. The missile test fails.

December 8, 2015: The U.S. Treasury Department announces additional designations under Executive Orders 13551 and 13382. This include the State Department designating North Korea’s Strategic Rocket Force under 13382 for engaging in activities that contribute to delivery vehicles capable of carrying WMDs. Several banks involved with proliferation financing were also named as were three shipping companies.

December 21, 2015: North Korea tests another ballistic missile from a submarine. This test is reported as a success.

2016

January 6, 2016: North Korea announces it conducted a fourth nuclear weapons test, claiming to have detonated a hydrogen bomb for the first time. Monitoring stations from the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization detect the seismic activity from the test. The type of device tested remains unclear, although experts doubt it was of a hydrogen bomb based on seismic evidence.

February 7, 2016: North Korea launches a long-range ballistic missile carrying what it has said is an earth observation satellite in defiance of United Nations sanctions barring it from using ballistic missile technology, drawing strong international condemnation from other governments which believe it will advance North Korea’s military ballistic missile capabilities.

March 2, 2016: The UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 2270 condemning the nuclear test and launch of early 2016, and demanding that North Korea not conduct further tests and immediately suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program. Resolution 2270 expands existing sanctions on North Korea by adding to the list of sanctioned individuals and entities, introducing new financial sanctions, and banning states from supplying aviation fuel and other specified minerals to North Korea. Resolution 2270 also introduces a requirement that UN member states inspect all cargo in transit to or from North Korea for illicit goods and arms.

April 15, 2016: North Korea test launches an intermediate-range ballistic missile, the Mususdan, which was not known to have been flight-tested prior to the April 15 launch. The missile test is a failure. The UN Security Council issues as statement condemning the launch as a “clear violation” of existing Security Council resolutions.

April 23, 2016: North Korea tests a KN-11 submarine launch ballistic missile. The missile flew approximately 30 kilometers before exploding, according to South Korean officials.

April 24, 2016: The UN Security Council condemns North Korea’s submarine-launched ballistic missile test.

April 28, 2016: North Korea tests two intermediate-range Musudan missiles. The tests are reported as a failure.

May 6-9, 2016: North Korea holds its seventh Congress for its ruling Korean Workers’ Party. During the Congress, Kim Jong Un describes North Korea’s nuclear policy, saying North Korea “will not use a nuclear weapon unless its sovereignty is encroached upon by any aggressive hostile forces with nukes, as it had already declared.”

May 30, 2016: North Korea tests another intermediate-range Musudan missile.

May 31, 2016: Satellite imagery analysis from 38 North assess that North Korea is “preparing to commence or has already begun” reprocessing nuclear material to separate additional plutonium for weapons use.

June 21, 2016: North Korea conducts two additional intermediate-range Musudan ballistic missile tests, bringing the total number of Musudan tests to six since April. One of the tests is a partial success, as the missile flew an estimated 400 kilometers. The other explodes in midflight after approximately 150 kilometers.

June 22, 2016: The UN Security Council holds an emergency session to consider North Korea’s missile tests.

June 23, 2016: The Security Council releases a statement strongly condemning North Korea’s recent ballistic missile launches and calls on member states to fully implement UN Security Council measures imposed by council resolutions.

July 6, 2016: North Korea signals a willingness to resume negotiations on denuclearization and defines denuclearization in a statement by a government spokesperson.

July 6, 2016: The US Department of Treasury announces designations on top North Korean officials, including the leader, Kim Jong Un, over ties to human rights abuses in North Korea.

July 8, 2016: South Korea and the United States announce a decision to deploy the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense battery (THAAD), to South Korea. The missile defense system is “a defenisve measure to ensure the security” of South Korea. THAAD is designed to intercept short and medium-range ballistic missiles.

August 3, 2016: North Korea fires a medium-range ballistic missile, the Nodong. The missile splashes down in Japan’s economic exclusion zone, about 200 kilometers off of Japan’s coast.

August 24, 2016: North Korea tests an SLBM, the KN-11. The missile ejects from a submarine and flies approximately 500 kilometers on a lofted trajectory before splashing down in the ocean. The test appears to be a success.

September 5, 2016: North Korea tests three medium-range ballistic missiles simultaneously. The missiles travel about 1,000 kilometers.

September 9, 2016: North Korea conducts a fifth nuclear test. The sesimic activity registers a magnititude of 5.0.

October 14, 2016: North Korea conducts a failed test of what is believed to be the intermediate-range Musudan ballistic missile. The missile explodes soon after lift-off.

October 19, 2016: North Korea conducts a failed test of what is believed to be the intermediate-range Musudan ballistic missile. The missile explodes shortly after lift-off. This is the eighth test of the Musudan in 2016. Only the June launch was a success.

October 25, 2016: U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper says that “the notion of getting the North Koreans to denuclearize is probably a lost cause” and that nuclear weapons are North Korea’s “ticket to survival.”

2017

February 12, 2017: North Korea tests a new ballistic missile, the Pukguksong-2. North Korean media calls the test a success. The missile flew about 500 kilometers at a lofted trajectory. Imagery suggests that the Pukguksong-2 is a solid-fueled, medium-range system based on a submarine launched ballistic missile that North Korea has been testing for several years. The test utilized ‘cold-launch’ technology, meaning that the missile was ejected from its canister using compressed gas. The transport erector launcher used for the missile test was also domestically manufactured in North Korea.

February 13, 2017: Kim Jong Nam, the older half-brother of Kim Jong Un, is killed in an airport in Malaysia. Tests reveal that he died from exposure to VX, a nerve agent. VX is banned under the Chemical Weapons Convention, but North Korea has not signed or ratified that treaty. North Korea denies responsibility for the assassination.

March 6, 2017: North Korea launches four ballistic missiles from a region near North Korea’s border with China. The missiles fly about 1,000 kilometers and land in Japanese economic exclusion zone, about 300 kilometers off the coast Japan.

April 5, 2017: North Korea tests a ballistic missile. The missile explodes shortly after the launch.

April 6, 2017: U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet and agree to cooperate more closely on achieving denuclearization of North Korea.

April 15, 2017: North Korea celebrates the birth of its founder, Kim Il Sung, with a parade that displays several new ballistic missiles, including a new variant of the KN-08 and two cannister systems. It is unclear if the cannisters hold new ICBMS.

April 16, 2017: North Korea tests a ballistic missile. The missile explodes shorterly after the launch.

April 17, 2017: Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, Susan Thornton, tells reporters about the U.S. policy toward North Korea, which officials describe as “maximum pressure and engagement.” Thornton said that Washington is looking for a “tangible signal” from North Korea about its seriousness in engaging in talks and there is not a “specific precondition.”

April 26, 2017: The Trump Administration briefs Congress on its North Korea policy and releases a statement that calls for increasing sanctions pressure on North Korea and working with allies and regional partners on diplomacy.

figure 7 - Tillerson

Figure 7 CFR Stooge Rex Tillerson and CEO of CFR corporate member Exxon-Mobile, the largest publicly traded oil company in the world. Tillerson’s been in that position for six years. He was responsible for the big move into natural gas, a resource that belongs to we the people, the $30 billion acquisition of XTO Energy in 2009. In his new book, “Private Empire,” Steve Coll refers to Exxon Mobil as a corporate state within the American state, with its own intricate web of international relations and, in a sense, its own foreign policy. So I think it’s particularly fitting that Rex Tillerson is speaking to this group at the Council on Foreign Relations. Tillerson is also one of the CFR members who is taking morally straight out of scouting and helping to promote the #lgbt normalization of sodomy in the work place.

April 27, 2017: Secretary of State Rex Tillerson says in an interview with NPR that the United States is open to direct talks with North Korea on the “right agenda.” He says that denuclearization is still the goal for any agreement.

April 28, 2017: Secretary of State Rex Tillerson chairs a special meeting of the UN Security Council. In opening remarks he says that North Korea must take “concrete steps to reduce the threat that its illiegal weapons programs pose” before talks can begin.

May 2, 2017: The THAAD missile defense system becomes operational in South Korea.

May 9, 2017: Moon jae-in is elected president of South Korea. Moon supports engagement with North Korea, but says talks cannot occur while Pyongyang continues to conduct nuclear and missile tests.

May 14, 2017: North Korea tests the Hwasong-12 missile. The missile test is successful with a range of 4,800 kilometers on a standard trajectory, making it an intermediate-range ballistic missile.

June 1, 2017: The United States imposes sanctions on individuals and entities linked to North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.

June 29-30, 2017: South Korean President Moon Jae-in meets with U.S. President Donald Trump at a summit in Washington, DC. The leaders pledge to continue working together on North Korea.

July 3, 3017: North Korea tests its Hwasong-14 ballistic missile. Initial analysis of the test indicate that the range would have been about 6,700 kilometers at a standard trajectory, making it an ICBM.

July 28, 2017: Japan, South Korea, and the United States report that North Korea tested an ICBM. Initial analysis of the test indicates a range of about 10,400km, not taking into account the rotation of the Earth, putting Los Angeles, Denver and Chicago within range. Russia claimed the missile was a medium-range ballistic missile.

August 5, 2017: The UN Security Council unanimously passes Resolution 2371, which imposes additional sanctions, including a complete ban on the export of coal, iron, seafood and lead, on North Korea in response to the July ICBM tests. See UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea for more information.

August 8, 2017: A leaked Defense Intelligence Agency report found that North Korea has produced miniturized nuclear warheads for ballistic missile delivery, including for ICBMs.

On the same day, in response to North Korean criticism of the United States, President Trump told reporters that “North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States…. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.”

August 9, 2017: In response to Trump’s remarks, North Korean made a statement detailing a plan to test four Hwasong-12 intermediate range ballistic missiles, which would fly over Japan and land in the waters 30-40km from the coast of Guam.

August 10, 2017: Trump told reporters that his previous threat of “fire and fury” should North Korea continue to threaten the United States may not have been “tough enough”.

August 11, 2017: Trump tweeted: “military solutions are now fully in place, locked and loaded, should North Korea act unwisely. Hopefully Kim Jong Un will find another path!”

August 14, 2017: Kim Jong Un declares that after receiving Guam strike plans, he will wait to see what Washington’s next move is before making a decision.

August 25, 2017: North Korea tests three short-range ballistic missiles to the northeast, two of which flew about 155 miles, and one of which blew up immediately.

August 28, 2017: North Korea tests its Hwasong-12 missile, which flew over 2,700km and overflew Japan. In a statement the next day, President Trump claims “all options are on the table.”

September 2, 2017: North Korea official state media releases photos of Kim Jong Un with what it claims is a thermonuclear weapon small enough to fit on an ICBM that could reach the continental United States.

September 3, 2017: North Korea conducts its sixth nuclear test, claiming the device tested was a hydrogen bomb and the test was a “perfect success.” Seismic activity indicates that North Korea did conduct its largest nuclear test to date at 3:30 UTC. The initial estimate from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is that the seismic event’s magnitude was around 5.8, occurred at a very shallow depth, and took place in the immediate vicinity of North Korea’s Pyunggye-ri test site. Based on the seismic data, a number of experts assess the device had an explosive yield in excess of 100 kilotons TNT equivalent, which is significantly higher than North Korea’s past nuclear tests. North Korea’s claim that the device was a hydrogen bomb cannot be independently substantiated, but the higher yield could be indicative of a boosted fission or thermonuclear device. The CTBTO’s seismic estimate was later revised to 6.1 on September 7.

September 4, 2017: In remarks at an emergency UN Security Council briefing called in the wake of North Korea’s sixth nuclear test, US Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley states “being a nuclear power is not about using those terrible weapons to threaten others. Nuclear powers understand their responsibilities.”

September 11, 2017: The UN Security Council passes UNSCR 2375 imposing additional sanctions on North Korea, including a ban on textile exports and a cap on refined petroleum product imports.

September 15, 2017: North Korea conducts a ballistic missile test. The test appears to be an intermediate-range Hwasong-12. The missile over flew Japan on a standard trajectory and reportedly traveled about 3,700 kilometers.

September 19, 2017: In his first address to the UN General Assembly, President Trump threatens to “totally destroy North Korea,” if the United States is forced to defend itself or its allies, adding “Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime.”

September 21, 2017: President Trump issues an executive order imposing additional sanctions on entities that facilitate financial transactions and trade with North Korea.

September 21, 2017: Kim Jong Un responds to Trump’s UN speech with an unprecedented statement under his own name, calling Trump’s behavior “mentally deranged” and asserting that “a frightened dog barks louder.” Kim Jong Un further stated that Trump’s words “convinced me, rather than frightening or stopping me, that the path I chose is the correct and that one I have to follow to the last.” He threatened, “exercising…a corresponding, highest level of hardline countermeasure in history” and declared he would make Trump “pay dearly for his speech.”

North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho explains that the “highest level” action Kim Jong Un referred to in his statement could be a hydrogen bomb test in or over the Pacific Ocean, although he claimed he had “no idea what actions could be taken as it will be ordered by leader Kim Jong Un. Ri also says that Trump’s comments make “our rocket’s visit to the U.S. mainland inevitable all the more.””

September 23, 2017: U.S. B1-B strategic bombers fly near North Korea’s coast, the farthest north they have flown in the 21st century.

Trump tweets that North Korea “wouldn’t be around much longer” if he echoes “Little Rocket Man.”

September 25, 2017: At a press conference in New York, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho claims that Trump’s comments at the UN General Assembly and on Twitter constituted a declaration of war and that North Korea therefore has a right to shoot down U.S. strategic bombers.

November 7, 2017: President Trump delivers an address to the South Korean National Assembly, the first address by a U.S. President since President [Council on Foreign Relations member]  Clinton’s in 1993. In his speech, Trump addresses Kim Jong Un directly, warning him not to underestimate the United States. Trump also sets the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea as a precondition for talks.

* Entry dates for the imposition of sanctions indicate the dates the sanctions took effect.

 

Posted: November 7, 2017

 

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How the CFR established the Chinese Elite & sold out the US & Chinese Worker

Source: How the CFR established the Chinese Elite & sold out the US & Chinese Worker

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The National Endowment for Democracy a Council on Foreign Relations Deep State Covert Operations Tool

In Trojan Horses and Color Revolutions: The Role of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) William Blum writes: How many Americans could identify the National Endowment for Democracy? An organization which often does exactly the opposite of what its name implies.

The NED was set up in the early 1980s under President Reagan in the wake of all the negative revelations about the CIA in the second half of the 1970s. The latter was a remarkable period. Spurred by Watergate – the Church committee of the Senate, the Pike committee of the House, and the Rockefeller Commission, created by the president, were all busy investigating the CIA. Seemingly every other day there was a new headline about the discovery of some awful thing, even criminal conduct, the CIA had been mixed up in for years. The Agency was getting an exceedingly bad name, and it was causing the powers-that-be much embarrassment.

Something had to be done. What was done was not to stop doing these awful things. Of course not. What was done was to shift many of these awful things to a new organization, with a nice sounding name – The National Endowment for Democracy. The idea was that the NED would do somewhat overtly what the CIA had been doing covertly for decades, and thus, hopefully, eliminate the stigma associated with CIA covert activities.

It was a masterpiece. Of politics, of public relations, and of cynicism.

Thus it was that in 1983, the National Endowment for Democracy was set up to “support democratic institutions throughout the world through private, nongovernmental efforts”. Notice the “nongovernmental” – part of the image, part of the myth. In actuality, virtually every penny of its funding comes from the federal government, as is clearly indicated in the financial statement in each issue of its annual report. NED likes to refer to itself as an NGO (Non-governmental organization) because this helps to maintain a certain credibility abroad that an official US government agency might not have. But NGO is the wrong category. NED is a GO.

“We should not have to do this kind of work covertly,” said Carl Gershman in 1986, while he was president of the Endowment. “It would be terrible for democratic groups around the world to be seen as subsidized by the C.I.A. We saw that in the 60’s, and that’s why it has been discontinued. We have not had the capability of doing this, and that’s why the endowment was created.”

And Allen Weinstein, who helped draft the legislation establishing NED, declared in 1991: “A lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA.”

In effect, the CIA has been laundering money through NED…”

The NED website identifies NED’s Council on Foreign Relations Connections. Council on Foreign Relations members McCloy and Donovan created the OSS, the CIA and the NSA and run the U.S. intelligence community. NED is just another CFR deep state tool for creating endless war, spreading globalization and creating one world government.

NED’s websites tell us:

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Ronald Reagan Conversing with CFR member John McCloy

“NED’s non-governmental status has a number of advantages that are recognized by those institutions that really do carry out American foreign policy. As pointed out in a letter signed by seven former Secretaries of State in 1995, “We consider the non-governmental character of the NED even more relevant than it was at NED’s founding twelve years ago.” The seven were [Council on Foreign Relations members] James Baker, Laurence Eagleburger, George Shultz, Alexander Haig, Henry Kissinger, Edmund Muskie and Cyrus Vance.

To commemorate the twentieth anniversary of NED’s establishment, the Board of Directors issued an invitation to President George W. Bush [son of CFR member George H.W.Bush] to make a major statement about democracy. In his address, one of the most cited of his Presidency, he articulated a vision of a more democratic Middle East, the one region of the world where democracy has failed to take hold. Much of his speech echoed one of the major themes of the Endowment’s third strategy document, which calls for promoting democratic institutions and values in countries with significant Muslim populations, while maintaining NED’s global grants program. [Was this the real goal or was the real goal to promote Middle East unrest and stir up the War on Terror?]

In January 2009, NED’s Board of Directors elected former congressional leader [CFR member] Richard Gephardt to serve as its Chairman,succeeding former congressman [CFR member] Vin Weber, who had held the position since 2001.  Former U.S. Representative Martin Frost (D-TX),  Ambassador Princeton Lyman, Progressive Policy Institute President Will Marshall, and Ambassador Stephen Sestanovich have joined the Board of Directors of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).  Frost and Sestanovich were elected for a three-year term on June 19, 2009; Lyman and Marshall were elected to a similar term today.

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CFR member Gephardt follows Al Gore, CFR member Bill Clinton and Hillary Clinton

“We can see beyond the present shadows of war in the Middle East to a new world order where the strong work together to deter and stop aggression.” — Richard Gephardt, in the Wall Street Journal (September 1990)

 

Ambassador Princeton N. Lyman is an adjunct senior fellow for Africa policy studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). He is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University [ a CFR rats nest]. Ambassador Lyman’s career in government included assignments as deputy assistant secretary of state for Africa, U.S. ambassador to Nigeria, director of refugee programs, ambassador to South Africa, and assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs. He has published books and articles on foreign policy, African affairs, economic development, HIV/AIDS, UN reform, and peacekeeping.

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CFR Member Princeton N. Lyman

 

Stephen Sestanovich is the George F. Kennan senior fellow for Russian and Eurasian studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis professor of international diplomacy at Columbia University. His particular areas of expertise are Russia and the former Soviet Union, Caucasus and Central Asia, and U.S. foreign policy. From 1997 to 2001, he served as ambassador-at-large and special adviser to the secretary of state for the new independent states. In this capacity, he was the State Department’s principal officer responsible for policy toward the states of the former Soviet Union.

pic 4 Sestanovich

CFR member Stephen Sestanovich 

Congressman Martin Frost is a keen observer of national politics who has held a number of leadership positions for the Democratic Party including Caucus Chair, Ranking Democrat for the Rules Committee, and Chairman of the DCCC — he is considered one of the party’s top strategists. From 1979-2005, Mr. Frost served as a member of Congress representing the Dallas-Fort Worth area in north Texas. From 1990-95, he also chaired a special House Task Force established to help eastern and central European nations transition to democracy after the fall of the Berlin Wall. He has continued democracy building efforts through work with the National Democratic Institute.

Will Marshall is president and founder of the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI), established in 1989 as a center for political innovation in Washington, D.C. In this capacity, he has been one of the chief intellectual architects of the movement to modernize progressive politics for the global age. PPI’s policy analysis and proposals were the source for many of the “New Democrat” innovations that figured prominently in national politics over the past two decades. The Institute also has been integral to the spread of “Third Way” thinking to center-left parties in Europe and elsewhere.”

William Base wrote:

“If one group is effectively in control of national governments and multinational corporations; promotes world government through control of media, foundation grants, and education; and controls and guides the issues of the day; then they control most options available. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), and the financial powers behind it, have done all these things, and promote the “New World Order”, as they have for over seventy years. The CFR is the promotional arm of the ruling Elite in the United States of America. Most influential politicians, academics and media personalities are members, and it uses its influence to infiltrate the New World Order into American life. Its’ “experts” write scholarly pieces to be used in decision making, the academics expound on the wisdom of a united world, and the media members disseminate the message.”

Felix Frankfurter, Justice of the Supreme Court (1939-1962), said:

“The real rulers in Washington are invisible and exercise power from behind the scenes.”

In a letter to an associate dated November 21, 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt wrote,

“The real truth of the matter is, as you and I know, that a financial element in the large centers has owned the government ever since the days of Andrew Jackson.”

February 23, 1954, Senator William Jenner warned in a speech:

“Outwardly we have a Constitutional government. We have operating within our government and political system, another body representing another form of government, a bureaucratic elite which believes our Constitution is outmoded.”

Since 1934 almost every United States Secretary of State has been a CFR member; and ALL Secretaries of War or Defense, from Henry L. Stimson through Richard Cheney. The CIA has been under CFR control almost continuously since its creation, starting with Allen Dulles, founding member of the CFR and brother of Secretary of State under President Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles. Allen Dulles had been at the Paris Peace Conference, joined the CFR in 1926, and later became its president. “The most powerful cliques in these elitist groups have one objective in common: they want to bring about the surrender of the sovereignty and national independence of the United States.” What must be remembered is that this is not some lunatic- fringe group…these are members of one of the most powerful private organizations in the world: the people who determine and control American economic, social, political, and military policy. Members’ influence and control extends to “leaders in academia, public service, business, and the media,” according to the CFR 1993 “Annual Report.”

James Warburg, son of CFR founder Paul Warburg, and a member of FDR’s “brain trust,” testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 17, 1950,

“We shall have world government whether or not you like it – by conquest or consent.”

The National Endowment For Democracy was not created for supporting freedom around the world it is another Council on Foreign Relations tool for destroying freedom and creating a world government under Council on Foreign Relations control.

 

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